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of  oil’s potential to undermine democracy, which appeared in the May 2012 
issue of  New Global Studies, and we were aware of  a number of  our colleagues 
at Athabasca University whose research looked at various aspects of  democ-
racy in Alberta, in Canada, and internationally. Given that the following year 
would mark the sixtieth anniversary of  the publication of  C. B. Macpherson’s 
seminal work Democracy in Alberta, the time seemed ripe for a collaborative, in-
depth, interdisciplinary exploration of  liberal democracy in Canada, focusing 
on Alberta as the epicentre of  an expanding oil-based economy. By the time 
this book was completed, in the spring of  2015, the world market for oil was 
markedly different, with the production of  oil in the United States at all-time 
highs and the volatility of  oil prices threatening the economies of  oil-export-
ing countries. In addition, concerns about the state of  democracy had become 
widespread. This volume represents an attempt to examine some of  issues aris-
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Framing the Debate on Democracy and  
Governance in an Oil-Exporting Economy
Meenal Shrivastava and Lorna Stefanick
In 1953, C. B. Macpherson’s Democracy in Alberta: The Theory and Practice of a Quasi-
Party System appeared. Much has changed in the sixty years since the publication 
of  this influential work, which explores the nature of  democracy in a jurisdic-
tion dominated by one class of  producers—the farmers. Today, more than 
ever before, Alberta can be seen as a one-industry economy, with agricultural 
interests having been replaced by those of  the oil industry. Since Macpherson’s 
analysis, Alberta’s population has also grown dramatically as a result of  both 
national and international migration. Calgary and Edmonton have become 
major urban centres, and economic and political power has incrementally and 
steadily shifted from central Canada to western Canada. What did not change 
until 5 May 2015—when the New Democratic Party (NDP) formed a majority 
government in Alberta, decisively ending nearly forty-four years of  rule by the 
Progressive Conservative (PC) Party—was the dominance of  one party in the 
provincial political system and the resultant concern for the health of  democ-
racy in this province. While the symbolic significance of  the NDP electoral vic-
tory is enormous, it remains to be seen to what extent the NDP’s traditionally 
social democratic stance will alter the course of  provincial energy policy.
At the time Macpherson wrote, the state of  democracy in Alberta might 
have been assumed to be of  only local importance. This, too, has changed: it is 
now clear that contemporary trends in Alberta have significant national and 
international implications. Because of  Alberta oil, Canada joined the list of  the 
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world’s top ten oil producers in 2006, and it subsequently rose to number five 
on the list in 2014 (USEIA 2014, 2). The far-reaching ramifications of  environ-
mental damage caused by unconventional oil extraction and the intensifica-
tion of  neoliberal policies in the country have garnered interest in the health 
of  democracy in both Alberta and Canada. In this context, it is worth explor-
ing Macpherson’s thesis that a society dominated by petit bourgeois producers 
tends to reduce politics to a single-minded focus on maximizing returns from 
sales of  commodities for these producers. In such a society, in which there is an 
unequal distribution of  wealth, inevitable conflicts of  class interests, if  they are 
recognized at all, are treated as irrelevant to political life (Macpherson 1953).
This collaborative project originated in an article that we co-authored 
(Shrivastava and Stefanick 2012). The article provides a survey of  studies, most 
of  them focused on countries in the Global South, that explore the relationship 
between oil dependence and liberal democracy. Reliance on oil exports can pro-
vide important revenue that might be used for development purposes, but it 
can also have negative economic and political effects. From the studies focused 
on the Middle East (e.g. , Mahdavy 1970) to wide-ranging cross-national studies 
(e.g. , Ross 2001, 2009; Tsui 2011), much of  the vast literature under the banner 
of  “oil and democracy” argues that reliance on oil exports is strongly associ-
ated with undemocratic, authoritarian rule (e.g. , Bulte, Damania, and Deacon 
2005; Karl 1997; Lowi 2004; Wantchekon 2002). This is not to suggest that “oil 
undermines democracy” is an unchallenged thesis, since some studies have also 
shown the pro-democratic effects, in varying degrees, of  the discovery of  oil 
wealth on countries such as Ecuador, Congo, Nigeria, Trinidad, and Venezuela 
(e.g. , Herb 2005; Smith and Kraus 2005). Nevertheless, the bulk of  the oil and 
democracy scholarship has found a negative relationship between natural 
resource dependence, particularly oil revenue, and democracy.
This negative relationship has been traced to phenomena such as the ren-
tier state (that is, a country that derives a high proportion of  its income from 
resource rents) and the “Dutch disease.” The term rentier state is most frequently 
used to describe countries in the Middle East and in North Africa, along with 
characteristics of  their national economies and state institutions and their gov-
ernments’ attitude toward their citizens. Using the revenue generated by the 
extraction and export of  resources as the independent variable, theories of  the 
rentier state draw causal links between the income derived from resource rents 
and poor economic governance as well as authoritarian rule (Ross 2001, 2006).1 
The term Dutch disease—which first appeared in The Economist (1977) to describe 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
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the decline of  the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery 
of  a large natural gas field in 1959—refers to another causal mechanism, one 
that harms a country’s non-resource sectors. A sharp rise in revenue from the 
export of  primary commodities, such as oil, has the effect of  strengthening the 
country’s currency, which in turn drives up the cost of  its other exports. This 
reduces the competitiveness of  the country’s agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors, which have already been weakened by the booming resource sector, 
and thus draws both capital and labour away from these sectors, thereby rais-
ing production costs (Gylfason 2001).
These mechanisms are part and parcel of  what is often called the “resource 
curse.” Sometimes described as the “paradox of  plenty” thesis, the resource 
curse is used to explain why countries rich in natural resources—notably, pet-
roleum-producing countries—have been unable to use that abundance to boost 
their overall economic growth—although recent studies have shown that it is 
the volatility in commodity prices, rather than abundance per se, that drives 
the resource curse paradox (e.g. , Cavalcanti, Mohaddes, and Raissi 2012; Leong 
and Mohaddes 2011). Simply put, the resource curse posits that the narrowing 
of  a capitalist economy down to one commodity gives those with control of  that 
commodity inordinate power. This skewed power is particularly evident when 
comparisons are drawn to economies in which the competition between differ-
ent factions of  capital creates opportunities for varied agendas on the part of  
both the state and civil society.
Our 2012 article applies measures of  democracy (such as the principles 
of  “good governance”) used in the oil and democracy literature to assess the 
impact of  oil wealth on fundamental elements of  liberal democracy in Canada. 
Specifically, we set out to determine whether relationships between oil-
dependence and democracy similar to those found in the Global South could 
be found in Alberta, a subnational jurisdiction in the Global North. We argue 
that the political influence of  the powerful oil lobby in the province has led to a 
decline in political liberalism—which refers to the limited role of  government, 
reduced to that of  a neutral referee mediating among competing definitions of  
the public good (see Rawls 1993)—and that the result constitutes a democratic 
deficit that is fuelling political and economic inequality in the province and the 
country. Although our focus is subnational, the implications of  our findings are 
national in scope.
In any given context, political, economic, and social variables, which are 
the product of  a range of  historical factors, mediate the relationship between 
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resource management and political economic outcomes.2 These context-
ual differences might explain, at least in part, the discrepancy in develop-
ment outcomes in different resource-abundant countries. Most importantly, 
these contextual variables are strongly influenced by the prevailing political 
dynamics. In the Canadian context, the strident rhetoric that characterizes 
debates about whether Alberta oil is “ethical” or whether reliance on “dirty” oil 
is turning Canada into a petro-state tends to deflect the focus from the polit-
ical system and the policy apparatus that is shaping the relationship between 
resource management and political economic outcomes—in particular, the role 
of  neoliberalism.
The term neoliberalism most commonly refers to economic reform poli-
cies and measures such as eliminating price controls, deregulating capital 
markets, lowering trade barriers, and reducing state influence on the econ-
omy, especially through privatization, fiscal austerity, and financialization.3 
Additionally, neoliberalism can be a political ideology that explains and justi-
fies a preferred economic and governmental order for society (Knight 2006). 
In Canada, neoliberalism entered the national scene under the regimes of  Jean 
Chrétien and Paul Martin, which oversaw the first wave of  rollbacks of  the 
national welfare state. Changes they made to the Canadian Assistance Program, 
for example, enabled welfare restructuring at the provincial level; Alberta and 
Ontario were the first provinces to replace welfare with workfare (Herd 2002; 
Peck and Theodore 2010). The Conservative-led government under Stephen 
Harper has overseen what Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) characterize as 
“roll-out neoliberalism”: strategies for restructuring the state characterized by 
authoritarian measures that rollback the welfare state while maintaining class 
privilege and market dominance. In Alberta, restructuring of  the welfare state 
through privatization, deregulation, the tightening of  eligibility requirements 
for assistance, and the devolution of  welfare services to nonprofit and volun-
tary sectors, has a long pedigree but certainly reached its zenith under Premier 
Ralph Klein in the 1990s. The intensification of  neoliberal policy provincially 
and federally has implications for both natural resource management and pol-
itical economic outcomes.
Contributors to this volume, therefore, consider two sets of  issues: the first 
pertains to broad questions about institutions of  liberal democracy in Alberta 
and Canada, and the second concerns specific trends in an oil-exporting juris-
diction. Unsurprisingly, these issues often overlap and are guided by similar 
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questions: What are the historical, socio-political, and political economic trends 
that have played a role in the evolution of  governance, equity, and citizenship 
issues in Alberta? How are these trends being felt on the national level? How 
does political ideology affect provincial and federal public policy issues? What 
are the impacts of  economic and political inequality on resource management 
and governance?
This collection takes a different approach from that of  much of  the oil and 
democracy literature. Instead of  relying on quantitative measures of  dem-
ocracy, the volume provides a critical evaluation of  the application of  the 
principles of  liberal democracy in Alberta, and in Canada generally, by inves-
tigating significant public policy areas, such as energy, Aboriginal issues, the 
environment, labour law, and urban planning. Additionally, the book includes a 
selection of  largely qualitative studies of  political ideology, political economy, 
national security, political activism, gender, labour, and the visual arts in the 
milieu of  increasing oil dependence federally and provincially. While most 
chapters focus primarily on Alberta as the major oil-producing jurisdiction in 
Canada, others draw comparisons between Canada and oil-rich powers in the 
Global South—notably, Venezuela and Iran. The fourteen scholars contribut-
ing to this book are from nine different academic disciplines; this diversity of  
approach and method reflects the cross-disciplinary reach of  this topic. These 
many perspectives on the nature and operation of  democracy in Alberta, all 
informed by liberal democratic theory, have significant ramifications for the 
country as a whole.
Liberal Democracy in an Oil-Exporting Jurisdiction
Among the many aspects of  the “oil impedes democracy” claim is the state of  
liberal democracy in oil-based economies, which we have chosen as the focus 
for this book. Consequently, the theme of  democratic governance weaves its 
way through every chapter of  our exploration of  various features of  liberal 
democracy. We recognize, however, that the term liberalism encompasses a 
diversity of  often contradictory streams of  thought. For instance, in the United 
States, liberalism is associated with the welfare-state policies of  the New Deal 
program instituted by the Democratic administration of  President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, whereas in Europe, it is more commonly associated with a commit-
ment to limited government and laissez-faire economic policies. In Canada, 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
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liberalism is most often associated with social liberalism, which ascribes to the 
state a legitimate role in addressing economic and social issues such as welfare, 
health care, and education, while simultaneously expanding civil rights. For 
the purposes of  this book, we use the terms political liberalism or liberal democracy 
interchangeably. They refer to a system of  governance characterized by civil 
liberties, more than one political party competing for election, separation of  
power, the rule of  law, and a representative government based on majority rule 
with protections for minority rights (see, for instance, Cunningham 2002).
Combining democracy with liberalism creates an uneasy juxtaposition of  
the individualistic ideology of  liberalism, which in its classical form concerns 
itself  with limiting the power of  the state over the individual, and the collectiv-
ist ideal of  democracy, which is concerned with empowering the masses. Thus, 
liberal democracy may be seen as a negotiated compromise between liberal 
individualism and democratic collectivism. One way to achieve this fine bal-
ance is through economic freedoms, which are supposed to result in the for-
mation of  a significant middle class and a broad and flourishing civil society. 
Moreover, attributes such as the protection of  civil liberties and human rights, 
political pluralism, equality before the law, the right to petition elected officials 
for redress of  grievances, and due process are often seen as preconditions for 
liberal democracy (Beetham 1992). In a nutshell, freedom, equality, and demo-
cratic participation are considered the cornerstones of  a liberal democracy. 
As the cycles of  recession became more common and intense after the end of  
the Cold War, however, some scholars (e.g. , Habermas and Rehg 1998; Tamas 
2011) argued that the increasing state authoritarianism and income inequality 
were important signifiers of  the failure of  the liberal or representative demo-
cratic framework and that alternative models of  democracy were needed. Some 
of  these models, such as deliberative or participatory democracy, go beyond 
but do not discard the liberal tradition. Moreover, the resilience of  the liberal 
democratic model is amply attested to in the continued use of  the attributes of  
this framework in measures such as the Democracy Index or the Polity Project, 
which seek to assess the political health of  countries around the world, includ-
ing that of  oil-exporting states.
Nonetheless, we do not accept the premise of  liberal democratic theory 
uncritically. As many of  the chapters in the book explain, more expansive defin-
itions of  democracy are needed to challenge the assumptions and rigid limita-
tions of  the liberal democratic model. For instance, liberal democracy typically 
implies a market-based economy that relies on supply and demand, with some 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
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regulation to prevent monopolistic behaviour. Much like C. B. Macpherson, 
who highlighted the tensions between possessive individualism and capital-
ist market relations in the liberal democratic model (see Macpherson 1977, 
1985), many chapters in this book call attention to the problems associated 
with accommodating the utilitarian concerns of  the market and with broader 
developmental liberalism, both of  which are important underlying assump-
tions of  liberal democratic theory.
In this context, the notion of  “developmental liberalism” is particularly 
pertinent to our use of  liberal democratic theory. Developmental liberalism 
emphasizes notions of  political legitimacy, public reason, and respect for rea-
sonable pluralism (Rawls 1993); the conceptualization of  development in terms 
of  capability expansion (Sen 1999); and the role of  the state in governance issues 
such as the fair distribution of  resources (Rawls 1971). With the recognition of  
the socio-economic failures of  neoliberal financialization and deregulation, 
the developmental role of  a democratic state has re-emerged not only in the 
burgeoning critique of  neoliberal orthodoxy but also in governance discourse, 
where good governance is essentially equated with sound “development man-
agement” (Harriss 2005, 37).
As pointed out by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), even the most widely used 
democracy indices suffer from important weaknesses deriving from meth-
odological issues. The normative, descriptive, methodological, and semantic 
limitations of  theorizing democracy amply apply to the liberal democratic 
framework and are dealt with in some detail in the opening chapter, by Meenal 
Shrivastava. We acknowledge the limitations of  this framework, but because 
most studies on the impact of  oil dependence on democracy apply the liberal 
democracy model, we have chosen to use it as a limited but necessary framework 
upon which to build our assessment of  the strength of  democracy in Alberta. 
While this has provided our authors with a consistent set of  indicators, their 
application actually reveals the restrictive and simplistic nature of  the liberal 
democratic conceptualization. The limitations of  the liberal democratic param-
eters stand out most noticeably in the chapters comparing Venezuela (Kellogg, 
chapter 5) and Iran (Fraser, Mannani, and Stefanick, chapter 6) to Canada, but 
they are also evident in the examinations of  homelessness in Canada’s richest 
province (Evans, chapter 12), the legal and human rights of  the First Nations 
communities affected by the extractive industry (Slowey and Stefanick, chap-
ter 7), and the gendered dimensions of  resource extraction (Dorow, chapter 10). 
Furthermore, Karen Wall’s analysis of  the state of  the visual arts in Alberta 
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(chapter 13) challenges this reductive conceptualization and joins the ranks of  
writings that re-examine the social and cultural dimensions of  oil extraction in 
an oil-exporting economy.
In a liberal democracy, supreme power is assumed to be vested in the people 
and is expressed through the institutions of  the state. In this formulation, 
strong democratic institutions support the expression of  a plurality of  political 
perspectives such that the “winners” and “losers” of  any contestation over state 
policy are neither predetermined nor consistent. In this context, a democratic 
deficit arises when certain members of  the community are systematically dis-
enfranchised—specifically, when their voices are consistently ignored or when 
political, social, and economic benefits regularly accrue disproportionately to 
one group of  people. While Shrivastava (chapter 1) points to the role of  inequal-
ity in creating a democratic deficit, other authors—such as Barnetson (on occu-
pational safety, chapter 8), Foster and Barnetson (on temporary foreign workers, 
chapter 9), Dorow (on women in Fort McMurray, chapter 10), and Evans (on 
homelessness, chapter 12)—demonstrate how inequality plays out in particular 
sectors in Alberta. Such a deficit manifests itself  in low voter turnouts, distrust 
in or hostility toward state institutions, a pronounced lack of  social cohesion, 
and wildly disproportionate allocation of  societal benefits, in both the political 
and the economic realms. As illustrated by Stefanick’s discussion of  Alberta’s 
energy paradigm (chapter 4), Smith’s analysis of  petro-politics (chapter 3), and 
Slowey and Stefanick’s look at First Nations in the vicinity of  Fort McMurray 
(chapter 7), this hegemony marginalizes alternative framing of  issues, causing 
dissenters to seek new spaces for political contestation. Additionally, Harrison 
(on the fate of  progressivism in Alberta, chapter 2), Acuña (on the nature of  pol-
itical power in Alberta, chapter 11), and Stefanick (on accountability, chapter 14) 
pointedly reveal the history and mechanism of  ideological and political hegem-
ony in the province, which can be construed as a democratic deficit within a 
liberal democratic context. The theme of  democratic governance can thus be 
found in every chapter of  this volume; however, the uniqueness of  this book is 
that it is framed within the context of  an oil-exporting economy in the Global 
North.
Terminology, Staples Theory, and the Impact of Oil Wealth on Democracy
Another theme that provides a connective thread in the following chapters is 
the relationship between oil dependence and democracy. The debate over the 
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impact of  oil dependence has at times been conducted at a shrill pitch in drawn-
out public battles, with “petro-state” and “ethical oil” characterizing the two 
extremes of  the ideological spectrum. At one time, the petroleum industry’s 
chosen term for the bitumen sands was tar sands. The oil industry, mainstream 
media, and government officials have since adopted oil sands as their preferred 
term because the word oil is perceived to have a less negative connotation than 
tar. In an effort to achieve a balanced perspective unburdened by the political 
polarization inherent in “oil” versus “tar” sands, authors in the book have chosen 
to adopt the term bitumen sands. The goal is to emphasize the analysis. After all, 
if  causal links exist between oil revenue dependence and specific elements of  
liberal democracy in Alberta, they do so independently of  terminology.
On a global scale, there appears to be considerable support for the assertion 
that oil-dependent economies in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America 
are characterized by a democratic deficit within both quantitative and qualita-
tive measures of  liberal democracy (Feldman 2003; Ross 2001, 2009; Tsui 2011; 
Wantchekon 2002). There are many other factors, however, that inhibit the 
growth of  democracy in the Global South, most notably the legacy of  imper-
ialism and colonialism that continues to affect internal and external relations 
of  these countries. However, both the impact of  this important historical con-
text and the international system that created and perpetuates the North/South 
division are often overlooked within the rigid confines of  the liberal democratic 
framework.4 Furthermore, singling out oil as a “curse” to democracy may well 
overstate the case, as other commodities such as diamonds, gold, and other 
minerals have been shown to have similar antidemocratic effects (Corden and 
Neary 1982; Ross 2006; Van Wijnbergen 1984).
As mentioned above, nearly all of  the studies on oil and democracy use 
the liberal democratic framework and related measures for their analyses. 
Associated indices, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators of  the World 
Bank, and other good-governance models, such as that of  United Nations 
Development Programme, have been applied in their various iterations as key 
variables for the development of  a functioning market economy, economic 
development, and democratic characteristics.5 A discussion of  the evolution 
and limitations of  these indicators is provided in the opening chapter. However, 
the notion that democracy is alive and well in the Global North is becoming 
increasingly contentious, as is evidenced by the many global movements, such 
as Occupy Wall Street, that protest the austerity measures in Europe and North 
America. These movements seek to address what is seen as a rising democratic 
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deficit in both the Global North and the Global South that is producing socio-
economic inequities and environmental destruction.
In Canada, there is sporadic rhetoric of  “petro-state,” on the one hand, by 
critics who charge that the oil industry has an inordinate amount of  influence 
on democratic governance in Canada (e.g. , Nikiforuk 2010) and “ethical oil,” 
on the other, by those who advocate the development of  bitumen oil on “eth-
ical” grounds (Levant 2011). There is scholarship on the impact of  Alberta’s oil 
dependence on the environment from a political economic perspective (see, 
for instance, Davidson and Gismondi 2011) and on socio-cultural dimensions 
of  an oil economy: see, for instance, the special issue of  the Canadian Journal of 
Sociology in 2013 on the petro-culture of  the Fort McMurray region.6 This collec-
tion provides an important complement to the existing research by exploring 
the intensification of  many political and policy trends in Alberta that appear 
to be directly or indirectly influenced by the development of  Canada’s bitumen 
oil. In doing so, this book evaluates the political, policy, and cultural dimensions 
of  economic practices associated with the rise of  oil dependence in Alberta and 
Canada, rather than examining political economy and culture as distinct com-
ponents. This approach is in keeping with many studies which argue that the oil 
industry does not just function as an isolated outpost of  the export economy but 
broadly influences the formation of  social and political values, labour practi-
ces, and notions of  citizenship (e.g. , Chomsky and Santiago 1998; Coronil 1997; 
Finn 1988; Klubock 1998; Putnam 2002; Salas 2009). After all, as Miguel Salas 
(2009, 238) notes in the context of  past studies of  Venezuela, “To only address 
economic factors associated with this extractive industry was to underestimate 
the power of  oil to influence society, politics, and culture. Beyond monopoliz-
ing the economy, oil shapes social values and class aspirations, cemented polit-
ical alliances, and redefines concepts of  citizenship for important segments of  
the population.”
While applying to the Global North the same lens that has been used to ana-
lyze the oil-rich nations of  the Global South helps to unearth the many similar-
ities in economic and political trends in the two hemispheres, it is not very useful 
in providing a cogent explanation for the political and economic outcomes of  
oil dependence. By explaining development performance solely in terms of  the 
size and nature of  the resource wealth, the oil and democracy literature often 
does not adequately account for the role of  internal and external social, political, 
and economic environments in shaping development outcomes in resource-
abundant countries. In response to the perceived reductionism of  the oil and 
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democracy literature, some recent studies have been questioning the validity 
of  examining various political pathologies and poor development performance 
fostered by natural resource wealth (Rosser 2006; Meissner 2010). According to 
Rosser (2006, 3), the most pertinent question to ask is this: “What political and 
social factors enable some resource abundant countries to utilise their natural 
resources to promote development and prevent other resource abundant coun-
tries from doing the same?” While Rosser asks this question with reference to 
the countries in the Global South, it is equally applicable to economic, political, 
and social development in the Global North, when, for instance, we consider 
the vast difference between the management of  oil wealth and its impact in 
Canada as compared to Norway.
In our examination of  the political economy of  Alberta and Canada, we 
use staples theory, a complementary articulation of  the more recent “resource 
curse” literature, to bring political economic and institutional dynamics into 
the study of  oil and democracy. Emerging in the early decades of  the twenti-
eth century, the staples theory of  economic development explained the role 
of  Canadian staple commodities (fish, fur, lumber, agricultural products, and 
minerals) in the creation of  institutions that defined the political trends of  the 
nation and its regions (Innis 1956; Mackintosh 1923). This theory was revived in 
the 1960s through Mel Watkins’s work on resource capitalism, and the state-
fostered backward and forward linkages in the supply chain. These linkages 
were credited for creating opportunities for innovation and economic growth. 
Watkins’s expansion of  the scope of  the staples thesis pointed out some active 
directions for policy makers to pursue in staples production. His work inspired 
many other staples-oriented theories in a similar vein (e.g. , Hirschman 1980; 
Kindelberger 1986).7 Fundamentally, the staples thesis argues that while the 
export of  raw materials can sustain economic growth, reliance on exporting 
natural resources has made Canada dependent on the international market. 
This dependence has resulted in periodic disruptions to economic life as the 
international demand for staples rose and fell, as the staple itself  became 
increasingly scarce, and as technological change resulted in shifts from one 
staple commodity to another (see Watkins 1963, 1977).
Writing just as Western Canada’s most recent resource boom started, 
Michael Howlett and Keith Brownsey (2008) question the continuing import-
ance of  staples in the Canadian political economy, arguing that the Canadian 
economy has evolved past its mature staples stage and that Canada is becom-
ing a “post-staples” state. This post-staples state features severe cost and 
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supply pressures that have led to the contraction of  the once important natural 
resource industries, growth in metropolitan shares of  employment and popu-
lation, and economic diversification in both urban and rural areas. Although 
the authors acknowledge that resource development continues to be important 
in some regions, they suggest that resource governance is now more participa-
tory and democratic than previous staples development because it incorpor-
ates multiple interests, such as those of  environmentalists and the Aboriginal 
peoples.
Other writings during the same period (e.g. , Stanford 2008; Watkins 2007) 
emphasize the fact that the unprecedented resource boom led to foreign take-
overs, currency overvaluation, and crises in the domestic automotive sector. 
These changes mark a shift away from the mature staples political economy 
theorized by Mel Watkins in which governments provided firms with access 
to natural resources in exchange for royalties, commitments to employment, 
and infrastructural development in rural areas, leading to economic diversifi-
cation through expanded secondary manufacturing. Instead, during the most 
recent resource boom, which extended from the rise of  global petroleum prices 
in 2007 to the drop in prices in late 2014, natural resource firms used highly 
mobile workforces to produce commodities for export rather than for domestic 
manufacturing, and fewer benefits accrued to local communities. Particularly 
in relation to oil and gas as extensions of  staples production, Watkins (2007) 
raises issues such as the appropriate use of  the “rent” and associated fiscal 
effects that may suggest regression to a staples economy. In light of  the preced-
ing, many scholars (e.g. , Drache 2013; Mills and Sweeney 2013; Stanford 2013) 
contend that Canada’s political economy is better characterized as neostaples, 
with resource rents increasingly concentrated in the hands of  foreign investors 
rather than governments, employees, and resource-dependent communities.
It is important to note that recent characterizations of  the neostaples 
economy do not pay enough attention to internal colonial relations or to the 
increased participation of  northern Aboriginal peoples in resource indus-
tries over the past three decades. This increased participation has come about 
through the successful push for recognition of  proprietary interests over the 
territory of  the First Nations, expansion of  their jurisdictional authority, and 
the relocalization of  employment benefits for northern populations through 
measures such as Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs; see Mills and Sweeney 
2013). However, Suzanne Mills and Brendan Sweeney (2013) admit that in its 
extensive use of  subcontractors and “fly-in, fly-out” work arrangements, the 
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governance of  employment in a neostaples stage of  resource development 
deviates from the Fordist compromise of  preceding eras of  resource develop-
ment.8 Shaped by global mining trends, the resulting model of  employment 
governance has had ambiguous outcomes for Aboriginal workers. The agency 
of  Aboriginal actors is constrained by the internationalization of  the indus-
try and private capital, the lack of  control of  Indigenous peoples over signifi-
cant dimensions of  work and labour practices, and the neoliberalization of  
Aboriginal governance (MacDonald 2011; Mills and McCreary 2013; Slowey and 
Stefanick, this volume).
Nonetheless, in keeping with the nature of  the neostaples political economy, 
while Aboriginal institutions are playing an increasingly important role in gov-
erning employment, the role of  unions is much diminished, as evidenced by 
the increasing number of  non-union mines and the widespread use of  subcon-
tractors. The declining local influence over resource development and employ-
ment is particularly problematic in the context of  encroachments on worker 
wages, benefits, and collective representation in a neoliberal economy. Labour 
unions in the mature staples regime represented a large number of  workers and 
enhanced their ability to capture increasing shares of  resource rents in wages 
and benefits. In the neostaples regime, however, unions have been relegated to 
defending a smaller proportion of  workers, since new operations are increas-
ingly non-unionized.
Clearly, staples theory continues to be popular and relevant, not only 
to describe the ramifications of  staples production for the evolution of  the 
Canadian economy and society but also as an analytical tool to study the econ-
omies of  countries that are dependent upon resource extraction and primary 
industries. As such, we use the staples theory to complement the liberal demo-
cratic model that underlies our analyses and provides insights into the efficacy 
of  various policy choices in promoting and supporting institutions of  dem-
ocracy. In particular, the history of  the social and economic characteristics of  
Alberta is not only useful for understanding political monopolies but also raises 
probing questions about the nature and operation of  democracy itself, particu-
larly with respect to democracy in oil-exporting countries in both hemispheres.
Alberta: The Epicentre of Canada’s Oil Economy
The nature and strength of  democracy in Alberta became a subject of  schol-
arly interest long before oil lubricated the political economy of  the region. 
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C. B. Macpherson (1953) analyzed the phenomenon of  one-party rule in Alberta, 
exemplified by two parties that grew out of  populist movements: the United 
Farmers of  Alberta (UFA), which ruled from 1921 to 1935, and the Social Credit 
Party, which grew out of  depression-ravaged Alberta and dominated provincial 
politics for the next thirty-six years (Finkel 1989). Unbeknownst to Macpherson 
in 1953, a provincial branch of  the Progressive Conservatives would replace 
the Social Credit in 1971 and would lead the government for almost forty-four 
years. Nevertheless, Macpherson correctly notes the uniqueness of  Alberta 
politics since its earliest days: the same party leads the government for many 
years and is eventually decimated when the electorate switches en masse to 
a new party, which then continues to dominate the political scene. Reducing 
the PC numbers to a paltry ten MLAs in May 2015, the rise of  the NDP from a 
four-MLA party in the 28th legislative assembly of  2012 to a fifty-four-MLA 
majority government in the 29th legislative assembly fits this pattern. It is too 
early to say, however, how long the reign of  the left-wing NDP will last, or if  the 
NDP will be able to make substantial policy changes to address issues related to 
democratic deficits noted in this volume.
According to Macpherson, this one-party dominance, which the resource 
curse literature generally associates with oil-exporting states, produced a 
new species of  democratic governance in Canada, a “quasi-party system” that 
emerged in the first half  of  the twentieth century. Macpherson describes this 
system as a deviation from the normal two-or-more-party system gener-
ally envisaged in a liberal democratic state. In the quasi-party system, strong 
opposition and party competition appear only periodically, thus enabling one 
party to monopolize political power. It is noteworthy that the lack of  political 
plurality and strong opposition is a characteristic most often associated with 
oil-exporting states in the Global South. According to Macpherson, the political 
longevity of  one party in Alberta during the first half  of  the twentieth cen-
tury had two significant causes: (1) the traditional system of  alternating parties 
was never popular among the petit bourgeois class of  independent producers 
in Alberta, whose interests and particular conceptions of  society dominated 
the political landscape, and (2) this same interest group rejected party-dom-
inated parliamentary representation, advocating instead for a populist system 
of  functional representation, whereby legislators see themselves as delegates 
of  their constituents rather than as representatives bound by party discipline 
(Macpherson 1953).
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Macpherson’s critics argue that his view of  the homogeneity of  Alberta’s 
population is simplistic (Richards and Pratt 1979). Indeed, as the recipient, at 
the turn of  the century, of  waves of  immigration from Britain, Europe, and the 
United States that comprised a diverse cross-section of  people, Alberta experi-
enced large electoral majorities, partly as a result of  the first-past-the-post 
electoral system. This system over-rewards the winning party in a multiparty 
situation that reflects a very diverse electorate. But Macpherson’s larger point 
about Alberta being dominated by the petit bourgeois class of  independent 
producers has some merit. Since Alberta has always had an economy domin-
ated by a single staple, the producers of  the dominant commodity (whether 
wheat or oil) have had inordinate influence on provincial politics. Historically, 
commodities from the West have fed Central Canada’s industrial heartland. 
It was not until the 1930s, however, that the Western provinces gained parity 
with other Canadian provinces with respect to gaining control of  their own 
natural resources. The deep-seated distrust of  the federal system of  govern-
ment is a legacy of  these pre-1930s “quasi-colonial” years when Western prov-
inces perceived themselves as continually subservient to the capital interests 
of  the industrial heartland. As Harrison (this volume) notes, this has remained 
a defining feature of  Alberta’s politics and culture, providing fertile ground 
for new political parties that experimented with new forms of  governance. In 
addition, as Macpherson (1953, 247) puts it, “The quasi-colonial society in which 
independent producers are the predominant element appears peculiarly liable 
. . . to reject the regular party system.”
The first manifestation of  the functional representation phenomenon can 
be seen in the first governing party in Alberta, the Liberals, who ruled from 
1905 to 1921. In 1913, the Liberals passed the Direct Legislation Act, which pro-
vided citizens with the ability to call for a referendum through petition (Barrie 
2006, 9). Strands of  anticorporatism and concern about the stifling power of  
party discipline can be seen in subsequent parties, such as the UFA. This popu-
list party advocated for farmers, particularly around improving access to health 
care and education; it also supported the women’s suffragette movement. It was 
during the so-called dirty thirties that two other populist parties were born 
in Alberta—the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (the forerunner of  
Canada’s left-wing New Democratic Party) and the Social Credit Party. All of  
these early populist parties supported public health care, something that is 
normally associated with left-leaning parties. As Richards and Pratt (1979) and 
Harrison (this volume) point out, a staples-based economy does not preclude 
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progressive politics. The story of  the conversion of  Alberta’s Social Credit Party 
from left- to right-wing populism is discussed in Harrison’s chapter. Suffice to 
say here that by the 1940s, Social Credit had firmly entrenched a right-wing 
populist agenda in Alberta that opposed both the social welfare programs and 
the centralizing tendencies of  the federal government of  Canada (Finkel 1989). 
Long after Macpherson’s analysis of  the party system and Alberta’s political 
structures and institutions, right-wing populism flourished in Alberta under 
the Alberta Progressive Conservatives and the official opposition, the Wildrose 
Party, earning for Alberta the redoubtable distinction of  being ruled by two 
right-wing parties without interruption for eighty years.
Another constant in Alberta is the nature of  its economy. For nearly a cen-
tury, Alberta’s economy has followed a pattern of  primary-resource exploita-
tion and dependence on external markets, moving from the export of  fur prior 
to becoming a province, to wheat and beef, and finally to petroleum. Although 
the existence of  vast bitumen pools had been recognized for decades, it was only 
with advances in extraction technologies and the rapid rise in international 
prices of  oil since the last quarter of  the twentieth century that the produc-
tion of  unconventional oil became financially viable. The pace of  bitumen 
oil production picked up significantly beginning in 2004–5, coinciding with 
consistently high international oil prices. The resulting socio-economic chan-
ges to the province were immediate and profound, and quickly spread across 
Canada. Imbalances in provincial fiscal capacity, waves of  internal migration, 
and political and income disparities are a few examples of  these changes. The 
rapid expansion of  the oil sector has been realized with significant government 
support for Alberta’s oil industry in the form of  investment, subsidies, and 
tax breaks at both federal and provincial levels. In particular, this government 
support has spurred the expansion and development of  the unconventional 
oil industry, which in the past provided little profit because of  the high cost of  
extraction and transportation. Alberta’s extremely industry-friendly tax and 
revenue-sharing regime, along with the province’s propensity to externalize 
the social and environmental costs of  bitumen oil production, has led to hand-
some returns for private corporations (Campanella 2012). For instance, Royal 
Dutch Shell announced in 2007 that its Canadian bitumen oil division made an 
after-tax profit of  $21.75 per barrel, nearly double its worldwide profit of  $12.41 
per barrel on conventional crude oil (Mortished 2007). As noted in a Pembina 
Institute report (Dobson and Asadollahi 2014, 2), while federal and provincial 
taxes fell between 2009 and 2012, subsidies to the oil sector rose simultaneously.
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The growing economic and political might of  Alberta has made this prov-
ince the barometer of  political economic change in Canada. The rising polit-
ical influence of  this landlocked province can also be construed as leading to 
the “Albertization” of  Canada under the leadership of  Stephen Harper and the 
Conservative Party, as exemplified by fiscally and socially conservative federal 
policies. This policy orientation includes government austerity, especially with 
respect to social programs; privatization of  government services; and reduc-
tions in income tax for corporations and upper-income earners. The role of  the 
province of  Alberta within the larger Canadian federation has changed dra-
matically in the past decade. With 11 percent of  the total population of  Canada, 
Alberta accounts for 17 percent of  its gross domestic product (GDP), 28 percent 
of  which is derived directly from the energy sector (Alberta, Alberta Energy 
2015). In 2014, the oil and gas industry produced one-quarter of  Alberta’s GDP, 
almost 70 percent of  its exports, and 35 percent of  Alberta government rev-
enues, and the industry accounted for 146,000 direct and indirect jobs (Alberta, 
Alberta Energy 2015; CERI 2014, ix). It is important to note that although it is 
best known for the world’s largest bitumen oil reserves, Alberta is also the lar-
gest producer in the country of  conventional crude oil, synthetic crude, coal, 
natural gas, and gas products. Agriculture and food processing, forestry, con-
struction, manufacturing, biotechnology, and services are the other major sec-
tors of  Alberta’s economy, but they are much smaller in relation to the energy 
sector (Alberta, Alberta Innovation and Advanced Education 2015). Moreover, 
as of  2011, the cumulative natural resources sector represented 15 percent of  
Canada’s nominal (i.e. , not adjusted for inflation) gross domestic product 
(GDP), generating nearly 800,000 direct jobs, as well as a roughly equivalent 
number of  indirect jobs, in the construction, manufacturing, transportation, 
financial, technology, and service sectors (Canada, NRC 2012).
While the figures above are significant, they do not reflect the actual scale of  
the direct and indirect impact of  the oil industry at both provincial and national 
levels. These numbers do not account for important factors such as the vola-
tility of  the unconventional oil industry; the combination of  fiscal and taxa-
tion policy leading to significant concerns related to revenue realization; the 
weakening of  the various regulatory regimes under pressure from the short-
term priorities of  the oil industry; and the cost of  several externalities, such 
as pollution and inflation, related to the rising costs of  manufacturing.9 While 
some analysts point to the declining contribution of  oil and gas to Canada’s 
GDP, from a high of  12 percent in 1997 to 10 percent in 2012 (Leach 2013), the 
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assertion that the influence of  oil vis-à-vis the Canadian economy is actually 
lessening does not account for issues such as the diminishing share of  total cor-
porate taxes, problems of  oil revenue realization, the impact on frontier lands 
of  the elimination of  foreign ownership restrictions for production licences, or 
the issue of  First Nations treaty violations.
The financial crisis of  2008–9 compressed and depressed the world econ-
omy, as well as oil prices. The fiscal impact of  this ongoing crisis was com-
pounded by the rapid rise of  bitumen production costs in Canada, owing in 
part to shortages of  labour and materials. Government policies in response to 
these challenges continue along a familiar trajectory by ceding more regulatory 
control to industry; opening new doors for foreign acquisitions; and increasing 
financial, social, and environmental subsidies. Given this scenario—along with 
the direct and indirect environmental costs of  the expansion of  bitumen oil 
production, such as water and energy use, release of  greenhouse gases, destruc-
tion of  the boreal forest, water pollution, and toxic tailings ponds—the con-
tributors to this book have focused their attention on bitumen oil development 
as the most contentious beneficiary of  government support, rather than on the 
wider energy sector.
By using the contemporary political and policy trends in Alberta as a snap-
shot of  the larger Canadian political economy, we hope that the analyses in this 
volume will be relevant for the examination of  liberal democracy in a myriad 
of  contexts in the world. Despite our focus on Alberta, the general principles, 
issues, and institutions explored in this collection are common to resource-
based jurisdictions around the world and are pertinent to concerns about 
democratic governance. As the diverse topics covered in this volume reveal, oil 
wealth not only impacts democratic governance; it has infused all aspects of  
life in Alberta.
Themes and Assumptions
The uniqueness of  this book lies in critically examining the “oil inhibits dem-
ocracy” thesis within a jurisdiction in the Global North by applying the liberal 
democratic parameters that are usually applied to explain the deficiencies of  
democracy in the oil-dependent economies of  the Global South. Of  course, 
Canada is not the only oil-exporting country in the Global North and is most 
frequently compared to Norway. Despite the recent rise of  right-wing politics 
in Norway, the country’s high taxes continue to fund its welfare model, while 
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almost all government revenue from oil go into the Norwegian pension fund. In 
contrast to this approach of  sharing the resource rent with future generations, 
Alberta’s low tax rate means that it must use oil royalties to fund current gov-
ernment expenditures. Norway’s state capitalism, then, is markedly different 
from Canada’s increasing entrenchment of  neoliberal policies and its retreat 
from social democracy. By avoiding a North-North comparison that often 
assumes the strength of  democracy as a given, not only do we open the door for 
a much richer and wider analysis of  democracy in a specific jurisdiction and of  
democracy in oil-exporting countries of  the Global North more generally, but 
we also eschew the normalized North-South dichotomy that informs studies of  
oil and democracy.
The three sections of  this book explore the “oil inhibits democracy” hypoth-
esis by examining some critical aspects of  liberal democracy in Alberta and 
Canada. The first section starts with a broad theoretical discussion as well as the 
contextualization of  bitumen oil in the global oil market. It then provides a con-
text for democracy in Alberta through historical, political economic, and socio-
political perspectives. Starting from the local and the specific, and then moving 
to the international, the chapters in this section outline the political peculiar-
ities of  Alberta and highlight the similarities and differences between Alberta 
and jurisdictions in the Global South. Clearly, neoliberalism has become a global 
phenomenon, sparing few countries, resource rich or not. Within this context, 
we are concerned about how the predominance of  a single resource may create 
special problems for creating or maintaining democratic norms. Alternatively, 
could it be that the threat to democracy in states dependent on the export of  one 
commodity is another manifestation of  a generalized corporate attack against 
democratic norms in a period characterized by a global capitalist crisis of  over-
production and declining confidence in governments and institutions? In the 
wake of  the electoral rout of  the PC Party in Alberta in May 2015, this trend is 
manifested by the reaction of  the energy industry in the media and the stock 
exchange (Hussain and Morgan 2015).
The second section of  the book concentrates on rights claims in an oil-
exporting economy, focusing on the most vulnerable groups: women, work-
ers, Indigenous populations, and immigrants. This section underscores the 
similarities among vulnerable communities in both the Global North and the 
Global South, showing that “First and Third World” relations can be replicated 
within any country, particularly those with Indigenous populations. Despite 
being focused on Alberta, these chapters illustrate a worldwide neoliberal trend 
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toward maximizing profit by undermining the rights of  labour, sidelining mar-
ginalized communities, and downloading specific functions of  the state on the 
family—and in particular, on women. The end result is class-based, gendered, 
and racialized economic structures wherein certain groups in society bear the 
brunt of  the social, political, and economic burdens of  oil extraction.
The third section of  the book considers the impact of  the trends identified 
in the previous sections on certain governance, equity, and citizenship issues 
in Alberta. Specifically, the chapters in this section look at current policies and 
institutions as reflections of  particular political ideologies. Significantly, these 
chapters identify existing policies as the manifestations of  neoliberal notions 
of  citizenship and identity that are shared by corporate and state interests, 
effectively excluding those who have different understandings. The disciplin-
ary role of  government is explored, as is the impact of  privileging the role of  
government in fostering favourable market conditions for business on the pro-
vision of  social and economic justice in Alberta.
It is obvious that oil influences democratic participation and governance in 
Alberta; however, it is equally clear that its impact is shaped by other factors. As 
illustrated in many of  the chapters in this volume, the fact that Canada is part of  
the Global North does affect the trajectory of  the form and outcome of  political 
economic trends. Moreover, it is also clear that while the particular manifesta-
tion of  the democratic deficit may be different in Alberta and Canada than else-
where, the general oil versus democracy theme has relevance in various parts 
of  the world. Finally, we cannot ignore the fact that while many jurisdictions 
in the Global South have the additional burden of  colonialism, which adds to 
the democratic malaise, Canada’s own internal colonization of  its Indigenous 
population dampens its claims to having healthy democratic institutions.
Certainly, these chapters point to a variety of  factors that ultimately influ-
ence the nature and practice of  democracy in an oil-exporting country. Some 
of  these interactions are consistent with what has been reported in studies of  
oil-dependent countries in the Global South, while others are unique to Canada 
as an oil-exporting country in the Global North. Perhaps the most valuable 
lesson that can be taken from this study is that oil-rich jurisdictions in the 
Global North are not so categorically different from those in the Global South. 
Nor is the binary classification of  “North” and “South” very helpful in exploring 
the dimensions of  democracy in an interconnected world. The chapters in this 
volume highlight that the success of  liberal democratic institutions in reflect-
ing collective priorities and interests is complicated not only by the nature and 
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history of  an oil-exporting jurisdiction but also by the rapidly changing global 
political and economic dynamics. In Canada, the short-term priorities of  the oil 
industry are shaping politics and policy provincially as well as federally. Many 
chapters in this book suggest that these policies will have a long-term impact on 
democracy in Alberta. Oil wealth may not be the only engine that works toward 
diminishing democratic structures, but it certainly serves as the fuel that helps 
to propel specific socio-economic and political forces and ideologies. What is 
indisputable is that oil has left an indelible stamp on democracy in Alberta and 
Canada.
Notes
1 Resource rent is the surplus revenue generated from the extraction of  a natural 
resource. That is, it is the revenue that remains after all the costs of  extraction and 
production, including the minimum return that investors need on the capital they 
have invested, have been deducted from the total revenue. Governments do not 
typically engage directly in extraction and production activities. Instead, as the 
holders of  the rights to a country’s natural resources, they levy a tax on the resource 
rents earned by businesses.
2 We use the term political economy in its broad sense to refer to the influence of  
political ideologies on economic life, particularly in relation to the development of  
public policy. Although specific political economic analyses inevitably reflect the 
disciplinary framework and theoretical orientation of  the researcher, all begin from 
the fundamental insight that politics and economics are inextricably bound up with 
one another.
3 Financialization is explained in more depth in the next chapter. Briefly, it refers to 
changes in the structure and operation of  financial market that lead to an increase in 
the size and importance of  a country’s financial sector relative to its overall economy 
(Krippner 2005).
4 As Slowey and Stefanick explain in chapter 7 in this volume, the legacy of  internal 
colonialism has also had a huge impact on the relationship between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal people in Canada. In this regard, the same forces that inhibit 
development in the Global South are at work in the Global North.
5 See World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” 2014, http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home; and United Nations Development 
Programme, “Democratic Governance,” http://www.undp.org/governance/.
6 See Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 38 (2), http://
ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/CJS/issue/view/1380. The issue set out to 
revisit the concept of  community in the context of  Alberta’s oil fields.
7 Watkins’s theoretical interpretation did not go unchallenged. For instance, John 
Richards and Larry Pratt, in Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (1979), 
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argue that staples theory ignores the classical theory of  comparative advantage. They 
also question the Canadian dependency thesis as proposed by staples theory.
8 Fordism relates to an economic and social system based on industrialized and 
standardized forms of  mass production, mass consumption, and changes to working 
conditions of  workers over time. The Fordist compromise guarantees employment 
at relatively good wages for a subset of  (usually) unionized workers in return for 
acceptance of  capital’s exclusive right to run the company and its right to earn high 
profits in the process.
9 At the time we write, the human impact of  the volatility of  the energy sector has been 
brought home once again, owing to the recent downturn in international oil prices. 
According to a Statistics Canada analyst, from September 2014 to early January 2015, 
thirteen thousand jobs were lost in Alberta’s energy sector, most of  them in oil and 
gas. Moreover, in January, the Canadian Association of  Oilwell Drilling Contractors 
predicted that the number of  rigs operating in the field would decline by 167 in 2015, 
“resulting in the layoffs of  3,400 rig workers with the loss of  another 19,500 indirect 
jobs” (Geddes 2015).
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Liberal Democracy in Oil-Exporting Countries
A View from the Perspective of Staples Theory
Meenal Shrivastava
The Many Modes of Liberal Democracy
The political history of  our world could well be written as a continuing struggle 
to define and refine democracy—from its limited beginnings in the republics 
of  India and the city-states of  Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries BC, to 
the Magna Carta and the French Revolution, and finally to the emergence of  
so-called liberal democracy, in its many iterations, as the predominant political 
system throughout the world in the twentieth century. Most often described as 
a representative form of  government that operates according to the principles 
of  liberty and equality first articulated by John Locke and other philosophers 
of  the Enlightenment, liberal democracy seeks to protect basic human rights, 
civil liberties, and political freedoms for all persons, including minorities. It 
is characterized by attributes that include fair, free, and competitive elections 
between multiple distinct political parties, a separation of  power into different 
branches of  government, and the rule of  law. Liberal democracies often rely on 
a constitution to delineate the powers of  the government and to enshrine the 
social contract—the legitimacy of  the authority of  the state over the individual 
(see Beetham 1992; Macpherson 1977). 
Although expressed in widely varying manifestations, first in different 
parts of  Europe, then in the Americas, and finally in the former colonies in the 
Global South, notions of  widespread social, economic, and political equality 
have formed the basis of  the quest for democracy over the past two centuries. 
However, the path to democracy is fraught with many obstacles in all parts of  
the world, as is evident from growing income and political inequality in both 
hemispheres and from the rise of  movements such as the Arab Spring in the 
Middle East, Occupy in North America, Indignados in Spain, Aganaktismenoi 
1
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in Greece, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil, and Naxal 
in India, among others.
Indeed, historically the vast spectrum of  democracy ranges from minimal-
ist, electoral, and polyarchical to many direct and representative types of  dem-
ocracies (Schmidt 2002). Clearly, the term democracy is a highly contested one, 
and much has been written within the field of  democratization studies to try 
to define it. In the twenty-first century, the global financial crisis that began in 
2008, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the economic success of  authoritarian 
China, and increasing inequality in all parts of  the world, among other trends 
and events, have rekindled the debate about threats to democratization and 
about the probability of  a “reverse wave” bringing a revival of  authoritarianism 
(Carothers 2007; Diamond 2008; Krugman 2009, 181–96). Interestingly, despite 
these global warnings, the vast majority of  comparative studies of  democracy 
continue to focus on the reasons for and quality of  democratization in the 
Global South. A quick survey of  the most influential journal in this area, Journal 
of Democracy, reveals a continuing focus on the trends and causes of  the emer-
gence or reversal of  democratization in the regions of  the Global South (e.g. , 
Puddington 2010). This focus appears to presume that democracy and its insti-
tutions are sound in the Global North. As recently as 2013, Jørgen Møller and 
Svend-Erik Skaaning, in their comprehensive analysis of  the three waves of  
democratization, challenged common assumptions about the reversal of  dem-
ocratization, describing the situation as a “trendless fluctuation” (Doorenspleet 
2000, quoted in Møller and Skaaning 2013, 105). They correctly acknowledge 
the inaccuracy of  Samuel Huntington’s (1991) description of  a “second reverse 
wave of  democratization” occurring between 1958 and 1975, which does not take 
into account the rise of  democratic regimes after the decolonization of  Africa in 
the 1960s (Møller and Skaaning 2013, 105–7). However, Møller and Skaaning’s 
analysis of  democratization trends in the world suffers from a blind spot of  its 
own by only focusing on the non-OECD regions of  the world.
Yet the notion that the countries in the Global North are immune from a 
democratic deficit is questionable, given both growing inequality and restive 
protests against government austerity measures in various OECD countries 
(OECD 2008, 2011). Although it is too early to predict their impacts, the ongoing 
popular movements inspired by increasing income and political inequality are 
indeed challenging the “authorized” site of  politics (political parties, the elec-
toral system, and other formal mechanisms of  government), questioning the 
limits of  political representation, and shifting the question of  the survival of  
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the economic system to the survival of  democracy itself, in both the North and 
the South.
Ironically, while there has been a steady stream of  writing on the relation-
ship between democracy and inequality (Savoia, Easaw, and McKay 2010), as 
well as on a perceived democratic deficit in OECD countries such as the United 
States, Canada, and countries in the European Union (Bexell and Mörth 2010; 
Krugman 2007; Lenard and Simeon 2012; Lindgren and Persson 2011; Norris 
2011; Tamas 2011), the insights from these studies have been slow to inform 
large-scale comparative studies of  democratization spanning various regions. 
This may be the consequence of  a world view that continues to conceptualize 
the globe as divided into North/South silos that are perceived as static social, 
economic, and political spheres rather than as dynamic and uneven construc-
tions that interact, collide, and overlap unpredictably in a deeply connected 
international system. Additionally, the tendency of  comparative studies to 
focus on the Global South can be seen as a reflection of  the discrepancy between 
liberal democratic theory and its application—in other words, as ignoring the 
disjuncture between the principles and the practice of  liberal democracy in 
various parts of  the world. In this context, the worldwide trend toward econo-
mism—the theoretical separation of  economic activity from a social and polit-
ical ensemble and, specifically, the reduction of  this ensemble to its economic 
causes (Gramsci 1971, 369–84)—has emerged as a particularly significant para-
dox of  liberal democracies, inasmuch as giving primacy to the economic over 
the political has marginalized issues of  justice and equality.
As demonstrated by a number of  studies (e.g. , Herb 2005; Karl 1997; 
Lowi 2004; Mahdavy 1970; Ross 2001, 2009; Shaxson 2007; Shrivastava and 
Stefanick 2012; Tsui 2011; Wantchekon 2002), oil-exporting countries of  the 
world are at a particularly crucial juncture of  economism and politics, since the 
tensions between the two core assumptions of  liberal democratic theory—cap-
italist market relations and developmental liberalism—are heightened further 
in a resource-driven economy. The role of  the state in providing the conditions 
for and thus the possibility of  economic development underlies the concept of  
developmental liberalism within a liberal democratic framework (Chan 2002). 
The financial crisis of  2008–9, in particular, not only accentuated the virtues 
of  state regulation of  financial sectors but also brought back focus on the role 
of  equality in ensuring economic stability. A recent report (G20 2012) notes 
the growing disparities in earnings and working conditions in the G20 coun-
tries, inequities that are undermining social cohesion, economic performance, 
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and political legitimacy. This joint report identifies labour market and social 
protection policies, tax policies, and regulatory measures as the tools needed 
to reverse income inequality and ensure sustainable economic growth (9–13). 
This re-emphasis of  the role of  state policies in ensuring economic develop-
ment, which used to be a staple of  development studies literature focused on 
the Global South, is now experiencing a global resurgence of  sorts in the con-
text of  the growth and assertiveness of  emerging economies and the slowing 
economic growth in the Global North (Cammack 2012).
In the context of  oil and democracy, another set of  literature has emerged 
that incorporates the concerns of  developmental liberalism, highlighting that 
it is not oil but the vast wealth that it generates in a short span that depletes 
democracy by tipping the balance too far away from the principles of  liberal 
democracy, such as economic and political equality (e.g. , Boschini, Pettersson, 
and Roine 2007; Gylfason 2001, 2006; Mitchell 2011; Rosser 2006). These stud-
ies emphasize the crucial role of  economic and political institutions in success-
fully appropriating rent gains and countering any negative effects of  reliance 
on resource exploitation.
Consequently, for the purposes of  analyzing the practice of  democracy in 
Canada as an oil-exporting country, I will use the term liberal democracy to refer 
to a mode of  governing economic and political institutions and neoliberalism to 
refer to a political ideology that affects the mode of  governing by increasing 
economic and political inequality. As an OECD and G8 country ranking high 
on the Human Development Index, Canada is also among those industrialized 
countries in which inequality is growing even faster than in the United States 
(Conference Board of  Canada 2011, 10), providing a compelling example of  a 
country that manifests the contradictions of  a complex international system. 
Not unlike most developed nations, the largest share of  Canada’s GDP is pro-
vided by the service industry. However, Canada is unusual among these coun-
tries in that the primary sector, particularly lumber, minerals, agriculture, and 
energy, constitutes a significant bulk of  Canadian exports. Along with Norway 
and the United States, Canada is one of  the few OECD nations that are among 
the top ten producers and exporters of  oil (IEA 2013, 479–83). Therefore, I also 
consider in this chapter trends in global oil markets as they pertain to Canadian 
political economy, since staples or natural resources have been central to 
Canada’s economy since its inception (Innis [1930] 1977).
I begin by contextualizing the debates on the nature and evolution of  the 
liberal democratic model, noting the discrepancy between liberal democratic 
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theory and its application. I delineate a relationship between economistic con-
ceptions of  liberal democracy and the entrenchment of  neoliberalism, arguing 
that an economistic application of  liberal democracy has directly contributed 
to decreasing democratic engagement and increasing inequality in many coun-
tries of  the world. Additionally, I provide an overview of  the energy sector in 
Canada and situate bitumen oil in the context of  the shifting global oil market. 
While the so-called oil curse literature points the causal arrow from oil depend-
ence to democratic deficit, the following discussion includes staples theory, a 
Canadian theory of  political economy, in order to examine the possibility that it 
is actually the rise of  political and economic inequality that is fuelling a demo-
cratic deficit in Canada. Ultimately, it is not the commodity of  oil itself  that 
is the culprit, but the exacerbation of  the tension between the individualist 
and collectivist assumptions underlying liberal democracy, an amplification 
brought on by the great wealth generated in a short span of  time in a neoliberal 
context. This tension between the core assumptions of  democracy is evident in 
the theoretical debates on liberal democracy and is explored in the next section.
Liberal Democratic Theory and Application: Two Sides of Different Coins
The ongoing debate on the nature and components of  liberal democracy appears 
to be happening on two largely unconnected planes. On one plane are the polit-
ical theorists and social philosophers who have been assessing the failures of  the 
liberal or economic models of  democracy in order to do justice to the ideals of  
democratic legitimacy (e.g. , Beetham 1992; Benhabib 1996; Cunningham 2002; 
Macpherson 1985; Polanyi [1944] 2001). Theoretically, the contested boundary 
between the “economic” and the “political” in a liberal democratic system is the 
most critical issue in this discussion. According to Gramsci (1971), positing the 
existence of  an apolitical economic sphere—the stance referred to as “econo-
mism”—is problematic in a number of  respects. For one, the subjugation of  pol-
itics to economics privileges the transformation of  economic production over 
the transformation of  the state as the lever for creating a democratic society. At 
the same time, the separation of  the economic sphere from the political encour-
ages a view of  the economy as a self-regulatory space of  individual enterprise 
immune to the interventions of  the state.
Many critical international political economy (IPE) scholars have used 
the Gramscian position on economism to explore the constitution of  such 
dichotomous boundaries and their impact on democracy in the context of  
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transnational capitalism (e.g. , Cox 1992; Gill 1998; Teivainen 2002; Wallerstein 
1995). They have shown that both the economic/political boundary and the 
domestic/external boundary are socially constructed and interconnected in 
many ways. Moreover, since the economic rendering of  issues and processes 
changes the boundaries of  the political sphere, activities situated within a 
socially constructed “economic sphere” are defined as nonpolitical or private, 
which denies the possibility of  democratic consultation to socially significant 
activities. According to these scholars, the late-twentieth-century redefinition 
of  politics based on the metaphysical separation of  politics and economy could 
well be seen as producing limits to democracy domestically and internation-
ally. In Canada, this has manifested in the erosion of  social citizenship rights 
through neoliberal governing practices, which has negatively affected national 
identity and social solidarity (Brodie 2002).
In sharp contrast to the critical IPE scholarship is the application-oriented 
group of  scholars who focus on identifiable practices and quantifiable meas-
urement of  the tenets of  liberal democracy (e.g. , Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). The approach of  this group overlaps significantly 
with that of  the prolific and influential “ranking industry,” which comprises 
intergovernmental organizations (such as the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Program, and the International Monetary Fund) and nongovern-
mental institutions (such as Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
and the Centre for Systemic Peace). These organizations generally support the 
application of  both liberal and democratic principles of  the state, but they only 
apply the principle of  liberalism to what is defined as the “economy.” This lim-
ited application of  liberal principles is essentially an economistic solution to 
the dilemma of  democratic liberalism, but it provides no coherent justification 
for the asymmetric treatment of  the state and the economy. According to this 
solution, also referred to as neoliberalism, activities situated within the eco-
nomic sphere should not be under democratic control since the “invisible hand” 
of  the market will ensure (in varying degrees) that the pursuit of  private needs 
leads to the common good. This disjuncture between democratic ideals and the 
economist context is largely ignored in studies informed by the neoliberal per-
spective. In the process, this separation justifies the transformation of  public 
and political activities into a private and apolitical realm.
Therefore, at the same time that liberal democracy was emerging as the 
dominant political paradigm in the international system, we were also witness-
ing the rise of  another political and economic ideology—neoliberalism, the 
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prime belief  system driving and justifying economic globalization as well as 
the financialization of  the national and international economy. Neoliberalism 
is the discourse of  governance that informs the economistic separation of  
democratic spheres and only allows for minimalistic conceptions of  liberal 
democratic theory. In this discourse, key institutions operating in the eco-
nomic sphere are represented as nonpolitical or beyond politics (Plattner 2013). 
In practice, of  course, policies affecting economic institutions such as central 
banks and business corporations involve a combination of  public and private 
power and have deep implications for questions of  social justice, distribution, 
and economic performance, all of  which are deeply political questions.
Neoliberalism, Financialization, and Inequality: A Causal Relationship
The meaning of  the term neoliberalism has changed over time: it has at times 
meant something quite different from the free market radicalism with which it 
is usually associated today. An analysis of  leading scholars who have written on 
neoliberalism—such as Friedrich Hayek (1960), Noam Chomsky (1999), David 
Harvey (2007), Milton Friedman (2008), and Gérard Duménil and Dominique 
Lévy (2011)—shows a range of  differences in the meaning and application of  
the concept. In fact, according to the Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) study of  148 
journal articles, the word neoliberalism is used to describe an ideology, an eco-
nomic theory, a development theory, or an economic reform policy. In the con-
temporary era, the term most commonly refers to economic reform measures 
such as eliminating price controls, deregulating capital markets, lowering trade 
barriers, and reducing state influence on the economy, especially through pri-
vatization, fiscal austerity, and financialization.
For the purposes of  this chapter, neoliberalism will be understood as a pol-
itical ideology—that is, as a belief  system that explains and justifies a preferred 
economic and governmental order for society, offers strategies for its main-
tenance or attainment, and helps give meaning to public events, personalities, 
and policies (Knight 2006). Specific ideologies crystallize and communicate 
the widely shared beliefs, opinions, and values of  an identifiable group, class, 
constituency, or society. In response to the resurgence of  ideologically inspired 
political conflict and polarization in the current era, John Jost, Christopher 
Federico, and Jaime Napier (2009) reviewed recent scholarship on political 
ideology as a social psychological phenomenon. Their analysis focuses primar-
ily on liberal versus conservative ideology and the two core aspects of  Left-Right 
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ideology—resistance to change and acceptance of  inequality. It shows ideology 
not merely as an organizing device or a shortcut for making experiential judg-
ments about various political objects but also as a device for explaining and even 
rationalizing the way things are or, alternatively, how things should be differ-
ent than they are. Jost, Federico, and Napier argue that “the power of  ideology 
to explain and justify discrepancies between the current social order and some 
alternative not only maintains support for the status quo, but also serves for 
its adherents the palliative function of  alleviating dissonance or discomfort 
associated with the awareness of  systemic injustice or inequality” (313) For 
instance, in attempting to understand why conservatives report being happier 
than liberals, the authors found that the association between political ideology 
and subjective well-being was explained by the degree to which respondents 
rationalized inequality in society. In other words, conservatives were better 
at rationalizing inequality than liberals (326–27). These two aspects of  polit-
ical ideology, resistance to change and acceptance of  inequality, are important 
to bear in mind as we explore the impact of  neoliberal ideology on the liberal 
democratic system of  governance.
Within a liberal democratic framework, then, the phenomenon of  finan-
cialization can be considered as neoliberalism’s most powerful tool to entrench 
the separation of  the political and economic spheres. Financialization refers to 
the vastly expanded role of  financial motives, market institutions, and elites 
in the operation of  governing institutions (Epstein 2006) at the international, 
national, and subnational levels. According to Krippner (2005, 181–82), the 
finance industry, as it becomes increasingly dominant, takes over the primary 
economic, cultural, and political role in a national economy. This is manifested 
in the inflated roles of  financial controllers, financial assets, and marketized 
securities in determining corporate strategies, as well as in the fluctuations 
of  the stock market as a determinant of  business cycles in an economy. The 
entrenchment of  financialization is most evident in the United States, where 
the share of  the financial sector in corporate profit rose from just a few percent 
in the 1960s to over 30 percent in 2004. Financial sector profits as a percentage 
of  the total dipped to -10 percent during the crisis of  2008/9; however, with 
further deregulations and government support, by 2011, financial profits once 
again accounted for a third of  all profits in the United States (Madigan 2011).
The consequences of  financialization have not only led to national and 
international financial crises but have also had a deflationary impact on real 
economic activity, major social effects in terms of  loss of  employment, and 
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more volatile material conditions for most citizens. This phenomenon is not 
confined to the Global South (Chomsky 2010), as exemplified by the Indignados 
movement in Spain, the Occupy movement in nearly eighty-two countries 
(Adam 2011), and the rising crescendo of  anti-austerity protests in Europe 
(Lichfield 2012). Furthermore, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) report titled Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps 
Rising highlights trends from 1980 to 2008, showing that most OECD coun-
tries carried out regulatory reforms to strengthen competition in the markets 
for goods and services and to make labour markets more adaptable. The report 
notes that during this period, nearly all OECD countries significantly relaxed 
anticompetitive product-market regulations, loosened employment protec-
tion legislation for workers with temporary contracts, reduced unemployment 
benefit replacement rates, and changed wage-setting mechanisms leading to a 
decrease in the share of  union members among workers across most countries. 
Consequent to these regulatory reforms and institutional changes, minimum 
wages declined relative to median wages in a number of  OECD countries, con-
tributing to widening wage disparities (OECD 2011, 30–33).
Despite the sporadic revisions of  neoliberal orthodoxy, many advocates of  
neoliberal macroeconomic reforms have argued that the welfare costs of  higher 
volatility are negligible since the negative effect on income distribution is prob-
ably outweighed by its contribution to growth (Hoxha, Kalemli-Ozcan, and 
Vollrath 2009; Lucas 1987). However, this is not borne out by trends in the era 
of  financialization. The United States, in particular, provides a good example of  
the parallel growth of  financialization and extreme economic disparity. During 
the era of  financialization, the top four hundred earners in the United States 
saw their income increase 392 percent and their average tax rate reduce by 37 
percent from 1992 to 2007. The share of  total US income going to the top 1 per-
cent of  American households (also after federal taxes and income transfers) 
increased from 11.3 percent in 1979 to 20.9 percent in 2007 and 22.5 percent in 
2012 (Domhoff  2013).
There is overwhelming evidence that income inequality is bad for the indi-
vidual, the society at large, and for the economy. For instance, income inequal-
ity has been shown to exert a significant drag on effective demand (Rajan 2010). 
Reducing inequality could reduce consumer debt; indeed, as Paul Krugman 
(n.d.) suggests, the Great Divergence—the period, beginning in the late 1970s, 
when inequality grew dramatically in the United States—may have helped 
cause the recession of  2008 by pushing middle-income Americans into debt. 
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Krugman shows that the growth of  household debt has followed a pattern 
strikingly similar to the growth in income inequality and suggests that political 
shifts may have led both to rising inequality and to a more vulnerable finan-
cial system. Similarly, two recent OECD reports note that while rising income 
inequality creates economic, social, and political challenges, there is nothing 
inevitable about growing inequalities (OECD 2008, 2011). Arguing that the 
social contract is starting to unravel in many countries, the reports also note 
that tax and benefit systems have become less redistributive in many countries 
since the mid-1990s.
Ironically, income inequality has been rising in Canada even more rapidly 
than in the United States since the mid-1990s. The richest 1 percent of  Canadians 
saw their share of  total income increase from 7.1 percent in 1982 to 13.3 percent 
in 2011 (OECD 2011, table 9.1; Wolfson, Veall, and Brooks 2014, 10).1 At the same 
time, the top federal marginal income tax rates saw a marked decline, dropping 
from 43 percent in 1981 to 29 percent in 2010 and 20.8 percent in 2012 (Grant 
2013). According to the OECD study, prior to the mid-1990s, the Canadian 
tax-benefit system was as effective as those of  the Nordic countries in stabil-
izing inequality, offsetting more than 70 percent of  the rise in market income 
inequality. The effect of  redistribution has declined since then: therefore, in 
2011, taxes and benefits only offset less than 40 percent of  the rise in inequal-
ity. This downward trend in redistribution can be directly linked to three fac-
tors: the entrenchment of  the neoliberal view of  the role of  the state, which is 
manifested in the “reduced role of  means-tested transfers, as benefit rates fell 
and benefits became less targeted” (OECD 2011, 37–40); the effects of  institu-
tional shifts such as dwindling unionization rates and stagnating minimum 
wages (Conference Board of  Canada 2015); and falling top marginal tax rates 
(Yalnizyan 2010).
While the use of  neoliberal policies for “fiscal consolidation” started under 
the Liberal Party regime in the 1990s (Posner and Sommerfeld 2013, 149–52), 
the Conservative Party regime in Canada, since its rise to power in 2006, has 
further emphasized the economistic conception of  the role of  government 
through the policies of  fiscal restraint via social spending cuts and tax cuts. 
Furthermore, in terms of  liberal democratic theory and its core assumption of  
the separation of  the political system from its environment, Canada is experi-
encing an unprecedented wave of  market values, norms, and ideals from the 
private sector successfully penetrating the state. The separation of  powers 
(between different government agencies like the legislature, the executive, and 
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the judiciary) in a liberal democracy is supposed to protect the governing elite 
and their institutions from societal encroachment, and vice versa, in the inter-
est of  both state and society. Yet the significant inroads of  market interests 
into the very locus of  the powers from which they are to be protected blurs the 
boundaries with respect to the exercise of  political power.
Oil Versus Democracy?
The disconnect between the critical theorists and the quantitative analysts 
noted above is particularly relevant for studies of  oil and democracy, since such 
studies are often at the cusp of  the theoretical and applied approaches to liberal 
democracy. While most of  the oil and democracy studies are concerned with the 
theoretical assumptions of  liberal democracy—political legitimacy and broad-
based economic development—they generally use the measures and indicators 
of  those who apply the theory. For instance, Polity scores are frequently used in 
studies of  regime change and the effects of  regime authority to evaluate a coun-
try’s degree of  democracy. According to the Center for Systemic Peace, “The 
Polity conceptual scheme is unique in that it examines concomitant qualities 
of  democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than 
discrete and mutually exclusive forms of  governance.” Employing six measures 
that capture “key qualities of  executive recruitment, constraints on executive 
authority, and political competition,” the scheme evaluates countries along “a 
spectrum of  governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autoc-
racies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed ‘anocracies’) to 
fully institutionalized democracies.”2 The Polity approach has been criticized 
for relying on a minimalistic definition of  democracy and for not offering a 
theoretical justification for the way the component variables are aggregated 
into a single regime index (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Such indicators, which 
are based on subjective and narrow interpretations of  democracy, could be con-
sidered uncertain and contested. 
Nevertheless, Polity scores continue to be among the most widely used 
indices of  democracy, as seen in the extensive cross-national studies by Ross 
(2001) and Tsui (2011), which examine the impact of  oil wealth on democracy as 
measured by the Polity index. Both studies note the antidemocratic effect of  oil 
wealth on states, even when other factors are accounted for. However, while Ross 
focuses on the role of  dependence on oil and other minerals in an economy that 
fails to bring about the social and cultural changes needed to produce democratic 
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government, Tsui proposes a theory of  endogenous barriers to political entry 
to explain democratic deficits in oil-rich states. The quantitative measures of  
such studies, however, have not gone unchallenged. Questioning the validity of  
regressions centred on cross-sectional analysis, Haber and Menaldo (2011) show 
that resource dependence is not necessarily associated with the undermining of  
democracy. The authors do a thorough job of  critically evaluating the quantita-
tive parameters of  studies like those of  Ross (2001), Mahdavy (1970), Huntington 
(1991), and others who claim a causal relationship between natural-resource 
reliance and authoritarianism. Their analysis, however, uncritically accepts the 
indicators of  democracy as proposed by the Polity index.
The debate around using these indicators continues, as is evident in Ross’s “Oil 
and Democracy Revisited” (2009), where he responds to his critics by using a more 
exogenous measure of  oil wealth, separating democratic transitions from demo-
cratic survival, adding new robustness tests, and employing a dataset that extends 
from 1960 to 2002 and covers 170 states. In this new study, Ross still finds evi-
dence that, regardless of  any possible countervailing pro-democracy effects, the 
net impact of  the dependence on oil revenue on democratic transitions in authori-
tarian states is strongly negative. Additionally, he finds that undemocratic effects 
fuelled by oil dependence are uneven but are growing stronger over time, which 
he argues is due to the rising prevalence of  state ownership. Nevertheless, much 
like his detractors, Ross does not concern himself  with the limited application of  
the principles of  democracy in “measuring” it.
Despite their narrow use of  the liberal democratic framework, many of  
the studies on oil and democracy provide valuable insights into the dangers of  
an economistic conception of  liberal democracy in oil-exporting economies. 
The most pertinent pattern noted in these studies is the “rentier effect,” which 
suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to 
dampen democratic pressures (Feldman 2003; Ross 2001, 2009; Wantchekon 
2002). According to these studies, the explanation for the rentier effect lies in 
the loss of  fiscal connection between the government and the people in a state 
that derives all or a substantial portion of  its national revenue from the rent 
of  resources rather than taxes. In this scenario, the incumbent elite’s power 
over rent distribution enables it to use resource revenue to favour one or more 
groups in the society at the expense of  others. Using the measures of  Polity IV, 
this trend is clearly shown in the oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa and is regarded as evidence of  the negative impact of  oil depend-
ence on democratic transition in oil-exporting countries in the Global South. 
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Considering the vast array of  variants of  democracy, the standardized meas-
ures of  democracy are contentious in themselves; moreover, such measures 
fall short in exploring the health of  democracy in countries in the Global North 
that are regarded as “established democracies.”
For instance, Norway could be seen as the model of  a highly functioning 
democracy despite being a major oil-exporting country. The fifth-largest oil 
exporter in the world (compared to the ninth position held by Canada), Norway 
is the fourteenth-largest producer of  oil, compared to the sixth position held 
by Canada (Campbell 2013, 10). Norway is the world’s largest producer of  oil 
and natural gas outside the Middle East, and it also holds the top spot in the 
Democracy Index (EIU 2013, 3). However, narrowly defined democracy indices 
and categories such as “electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the func-
tioning of  government; political participation; and political culture” (EIU 2013, 
1) are unlikely to explain the role of  the egalitarian welfare-state model. Neither 
is this limited framework likely to explain the impacts in Norway of  the adoption 
of  soft neoliberal policies during the 1980s and 1990s; the extensive program 
of  privatization and deregulation since 2000–2001; unpopular restructuring, 
commercialization, and privatization of  the public sector, including health, 
pension, and labour law; weakening of  the trade unions; rising social and 
income inequality; and the recent ascendance of  an economically neoliberal 
and right-wing populist coalition (Wahl 2011; Wahl and Pedersen 2013). Despite 
the rise of  right-wing politics recently, Norway’s high taxes continue to fund 
its welfare model, while almost all of  the oil revenue goes into the Norwegian 
sovereign wealth fund. In contrast to this approach of  sharing the resource rent 
with future generations, Alberta’s low tax rate ensures that it must use oil roy-
alties to fund current government expenditures, enabling the entrenchment of  
neoliberal policies and the chronic boom-bust economic cycles.
These trends are much more central to critical theoretical debates on the 
nature and dilemmas of  liberal democracy and are likely to raise questions such 
as these: Why is the political-economic impact of  oil dependence different in 
Norway, compared to other oil-exporting countries? What is the relationship 
among neoliberalism, income inequality, and democratic engagement? How do 
these factors affect the political-economic outcomes in various oil-exporting 
countries? These are questions worth asking in the context of  oil-exporting 
countries in not only the Global South but also the Global North, especially 
since the list of  top twenty oil-producing countries in the world in 2014 already 
included eight OECD countries.3 Additionally, the discovery of  recoverable 
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shale oil deposits of  4.8 trillion barrels (2010 estimate) in the western United 
States, China, the Russian Federation, the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, 
Brazil, Italy, Morocco, Jordon, Estonia, and South Australia (WEC 2010, 97–99) 
is likely to fundamentally alter global oil supply and, consequently, the political 
economy of  oil-producing and -exporting countries.
Returning our focus to Canada, the next section explores the political econ-
omy of  Canada, as a country with a resource-exporting economy, through the 
most consistent theoretical lens used to examine the evolution of  political and 
economic trends in Canada. Broadly defined as a theory of  unbalanced export-
led growth (Watkins 1977, 2007), staples theory is more than an approach to eco-
nomic history. It emphasizes the longer-term developmental questions related 
to policy, infrastructure, and redistribution linkages. In other words, the appli-
cation of  staples theory goes into the realm of  a policy-oriented approach that 
describes the likely developmental accompaniments, positive or negative, of  
alternative export “choices” (where choices exist) and a policy-oriented solution 
to the inherent deficiencies in these choices. Thus, staples theory is uniquely 
complementary to the vast literature on the resource curse that mainly focuses 
on the interplay of  resource rents, overvalued currencies, and their economic 
and political manifestations.
Staples Theory and Canada’s Resource Economy
The staples thesis of  economic development emerged in the 1930s through the 
work of  Harold Innis ([1930] 1977) and W. A. Mackintosh (1936) on the evolu-
tion of  the Canadian state, and the relationship between the nation and its 
regions, on the basis of  its staple commodities such as fish, fur, lumber, agri-
cultural products, and minerals. While the trading links cemented Canada’s 
cultural connections to Europe, the search for and exploitation of  these staples 
led to the creation of  unique regional economic and political institutions within 
Canada. In addition, Innis and Macintosh argued that the nature of  the staples 
was responsible for the unique regional political and economic developments. 
For instance, according to Innis, the independent nature of  wheat farming in 
Western Canada led to a history of  distrust of  government and corporations in 
that part of  the country (386–93). In Central Canada, the main staple was fur, 
controlled by large firms such as the Hudson’s Bay Company. The fur trade pro-
duced the centralized, business-oriented society in that region. Furthermore, 
Innis depicts the relationship between the nation and the regions of  Canada as 
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one of  “heartland/core” and “hinterland/periphery,” with the core seeking to gain 
economic and political power over the periphery, since the staples are located 
in the hinterland. While Mackintosh suggests that staples export could be the 
positive path to more diversified development (459–60), Innis emphasizes the 
significance of  the characteristics of  the commodity itself  and cautions against 
the tendency toward wildly fluctuating economic activity (396–402).
In the 1960s and 1970s, the staples thesis was revived by Melville H. Watkins 
(1963, 1977) through his work on resource capitalism and Canadian political 
economy. Innis’s analysis had pointed to the vagaries of  international com-
modity markets, which tend to witness violent fluctuations and where any 
decline in demand or increase in supply can have drastic consequences for the 
staples-exporting economy. Watkins refers to this vulnerability to broader eco-
nomic trends as the “staples trap,” arguing that a resource-exporting economy 
is poorly placed to respond to the challenge of  finding a new economic base. 
Watkins proposes creating linkages that produce economic spinoffs for the 
region and the country (backward, forward, final demand linkages) in order to 
plan for growth and economic stability and to avoid the staples trap. He argues 
that public policy could strengthen linkages and thus help to tame the volatility 
of  a staples economy and change the “boom-and-bust psychology” of  staples-
export development. Watkins’s analysis is supported by studies such as those by 
Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, which classify Canada as a successful “coordin-
ated market economy” (2001, 8). According to Hall and Soskice, Canada’s unique 
model of  a growth strategy founded on the export of  natural resources blended 
the dynamism of  a powerful export sector with elements such as skilled human 
resources, a high-wage manufacturing sector, modern public infrastructure, a 
robust financial sector, macro-economic stability, and a relatively unionized 
workforce. Arguably, under the ongoing neoliberal economic restructuring in 
Canada, wages are declining, collective bargaining is being suppressed, and 
public investments in infrastructure related to education, health and social ser-
vice are declining significantly—a pattern that is likely to fundamentally alter 
the basis of  the Canadian resource economy model as perceived by Hall and 
Soskice.
On the basis of  the declining percentage share of  natural resources relative 
to other sectors in the GDP, however, some commentators contend that Canada 
has entered a “post-staples” political economy. Two decades ago, Thomas A. 
Hutton, in Visions of a “Post-Staples” Economy (1994), argued that some regions 
were showing signs of  the emergence of  a post-staples economy, signs such as 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
46   Meenal Shrivastava
industrialization and urbanization, resources depletion, the regionalization of  
markets, and industrial restructuring. At that time, these elements were seen 
by some as driving the Canadian political economy in a new, post-staples direc-
tion, as illustrated by the apparent importance of  manufacturing and tertiary 
activities, the rise of  social movements, the importance of  knowledge elites, 
urbanization, and increasingly disconnected regional politics (Howlett and 
Brownsey 1996; Howlett and Ramesh 1992; Hutton 1994). However, Canada’s 
enduring reliance on international trade, the consistently high interprovincial 
trade in natural resources and related sectors (Wellstead 2007), and the recent 
emergence of  Canada as a major oil-exporting country confirm the continuing 
significance of  the natural resources sector for the Canadian economy. In terms 
of  the energy sector, Watkins (2007, 215) argues that Canadian “oil and gas in 
particular, which flows heavily to American markets, are much closer to being 
simple staples exports—which suggests a regression to a staples economy,” or to 
a neostaples economy (Mills and Sweeney 2013, 7).
Undeniably, the most recent resource-commodity boom involving bitumen 
oil has been accompanied by neoliberal cutbacks and the shrinking of  redis-
tributive policies and programs, both provincially and federally. Moreover, 
many of  these policies have effectively removed resource rents from the con-
trol of  the state, workers, and resource-dependent communities. Without the 
earlier mix of  goods and social programs for working families and individuals 
or the regulatory role of  the state, “rowing and steering” the economy, the bitu-
men boom has led to an unprecedented degree of  wealth creation for some and 
rising income inequality for the majority. Undoubtedly, this inequality further 
restricts the Canadian state’s ability to attain an economic trajectory that is 
socially and environmentally sustainable, giving credence to the assertions of  a 
regression into a neostaples economy made by analysts such as Stanford (2013), 
Drache (2013), and Mills and Sweeney (2013). 
From this perspective, the staples theory of  economic development remains 
critical to understanding questions of  public policy in Canada, including those 
regarding resource development; industrial, fiscal, and social policy; and 
federal-provincial relations. Despite its limited use of  the liberal democracy 
framework and its dominant focus on the transformation of  economic and pol-
itical institutions in the Global South, the oil and democracy literature provides 
many useful insights for oil-exporting jurisdictions. These insights can be com-
plemented rather neatly by the staples theory of  economic development, which 
has been used to study the economies of  many nations that are dependent 
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upon resource extraction and/or primary industries (e.g. , Helleiner 1994; Levitt 
2004). Indeed, the theoretical frameworks of  liberal democracy and staples 
theory can be seen as largely complementary: while the “oil versus democracy” 
analysis highlights the mechanisms through which resource dependence leads 
to a democratic deficit, staples theory points to policy mechanisms to avoid the 
resource curse and the staples trap.
Interestingly, the rise of  the Conservative regime in the country has 
coincided with the rise of  Canada as a major oil-exporting country. The upswing 
in oil prices that began in 2005 led to a peak of  $147 per barrel in summer 
of  2008, heralding a phase of  unprecedented profits of  hundreds of  billions 
of  dollars for the oil industry (see Cattaneo 2013; Tertzakian 2013; Weiss, 
Weidman, and Leber 2012) and creating the opportunity for unconventional 
oil field expansions in North America. After spending most of  the past few 
decades as one of  the top ten consumers and producers of  oil, Canada entered 
the list of  top ten oil-exporting nations in the world at number eight in 2007 
(while the United States was at number sixteen). Despite the short-term price 
setbacks of  2008–9, while the high oil prices enabled Canada to rise to number 
six in the list of  oil-producing countries, across the border, the production of  
shale oil and other tight oil allowed the United States to climb to number one in 
2014 (USEIA 2015; Lane 2015, 5–6 ). As Canada becomes firmly established in 
the list of  the top ten oil-exporting nations in the world (while it is estimated 
that the United States will be energy self-sufficient within a decade and a net 
exporter of  energy by 2035 [British Petroleum 2014, 23–50]), it is important 
to examine the nature and impact of  what is repeatedly dubbed the “driver of  
Canadian economy”—the oil industry (see Canada, NRC 2010; Canadian Press 
2013a; Krugel 2012). The next section, therefore, provides a broad overview of  
the complicated world of  the global oil industry before we contextualize its role 
in the Canadian political economy.
Global Oil Deposits, Oil Markets, and the Canadian Context
To begin with, it is important to recognize the very complicated world of  dif-
ferent types of  crude oils. Hydrocarbons such as coal, petroleum, and natural 
gas—and their derivatives such as plastics, paraffin, waxes, solvents, and oils—
are economically the most significant commodities since the late nineteenth 
century. Of  these, petroleum in particular is used for producing petroleum-
based fuels, including petrol, diesel, jet, heating, other fuel oils, and liquefied 
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petroleum gas. The petroleum industry generally classifies crude oil by the geo-
graphic location where it is produced, its API gravity or measure of  density, and 
its sulphur content. Crude oil is considered “light” if  it has low density or “heavy” 
if  it has high density; it is referred to as “sweet” if  it contains relatively little sul-
phur or “sour” if  it contains substantial amounts of  sulphur (Alboudwarej et al. 
2006). Light crude oil is more desirable than heavy oil since it produces a higher 
yield of  petrol, while sweet oil commands a higher price than sour oil because it 
creates fewer environmental problems and requires less refining to meet sul-
phur standards imposed on fuels in consuming countries. The price per barrel is 
determined by these characteristics, in addition to the geographic location of  the 
wells, which affects the cost of  transportation to the refinery. The lighter grades 
of  crude oil produce the best yields of  petroleum products, but as the world’s 
reserves of  light and medium oil are depleted, oil refineries are increasingly 
processing heavy oil, bitumen, and tight oil, and use more complex and expen-
sive methods to produce the required products. Because heavier crude oils have 
too much carbon and not enough hydrogen, processing them generally involves 
removing carbon from or adding hydrogen to the molecules and using the pro-
cess of  fluid catalytic cracking to convert the longer, more complex molecules in 
the oil to the shorter, simpler ones in the fuels.
The inflation-adjusted price of  a barrel of  light crude oil remained under 
$25 per barrel from 1980 to September 2003. In late 2003, the price rose 
above $30; it reached $60 in August 2005 and peaked at $147.30 in July 2008. 
Commentators attributed these price increases to many factors, including the 
falling value of  the US dollar, reports of  a decline in petroleum reserves, wor-
ries over peak oil, Middle East tensions, and oil price speculations (Sieminski 
2012). Geopolitical events and natural disasters indirectly related to the global 
oil market also had strong short-term impact on oil prices, hiking demand and 
threatening oil supply until the onset of  the global recession in late 2008. The 
2008–9 financial crisis led to the ongoing global recession, causing demand for 
energy to shrink and oil prices to fall from $147 in the summer of  2008 to $32 
in December 2008. Oil prices stabilized in 2009 and established a trading range 
between $60 and $80. At the time of  writing, while the economic recession con-
tinues to affect the world economy and oil production in the United States has 
climbed to a twenty-year high, the price of  oil per barrel has slid to below $50 
per barrel, posing new challenges to the unconventional oil industry and lead-
ing to worldwide job losses for an estimated 100,000 oil workers.4 
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Although Canada consistently appeared in the list of  top ten producers and 
consumers of  petroleum because of  its conventional oil reserves and high per 
capita consumption, it was the dramatic increase in oil prices, beginning in 
2005, that made the production of  bitumen oil economically viable for global 
export. Consequently, despite the high costs of  extraction and transport of  
bitumen oil, estimates of  which range from $30 to $80 per barrel, by 2007, 64 
percent of  Canada’s petroleum production of  1.86 million barrels per day was 
from bitumen oil rather than conventional oil fields (ERCB 2008).5 Total crude 
oil production in Canada rose by an average of  8.6 percent per year from 2008 
to 2011 (Canada, NEB 2011a, 2011b), prompting the Canadian Oil Sands Industry 
Review (COSIR 2011) to proclaim:
Once a footnote in the story of  world oil production, Canada’s oil sands 
are part of  the solution to declining conventional oil reserves elsewhere in 
the world. Canada has approximately 175 billion barrels of  oil that can be 
recovered with today’s technology. Of  that number, 170 billion are located 
in the oil sands. There are an estimated 2.5 trillion barrels of  bitumen in 
the Canadian resources. That is more than enough to supply all of  Canada’s 
needs and make a significant contribution to America, China and other oil 
importers for generations to come.
By 2013, the share of  bitumen oil in Canada’s total oil production stood at 82 
percent (see Canada, NEB 2013a), enabling Canada to emerge as the sixth-lar-
gest crude oil producer in the world. Canada has also become the largest source 
of  crude oil for the United States, supplying more than 20 percent of  the US’s 
import volumes in the past decade. The world at large consumes 32 billion bar-
rels of  oil per year, and the United States is the top oil consumer, accounting 
for 24 percent of  world consumption in 2004, dropping to 21 percent by 2007, 
and stabilizing at 22 percent for 2010 and 2011. The slowing of  the US economy, 
as well as advances in energy-efficient technology, are possible reasons for the 
declining share of  US consumption of  oil between 2004 and 2011. However, 
this decline was more than offset by the nearly 12 percent per annum rise of  
consumption in China and the steady rise in oil consumption in other “emer-
ging economies” (Rapier 2012; USEIA 2012).
Canadian bitumen oil certainly filled an important gap created by declin-
ing conventional oil production in all the major OECD producers—the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, and Canada—and by the national 
security rhetoric in the post-9/11 era. However, the dramatic rise of  oil prices 
from 2005 to 2008 led not only to the expansion of  bitumen oil in Canada 
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but also to a rash of  investments in shale oil and other tight oil projects in the 
United States.6 Shale oil drilling intensity in the United States skyrocketed from 
a few hundred wells brought online (becoming productive) before 2011 to more 
than four thousand in 2012 (Maugeri 2013, 1). By April 2013, US crude produc-
tion was at nearly 7.2 million barrels per day, higher than it had been in more 
than twenty years. The shale oil production boom, particularly from sites in 
North Dakota and Montana, has allowed the United States to further decrease 
its reliance on oil imports and to emerge as the third-largest producer of  oil in 
the world, preceded only by Saudi Arabia and Russia (IEA 2013), and overtaking 
them by June 2014 (Smith 2014).
The success of  horizontal drilling and multistage fracturing to exploit tight 
shale formations is expected to catapult the United States into energy self-suffi-
ciency within this decade, probably making it a net exporter of  oil by 2035 (IEA 
2012). The likelihood of  this trend is confirmed by the 12 percent decline in US 
crude oil imports since 2005 (USEIA 2015). In other words, although the United 
States is importing more crude oil from Canada, the total amount of  crude oil 
imported from foreign suppliers is falling in that country. With the cost of  
developing the tight oil trapped in unconventional rock formations estimated 
to be dropping below $50 a barrel—making it more competitive than Canadian 
bitumen oil or ultra-deepwater crude—recent price levels are spurring sub-
stantial investment in tight oil explorations (IEA 2012). As the United States has 
traditionally absorbed 95 percent of  Canada’s crude oil exports, rising US shale 
oil production stands to jeopardize a significant portion of  Canada’s future 
potential exports.
A recent study by Leonardo Maugeri (2013, 25–26) mentions two main rea-
sons for this scenario. First, Canadian oil exports already compete for trans-
portation capacity, particularly via pipeline, with North Dakota’s surging 
production. Furthermore, both producing areas rely on the same trading and 
storage hub, the already overburdened Cushing, Oklahoma. But while North 
Dakota is finding alternative takeaway options because of  rail transportation, a 
significant part of  future Canadian oil production risks being landlocked with-
out the availability of  new pipelines, such as the much debated Keystone XL. 
Second, marginal production costs for a substantial amount of  Canadian crude 
are the highest in the world, with several oil sands projects presenting a break-
even of  more than $90 per barrel. Conversely, the price for West Canadian 
Select, a large heavy crude oil stream and the benchmark for Canadian heavy 
crude derived from oil sands, hit a six-year low in March 2015 at $29.54 per 
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barrel, or less than half  of  the price of  Brent crude (Tuttle 2015), thus making 
bitumen oil the cheapest crude oil on the planet, even though it continues to be 
the most expensive oil to produce and transport. Maugeri’s analysis does not 
bode well for the future of  bitumen oil and is supported by the fact that several 
Canadian oil sands companies have slashed their investment budgets and are 
posting losses (Lewis 2015).
Although the unique characteristics of  shale oil in terms of  drilling inten-
sity makes it extremely vulnerable to a drop in oil price, as well as to environ-
mental opposition, the shale oil boom in North America is massive in scope. 
According to Leonardo Maugeri (2012), the United States averaged 1,919 active 
drilling rigs in 2012 alone, which is just below 60 percent of  worldwide activ-
ity and vastly more intense than that of  Canada, with 356 active drilling rigs. 
Moreover, in 2011, roughly 90 percent of  the US drilling rigs were equipped for 
horizontal hydraulic drilling, significantly contributing to shale oil production 
and to the revival of  production in mature conventional oil fields (Maugeri 2013, 
21). Additionally, on the basis of  a comprehensive field-by-field analysis of  oil 
exploration and development projects in the world, Maugeri (2012, 1) suggests 
that an unrestricted production and supply capacity “is growing worldwide at 
such an unprecedented level that it might outpace consumption,” leading to “a 
glut of  overproduction and a steep dip in oil prices” in the near future.
Whereas exporting crude oil has always been a highly sensitive and heated 
issue both in the United States and Canada, increased production in the United 
States, largely from light tight oil in North Dakota and Montana, combined 
with steadily increasing imports from Canada has already led to a glut in the 
US Midwest. As this glut took hold, it led not only to a disconnection of  the 
US mid-continent oil market from world markets but also to lower oil prices 
in Western Canada relative to both world prices and the price of  West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI). Consequently, in the spring of  2012, “light oil at Edmonton 
was trading at a discount of  almost $CDN 40 per barrel to Brent prices, and at a 
discount of  almost $CDN 20/barrel to US mid-continent prices” (Leach 2013b). 
Moreover, Canada is the cheapest alternative destination for moving oil via 
vessel because of  the effects of  the Jones Act (1920), which makes it very expen-
sive to ship goods between domestic ports.7 Therefore, in 2012 all exports of  US 
crude oil went to Canada, the only destination to which approval for exports is 
easy under existing US laws (Clayton 2013; USEIA 2015). However, the grow-
ing surplus of  domestic oil will probably catalyze a reassessment of  US policies 
that were created in an era when domestic production was in decline and energy 
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security was a major concern. Clearly, the implications of  the shale oil boom in 
the United States are likely to be significant for Canadian bitumen oil.
Within this complicated context of  the unpredictable global oil market, let 
us now consider the Canadian oil sector. The energy sector in Canada is vast, 
comprising crude oil, petroleum, coal and coal products, natural gas, and elec-
tricity. Canadian energy exports alone contributed $107.6 billion to the econ-
omy in 2012, which amounted to 9.5 percent of  Canada’s GDP that year. Within 
the energy sector, the share of  crude oil, petroleum, and coal products is indeed 
the largest and growing. They contributed 77 percent of  net energy export rev-
enue in 2012, compared to 60 percent in 2009 and 42 percent in 2006. (Canada, 
NEB 2013b).
However, the real contribution of  the energy sector to the national econ-
omy is likely to be significantly higher when we consider the direct and indirect 
investments, manufacturing, construction, services, and other factors that are 
associated with this industry. Additionally, as pointed out by Erin Weir (2006), 
transborder trade in exports and imports of  manufactures between Canada 
and the United States has increased considerably since the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force, creating trade statistics that 
can be interpreted as showing manufacturing to be a rising share, and resources 
a falling share, of  exports. Weir argues that this is an illusion that comes from 
relying on gross figures of  exports and imports. The movement of  components 
back and forth across the border is heavily concentrated in the manufacturing 
sector, which leads to an overestimation of  the actual share of  the manufactur-
ing sector relative to exports of  services and natural resources. While such a 
correction is beyond the scope of  this chapter, it is indeed a useful reminder to 
bear in mind in an analysis of  the nature of  Canada’s political economy.
Canadian energy production increased in 2012 by about 2 percent, with 
growth in petroleum production and a decline in natural gas production. As 
mentioned earlier, the glut of  supply in the American Midwest caused oil 
prices in Western Canada to be discounted by nearly 20 percent, which is “esti-
mated to have reduced annualized Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth by 
0.4 percentage points in the second half  of  2012. Canadian GDP increased by 
1.8 percent in 2012 after growing by 2.6 percent in 2011” (Canada, NEB 2013b, 
3). The National Energy Board report confirms the pessimistic outlook due to 
the impact of  the shale boom, noting that “after a very active 2011, the leas-
ing of  petroleum rights in Western Canada fell to its lowest level since 2002” 
(3). Additionally, “Alberta’s revenue from the sale of  petroleum rights fell from 
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a record $3.59 billion in 2011 to $1.12 billion in 2012” (3). In 2013, the Alberta 
government blamed the “bitumen bubble” for the loss of  $6 billion in royal-
ties (Bennett 2013). Alberta’s proposed solution is to get more of  its oil to tide-
water ports for shipment overseas, where it will potentially fetch a higher price. 
However, this strategy does not take into account the realities of  oil supply, 
particularly in terms of  the shale oil boom, which is likely to include other big 
oil exporters such as Russia, China, and possibly Australia, where the second-
largest shale oil reserves have been identified (Linc Energy 2013; Maugeri 2012). 
Nor does it take into account the realities of  demand in terms of  the impend-
ing energy self-sufficiency of  its biggest market, the United States, or the com-
plexities of  energy markets elsewhere. For instance, as the OPEC countries lose 
their shares of  the US market, they are more likely to turn to Asian markets to 
offset potential losses. Given the high cost of  production and transportation 
of  bitumen oil, it is quite unlikely that heavy crude from Alberta will prove to 
be competitive with significantly cheaper conventional oil in regions where the 
markets and the suppliers are in closer proximity.
Despite the inevitable uncertainties and clear trends in the oil markets, the 
policy direction in Alberta appears to be driven by the short-term priorities of  
the bitumen oil industry, as evidenced by the premiers of  Alberta travelling 
overseas to sell the virtues of  bitumen oil (Canadian Press 2015; Lye 2013), the 
dismantling of  the Environment Department to advance oil-industry activity 
(Pratt 2013), and the curtailment of  union activity (CBC News 2013) in a prov-
ince that already has the lowest minimum wage in the country and the highest 
income disparity in Canada (Gibson 2012, 7–8). Nationally, the federal govern-
ment’s position on climate change, the muzzling of  scientists working on cli-
mate change, and the shutting down of  research and scientific facilities related 
to the environment and other data collection are seen as examples of  the oil 
industry’s very significant influence over the government (Homer-Dixon 2013). 
Such trends have led to claims by commentators that both Alberta and Canada 
are beginning to exhibit the economic and political characteristics of  a petro-
state in terms of  environmental consequences, boom-bust economic cycles, 
investment imbalances, and the undermining of  the institutions and practice 
of  democracy in Canada (Hoberg 2014; Homer-Dixon 2013; Nikiforuk 2010, 
2012).
Typically, petro-state is a derogatory term for a state that relies on oil rev-
enue rather than on taxes and has weak political and economic institutions, 
and where power is concentrated in the hands of  an elite minority (Karl 2007, 
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279). Some critics object to using this term for Canada since only the province 
of  Alberta has exceeded the 20 percent mark for oil revenue as a share of  the 
GDP, while the national share for oil revenue remains under 10 percent of  the 
GDP (Leach 2013a). Setting aside polemical and rhetorical statements, the sig-
nificance of  bitumen oil in the Canadian economy remains undeniable for two 
reasons: first, underestimating the real contribution of  the energy sector to 
the national economy is a statistical possibility, as noted earlier, and second, 
despite vociferous environmental opposition domestically and abroad (Rabson 
2013; Wotherspoon and Hansen 2013), the federal Conservative government 
(and not the oil industry) spent $40 million in 2013–14 to advertise the import-
ance and environmental responsibility of  Canada’s resource sector (Canadian 
Press 2013b), and talk of  pipeline politics has dominated the governing agenda 
(Canadian Press 2013a).
While most recent writing on the impact of  bitumen oil extraction is con-
cerned with the economic and environmental consequences (e.g. , Davidson 
and Gismondi 2011; Marsden 2010; Nikiforuk 2010, 2012; Taft, MacMillan, and 
Jahangir 2012), there is also growing concern about the rising democratic defi-
cit in Canada, along with the recognition that dependence on natural resource 
rents produces political problems (Homer-Dixon 2013). For instance, Trevor 
Harrison and Harvey Krahn, in Governing Alberta: Citizens’ Views (2013), note high 
levels of  public concern over issues such as reform to systems of  taxation and 
royalty collection, economic diversification, and the need for environmental 
protection (18). In another survey, Harrison and Krahn (2014, 1–4) found a 
continuation of  high levels of  political alienation and a declining voting trend 
among Albertans. Even the electoral victory of  the New Democratic Party 
(NDP) in May 2015, while being a symbolic shift of  seismic proportions in 
Alberta politics, came about with only 53.7 percent of  eligible voters casting 
their vote (Elections Alberta 2015). Indeed, political alienation that perpetuates 
over time is corrosive to democracy and the legitimacy of  government institu-
tions. Concerns regarding opportunities for and degree of  citizenship engage-
ment are not limited to the provincial level, where the long-ruling Progressive 
Conservative Party as well as the opposition Wildrose Party were perceived 
as beholden to the powerful bitumen oil lobby in Alberta (Campanella and 
Stunden Bower 2013, 3–6). Samara, a private think tank, conducted a national 
public opinion survey in 2013 asking politically disengaged Canadians about 
the barriers they face to being politically active. While the most frequently 
cited barrier was a lack of  political role models, the research also indicates that 
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two-thirds of  Canadians believe that members of  Parliament are not repre-
senting their interests in Ottawa (Samara 2013, 2–3). Additionally, regardless 
of  province of  residence, only 55 percent of  Canadians reported being satis-
fied with the way democracy works in Canada, down from 75 percent in 2004 
(Samara 2012, 1). These trends are undeniably critical in understanding the 
ongoing transformation of  the economic and political institutions in Canada, 
since they significantly affect the practice of  liberal democracy provincially 
and federally.
Inequality: The New Trap in a Staples Economy
Amartya Sen characterized liberal democracy in the twentieth century “as the 
preeminently acceptable form of  governance” (Sen 1999, 4). While exceptions 
such as Islamic theocracy in the Middle East and the “China model” of  growth-
promoting authoritarian government with a partially marketized economy do 
exist, liberal democracy in its various manifestations appears to be the domin-
ant political system in much of  the world today. The creation of  a vast middle 
class undermined the appeal of  Marxism, and Marx’s socialist scenario was 
largely bypassed in most post-industrial societies (Moore 2003). Moreover, 
the growth of  electoral democracies in the latter half  of  the twentieth century 
coincided with the emergence of  new middle classes in countries such as Brazil, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Africa. Significantly, as the middle class 
has expanded considerably in countries of  the Global South, particularly in 
Asia (and most impressively in populous China and India), it has shrunk in the 
OECD countries, especially in the aftermath of  the financial crisis of  2008–9.8 
Given the experience of  industrialized countries in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries, as well as that of  “emerging economies” (with the possible excep-
tion of  China) in more recent years, clearly there is a broad correlation among 
economic growth, socio-economic change, and the hegemony of  liberal demo-
cratic ideology in the world today.
In this scenario, divorcing the measures of  democracy from the theoretical 
underpinnings of  the liberal democratic framework is particularly problem-
atic since it undermines the role of  the state in striking a fine balance between 
capitalist market relations and developmental liberalism. Even the World Bank 
has, for some time now, accepted the failure of  the long-standing attempts to 
improve the prospects for development on the basis of  econometric analysis 
of  large cross-country data sets and the need to understand the role of  state 
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agency in the processes that drive economic growth (World Bank 1992). These 
technical and methodological arguments, which are often focused on develop-
ment processes in the Global South, are increasingly coinciding with a broader 
struggle against global capitalism (Little 2003), the moral and practical require-
ments of  global justice (Cammack 2012), and the analysis of  the drivers and 
impacts of  inequality in the Global North (Krugman 2007; Norris 2011).
John Dryzek (1996) argues that historical conditions in the Western world 
made possible the theoretical separation of  democratic rules from the social 
outcomes of  political economic decisions, since economic rationality was used 
to battle the forces of  entrenched hierarchy and religious privilege. In contem-
porary times, economic rationality is giving rise to an exclusionary approach 
to participation in economic policy making, with restricted public scrutiny or 
public accountability, nationally and internationally. Stephen Gill (1998) refers 
to this as “New Constitutionalism,” which, he argues, operates to confer priv-
ileged rights of  citizenship and representation to corporate capital and large 
investors, serving to secure investor freedoms and property rights for trans-
national enterprises. “What is emerging within state forms (state and civil 
society complexes),” writes Gill, “is a pattern of  authority in which capital has 
greater weight and representation, restraining the democratisation process 
that has involved centuries of  struggle for representation—a development that 
is contested and contradictory” (23).
As shown by numerous studies, changing trade and tax policies inspired by 
the neoliberal prescriptions of  political and economic organization have led to 
rising inequality. Particularly in the wake of  the global financial crisis, it is now 
more widely acknowledged that inequality may promote inefficiency rather 
than growth. A recent IMF study noted:
When growth is looked at over the long term, the trade-off  between effi-
ciency and equality may not exist. In fact equality appears to be an import-
ant ingredient in promoting and sustaining growth. The difference between 
countries that can sustain rapid growth for many years or even decades and 
the many others that see growth spurts fade quickly may be the level of  
inequality. Countries may find that improving equality may also improve 
efficiency, understood as more sustainable long-run growth. (Berg and 
Ostry 2011, 13)
The political effects of  increasing inequality should be considered equally 
significant. The unchallenged entrenchment of  neoliberalism in Canada is 
likely to reduce further the role of  the state as the provider of  public and social 
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services to the general population and the marginalized, thus undermining one 
of  the core assumptions of  liberal democracy. Disturbingly, rather than con-
tributing to a post-staples political economy, increasing social, political, and 
economic inequality has pushed Canada toward a neostaples economy func-
tioning within a postdemocratic state, that is, one in which elected govern-
ments continue to operate within a framework of  democratic processes, of  the 
sort measured by indicators of  democracy, while the application of  the basic 
principles of  democracy becomes increasingly limited, such that the apparatus 
of  democracy serves to benefit a relatively small, but powerful, elite (Crouch 
2004). Despite current talk of  recession, Canada does not lack for wealth, but 
the concentration of  this wealth in the hands of  the few, consequent on the 
embrace of  neoliberal policies, is only fuelling more inequality. Moreover, the 
spectre of  unpredictable and widely fluctuating oil prices and the changing map 
of  oil production in the world make the postdemocratic scenario even more 
problematic. Much is therefore at stake. We can work to revive the underlying 
principles of  liberal democracy in Canada, or we can allow ourselves to be lulled 
into complacency by the apparent functionality of  the democratic apparatus.
Notes
1 Compared to the United States, income inequality levels in absolute terms are 
certainly lower in Canada and the rate of  change in the top 1 percent is comparable 
in the two countries. However, in terms of  the distribution of  income among the 
various income groups, the rate of  change in inequality has been greater in Canada 
than in the US since the mid-1990s (OECD 2008). Canada’s Gini index (measure of  
inequality) rose from 0.293 in the mid-1990s to 0.320 in the late 2000s. During the 
same period, the US’s Gini index increased from 0.361 to 0.378 (Conference Board of  
Canada 2011).
2 “The Polity Project: About Polity,” Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, http://www.
systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. For more information about the Polity IV data 
sets, see Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2014).
3 This list includes Canada, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (IEA 2014, 11; OPEC 2014, 314–19).
4 The number of  lay-offs is mentioned by Vanderbruck (2015) in the context of  
illustrating the capacity of  nonconventional oil companies to use the price free fall as 
an opportunity for cheaper technology and automation.
5 Despite its headline, “Oil Sands Crude Not as Expensive to Produce as It Used to Be,” 
a Financial Post article quotes Jean-Michel Gires, former chief  executive officer with 
the Canadian unit of  France’s Total SA, stating that bitumen sands-derived crude is 
still “among the most expensive oil” in the world to produce. The article mentions 
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that the supply cost (i.e. , recovery of  costs, plus a 10% return on capital) for bitumen 
oil projects in the range of  US$50 to US$90 per barrel. It is not clear if  this estimate 
takes into account “a history rife with cost overruns on project expansions,” often as 
much as 40 percent above earlier estimates (Lewis 2013).
6 “Tight” oil refers to conventional light oil, with low sulphur content, trapped in 
unconventional formations of  low permeability, often shale or tight sandstone, 
which requires hydraulic fracturing and/or horizontal well technology for extraction. 
Shale oil (a type of  tight oil) should not be confused with oil shale, which is 
unconventional oil containing kerogen and is found in deposits closer to the surface 
than those containing shale oil. Estonia, China, and Brazil are the largest producers 
of  oil shale (WEC 2010, 93).
7 The Merchant Marine Act (also called the Jones Act) of  1920 regulates the maritime 
transport of  cargo between various points in the United States. It is criticized for, 
among other things, raising the cost of  coastal shipping and distorting trade flows 
(Kemp 2013).
8 See Homi Kharas (2010) for a discussion of  the many definitions of  the “middle class” 
and of  its political and economic impact, as well as for a quantification of  trends in 
the growth of  the middle class in the world.
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Petroleum, Politics, and the Limits of  Left 
Progressivism in Alberta
Trevor W. Harrison
Until the election of  5 May 2015, which saw Alberta’s left-progressive New 
Democratic Party elected to office with a majority, Alberta was widely—and 
not inaccurately—viewed as a conservative province, based on the province’s 
formal political history. This chapter proceeds along two lines of  examination 
to place brackets around this conventional wisdom. The first line traces the his-
tory of  left progressivism in Alberta. An admittedly vague term, left progressiv-
ism, for the purpose of  this chapter, is defined as a set of  values consistent with 
social, political, and economic equality; the inseparability of  the individual and 
society; and the necessary subservience of  market institutions to the common 
good. The second line of  inquiry highlights the role of  specific historical events 
and socio-economic and political factors in shaping Alberta’s political terrain. 
Specifically, this chapter traces the gradual transition of  Alberta from a hub 
of  democratic radicalism, to a quasi-democracy, to a corporatist state, to—as 
of  the recent election—a province and society that has perhaps rediscovered 
its left-progressive and democratic roots. Ultimately, while stressing the par-
ticular problems of  democratic governance in a resource-based economy, this 
chapter also shows that politics matter.
Political Power and Democracy in Resource-Based Economies
Conventional theories of  political power, at least in North America and espe-
cially in the United States, have long adopted pluralist notions of  a largely neu-
tral state—an empty vessel filled with the competing interests of  more or less 
equal social actors. While pluralist theorists recognize the greater influence of  
business, they argue that no one actor holds sufficient power to overwhelm all 
the others, thus creating a system of  checks and balances (Neuman 2005, 86–89).
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Pluralist theory has many critics (Orum and Dale 2009, 121–25). It is espe-
cially inadequate in describing the situation of  single-resource economies. 
Consider for the moment company towns, where single industries often dom-
inate the lives of  citizens economically, politically, and culturally and where 
class relations are often felt as much as observed. The same is true, although 
at a larger scale and more opaquely, for states and provinces in which a single 
resource holds sway. A large body of  scholarship going back to Harold Innis’s 
work of  the 1920s and 1930s argues that dependence upon a single industry 
such as fishing, mining, forestry, or agriculture has impacts that go beyond the 
economy to include social and political relations.1
Oil appears to be just another staple resource. Except that it isn’t. There is 
something quite distinct about oil: it is, quite simply, the energy source that 
has made the modern industrial (and post-industrial) age possible. People can 
substitute salmon for cod, or rice for wheat. They can substitute, in terms of  
building materials, wood for brick or straw for wood. But, as yet, there is no 
obvious or effective substitute for petroleum as the energy source for civil and 
military transport, for industrial production, or for the day-to-day uses of  pri-
vate homes and public buildings.
This ubiquitous demand for oil means that its suppliers have enormous 
market and political power, as evidenced when OPEC decides to raise or lower 
prices. But the power of  oil goes beyond that of  monopoly control of  the 
market. It is also political. Andrew Nikiforuk (2010, 172), a long-time critic of  
energy and environmental policy in Alberta, argues that the price of  oil is nega-
tively correlated with the quality of  freedom. He cites Michael Ross (2001), who 
notes three ways in which oil impacts democracy: oil royalties, because they 
are used to lower taxes, sever the connection between citizenship and political 
accountability (i.e. , no taxes = no representation); oil wealth creates a system of  
patronage; and oil wealth provides the state with a means of  organized repres-
sion when patronage fails.
Many critics use observations such as these to argue that Alberta is a petro-
state, as discussed in the first chapter of  this book. Whether or not such a 
description is accurate, certain questions need to be asked: What has been the 
state of  democracy in Alberta? What role has petroleum played within it? And 
which roads have been taken—or abandoned—in getting the province to where 
it is today? In this chapter, I seek answers to these questions, beginning with a 
brief  historical review.
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
Petroleum, Politics, and the Limits of  Left Progressivism in Alberta   71
Left Progressivism in Early Alberta
At first glance, Alberta’s inception as a province in 1905 seemed favourable for 
left-wing politics. Created under Canada’s National Policy as a colony of  cen-
tral Canadian industrialists, Alberta contained a ready-made class of  agrarians 
with legitimate gripes against big business (e.g. , grain companies and the CPR) 
and eastern bankers. Alberta’s economy also featured a number of  extraction 
industries, especially mining, where the diverging interests of  labour and cap-
ital were too often evidenced, as in June 1914, for example, when the town of  
Hillcrest suffered the largest mining disaster in Canadian history, killing 189 
workers. Finally, Alberta—like much of  the prairies—featured a difficult and 
precarious climate that encouraged collective solutions.
Indeed, left progressive forces were successful during Alberta’s early dec-
ades. Amidst declining grain prices at the end of  the First World War, the United 
Farmers of  Alberta (UFA) formed government, one of  a series of  so-called farm-
ers’ parties elected throughout Canada at the time.2 Alberta’s labour movement, 
though small, also made itself  known in the growing cities of  Edmonton and 
Calgary and in resource-based towns throughout the province. The late 1920s 
also witnessed a major victory for women’s equality when five Alberta women 
won the battle to have women recognized as “persons” under the law.
The material conditions for left-wing success accelerated during the Great 
Depression of  the 1930s. Against a backdrop of  growing human misery, strikes 
and marches ensued, often turning violent. As the middle ground disappeared 
and unregulated capitalism was discredited, some people turned to right-wing 
solutions to the crisis, but many more turned to the left. In the mid-1930s, the 
coal-mining town of  Blairmore elected a Communist town council. During 
the same period, Alberta also witnessed the founding of  two populist par-
ties, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), begun in Calgary in 
1932, and the Social Credit Party, founded in 1935 and soon thereafter, forming 
government.
In their infancy, the CCF and Social Credit shared common left-wing creden-
tials. Though the former was more avowedly socialist, the latter—supported by 
small independent farmers, townspeople, and workers—also regularly cham-
pioned some very progressive and anti-corporatist views, including toying 
with the idea of  nationalizing key industries (Barr 1974, 83–119; Finkel 1989, 88). 
Quickly, however, the Social Credit, and the province, veered politically to the 
right. What happened?
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The Early Roots of Alberta’s Political Culture
Alberta is unique in Canada for having been governed by a series of  political 
dynasties: the Liberals (1905–21), the United Farmers of  Alberta (1921–35), the 
Social Credit (1935–71), the Progressive Conservatives (1971–2015), and today, 
the New Democrats. The province has never had a minority government; 
indeed, through most of  Alberta’s history, the ruling party has faced minimal 
opposition in the legislature. There are several possible reasons for what C. B. 
Macpherson (1953) described as Alberta’s “quasi-party system,” but the impact 
of  populism provides a starting point.
It is impossible to overstate populism’s importance to Alberta’s political 
culture.3 But what exactly is populism? I use the term populism to refer to an 
urgent and personal appeal by a leader to a mass audience, “the people,” an 
imagined group defined by its historic, geographic, and/or cultural roots and 
threatened by a crisis emanating from another loosely defined group, a “power 
bloc” made up of  elites and other elements viewed as physically or culturally 
external to “the people” (Harrison 2000, 108). But populism can occur any-
where on the left-right continuum. In fact, during the early stages of  Alberta’s 
political development, two left-wing political activists, Henry Wise Wood and 
William Irvine, espoused populist ideals. Missouri-born Wise Wood was a keen 
observer of  American populism. After relocating to Canada in 1905, he joined 
a farmers’ organization. In 1914, he became the UFA’s director and, soon after, 
its vice-president and then president. At the time, the UFA was under growing 
pressure to formally enter the political arena. Much of  this pressure came from 
the Non-Partisan League (NPL), whose founders included Irvine, a Scottish-
born Christian Socialist who had moved to Canada in 1907. In the provincial 
election of  1917, the NPL elected two candidates on a platform that joined social-
ist policies of  intervention in the economy with a belief  in nonparty politics, a 
success that proved to many UFA supporters the efficacy of  electoral politics 
(Monto 1989, 13; see also Mardiros 1979).
Though both men were populists inspired by the beliefs and values of  the 
Social Gospel movement, Wise Wood and Irvine viewed politics differently. 
Wise Wood believed that society necessarily involved a conflict between differ-
ent economic interests and that all should be represented within government, a 
notion he referred to as “group government.” But he wanted the UFA to remain 
primarily a pressure group—and not a party—made up of  farmers, while 
Irvine favoured a broader political movement, embracing farmers and workers 
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alike. Additionally, Wise Wood firmly rejected the NPL constitution, which was 
radically socialist, endorsing “government ownership and control of  all natural 
resources and fundamental industries,” including “banks, flour mills, packing 
houses, and Crown lands” (Monto 1989, 14).
In the end, the UFA did opt for a formal political role, resulting in its win-
ning the Alberta election of  1921. Wise Wood was successful in restricting 
UFA membership to farmers and in sidelining the NPL’s more radical, social-
ist agenda, but his emphasis on group government, combined with the NPL’s 
antiparty stance, also had a more long-term impact: it led to a political culture 
within Alberta that largely eschews competitive party politics. Political con-
flict, rather than occurring between parties, takes place between factions oper-
ating within the governing party tent. It is a system that enforces conformity: 
anyone who refuses to get inside the tent is ostracized. Such persons are out-
siders. Ironically, the tradition of  non-party politics emerged, in large part, out 
of  left progressive ideas.
Two other characteristics emerged out of  Alberta’s early years that influ-
enced the province’s political culture in the long term. The first is a tradition of  
strong, sometimes charismatic, leadership. It is significant that the only times 
since 1935 when the dominance of  Alberta’s governing party has been threat-
ened is when their leadership appeared weak, indecisive, out of  touch with the 
people, or corrupt.
The second characteristic is a tendency to seek technocratic solutions for what 
are essentially political and social problems. By the early twentieth century, 
North America was awash in efforts to apply scientific principles to improve 
society, one prime example of  which is the theory of  social credit. Social credit 
theory (also referred to as the A + B theorem) suggested that economic prob-
lems were amenable to technocratic solutions applied by technocratic experts 
(Bell 1993, 37–60). The Social Credit’s leader in Alberta, the Reverend William 
Aberhart, did not understand the theory any better than his followers did, but, 
as he famously told them, they did not have to understand social credit theory 
any more than they had to understand how electricity worked (Barr 1974, 84). 
They simply had to flip the switch—that is, vote for Social Credit—in order for 
their economic problems to be solved. In an admittedly contradictory fashion, 
the belief  that there was “one right answer” that could be supplied by experts 
was at once deferential to elites and anti-intellectual in regard to those disci-
plines that did not offer ostensibly scientific solutions (i.e. , the social sciences 
and humanities).
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These early influences continue to be constant and perennial elements of  
Alberta’s political culture: appeals to populism; the insistence that there are 
no fundamental social differences, or bases for conflict, between people (see 
Flanagan 1995, 34, on “monism”); and the belief  that any problems are amen-
able to technocratic solutions.4 None of  these elements necessarily originated 
in right-wing politics. Indeed, many elements in Alberta’s early political cul-
ture—opposition to party discipline and to control by financial interests, for 
example—had left-wing support. Yet, in time, these same elements coalesced 
around a one-party corporatist state wedded to a single dominant industrial 
sector based in petroleum (Harrison 1995). How did this come about?
Oil and the Social Credit’s Rentier Government
Why did Alberta elect a right-wing Social Credit government while 
Saskatchewan, only a few years later, turned to the socialist Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation? This question, which has vexed observers for 
decades, has several not incompatible answers. Howard Leeson (1992, 11–12) 
argues the CCF’s close association with the UFA “tainted” the CCF party brand 
in Alberta (see also Finkel 2012). He further contends that the CCF was damaged 
by infighting between those who wanted power and those who demanded ideo-
logical purity—a conflict not uncommon to left-wing movements everywhere, 
even today.
One popular explanation holds that different early settlement patterns div-
ided the two provinces politically: that southern Alberta was primarily settled 
by arrivals from the United States, exemplars of  Frederick Jackson Turner’s 
“frontier thesis,” who carried in their saddlebags a mix of  egalitarian, demo-
cratic, and individualist values, while, by contrast, Saskatchewan and northern 
and central Alberta were settled by European immigrants who brought with 
them class-based orientations to politics (Wiseman 2007).
Another explanation, grounded in political economy, traces the provinces’ 
distinctive politics to differences in their primary economic activities (Brym 
1978). Farming, the basis of  Saskatchewan’s early economy, is an activity com-
mensurate with cooperative action, but ranching, Alberta’s economic base, is 
an enterprise that accentuates competitiveness and individualism.
Finally, the element of  religion is worth considering: specifically, that 
the distinctive political orientations of  the two provinces express different 
articulations of  religious belief. The influence of  the Social Gospel movement 
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on Wise Wood and Irvine has already been noted. The CCF’s leadership in 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, Tommy Douglas and J. S. Woodsworth, also came 
out of  this tradition, which emphasized the role of  creating a heaven on earth. 
By contrast, the Social Credit’s leadership—William Aberhart and his disciple, 
Ernest Manning—belonged to an evangelical tradition that had originated in 
the United States and that emphasized personal salvation through struggle and 
spiritual rewards in the hereafter.
Still, which populist form—left or right—would come to dominate was 
not immediately determined. When Aberhart died in 1943, Alberta’s eco-
nomic circumstances were not much different from those of  neighbouring 
Saskatchewan, a province that only one year later elected Douglas’s CCF. By this 
time, the Social Credit’s policy agenda was in tatters, the federal cabinet and the 
Supreme Court having long since disallowed much of  what the party had set 
out to do politically (Conway 1994, 122).5 The CCF, however, seemed on the rise, 
as shown in electoral outcomes of  the period.
In 1942, Elmer Roper, running for the CCF, won a provincial by-election 
in Edmonton. Roper—who somewhat later became Edmonton’s mayor—sub-
sequently led the party into the 1944 election, and the CCF gained nearly a 
quarter of  the vote but only two seats; the first-past-the-post electoral system 
combined with rural overrepresentation worked to the disadvantage of  a left 
progressive alternative.
Two other factors also played an important role in blunting left progressiv-
ism in Alberta. The first was the Cold War, beginning after 1945. Ernest Manning 
did not coin the term “Godless Communism,” but he certainly promoted fears 
of  it to great effect through his weekly religious broadcasts. For Manning, 
Marxism, communism, socialism, and even liberalism shared the common sin 
of  leading individuals away from their spiritual rebirth. The second factor was 
the discovery of  oil at Leduc, just south of  Edmonton, in 1947. Since 1930, the 
provincial governments of  Alberta and Saskatchewan had owned the mineral 
rights under the topsoil. But, as luck would have it, under Alberta’s turf  lay an 
abundance of  conventional petroleum deposits, while Saskatchewan was home 
to only a trickle of  oil along the shared border. What might Alberta and Canada 
look like today had the CCF been in power in Alberta when oil was discovered? 
Might Alberta have developed its own oil as a national resource? It is intriguing 
to speculate.
Instead, Alberta—headed by a conservative, business-oriented Social Credit 
government—opted to allow foreign (mainly American) oil companies to locate 
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and extract the oil in return for three types of  revenue: deposits on explora-
tion, bids on drilling rights, and production royalties (Barr 1974, 139–43). In 
effect, Manning’s government took a rentier approach to the development of  
the province’s oil resources, renting the resources to external clients and using 
the new revenues to entrench its own political power.
By the mid-1960s, Alberta had become—as Robin Mathews (1966) described 
in an early article in Canadian Dimension—a largely one-party, totalitar-
ian state, buttressed by a corporatist relationship between government and 
business, aided and abetted by a compliant media. Dissent was systematically 
squelched; worse, its suppression was internalized. Edmonton was the lone sig-
nificant site for left-progressive resistance, its standard bearer being the CCF-
NDP and its union affiliates—who, during this period, gave the party a tougher, 
more political edge—along with a few academics from the University of  Alberta 
and liberal-minded church leaders.6 Edmonton was a lone beachhead, however. 
Power remained with an entrenched, politically and ideologically conserva-
tive and rural elite. Predictably, when the Social Credit was defeated, it came 
not from left progressive forces but from a new segment of  the capitalist class 
itself, located in Alberta’s other major city, Calgary.
Lougheed’s Bourgeois Revolution
By 1968, oil had changed Alberta in noticeable ways. Though it was still a 
have-not province, its economic circumstances were improving. Moreover, it 
was becoming increasingly urbanized. The signs of  change were particularly 
evident in Calgary where—despite the strong presence of  American capital, 
expertise, and ideology—a new indigenous class of  entrepreneurs arose. Its 
leader was Peter Lougheed, a former Edmonton Eskimo and a lawyer with deep 
family ties to the province and personal ties to Alberta’s corporate commun-
ity. In 1971, as leader of  the Progressive Conservatives, Lougheed defeated the 
Socreds, ending one era of  single-party dominance and beginning another.
In politics, as in life generally, being in the right place at the right time is 
important. Alberta’s economy had long been dependent on conventional oil pro-
duction, but by the late 1960s, technological developments had made extracting 
oil from the province’s northern oil sands feasible. In 1967, the Great Canadian 
Oil Sands project started up, and the small locale of  Fort McMurray/Waterways 
began its boom. This was followed by the construction of  the Syncrude plant 
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north of  Fort McMurray in 1973—the same year the OPEC crisis drove the price 
of  oil to new heights, signalling profound changes in the world economy.
The Lougheed PC’s coming to power coincided with the rise of  activist prov-
incial governments across Canada who engaged directly in developing their 
own resources. Often, these resources were located in the northern reaches: 
hydro in Québec, Manitoba, and British Columbia, uranium in Saskatchewan—
and oil in Alberta. To many, Lougheed represented a new breed of  politician: 
young, urbane, and, at least in terms of  provincial rights, a nationalist. Indeed, 
to some on the Left, Lougheed appeared to be an economic nationalist who 
would use the powers of  the state to develop Alberta’s oil riches for all citizens 
and—as he promised—to diversify the province’s economy away from resource 
dependency.
As economist Ed Shaffer (1979) argued, however, the Lougheed govern-
ment’s rise to power signalled not a genuine revolution but the rise of  a new 
class, an indigenous “industrial bourgeoisie” that merely wanted its cut of  the 
petroleum spoils and used the state for these ends. While the Lougheed gov-
ernment set royalty rates high compared to subsequent Alberta governments 
(Campanella 2012), it did not challenge the right of  private capital—foreign or 
otherwise—to develop the province’s oil. The closest it came to doing so was 
with the creation in the early 1970s of  the Alberta Energy Company, which, 
while organized by the Alberta government, was operated by nongovernment 
personnel on a for-profit basis.
By contrast, in 1973, Saskatchewan’s NDP government, headed by Allan 
Blakeney, created a Crown corporation, Sask Oil. Though later privatized by a 
Conservative government, Sask Oil during its time provided a positive contrast 
to the approach taken by Alberta’s PCs, as related by John Warnock (2012): “By 
1981 Sask Oil had assets of  $191-million, gross revenues of  $60-million, and 
paid $26-million in royalties to the government. The Blakeney government 
also raised the oil royalties significantly. The share of  the economic rent (excess 
profits) going to the general population rose from 13 per cent in 1972 to reach 
a high of  65 per cent in 1982.” A left progressive government in Alberta might 
have followed a similar path, using the profits from petroleum to spur broader 
social and economic development—indeed, to further democratic participation 
more generally. But the Lougheed government did not do this.
When Lougheed stepped down as premier in 1985, Alberta’s economy was 
well on its way to being economically dependent on oil. The consequences 
of  putting all of  the province’s economic eggs in one basket were not long in 
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coming, as Ed Shaffer had warned presciently in 1979: “It is certain that this 
industrialization will have all the evils associated with capitalist develop-
ment—boom and bust, over-expansion in some sectors, under-expansion in 
others, urban blight and the degradation of  the environment. The benefits will 
accrue to the new ruling class while the relative position of  the workers, farm-
ers and small businessmen will continue to decline” (45).
Alberta’s rapid and intense growth throughout the 1970s depended on a con-
tinued rise in the price of  oil. But, as with all staple products, its price was set 
on the world market, over which Alberta had no control. In early 1979, the Shah 
of  Iran was deposed, setting the stage for another surge in world oil prices. At 
first, this seemed a boon to Alberta, but as quickly as the price of  oil had risen, 
it also fell. The result was starkly negative for Alberta. The planned expansion 
of  the oil sands stopped abruptly and conventional oil drilling was scaled back. 
With few other significant industries to fall back upon, Alberta’s economy and 
its people faced hard times. Laid-off  workers either left the province or sought 
unemployment insurance, many of  them walking away from mortgaged homes 
whose value had dropped dramatically. Food bank use proliferated and social 
services costs increased, even as government revenues dropped sharply.
Predictably, the collapse of  oil prices in the early 1980s set in motion a series 
of  conflicts between Alberta’s capitalist state and specific groups within Alberta 
as well as the federal government. Over the next few years, Alberta experienced 
labour unrest in both the public and private sectors, highlighted by the bitter 
and violent Gainers meat-packing plant strike in Edmonton in 1986. As efforts 
at diversification and development pushed further into Alberta’s north, con-
flict with the province’s traditional Aboriginal communities also intensified, 
and environmental concerns moved to the forefront of  political debate.7
Throughout 1983 and 1984, Alberta’s economy languished, leading to 
Lougheed’s resignation and replacement as premier by Don Getty in early 1985. 
It seemed an auspicious moment for Alberta’s democratic Left to make a break-
through, but fate intervened. On 19 October 1984, a plane carrying NDP leader 
Grant Notley crashed in northern Alberta, killing him and five others. Though 
he was the NDP’s lone legislative member, Notley was highly respected by all 
parties and many Albertans. As the title to Howard Leeson’s 1992 book suggests, 
Notley was “the social conscience of  Alberta.”
What might have happened had Notley not met his untimely death? We will 
never know. But two years later, under its new leader, Ray Martin, the NDP cap-
tured sixteen seats and 29 percent of  the vote, while the Liberals took four seats 
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and 12 percent of  the vote. The collapse of  the Progressive Conservative Party’s 
program of  state capitalism continued in 1989, when the NDP captured sixteen 
seats and 26 percent of  the vote and the upstart Liberals took eight seats and 
nearly 29 percent of  the vote.
Alberta’s economy continued to slide. Efforts to stimulate the economy 
through subsidies to the private sector proved ineffective. Government invest-
ments went poorly, with some enterprises in which the government had a stake 
going bankrupt. A whiff  of  scandal ensued. Politically, the provincial govern-
ment also faced pressure from Preston Manning’s nascent federal Reform Party, 
which had major support in Alberta, to lower taxes, cut government spending, 
and bring in balanced budgets. Ironically, the NDP suffered political damage 
from the Conservative government’s practice of  state capitalism, which many 
Albertans wrongly associated with socialism.
Facing declining poll numbers, Premier Don Getty announced in the fall 
of  1992 that he was resigning. Thus ended, for a time, Alberta’s experiment in 
government-led economic development. In tandem with the Canada-US Free 
Trade Agreement of  1989, the result was the abandonment by Alberta’s bour-
geoisie of  hopes for autochthonous development; instead, the province threw 
its fate in with its larger, corporate North American counterparts and the neo-
liberal agenda of  laissez-faire capitalism. Low in the polls, the Progressive 
Conservative Party cast its net in search of  new ideas and, more importantly, 
a new leader. In Ralph Klein—a former television reporter, Calgary mayor, and 
all around “man of  the people”—the party found a champion around which to 
repackage its image.
The Klein Era and the Rebuilding of the Progressive Left
The spring election of  1993 was a standoff  between the Klein-led PCs and the 
Alberta Liberals, led by Edmonton’s former mayor, Laurence Decore. In fact, 
there was little difference between the two parties.8 Both coalesced around a 
single definition of  the problem: a debt crisis for which there was a set of  par-
ticular solutions—deregulation, privatization, lower taxes, and cuts to govern-
ment programs. The New Democratic Party was shut out of  seats, and the voices 
of  the progressive Left was nearly drowned out entirely.
Over the next few years, Alberta reverted to its authoritarian impulses. 
Verbal attacks on those referred to as “special interests”—such as union mem-
bers, environmentalists, academics, and feminists (Harrison, Johnston, and 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
80   Trevor W. Harrison
Krahn 2005)—combined with drastic cuts in spending to public services and a 
messianic zeal for privatization and deregulation became the order of  the day. 
In the broader picture, the Klein years saw the final stage of  Alberta’s transition 
to being a right-wing corporatist state in which the interests of  the state align 
with those of  private corporations (Harrison 1995).
At the same time, however, the actions of  the Klein government—and, 
more broadly, the neoliberal project everywhere—created the conditions for 
the emergence of  its own opposition. As before, much of  the opposition arose 
in Edmonton, the government centre and the site where many of  the spend-
ing cuts had their greatest effect. The opposition involved not only those in 
the public sector, however, but also private sector unions under the umbrella 
of  the Alberta Federation of  Labour (AFL); a few courageous journalists; many 
professional organizations, such as the Alberta Teacher’s Association (ATA), 
the United Nurses of  Alberta (UNA), and the Alberta College of  Social Workers 
(ACSW); and some members of  the academic community. Public protests—
marches in the streets and pickets at the legislative building—became common 
events.
Alberta’s political culture was influenced at the time by externally based left-
progressive organizations, such as the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 
and the Council of  Canadians, founded in 1980 and 1985, respectively, and both 
headquartered in Ottawa. In Alberta, the decade prior to Klein’s arrival saw 
the founding, in 1985, of  the Pembina Institute, an organization that conducts 
research on energy and environmental issues and remains a vital source of  
information. The advent of  Klein had the effect of  reinvigorating existing left-
progressive organizations in Alberta, such as Friends of  Medicare, founded 
in 1979, which became a central player in battling efforts to introduce private 
health care into the province, thereby creating a two-tier system. The actions 
of  the Klein government also gave birth to new movements and organizations.
Among these, the case of  Parkland Institute is particularly instructive. 
Out of  a coalescing of  opposition forces, The Trojan Horse: Alberta and the Future 
of Canada was published in 1995 and launched at a conference held at the 
University of  Alberta. Co-edited by Gordon Laxer and me, the book merged 
academic and non-academic authors, political theorists and social activists, in a 
critical examination of  what was going on in Alberta at the time and how those 
happenings were relevant to larger changes within Canada and the world. The 
book and conference led to Parkland’s founding in 1996. The institute soon pub-
lished a seminal text in the history of  critical thought in Alberta—Kevin Taft’s 
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(1997) Shredding the Public Interest. The book detailed unflinchingly the Klein gov-
ernment’s deceptive depiction of  Alberta as facing a fiscal crisis based on social 
spending. It sold over twenty thousand copies, making it a publishing suc-
cess. In addition, the Progressive Conservatives’ hostile response to the book 
ensured its political success and quickly put Taft and Parkland on the political 
map. Today, the institute remains a centre of  critical left-progressive thought 
within Alberta.
In time, as opposition to the government’s neoliberal agenda grew, other 
organizations also entered the contest of  ideas, one of  them being Public 
Interest Alberta, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, province-wide organization dedi-
cated to education and advocacy that was founded in 2004. Yet despite these 
eruptions at the level of  civil society, the Progressive Conservative Party and 
its neoliberal policies maintain their stranglehold on Alberta politics. Why is 
this the case?
The Contradictions of Oil Wealth
To briefly recapitulate, when Peter Lougheed and the PCs came to power in 1971, 
they had one manifest purpose—to grow and diversify Alberta’s economy—
and one more latent aim—to act in the role of  patron for Alberta’s nascent 
bourgeoisie who, at the time, wanted to garner more of  the spoils of  the devel-
oping oil and gas economy. In the end, the ruling PCs failed on both counts. The 
recession of  the early 1980s, combined with the rise of  neoliberal globalization, 
squeezed out Alberta’s indigenous capitalist class, which was quickly replaced 
at the top of  the food chain by large international petroleum companies and 
their directors. At the same time, Alberta’s economy became increasingly 
dependent, both directly and indirectly, upon the petroleum industry.
At the political level, the Progressive Conservatives assured their political 
support by keeping taxes low, relying instead on royalties to fund the kind of  
programs (health, education, and social services) that established their legit-
imacy with the electorate. But the governing party itself, through a lax system 
of  political contributions, also became increasingly captive to the petroleum 
industry and its demand that royalty rates be kept low. As a consequence, 
because the government was unwilling to raise either general taxes or resource 
royalties, its policy options became limited, even as Alberta’s economic expan-
sion required increased spending—even, moreover, as the uncertainties of  oil 
markets made reliance upon royalties alone untenable.
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The government after 1993 dealt with these contradictions (and the recurrent 
fiscal crises) in two ways: first, by ramping up development of  the Athabasca 
oil sands so that, although royalty rates remained low, production levels—and 
hence the government’s total take—increased, and second, by keeping a tight 
rein on government expenditures. But these two tactics did not resolve the con-
tradictions; they merely altered their form. Increased production meant addi-
tional costs in the forms of  heightened inflation, higher infrastructure costs, 
and escalating environmental damage. The accelerating economy also required 
additional social expenditures (e.g. , health care, education, social services) to 
service a growing population, although spending was kept low relative to the 
growing size of  the economy (Taft 1997, 2012). Finally, increased production 
also intensified the impact of  unstable oil revenues on the funding of  govern-
ment programs.
Amidst a growing crisis of  legitimacy, Ralph Klein left office in 2006 and 
was replaced as premier by a rural MLA, Ed Stelmach. Stelmach’s victory 
was unexpected since he defeated the perceived front-runner Jim Dinning, a 
Calgary-based former Alberta Finance minister and a favourite of  the oil com-
panies. During his leadership run, Stelmach had announced his support for 
higher royalty rates, and, true to his word, the following spring, he created the 
Royalty Review Panel to examine Alberta’s oil royalties. The panel’s subsequent 
report, released in September 2007, recommended a rate increase. This recom-
mendation was attacked immediately—by the industry as being too aggres-
sive and by others as being too timid. In the end, the Conservative government 
chose to adopt an increase smaller than that recommended by the panel and 
phased in over a longer period of  time.9
Unfortunately for Stelmach and his supporters, the Great Recession had 
begun. Although Alberta seemed at first immune to the growing crisis, a result-
ant drop in global oil consumption soon led to a drop in Alberta’s revenues. After 
years of  surpluses, Stelmach’s Tories announced in the spring of  2009 that the 
province would run a record deficit for the year. The deficit opened up divisions 
between the PC party’s fiscal hawks and its Red Tory faction. At the same time, 
the raise in royalty rates, albeit modest, caused the petroleum industry to seek 
out a new political partner, quickly finding one in an embryonic political party, 
the Wildrose Alliance Party of  Alberta.
Wildrose was formed in January 2008 from the merger of  two small con-
servative parties, the Wildrose Party of  Alberta (founded in 2007) and the 
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Alberta Alliance Party (founded in 2003). Both of  these parties had strong con-
nections to the earlier right-wing populist Social Credit and Reform parties.
The Wildrose iteration gained political traction in the spring of  2009 from 
the growing deficit, divisions within the governing party, and pressures from 
the oil industry. The party received a further boost, in September 2009, when 
Danielle Smith was elected as its leader. Smith is a media-savvy populist with 
a libertarian streak, a graduate of  the Calgary School of  conservative thought 
and a former Fraser Institute intern. Measured against Stelmach’s less than char-
ismatic personality, Smith definitely came out ahead. Over the next year, the 
Wildrose Alliance Party’s membership and donations soared, much of  the latter 
coming directly from the oil and gas industry. Faced with declining poll numbers 
and growing dissent within his party, Stelmach announced in January 2011 that 
he would step down as premier, staying only until a new leader was in place.
In October 2011, Alison Redford, a former human rights lawyer widely 
viewed as a Red Tory, became Alberta’s premier. In April 2012, Redford led the 
PCs to electoral victory, taking sixty-one of  the eighty-seven seats and defeat-
ing the nearest competitor, the Wildrose Alliance, which took seventeen seats 
and became Alberta’s official opposition.
But victory did not address Alberta’s continuing budget problems brought 
about in part by changes in the global politics of  petroleum. First, environ-
mental concerns tied to climate change can no longer be politically ignored. 
Second, new discoveries of  oil and gas in the United States mean a possible 
decrease in demand from Alberta’s major buyer at the same time as a glut of  
available oil worldwide has decreased the price of  oil. And while demand from 
newly developing economies, notably China, could offset this loss, Alberta’s 
previous efforts to deal with its economic contradictions have created a third 
difficulty: a misalignment among the supply of  bitumen, the province’s cap-
acity to turn this raw product into usable oil, and the means of  getting either 
bitumen or refined oil to market. This mismatch has intensified the politics in 
recent years surrounding pipelines designed primarily to ship raw bitumen to 
refineries in the American south or to China, politics in which the Alberta gov-
ernment has found a strident supporter in the current Conservative-led gov-
ernment in Ottawa. An obvious solution to the lack of  pipeline capacity was to 
decrease production overall, while increasing royalty rates, and to build refin-
ery capacity in Alberta. But this would have required that the PC government 
face up to the contradictions embedded in the province’s political economy 
and stand up to the power of  the petroleum industry. These actions, in turn, 
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would have confronted Alberta’s democratic deficit, to which the dominance 
of  petroleum has contributed. The PCs, having become a captive of  the petrol-
eum industry, lacked the relative autonomy by which to save itself. The political 
space for a left-progressive revival slowly took shape.
Alberta’s 2015 Election: This Changes Everything
Until the recent 2015 election, Alberta seemed a paradigmatic case of  an osten-
sibly liberal, authoritarian, and corporatist state: liberal in its adoption of  
laissez-faire economics, minimalist democracy (i.e. , restricted to voting), and 
respect for human and political rights; authoritarian in its practice of  control-
ling information, buying off  supporters, and threatening opponents; and cor-
poratist in its almost seamless merging of  state and party, social institutions, 
and the interests of  the oil industry (see Stefanick, chapter 14, this volume).
The problem went even deeper, however. It was not just the Alberta state 
that lacked relative autonomy from the petroleum industry; the same was true 
of  many Albertans who had grown dependent, psychologically as well as eco-
nomically, upon the petroleum industry for their well-being and sense of  iden-
tity. Many oil workers in Alberta earn enough money to be safely placed within 
the top 1 percent of  income earners, making them unlikely recruits for a prole-
tarian revolution; hence, also, many Albertans, tied either directly or indirectly 
to the industry, tend to go to the barricades to defend the oil companies when 
there is any sign of  criticism from outside the province or, indeed, from inter-
nal naysayers.
This kind of  enforced conformity and defensiveness does not elicit polit-
ical enthusiasm. Albertans, when asked about politics, routinely expressed high 
degrees of  alienation, cynicism, and apathy (Johnston, Krahn, and Harrison 
2006, 165–82), with the result that electoral turnout steadily declined after 
Klein’s victory in 1993 (just over 40% in 2008 before rebounding in 2012 to 
just over 50%). While voting has declined across many Western democracies, 
it is particularly pronounced in Alberta and is a pattern specifically found in 
petro-states (Nikiforuk 2010). Thus, the most deleterious impact of  Alberta’s oil 
wealth has not only been on its economy but also, until May 2015, on the health 
of  its democracy.
In the spring of  2014, Premier Redford resigned. Her personal poll numbers 
were low, partly due to a series of  scandals. More broadly, however, an austerity 
budget brought out the previous spring had alienated the progressive base that 
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helped her get elected in 2012. Once again, an unwillingness and inability to 
free itself  from its corporate masters put the governing party in jeopardy, with 
added pressure coming from the Wildrose Party on the right.
In an effort to save itself, the PC party’s brain trust recruited Jim Prentice 
to run for the leadership. Prentice is a former Alberta MP and federal cabinet 
minister, and former senior vice-president with the Canadian Imperial Bank 
of  Commerce, from which (after winning the leadership) he stepped down in 
September 2014. From the outside, the PC party seemed unbeatable, possessors 
of  enormous financial resources, the levers of  state, and tradition. But, after 
forty-three years in power, its social base was small and aging, and the party 
was out of  touch with the changes occurring in Alberta society.
The party faced accumulating hostility from both the Left and Right, hostil-
ity that soon intensified. The floor-crossing of  (ultimately) eleven members of  
the Wildrose Party (including its leader, Danielle Smith) to the PCs in the fall of  
2014 in order to “unite the Right” at a time of  falling oil prices seemed to some, 
at the time, a master stroke. In fact, it hardened the dislike of  Wildrose support-
ers for the PCs, while also further alienating progressives. The discontent grew 
stronger when the Prentice government brought in a budget in spring 2015 that 
raised taxes for nearly everyone—except, notably, the corporations—at the 
same time as Prentice publicly rejected any thought of  reviewing Alberta’s roy-
alty structure.
Heedless of  all warning signs, Prentice called an election, believing there 
was no legitimate political alternative to which Albertans might turn. But 
alternatives did exist, particularly that of  the New Democratic Party. In the 
fall of  2014, the party had elected a new leader, Rachel Notley, the daughter of  
Grant Notley. Rachel Notley is a lawyer who was first elected to the legislature 
in 2008. As the election went on, Albertans came to see in her a genuine leader 
whose voice echoed earlier populist traditions, a leader whose vision suggests 
a way forward beyond the uncertainties and contradictions of  the petro-econ-
omy to a restored practice of  genuine democracy.
When the votes were counted on 5 May 2015, the NDs had won over fifty 
seats with 41 percent of  the vote; the Wildrose party had re-established itself  
under a new leader, Brian Jean, taking 21 seats; and the PCs had fallen to eleven 
seats. Although Prentice was re-elected in the Calgary Foothills district, he 
resigned immediately as PC leader and also gave up his seat in the legislature. 
After almost forty-four years, PC rule was ended.
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Today, as this book goes to press, Alberta has embarked on a fundamental 
political change, the outcome of  which cannot be predicted. But for the first 
time in a long while, there is hope. Politics, as the 2015 Alberta election proved, 
makes a difference—even in a petro-dominated, resource-based economy.
Notes
1 For a summary of  staples theory, see “Innis: Staples Theory,” Library and Archives 
Canada, 2007, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/innis-mcluhan/030003-1020-e.
html.
2 The United Farmers of  Ontario were elected in 1919, and the United Farmers of  
Manitoba in 1922. In the federal election of  1921, the National Progressives, support 
primarily by farmers, gained sixty-five seats, the second most in the House of  
Commons.
3 The term political culture has many meanings and is somewhat contentious. My 
use of  the term refers not only to political norms but also to those material forces, 
especially as possessed by the state (through voice, control of  information, laws, 
policies and programs, and the public purse), that shape values and beliefs. In 
short, I argue that norms are not free-floating but are materially produced under 
circumstances of  power and contestation (Harrison 2011).
4 It is worth noting that Preston Manning, in his early training, applied a systems 
approach to analyzing social and political problems. Indeed, Manning’s style of  
leadership has been widely described as technocratic (e.g. , Harrison 2000, 111).
5 Of  course, disallowance was also useful to the Social Credit in proving the threat 
to Alberta posed by external power blocs—in this case, the federal government. 
Likewise, the National Energy Program of  the 1980s would prove to be immensely 
beneficial in mobilizing Albertans against the federal government, especially the 
Liberal Party.
6 Of  particular note in the union movement at this time was Neil Reimer, an 
established social activist and trade union organizer who headed the NDP from 1962 
to 1968. Reimer’s legacy later continued through his daughter, Janice Reimer, who was 
Edmonton’s mayor from 1989 to 1995.
7 It is worth noting that conflict with Aboriginal peoples also occurred in other parts of  
Alberta (the Oldman Dam) and Canada (Oka, Ipperwash, and Gustafson Lake) during 
roughly this same period. As highlighted in part 2 of  this book, conflicts between 
the capitalist state and labour (Canadian and foreign workers alike), women, and 
Aboriginal peoples continues apace.
8 The 1993 election points out the problem of  necessarily labelling any party or group 
as “left” or “progressive,” or even “right” or “centre.” Nothing is fixed. The Liberals 
under Decore moved to the centre-right for political purposes, but after being 
defeated, they spent the next few years attempting to redefine their place on the 
political spectrum.
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9 On the decreasing trajectory of  Alberta’s royalty rates over time, see David 
Campanella’s 2012 report for Parkland Institute.
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Petro-politics in Alberta and Canada
A New Spatiality of Political Contestation?
Peter (Jay) Smith
In today’s globalized world of  risks and uncertainty, global realities are increas-
ingly impinging on the options available to Albertans and Canadians with 
regard to the development and export of  their energy resources, particularly 
the bitumen sands of  northern Alberta. This has led to a contentious debate—
evident in the conflict over the terms oil sands and tar sands—that is taking place 
at local, national, and global levels.
Clearly, in a globalized world, the spaces of  politics are being transformed. 
No longer is politics solely centred around the institutions of  the state. Thanks 
to digital technologies, there is a new spatiality, one that Manuel Castells (2010a, 
xxxii) describes as the “space of  flows”—“the material support of  simultaneous 
social practices communicated at a distance,” made possible by “the produc-
tion, transmission and processing of  flows of  information.” This space of  flows, 
with its ideas, politics, new transnational political actors, and advocacy, is now 
intersecting with provincial and national politics and public policy. The result 
is a new cycle of  what Charles Tilly (2008, 5) calls “contentious politics,” defined 
as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s inter-
est, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of  claims, or third 
parties.” Contentious politics—in this case, surrounding energy development 
in Canada—means that the normal expression of  politics no longer centres 
around traditional interaction with the state (letters to MPs, lobbying, personal 
contact) but takes more disruptive forms, such as demonstrations. There are 
two forms of  globalization at work here: globalization from above, in which 
governments and corporations are the key actors, and globalization from 
below, in which social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
and citizens are the key actors.
3
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In this chapter, I argue that globalization and neoliberalism have opened up 
new spaces for political contestation in Alberta. A shrinking state characterized 
by a reduction in expenditures and functions and a weakening of  democratic 
institutions within a globally driven oil economy makes Alberta vulnerable to 
this type of  contestation. I explore this new era of  contentious politics over the 
development and export of  Alberta’s bitumen sands, arguing that this newly 
contentious approach is already having significant political effects, particu-
larly in regard to relations with Canada’s Indigenous peoples. Essentially, 
Indigenous groups argue that Canada and mining companies are ignoring their 
rights, titles, and interests and that further development threatens their sur-
vival and the environment on which they depend. Not having received satisfac-
tion from either the provincial or the federal state, many Indigenous groups 
are taking their case to the global level, often in alliance with environmental 
organizations. The global scope of  the struggle over bitumen development 
means that, today, it is the national government, with its responsibilities for 
external relations, that is mediating the conflict on the international and global 
levels, with the Alberta government, historically the primary advocate of  the 
oil industry, playing a secondary role. This has already had two effects. First, 
the Conservative-led Canadian government has warmed its once cool relations 
with China, a potential market, and, second, Alberta is in a period of  warming 
with regard to its relations with Ottawa.1 What is uncertain, however, is the out-
come of  the cycle of  protest explored in this chapter.
I begin this chapter by placing this cycle of  contention in a global con-
text, arguing that it features two conflicting ideas of  “how the world should 
be organized”: the neoliberal vision relegates political and economic power to 
the market, and the justice-oriented vision emphasizes democracy at all levels, 
including international institutions and the liberal democratic state (Smith 
2008, 3). In this first section, I also consider the changing locus of  power in the 
world, the rise of  the garrison or security state, the emergence of  new polit-
ical opportunity structures, and the framing of  political messaging. I move in 
the second section to a discussion of  the development and export of  bitumen 
as the latest example of  Canada’s dependence on staple products, noting both 
the uncertainty surrounding bitumen export and the concern of  critics in civil 
society. The third section considers the cycle of  contention within the Canadian 
context, examining the issue of  bitumen sands development and export in 
general and profiling this contention not in terms of  the Keystone XL pipe-
line to the United States but on other fronts of  the battle, including Europe and 
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British Columbia, the site of  the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway pipe-
line. I discuss the major players—in particular, the governments of  Alberta and 
Canada, allied corporations and governments in Europe, and the networked 
transnational opposition represented by a growing confluence of  Indigenous 
and environmental movements across Canada, the United States, and Europe. I 
focus particularly on how the debate has been framed and how both sides take 
advantage of  political opportunity structures to press their case. The final sec-
tion is an attempt to assess the relative success of  each side in this continuing 
drama. I conclude with thoughts about the possible future of  political contesta-
tion in Alberta and Canada: Is transnational activism a harbinger of  things to 
come, especially in the natural resource sector?
Neoliberalism, Dissent, and National Discourse
There is little doubt that Albertan and Canadian energy development and 
export is spurring a new cycle of  protest, one that has become transnational. 
This cycle needs to be situated within the context of  the waves of  protest against 
neoliberal globalization that began in the 1990s and continue to the present. 
Protests, then, have become a staple of  contemporary political life.
Neoliberalism represents the latest form of  globalization. Neoliberalism can 
be defined as a social, political, and economic ideology according to which mar-
kets, not states, should be the fundamental allocators of  values in a society. 
With neoliberalism has come a shift in the loci of  political power. First, exter-
nal to the state itself, markets are increasingly replacing states as allocators of  
societal values and are viewed by proponents of  neoliberalism as the best means 
of  improving the lives of  most people; thus, the role of  the state in society has 
become more limited in scope. Internally within states, as Donatella Della Porta 
and Sidney Tarrow acknowledge (2005, 2), “there has been a continuing shift 
in power from parliaments to the executive, and within the executive, to the 
bureaucracy and to quasi-independent agencies.” This shift represents a clear 
de-emphasis of  democracy. Moreover, as states have begun to lose their cap-
acity and willingness to perform and to deliver what many citizens want, pol-
itical alienation has risen worldwide. Governments, parliaments, and global 
corporations now rank very low in terms of  public trust. All of  this has led 
Manuel Castells (2010b, 414) to conclude that “political [i.e. , liberal] democracy 
. . . has become an empty shell.” Castells may be too dismissive here. Democratic 
institutions, while weakened, are still worth contesting. However, the trend 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
92   Peter (Jay) Smith
is toward a “leaner, meaner state” (Evans 1997, 85), sometimes referred to as a 
“garrison state,” in which the welfare state—a critical means to the provision 
of  social and economic justice (in the form of  social security, equality of  access 
to education and health care, and the equitable distribution of  wealth)—is de-
emphasized in favour of  security, the military, the protection of  property, and 
the building of  prisons (Smith 2008, 71). Yet at the same time, as Foucault (1978, 
94–95) notes, “where there is power, there is resistance.” Those who are engaged 
in nonviolent resistance and protest against neoliberal globalization, though, 
are often seen as another threat “on par with terrorism, football hooliganism, 
and transnational organized crime,” to which authorities must respond (Smith 
2008, 73).
Thus, dissenters are perceived as a threat to security, another risk to be 
managed. Foucault (1991) argues that risk is socially produced and that groups 
deemed to be sources of  risk are subject to surveillance and to discipline and 
control through the collection and application of  knowledge. Today, accord-
ing to the Canadian government, these threats are “environmentalists” and 
other “radical groups,” such as Indigenous peoples. (Oliver 2012). Just how the 
Government of  Canada has framed these threats shall be examined shortly.
Although global neoliberalism has contributed to the rise of  the garrison 
state in Canada, globalization also facilitates resistance. In particular, it frag-
ments authority and creates new political opportunity structures for social 
movements and other nonstate actors. As Hein-Anton van der Heijden writes 
(2006, 28), “Political opportunity structure refers to the specific features of  a 
political system . . . that can explain the different action repertoires, organiza-
tional forms and impacts of  social movements, and social movement organiza-
tions in that specific country.” In other words, a political opportunity structure 
(POS) is where one goes within a state—its institutions and personnel—to find 
friends, mobilize allies, and draw political attention to one’s concerns. Today, 
globalization provides POSs beyond the state.
POSs can either constrain or enable collective action. On the one hand, the 
more decentralized and “the more open the formal institutional structure and 
the more integrative the informal elite strategies, the larger will be the number 
of  NGOs that try to influence the politics . . . by conventional means” (37). Thus, 
a nation-state that features competitive parties, a legislature with relative 
independence, an independent judiciary, and political and bureaucratic elites 
who listen is a preferred POS for social movements and NGOs. At the inter-
national level, the same principle of  decentralization and openness applies. 
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The United Nations is a preferred POS because it offers social movement organ-
izations both consultative status and an opportunity to be heard, although the 
UN has little formal power to implement decisions. The European Union is also 
relatively open and decentralized, with social movement organizations able to 
gain access to political and bureaucratic elites.
On the other hand, Van der Heijden argues that “the more closed the formal 
institutional structure and the more exclusive the informal elite strategies, 
the larger will be the number of  unconventional . . . actions” such as protests 
(38). Under the influence of  neoliberalism, Laurie Adkin (2009, 2) argues, 
the Canadian and provincial political systems are closing. In Alberta, this is 
exacerbated by a historically weak legislature, strong executive, and weak party 
competition (see Harrison, this volume). While in recent years, the Alberta 
government has initiated multistakeholder consultations on bitumen sands 
development, the process is cosmetic and produces little policy change. As a 
result, “the government’s strategy has lost its legitimacy” (Hoberg and Phillips 
2011, 524).
However, as political spaces close in one venue, they can open up in another. 
One option for social movements is to go to bodies such as the UN and EU. In 
addition, governing institutions, whether national or international, in which 
political spaces have closed can find themselves targets of  political protests and 
transnational campaigns against their policies. Increasingly, social movements 
and NGOs are also creating their own POSs, within which people can meet and 
organize. In a globalizing world, then, political spaces are becoming reconfig-
ured, more complex, and fragmented (Crack 2007; Mouffe 1999). Citizenship 
is also becoming more complex and is being practiced on a variety of  domestic 
and global levels (Sassen 2003).
Globalization, moreover, has stimulated the creation of  global Indigenous 
and environmental movements. The exponential growth of  the global economy 
has led to a thirst for cheap energy and resources (Haluza-DeLay and Davidson 
2008). According to Ken Coates (2004, 216), “The imperatives of  the industrial 
world, which needed energy, minerals, wood and pulp . . . drove nations to move 
aggressively into remote regions. In very few instances . . . did the national gov-
ernments take the concerns and needs of  indigenous peoples very seriously.” 
Since states proved unresponsive to Indigenous peoples, the United Nations 
became a preferred venue, not only for human rights advocacy but also for par-
ticipation in climate conferences, often together with environmental groups 
(Powless 2012). The rapid expansion of  the global economy, the externalization 
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of  environmental costs, and the fear of  climate change spurred the rise of  a 
global environmental movement. In particular, the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro served as a cata-
lyst for the creation of  this movement (United Nations Department of  Public 
Information 1997).
Given that the grievances and claims of  Indigenous and environmental 
movements cannot be taken for granted, framing is critical to the success of  
these movements. Frames provide meaning and the symbolic construction of  
collective identity for social movements; they also assist in articulating the 
nature of  the problem and the call for action (Gamson 2004, 243). However, 
governments can also frame an issue in a particular way; thus, frames can clash, 
with both sides—social movements and governments—competing to shape 
public opinion.
The terms tar sands and oil sands provide an excellent example of  competing 
frames. As Debra Davidson and Mike Gismondi (2011, 27) point out, the bitu-
men deposits of  northern Alberta have been known by both terms since their 
discovery in the 1800s. Today, governments and media prefer to use the term oil 
sands, while critics prefer tar sands. According to Davidson and Gismondi, the 
Alberta Minister of  Environment announced in 2001 “that the issue is closed, 
and oil sands is the officially sanctioned term” (27–28). This has had a signifi-
cant effect on discourse in both the legislature and the mass media. At one 
time, there was only a marginal difference in the provincial legislature in the 
use of  these competing terms. By 2007, however, the ratio was over three to 
one, with oil sands being the preferred term (Davidson and Gismondi 2011, 27, 
fig. 2.1). When I inserted the two terms into ProQuest’s data system on 13 April 
2015, Canadian Newsstand brought up 83,933 stories with oil sands and 13,435 
stories with tar sands, a six-to-one ratio: clearly, most Canadians are exposed to 
the more benign term. Today, using the term tar sands risks inviting the wrath 
of  governments and the mass media, which serves as a means of  disciplining 
public expression.
Landlocked Oil: All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go?
Once only a dream of  Alberta governments and petroleum corporations, the 
development of  Alberta’s bitumen deposits has become a reality and, increas-
ingly, a multifaceted problem. At one time too costly to pursue, bitumen produc-
tion in Alberta is rising rapidly, with The Economist predicting an increase from 
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2 millions barrels a day, in 2012, to 3.3 million by 2020, or “from 58% to 72% of  
Canada’s total oil output” (“Great Pipeline Battle” 2012). Canada is vaulting into 
the top ranks of  global crude oil producers, fulfilling the Harper government’s 
pledge to make Canada an “energy superpower” (Canwest News Service 2006). 
The problem is “there’s too much oil and not enough pipe” (Vanderklippe 2012), 
which has made finding markets and building pipelines matters of  great polit-
ical importance.
In one sense, there is little new here. Canada has a history of  fretting about 
access to markets for its staple products. According to political economist Harold 
Innis (1984), the exploitation of  successive staple commodities accounts for the 
particular pattern of  Canada’s economic, political, and cultural development. 
Canada was part of  a world economic system, the hinterland dependent on a 
more economically developed nation, the metropolis. At the heart of  Innis’s 
analysis is the belief  that staple production has dominated Canadian history. 
According to Stephen McBride (2005, 30), “There is little new about market 
dependency: the intrusion of  international factors and concerns into Canada’s 
domestic political economy was the central concern of  Canadian political econ-
omy long before the term ‘globalization’ was coined.” Market dependency was 
also a factor in the negotiation of  the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). At that time, the problem was “trapped gas”: Canadian producers 
had a surplus of  deliverable natural gas, which led to depressed prices. In brief, 
“NAFTA opened the way to new pipelines and a much deeper integration of  the 
American and Canadian energy sectors” (Pratt 2007, 468). Today, the issue is 
bitumen, not natural gas, and the fear, once again, is depressed prices—hence, 
the urgency to build more pipelines.2 
In addition, there is uncertainty about demand in the United States, which 
is now almost the only customer for Alberta’s energy. Thanks to new produc-
tion technologies that are allowing the extraction of  once inaccessible oil and 
natural gas supplies, US demand for foreign sources of  energy is declining 
rapidly (Lamphier 2012). Indeed, the bitumen targeted for the Gulf  Coast in 
the future could end up being surplus to US needs. At present, because the US 
market cannot absorb all the gasoline and diesel produced in the United States 
from the crude oil that is imported from Alberta, the excess is being shipped 
to Latin American countries such as Mexico and Colombia, who, while produ-
cers of  heavy oil, do not yet have their own upgrading capacities, a situation 
that is expected to be rectified (Cooper 2012). This leads to a critical question: 
“With North American and European consumer markets flat or declining, and 
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Latin American nations producing enough for their own needs, what is left?” 
(Cooper 2012). The end result is that shipping bitumen to Kitimat on the BC 
coast through the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline, and then on 
to Asia (primarily China), takes on paramount importance for the governments 
of  Alberta and Canada, both increasingly anxious to find secure markets for 
bitumen. This anxiety is compounded by escalating national and transnational 
resistance to bitumen development and export.
Bitumen Extraction and Pipeline Export: Resistance Goes Transnational
Resistance to bitumen extraction and export can be found in two social move-
ments that are increasingly working in concert: the Indigenous and environ-
mental movements. The emphasis here will be on the Indigenous movement. 
Both movements are transnational and networked, embodying what can be 
described as a “cultural logic of  networking” based on the logic of  global cap-
italism, itself  a networked system (Juris 2012, 266). That is, the same means of  
Internet communication that permits businesses to operate on a global scale 
also allows social movements and organizations to organize against them 
through highly diverse networks. Rejecting the top-down command structure 
of  political parties, networked organizations forge horizontal ties and empha-
size inclusivity and autonomy in pursuit of  common goals.
Participants in both movements agree that formal political institutions and 
channels in Canada are closing, which necessitates finding and using political 
opportunity structures (POSs) outside of  Canada to try and influence domes-
tic opinion and government policy. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 
12) call this the “boomerang effect”: “when a government violates or refuses 
to recognize rights . . . domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search 
out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside.” 
Through their activities abroad, NGOs frequently utilize a “mobilization of  
shame” (23) to bring visibility to their causes and to reframe debate at home and 
make their domestic governments more compliant.
Canadian Indigenous organizations have found a variety of  receptive POSs 
beyond Canada’s borders. According to Ben Powless (2012, 415), “A trans-
national, Indigenous movement really emerged during the 1970s largely in 
response to these closed doors at the national level and seemingly opening 
ones at the level of  the United Nations.” In addition to the UN, the European 
Union and the governments and legislators of  Europe have been open POSs. 
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Representatives of  Indigenous organizations also attend mass global confer-
ences and meetings, such as the World People’s Conference on Climate Change 
and the Rights of  Mother Earth held in Bolivia in 2010, where they are wel-
come and have opportunities to network with others. Increasingly, Indigenous 
groups are participating in shareholder activism, whereby activist organiza-
tions purchase shares in corporations—in this instance, oil companies invested 
in the bitumen sands—and make their case at the annual general meetings of  
shareholders. In addition, cross-country speaking tours in Canada and Europe 
have been organized.
Of  particular importance to the transnationalization of  the Indigenous 
movement is the United Nations. Going to the UN was a logical step, given its 
willingness to grant consultative status to NGOs. As early as 1982, a Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations was created at the UN. In 1987, this group 
was tasked with creating a declaration of  Indigenous human rights, which 
took twenty years to complete, culminating in the adoption in 2007 of  the 
Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples. These rights have become 
part of  what are known as “third-generation” rights, or solidarity rights, and 
they include the rights to self-determination, economic and social develop-
ment, a healthy environment, food, and natural resources, as well as the right 
to communicate. Of  particular importance here is Article 32(2) of  the declara-
tion, which reads:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain 
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of  any project affect-
ing their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection 
with the development, utilization or exploitation of  mineral, water or other 
resources. (United Nations General Assembly 2007)
The above has come to be known as the right to “free, prior and informed con-
sent” (FPIC). Initially, Canada was opposed to this language, along with other 
articles of  the declaration, and refused to adopt it, fearing it could be used as a 
veto power over issues affecting not only Indigenous peoples but all Canadians. 
Being one of  four holdouts—along with the United States, Australia, and New 
Zealand, all with significant Aboriginal populations—isolated Canada in world 
opinion, and on 12 November 2010, Canada finally adopted the declaration, 
noting, however, that it was not legally binding on Canada (Canada 2014).
While not legally binding, the declaration is an important development in the 
acknowledgement of  human rights and is indicative of  the direction that world 
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nations should be taking. The concept of  “free, prior and informed consent” has 
become instrumental to the framing of  the Indigenous movement. Moreover, 
as one of  the signatories to the International Convention on the Elimination of  
All Forms of  Racial Discrimination, Canada is legally obligated to report to the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination (CERD) on its com-
pliance with the terms of  the convention.2 In February and March 2012, CERD 
reviewed Canada’s nineteenth and twentieth periodic reports and allowed 
Indigenous organizations to respond by submitting alternative reports. One 
such report was submitted by First Nations Women Advocating Responsible 
Mining (FNWARM), a coalition based in northern British Columbia, where any 
proposed pipeline would necessarily traverse Indigenous lands. The FNWARM 
report declares:
Our very survival is threatened by resource developments being pursued 
in the absence of  proper consultation and accommodation, under a regime 
of  antiquated government legislation, standards and practices and in an 
environment marked by discriminatory practices, ignorance and willful 
destruction of  our lands and way of  life in the name of  profit at any cost.4
Other First Nations reports echoed this refrain. One report, jointly submitted 
by a number of  First Nations and Indigenous rights organizations, requested 
that CERD ask Canada’s UN representatives what the country was doing to 
fully implement the principle of  free, prior, and informed consent.5 This report 
places considerable emphasis on the negative environmental impacts of  the 
development of  the tar sands, stating that “the results are devastating for 
Indigenous Peoples,” and calls for a moratorium on tar sands extraction and 
pipeline construction.6
Similar concerns were voiced in a resolution adopted in August 2011 at a 
meeting in Manaus, Brazil, that was attended by representatives of  Indigenous 
peoples from around the world, in preparation for the UN Rio + 20 Conference 
to be held in June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro. The resolution noted that tar sands 
extraction was “vastly destructive to the Indigenous Peoples of  the region” and 
was “a major source of  greenhouse gas emissions.” Moreover, like the Keystone 
XL pipeline project, these projects were “being carried out without the free prior 
informed consent of  the impacted Indigenous Peoples as affirmed in Article 32 
of  the UN Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples.” The resolution also 
called for “for an immediate halt to the Tar Sands extraction,” as well as to con-
struction of  the XL pipeline.7
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These documents exemplify the activity of  Canadian First Nations at the 
United Nations in opposition to bitumen sands extraction and pipeline con-
struction, as well as the inclusion of  Canadian First Nations in a global network 
of  Indigenous peoples.8 Yet the UN is only one venue for activity. Not only is the 
movement for Indigenous rights  in itself  global, but it now works in concert 
with a broad-based network of  environmental groups and allied organizations.
In May 2012, organizations in this network engaged in intense lobbying in 
Europe over the possible approval of  an addition to the European Fuel Quality 
Directive that would determine the acceptable level of  carbon emissions pro-
duced by various types of  oil, including bitumen oil, that might potentially be 
sold in Europe. The EU has calculated that the “well-to-wheels” emissions of  
oil from bitumen sands are 23 percent higher than existing EU standards allow 
(McCarthy 2012). Despite this finding, on 17 December 2014, the proposed 
requirement that oil from unconventional sources, such as bitumen sands, be 
labelled as such was defeated in the European Parliament, albeit by only twelve 
votes (Crisp 2014). Europe does not currently import oil from Alberta, but 
should such a labelling requirement ever become part of  the EU Fuel Quality 
Directive, it could become a widely accepted standard in other countries as well, 
thereby lending force to the claim of  environmental groups that bitumen oil is 
“dirty oil.”
In making their case in Europe, environmental organizations worked closely 
with Canadian First Nations. Included in the collective-action repertoire were 
speaking tours, lobbying, and shareholder activism. For example, in 2011, sev-
eral of  the organizations in the network facilitated a week-long speaking tour 
of  England by Beaver Lake Cree Nation youth from Alberta. Support for the 
action came from a number of  NGOs in the UK, including the UK Tar Sands 
Network. The purpose of  the UK Tar Sands Network is to campaign “in partner-
ship with Indigenous communities affected by the Tar Sands oil developments 
in Canada,” with campaigns targeting “governments, UK companies, banks and 
investors operating in the Alberta Tar Sands.”9 The speaking tour was organized 
by People and Planet, the largest student network in Britain, and was part of  a 
solidarity exchange in which UK students travelled to Alberta to visit the Beaver 
Creek Cree Nation. On 11 July 2011, the students staged a theatrical protest out-
side the Alberta Environment offices, which was widely covered by major UK 
media outlets.10
In 2011, the UK Tar Sands Network, together with the Indigenous 
Environmental Network (IEN), sponsored a First Nations speaking tour in the 
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UK to campaign for divestment from British Petroleum following the com-
pany’s decision to invest in the bitumen sands. The speakers who took part in 
the tour attended BP’s annual general meeting, which was very contested and 
received considerable publicity in the British press.11
The IEN, a key link between groups in the UK and Canadian First Nations 
and civil society organizations, focuses on issues of  environmental and eco-
nomic justice from an Indigenous perspective. Founded in the United States in 
1990, the IEN  has developed strong Canadian and global connections, particu-
larly in Europe. For example, in May 2011, working with Friends of  the Earth 
Europe and Friends of  the Earth France, the IEN sponsored a tour that tar-
geted French investors, the French government, and members of  the European 
Parliament. “We are calling for a higher standard on tar sands in the EU Fuel 
Quality Directive,” said the IEN’s Heather Milton-Lightening: “We hope this 
forces other countries to stop developing, investing and importing Canadian tar 
sands oil.” Lionel Lepine, of  the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, described 
tar sands development as tantamount to “slow genocide for First Nations living 
within the extraction zone” (quoted in Canada Newswire 2011).
In March 2012, the IEN—in cooperation with the Council of  Canadians, 
Climate Action Network Canada, and Bill Erasmus, chief  of  the Dene Nation, 
and with the support of  European allies—organized a tour that began with 
visits to EU embassies in Ottawa and proceeded to Paris, The Hague, London, 
and Berlin to meet with government officials in support of  strengthening the 
European Fuel Quality Directive (Council of  Canadians 2012). Finally, in cooper-
ation with the UK Tar Sands Network, the IEN coordinated a visit to The Hague 
of  a spokesperson for the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation in May 2012, who 
presented grievances to the chairman, board, and shareholders of  Shell.
The foregoing is hardly exhaustive. In cooperation with other participants 
in the Indigenous movement, the IEN, and environmental organizations from 
Canada, the United States and Europe, the Indigenous peoples of  Alberta have 
developed a strong, complex support network that allows them to voice their 
claims within a wide variety of  POSs at various political scales. How have the 
Alberta and Canadian governments and their allies in the oil industry responded?
Fighting Back: The Development of a Counter-frame
Given the range of  national and international POSs within which the 
Indigenous and environmental movements operate, the development of  an 
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eff ective counter-frame by the Alberta government alone is not possible. Critics 
of  bitumen extraction and, increasingly, pipeline construction can be found on 
every continent. It is the Canadian government that is responsible for external 
relations and that has the right of  primary access to many international POSs. 
Alberta, therefore, must cooperate with and rely upon the leadership of  the 
federal government in framing its response.
Figure 3.1. “The Milch Cow,” a cartoon fi rst published in the 15 December 1915 edition of 
the Grain Growers’ Guide. Courtesy of the Glenbow Archives (NA-3055-24).
This is contrary to much of  Alberta’s history within Confederation. Roger 
Gibbins (1992, 70) writes of  a political ideology of  western alienation, defi ned 
as “the belief  that the West is always outgunned in national politics and as a 
consequence has been subject to varying degrees of  economic exploitation by 
central Canada.” This conviction was famously illustrated in a 1915 cartoon (see 
fi gure 3.1), and, as Gibbins notes, it “enjoys deep historical roots and contem-
porary nourishment.” Today, however, this is not the dominant narrative of  the 
Alberta government: working together and cooperating with the other prov-
inces and the federal government is.
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On the international level, gone is the Harper government’s truculent rela-
tionship with China. When Harper and the Progressive Conservatives first 
came to power in 2006, the Canadian government was noted for its chilly rela-
tionship with China (Goodspeed 2012). Only later did it become apparent that 
China was an important potential customer for energy from Alberta’s bitumen 
deposits and could no longer be given the cold shoulder.
It was clear that Canada and Alberta, facing a growing reputational prob-
lem, had to cultivate friends and allies abroad. By 2008, the international 
environmental movement had bestowed upon Canada its third Fossil of  the 
Year award.12 In Europe, the framing by the environmental and Indigenous 
movements had been gaining traction in public opinion and at the EU, which 
in 2007 began proposing amendments to the 1998 Fuel Quality Directive that 
would reduce GHG emissions for transport fuels. Emails obtained under the 
federal Freedom of  Information Act indicate an awareness that negative pub-
licity could adversely affect billions of  dollars of  investment in the bitumen 
sands. Sushma Gera, a London-based Canadian diplomat, wrote in a confi-
dential email in August 2010, “The oil sands are posing a growing reputational 
problem, with the oil sands defining the Canadian brand.” Gera went on to say 
that, in view of  the growing number of  NGO campaigns aimed at the European 
public, “we anticipate increased risk to Canadian interests much beyond the oil 
sands” (quoted in Lewis, Ljunggren, and Jones 2012).
In fact, in 2009, Ottawa established a Pan-European Oil Sands Team 
consisting of  representatives from the Alberta government, the Canadian 
Association of  Petroleum Producers (CAPP), federal environment and natural 
resource ministries, European oil companies, and the Royal Bank of  Scotland, as 
well as diplomats from major Canadian embassies in Europe (Lewis, Ljunggren, 
and Jones 2012). In January 2010, a number of  these embassies launched the 
Pan-European Oil Sands Advocacy Strategy. The strategy uses the language of  
framing and is explicit in its targets and its repertoires of  action. One intended 
outcome is described as a “reframing of  the European debate on oil sands in [a] 
manner that protects and advances Canadian interests related to the oil sands 
and broader Canadian interests in Europe.” The strategy acknowledges the 
effectiveness of  the opposition, stating that the “oil sands have been the focus 
of  many high profile NGO campaigns in Europe stressing their environmental 
and social impacts (in particular Aboriginal issues) which are actively framing 
the issue in a strongly negative light . . . in key European countries.” There was 
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a lot at stake, as “Canada’s reputation as a clean, reliable source of  energy may 
be put at risk.”13
Some of  the desired outcomes of  the reframing strategy include improving 
Canada’s image as a “responsible energy producer,” maintaining the confidence 
of  investors, and encouraging the dissemination of  “positive/factual informa-
tion” about Canada’s bitumen development. Goals also include an “increased 
acceptance by Europeans” of  the critical role of  Canada’s bitumen production 
in global energy security, an “increased and more balanced” understanding of  
the environmental impacts of  bitumen development, and an increased under-
standing of  Canada’s and Alberta’s approach to “consulting with First Nations 
and addressing their concerns.”14 The promotional tactics implicit in the strat-
egy correspond closely to a repertoire of  actions that Canadian government 
officials in Europe have pursued since 2010, which have included lobbying 
efforts directed at European officials and politicians, the hosting of  tours of  
the bitumen sands for investors and corporate executives, outreach to corpora-
tions and banks, and the hiring of  public relations firms to focus on obtaining a 
watered-down version of  the Fuel Quality Directive.
The document then identifies the POSs of  the strategy—Canada’s allies and 
adversaries. The POSs, or targets, include national and European politicians and 
governments, the public, investors, and the EU Commission. The allies listed 
in the document include energy companies, energy industry associations, the 
Alberta government, and the National Energy Board.15 Naming the NEB as an 
ally is curious given that the NEB is supposedly neutral, serving at arm’s length 
from government and functioning in the public interest. Adversaries include 
NGOs, especially environmental NGOs and Aboriginal groups. Naming the 
latter as an adversary highlights a conundrum faced by the Canadian gov-
ernment—that is, how to seem sympathetic to Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, 
knowing that Europeans are concerned about their welfare, health, and right 
to be consulted, and yet have an effective strategy in which they are in fact 
marginalized.
Indeed, the marginalization of  adversaries has become a cornerstone of  the 
Canadian government’s political and framing objectives. This is evident in fed-
eral Minister of  Natural Resources Joe Oliver’s “Open Letter” to Canadians, of  
January 2012. It is written from the perspective of  security and risk, in which 
threats to the export of  bitumen are identified and a course of  action recom-
mended. Oliver starts by acknowledging that the United States is no longer a 
dependable market for Canada’s oil. Instead, “we need to diversify our markets 
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in order to create jobs and economic growth for Canadians across this coun-
try.” This means that “we must expand our trade with the fast growing Asian 
economies,” as this “will help ensure the financial security of  Canadians and 
their families” (Oliver 2012). Although Oliver nowhere explicitly mentions 
Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway pipeline, the inference is clear.
However, there “are environmental and other radical groups” who “threaten 
to hijack our regulatory system to achieve their radical ideological agenda.” 
They “seek to exploit any loophole . . . to ensure that delays kill good projects”—
projects (such as the Northern Gateway pipeline) that would “create thousands 
upon thousands jobs for Canadians.” Worse yet, these groups “use funding from 
foreign special interest groups to undermine Canada’s national economic inter-
est.” Only the federal government can protect the interests of  Canadians from 
these threats and restore the balance to its regulatory environmental review 
system, so that “unnecessary delays” will not put an end to projects that are 
“safe, generate thousands of  new jobs and open up new export markets” (Oliver 
2012).
To remedy the situation, the federal government passed into law Bill C-38, 
a 425-page omnibus bill. The many provisions included new restrictions on 
the status of  charitable organizations perceived to be accepting foreign funds, 
changes to the Environmental Assessment Act to ensure that pipeline infra-
structure is not unduly delayed, changes to the NEB Act put a two-year limit 
on the review process and permit the federal cabinet to set aside the recom-
mendation of  the NEB and insert its own, and, finally, a stripping away of  the 
requirements of  the Fisheries Act to protect fish habitat. The purpose? To see 
that nothing stands in the way of  building future pipelines or other develop-
ment projects.
The language of  government officials is heavily confrontational focused 
on projecting strength, power, and dominance. While the federal government 
had pursued a confrontational approach, the approach of  Alison Redford, who 
became Alberta’s premier in October 2011, was more collaborative in tone, 
although she stuck with the position of  both previous Alberta governments and 
the federal government in maintaining that the bitumen sands provide energy 
security, are a key economic driver for the province and country, and represent 
an environmentally conscious energy supply. Redford did not speak of  adver-
saries but rather of  the need for cooperation, unity, and the national benefits of  
energy development. “What we have understood, as a federal government and 
a provincial government,” she said in May 2012, “is we want to work together to 
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advance Alberta’s interests. And we have had . . . since I became premier, a real 
focused effort on ensuring that we’re working well with our federal colleagues” 
(quoted in Wingrove 2012). Similarly, newly elected NDP premier Notley sig-
nalled that she would also take a cooperative approach, one grounded in Alberta 
traditions (McLeod 2015).
Conclusion
At this time, we are in the midst of  a great struggle with an uncertain outcome. 
The Keystone XL pipeline, for example, has been delayed, with the Obama 
administration facing strong lobbying both for and against. In Canada, the 
federal Conservatives have the majority to ensure that the Northern Gateway 
pipeline is approved, but the project is facing intense opposition, nationally 
and beyond Canada’s borders, that may make its completion difficult. Today, 
some of  that opposition may come from Alberta itself. In a stunning pol-
itical development, the Alberta Progressive Conservative government was 
defeated by the Alberta New Democratic Party in the May 2015 provincial 
elections. While getting Alberta’s oil and bitumen to market will necessitate 
that the provincial and federal governments work together, the new premier, 
Rachel Notley, has made it clear that her government will no longer champion 
the Northern Gateway and Keystone XL pipelines (McDiarmid 2015). Notley 
realizes that climate change is a pressing global issue and Alberta was in the 
global spotlight. According to Notley, in order to build Canada’s energy sec-
tion, we must “build bridges and . . . open markets instead of  having a black 
eye” (quoted in McDiarmid 2015). Notley favours more domestic refining, as 
well as TransCanada’s $12 billion Energy East proposal to ship oil to refineries 
in Québec and New Brunswick and Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain project 
from Edmonton to Burnaby, BC (Lewis 2015). But controversy remains over any 
pipeline development in Canada. If  these routes are not supported by the fed-
eral and other provincial governments, the NDP will face the same challenge as 
that of  past Progressive Conservative governments in Alberta—how to get oil 
to the market.
The EU battle has been intense. The Canadian and Alberta governments 
pulled out all the stops to defeat the amendment to the European Fuel Quality 
Directive that could have negatively affect bitumen development. Indigenous 
and environmental groups have responded in kind. Even though the Canadian 
government has prevailed in its attempt to block the EU’s proposal, Canada 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
106   Peter (Jay) Smith
now has fewer friends in Europe. According to one BBC report (Mallinder 
2012), “Canada’s decision last year to walk out of  the Kyoto Protocol caused 
concern around the world,” particularly in Europe, where the Kyoto agreement 
has much popular support.
Clearly, Canada and Alberta are in the global spotlight: what was once an 
internal struggle has spilled beyond their borders. The United Nations, the 
United States, and the European Union and its member states are just some of  
the spaces for political advocacy for the Indigenous and environmental move-
ments. Beyond these spaces, movements today are capable of  creating their 
own POSs, meetings, and venues. It bears repeating that the local is becoming 
the global, and the global, the local. No longer are issues of  natural resource 
extraction, the environment, and the treatment of  Indigenous peoples solely 
Albertan and Canadian issues. Both the Alberta and federal governments are 
losing control of  publicity and the exclusive ability to frame a story.
Yet this is by no means a novel occurrence. In fact, Indigenous peoples have 
become an inspiration for social movements around the world. The Zapatistas, 
named after Emilio Zapata, a hero of  the 1917 Mexican revolution, are a group 
of  indigenous Mayan farmers in Chiapas, Mexico, who rebelled in January 1994 
to draw attention to their exploitation and impoverishment. Seeking relief  
from oppression, desiring control of  their land and local resources, and fear-
ing the consequences of  the North American Free Trade Agreement, they rose 
in rebellion. Instead of  being crushed, a well-coordinated communications 
and Internet campaign was successful in drawing considerable international 
support from NGOs and the general public, making the Mexican government 
pause in its use of  force.
Today, Indigenous political struggles are “placed-based, yet transnation-
alised” (Atkinson and Mulrennan 2004, 469, quoting Arturo Escobar).16 In 
Canada, this has been the pattern since the Lubicon Lake Cree from Alberta 
went to the UN in 1984 to draw the world’s attention to the exploitation of  
their land and resources by foreign corporations. In the 1990s, the James Bay 
Cree in northern Québec waged a successful transnational campaign against 
the expansion of  the huge James Bay hydroelectric project (Atkinson and 
Mulrennan 2004). The identities of  Indigenous peoples, as well as those of  
other social movements, are being increasingly formed in opposition to neo-
liberal globalization.
Transnational advocacy thus represents the new normal in Canadian pol-
itical life. In the late 1980s, Canadians concerned about Canadian sovereignty 
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and social and economic justice, led in particular by the Council of  Canadians, 
began making transnational alliances in efforts to stop the Canada-US Free 
Trade Agreement, NAFTA, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (which 
was successfully blocked), and proposed trade and investment agreements of  
the World Trade Organization. The Council of  Canadians is particularly inter-
esting in this regard, having shifted its focus in 2010 “from one of  national 
sovereignty to one of  popular sovereignty—that is, democracy for all the 
peoples of  the planet.”17 No longer do participants in movements of  resistance 
view democracy as expressed solely by liberal or representative democracy. 
Manuel Castells (2010b, 414) argues that the state has been undermined by the 
informational flows of  corporate globalization.
There is little doubt that citizenship and democratic activity have spread 
beyond the borders of  the nation-state. In a sense, the Alberta (certainly prior 
to the election of  an NDP government in May 2015) and Canadian govern-
ments and the oil industry have underestimated their adversaries by acting 
as if  they could build pipelines with no or little opposition. Those opposed to 
the construction of  huge mineral extraction projects and pipelines have their 
own complex networks, histories, and experiences, as well as an ability to work 
beyond borders and galvanize public opinion. This is evident in the rapid rise 
in late 2012 of  Idle No More, an Indigenous-led movement, assisted by social 
media, that rose up in protest against Bill C-45, another omnibus budget bill 
passed in Parliament in December 2012 that removed the protected status of  
thousands of  rivers and streams in Canada, all to facilitate natural resource 
development. Within days of  the bill’s passage, rallies, marches, flash mobs in 
malls, and protests spread from Alberta across Canada and internationally to 
Britain and the United States, catching the Alberta and Canadian governments 
off-guard. This is clear evidence that as Alberta and Canada open their doors to 
global market demand for Alberta’s natural resources, they will be shadowed by 
transnational movements of  resistance. We are at the beginning of  a new era in 
Alberta political life, an era of  contentious politics.
Notes
1 Whether this warming continues with the election of  a New Democratic Party 
government in May 2015 is uncertain, but as a province, Alberta will still rely 
on Ottawa, in terms of  interactions with other provinces and other states in the 
international arena, to get its oil to market.
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2 For a useful illustration of  the pipeline development associated with Alberta’s 
bitumen sands, see Catherine Mann and Stacy Feldman, “Exclusive Map: 
The Tar Sands Pipeline Boom,” InsideClimate News, 30 April 2012, http://www.
insideclimatenews.org/news/20120430/exclusive-map-tar-sands-pipeline-boom.
3 The Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination was created by 
this convention, the text of  which is available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx. See, in particular, article 9. The convention 
went into effect in January 1969.
4 Report submitted by First Nations Women Advocating Responsible Mining 
(FNWARM), British Columbia, Canada, “To Canada’s 19th and 20th Periodic Reports: 
Alternative Indigenous Shadow Report on Canada’s Actions on the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, with a Focus on the Canadian Extractive Sector 
Operating Within Canada,” January 2012, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
cerd/docs/ngos/FNWARM_Canada_CERD80.pdf, 2. This and other alternative 
reports were reviewed at CERD’s 80th session, from 13 February to 9 March 2012, in 
Geneva.
5 “Response to Canada’s 19th and 20th Periodic Reports: Consolidated Indigenous 
Alternative Report,” 2011, http://cdn7.iitc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
JointIPShadow-Final_web.pdf, 8. This was a joint report submitted to CERD by the 
International Indian Treaty Council, the Confederacy of  Treaty 6 First Nations, the 
First Nations Summit, the Dene Nation and Assembly of  First Nations Regional 
Office (Northwest Territories), the Assembly of  First Nations, the Union of  British 
Columbia Indian Chiefs, the Samson Cree Nation, the Ermineskin Cree Nation, the 
Native Women’s Association of  Canada, the Indigenous World Association, and 
Treaty 4 First Nations.
6 Ibid. , 26. Indigenous peoples invariably use the term tar sands, and where they are 
explicitly referenced, I do the same.
7 “International: Resolution in Support of  Indigenous Nations, Tribes, Peoples and 
Organizations in North America in Opposition to the Tar Sands Extraction in Alberta 
and Keystone XL Pipeline,” August 2011, http://www.turtleisland.org/discussion/
viewtopic.php?f=14&t=9025#p13725.
8 Despite this, it must be noted that Indigenous peoples have not historically been of  
one accord in terms of  their activism. Members of  the Athabasca Chipewyan and 
Mikisew Cree have found employment in the industry and have supported bitumen 
sands development. However, since 2006, that support has begun to fray, in part 
because of  the increased amounts of  water being withdrawn from the Athabasca 
River when the flow is low. In 2006, the Athabasca Chipewyan withdrew from an 
Alberta government environmental multistakeholder committee (Brethour 2006; see 
also Hoberg and Phillips 2011). Since then, strong resistance has come from members 
of  the Athabasca Chipewyan and Mikisew Cree nations. In British Columbia, First 
Nations representatives strongly dispute Enbridge claims of  strong Aboriginal 
support, arguing that only two Aboriginal groups along the proposed route support 
the Northern Gateway Pipeline (Canadian Press 2012).
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9 “About Us,” UK Tar Sands Network, 2015, http://www.no-tar-sands.org/about/.
10 “‘Tar Sands: Don’t Turn a Blind Eye,’ Say Youth,” People and Planet, 12 July 2011, http://
peopleandplanet.org/navid12500.
11 For coverage of  the event, see “Protestors Dragged from BP Annual Meeting,” The 
Independent (London), 14 April 2011.
12 “Canada Wins Fossil of  the Year Award in Durban,” Climate Action Network, news 
release, 9 December 2011, http://climateactionnetwork.ca/2011/12/09/canada-wins-
fossil-of-the-year-award-in-durban/.
13 “Pan-European Oils Sands Advocacy Strategy,” March 2011, http://
climateactionnetwork.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ATIPPan-
EuropeanOilSandsAdvocacyStrategy.pdf, 1–2. See also “GEM Briefing for 
DMS’ Oil Sands Call, May 26, 2011: Background and Key Points,” 2011, http://
climateactionnetwork.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2011-05-24-Pan-European-
Oil-Sands-Team-Backgrounder.pdf.
14 “Pan-European Oils Sands Advocacy Strategy,” 1–2.
15 Ibid. , 3.
16 The authors quote from Escobar’s “Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, 
Global Coloniality, and Anti-globalisation Social Movements,” published in 2004 in 
Third World Quarterly 25 (1): 207–30 (quotation on p. 222).
17 The quotation is from a 2010 Council of  Canadians document titled “Vision 
Statement: Backgrounder,” which is no longer available online but is in the author’s 
possession.
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Prosperity, Security, and the Environment
Lorna Stefanick
It’s critical to develop that resource in a way that’s responsible and 
environmental and the reality for the United States, which is the biggest 
consumer of our petroleum products, is that Canada is a very ethical society 
and a safe source for the United States in comparison to other sources of energy.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 7 January 2011
Stephen Harper was referring, of  course, to Alberta’s bitumen sands. These 
comments to the media were made on the heels of  a declaration by Peter Kent, 
Harper’s newly appointed minister of  Environment, that Alberta was an “eth-
ical” source of  oil.  The terms ethical oil and dirty oil have recently crept into the 
lexicon of  energy-related politics. Critics of  the bitumen sands such as Andrew 
Nikiforuk (2008) bemoan the environmental degradation associated with this 
industrial megaproject and point to the myriad of  social problems associated 
with hyperdevelopment. In contrast, proponents such as Ezra Levant (2010) 
claim that the “dirty oil” moniker used by environmentalists and other critics 
of  bitumen development do not do justice to the benefits of  Canada’s “ethical” 
oil: that is, oil that comes from a nation that safeguards its citizens’ rights and 
freedoms. Six months after the 2010 publication of  Levant’s Ethical Oil: The Case 
for Canada’s Oil Sands, Prime Minister Stephen Harper began to draw attention 
to Canada’s liberal-democratic institutions in order to promote Canadian bitu-
men sands on the international stage, particularly in the United States. The 
questions driving this chapter are these: What explains the emergence of  the 
dirty/ethical oil monikers in reference to Alberta’s primary resource? And why 
has the use of  these terms led to such a polarized debate?
4
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This chapter makes two arguments. The first is that the dirty/ethical debate 
represents a dramatic shift in the trajectory of  Alberta’s energy regime. The 
debate stems from the connection of  Canadian oil-driven economic pros-
perity to American national security, a connection that is both a result of  the 
entrenchment of  neoliberalism and a tool to consolidate it within the Canadian 
landscape. Both industry and governments cast resistance to the current rapid 
pace of  bitumen extraction as opposition to economic prosperity and, more 
importantly, to national security conceived in continental terms. Points of  
view that are in opposition to government policy are construed as treasonous 
resistance to a continentalized border and economy, making critics unpatriotic 
at best and criminal at worst. While the trajectory of  Alberta’s energy regime 
is shifting once again with the collapse in the price of  oil in 2015 and the sub-
sequent election of  an NDP government in the province, the negative view of  
those who question bitumen extraction policy lingers on.
Second, while Alberta’s citizens are typically construed as a homogeneous 
bloc whose interests are tied inextricably to the energy sector, this chapter will 
demonstrate that this view is simplistic. A particular set of  historical circum-
stances in Alberta’s democratic development helped to downplay the diversity 
of  interests in the province, in addition to providing fertile grounds for those 
who would later sow the seeds of  neoliberalism. For those who seek to challenge 
Alberta’s unbridled economic development strategy, seeking support outside 
Canada offers opportunities to materialize their concerns about negative out-
comes of  hypercapitalism. As Gattinger and others have observed, environ-
mental groups, labour unions, associations, and other nongovernmental actors 
can take advantage of  the transnational character of  the energy sector to add 
progressive voices to the milieu of  its development (Gattinger 2005). Yet the 
strategy of  bitumen sands opponents of  leveraging international pressure on 
domestic decision makers may also be short-sighted, given bitumen’s precar-
ious position in a rapidly changing and unpredictable global oil market.
Alberta Oil: Neoliberal Transformation, Consolidation, and Resistance
In “Neoliberal Transformation and Antiglobalization Politics in Canada,” 
William Carroll and William Little (2001) explore the specificity of  neoliberal 
transformation in Canada by focusing on its peculiar history, geography, and 
organization of  the state. They argue that the adoption of  neoliberal ideas has 
been facilitated by Canada’s regional political identities. Because the control of  
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most aspects of  education, health, welfare, labour law, and resource develop-
ment rests with the provinces, Canada’s federal structure of  divided sover-
eignty provided the base “for launching certain elements of  the neoliberal 
project, well in advance of  the trade agreements” (39).
Carroll and Little identify “neoliberal mentalities of  political and economic 
rule” as being critical for both the transition to neoliberalism and its consoli-
dation (46). A neoliberal mentality involves attitudinal changes about the role 
of  the state and markets in social life. “Alongside the new economic regime of  
accumulation is a political culture or ‘governmentality’ in which market ration-
ales and ‘active citizenship’ replace the social rationales and entitlements of  the 
postwar era” (46). Political and cultural identity is transformed; Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau’s “good and just society” embodied by the activist welfare state 
is replaced by a neoliberal understanding of  the relation of  public to private, 
citizenship, and the role of  government in managing the economy in a global 
era. Individual responsibility is emphasized, while universal entitlements 
associated with the welfare state are diminished. The free choice and autonomy 
that underpin this discourse ultimately create “new circuits” of  control that 
limit the possibilities of  resistance to neoliberal globalization through industry 
deregulation, increased self-regulation, and disciplinary procedures (51–53).
Although all Canadian provinces have adopted neoliberalism to vary-
ing degrees, the ideology finds its most comfortable home in free enterprise 
Alberta (39). The widely accepted view in Alberta that the development of  
Canadian national sovereignty will be done at the province’s expense made it 
easy to resist nation-building exercises in favour of  a less active role for the 
state—a role that was perceived to fit more closely with Alberta’s interests. 
While Canada was already following other industrialized nations down the 
neoliberal path through state restructuring and the signing of  continental 
free-trade agreements, it was the 2006 installation of  Stephen Harper’s federal 
Progressive Conservative government at a time when oil prices were climbing 
to record-breaking levels that signified the final nail in the coffin of  a nation-
ally focused, federal government-directed energy policy that might in any way 
resemble Trudeau’s National Energy Program (NEP). The NEP will be discussed 
later in this chapter; suffice to say at this juncture that most Albertans despised 
it and that it still figures prominently on their list of  historic grievances. 
Harper’s Conservatives are now using the same energy playbook favoured by 
Alberta’s Conservatives—specifically, that “security” is attained by prosperity 
derived from Alberta oil, which fuels both American and Canadian free market 
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economies (Canada, Department of  Finance 2012, 101–2). In this context, “eco-
nomic security” is defined by strong economic growth based on oil extraction, 
regardless of  whether the benefits of  this growth accrue to more than a small 
minority of  the population.
The evolution of  the oil economy in Alberta and Canada provides the context 
for understanding both the resistance to the security/prosperity discourse and 
attempts to restrain and contain this resistance. To illustrate why the energy 
debate is so polarized, the following section tracks energy relationships among 
Alberta’s provincial government, Canada’s federal government, and the US 
Administration in three critical periods. The first period comprises the energy 
sector’s early development, and its later evolution in the era of  both province 
and nation building, that provided the foundation for neoliberal transforma-
tion. The second period saw the consolidation of  neoliberalism, punctuated by 
a sharp turn toward protection from international terrorism. The third period 
is characterized by the entrenchment of  the security/prosperity nexus in the 
post-9/11 period of  revved up economic growth and rapidly rising oil prices, 
followed by an economic crash, recovery, and shifting demand for Alberta’s oil. 
In the third period, those who frame the energy discourse in terms of  security 
and economic growth stand in stark opposition to those who frame it in social 
or environmental terms.
The Project of Nation and Province Building: The Context for Transformation
The British North American Act of  1867 (BNA Act) formalized the Canadian 
federation by establishing a unique regime that mixed provincial rights with 
parliamentary supremacy. Uslaner (1992, 42–43) summarizes the tension this 
can produce: “The BNA Act reserved all lands, mines, minerals, and royalties 
within a province’s borders to provincial control. Yet the act also permits the 
federal government to regulate international and interprovincial trade and to 
control any provincial works that it ‘declares’ to be ‘for the general advantage 
of  Canada’ or ‘of  two or more of  the provinces.’”
The situation in the West was complicated by the fact that the Prairie prov-
inces were created after Confederation. Prior to becoming provinces, the west-
ern territories provided the resources for the industrial machines of  the central 
Canadian heartland. Canada’s National Policy ensured that the terms of  trade 
were favourable for protecting these nascent industries, preventing western-
ers from engaging in trade on more favourable terms with the United States. 
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Even after Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta became provinces (in 1870, 
1905, and 1905, respectively), the federal government retained administra-
tive control over their natural resources in order to advance the broader inter-
ests of  the new nation. After protracted negotiations, the federal government 
finally transferred control of  natural resources to the western provinces in 1930 
(Canada, Parliament 1930). In Alberta, this struggle for control of  its resour-
ces began the tug-of-war between the federal government and Alberta’s polit-
ical and economic elite, which became a defining feature of  the new province’s 
identity.
Other groups in Alberta also were concerned with property rights. Waves 
of  immigrants came to Canada at the turn of  the twentieth century, enticed by 
the federal government with promises of  land. When WW I broke out, many of  
these non-Anglo Saxon immigrants had title to their property revoked and were 
imprisoned under the War Measures Act because they held passports issued by 
the Austrio-Hungarian and Turkish empires, with whom Canada was at war. 
Ironically, many of  these migrants had fled those empires because they had 
become ethnic minorities when their homelands were annexed during various 
European conflicts. Disproportionate numbers of  these same minorities were 
later sterilized under the eugenics program of  the Alberta government in an 
attempt to control the “mentally feeble” (Christian 1974). During World War II, 
it was the Japanese who were imprisoned. In both wars, the internment camps 
were disproportionately located in Alberta and British Columbia, and many 
former inmates settled in the local area. This dark early history helps to explain 
why a distrust of  government and a devotion to the protection of  private prop-
erty permeates all facets of  Alberta society. As noted in chapters 2 and 14 of  this 
volume, the various forces of  populism, progressivism, and distrust of  central 
Canadian political and economic forces coalesced in what C. B. Macpherson 
(1953) described as “business government,” wherein the role of  government is 
limited to fostering favourable conditions for economic development. While 
this conception of  government is consistent with neoliberalism, it is also con-
sistent with developmental liberalism within a liberal democratic framework. 
Fostering economic development only becomes problematic in the develop-
mental liberalism context when its broad definition is replaced by the narrowly 
defined interests of  a dominant industry—in Alberta’s case, agriculture, fol-
lowed by oil.
When Peter Lougheed and the upstart Progressive Conservative Party 
swept into power in 1971, the role of  government changed. Lougheed promoted 
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province building through purposeful economic development (Dyck 1986, 481), 
making large investments in infrastructure and education (Wood 1985, 100–105) 
and managing both the province’s finances and its economy through the estab-
lishment of  the Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Le Riche 2006, 172). At that time, 
the Canadian economy was centred in and around the profitable manufactur-
ing hub in Ontario and Québec (Innis 1995), albeit tied deeply to the American 
market. Recognizing that a global energy crisis was developing, Lougheed set his 
sights on developing Alberta’s vast oil and natural gas reserves by enticing large 
oil companies to invest in their development (Lougheed 1980). This strategy was 
not a break from the past; over 90 percent of  oil and gas assets in the 1970s were 
foreign owned, primarily by American-based companies (Fossum 1997, 25). At 
the same time, however, Lougheed raised oil extraction royalty rates (Wood 1985, 
141–42), earning him the title of  “the blue-eyed sheikh” (Pratt 2012).
Internationally, major oil-producing countries formed the Organization 
of  Peteroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, and by 1973, industrial-
ized countries were reeling from escalating oil prices that resulted from price 
coordination. Because industry in Central Canada relied on imported oil, 
Canada was not immune to the ensuing price shocks. Prime Minister Trudeau, 
like US President Nixon and other national leaders, began crafting policies to 
ensure sovereignty, economic stability, and protection from fluctuating energy 
costs. The creation of  the Crown corporation PetroCanada in 1975 and the NEP 
in 1980 was an attempt to ensure Canadian energy independence. These initia-
tives—in particular, the NEP—were bitterly unpopular in Alberta, reminding 
Albertans once again of  previous institutional arrangements that had made 
their province a subordinate partner in the Canadian confederation. In the 
words of  Lougheed, the NEP was received in Alberta as “an outright attempt to 
take over the resources of  [the] province” (Lougheed 1980).
During the 1970s, the Americans were looking north to diversify their supply 
of  oil and move it away from the politically unstable Middle East. Writing soon 
after the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, Ted Greenwood (1974, 695) observed that
shortages of  domestic oil and gas in the United States and rising world oil 
prices have caused an increased American demand for Canadian crude and 
calls by both American legislators and administration officials for a con-
tinental energy policy. . . . At the same time the combination of  declining 
conventional reserves, disappointing results in frontier exploration, and 
rising Canadian nationalism has led to a Canadian rethinking of  long-term 
strategy for oil and gas exports.
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With respect to oil and natural gas, Canada-US relations were as complex in the 
1970s as they are now. Canada’s concerns centred on ensuring self-sufficiency 
in domestic supply for its manufacturing sector, Alberta’s concerns focused on 
garnering foreign direct investment in its nascent industry, and American con-
cerns revolved around ensuring access to Canadian supply at prices that were 
not disruptive to American domestic oil suppliers.
This was also the era when neoliberal thought began to be expressed in the 
policies of  Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States. 
In Canada, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney replaced Trudeau in 1984, and in 
Alberta, Premier Don Getty replaced Peter Lougheed the following year. The 
new leaders did not have their predecessors’ appetite for government using the 
state for nation or province building, and thus the way was paved for the transi-
tion to neoliberalism at the national and provincial levels. At the federal level, 
Mulroney discontinued the NEP and privatized PetroCanada. In Alberta, the 
predilection for smaller government was supported by the fiscal woes brought 
on by the collapse of  the price of  oil, which dropped to a meagre $9 per barrel 
in 1986, shortly after Lougheed left office. Despite efforts to diversify the econ-
omy, Alberta was more dependent on oil revenue than ever before (Pratt 2012). 
With 40 percent of  the provincial budget coming from oil revenue, Alberta was 
particularly susceptible to fluctuations in global oil prices. The new premier cut 
spending in a vain attempt to balance the budget, but he also used public funds 
in an attempt to shore up Alberta’s failing businesses. By the time of  Getty’s 
departure from office, the provincial debt had reached $11 billion. The stage was 
thus set for a dramatic change in policy direction.
Consolidation: 9/11 and the Alberta Advantage
Neoliberalism leapt forward under the leadership of  Ralph Klein, who became 
premier in 1993. A former mayor of  Calgary, Klein believed that the financial 
management of  the province should resemble municipal financial manage-
ment; he adopted policies aimed at balancing the books. Klein reduced the 
debt and deficit through eliminating government jobs, contracting out servi-
ces, downsizing government, and cutting education and health care expendi-
tures. Most importantly, the Klein government reduced oil royalties in order to 
encourage investment in what was then a very depressed industry because of  
the low price of  oil. It also reduced personal and corporate taxes to the lowest in 
the country and adopted the “Alberta Advantage” corporate brand.
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Of  these changes, the reduction of  taxes has arguably had the most sig-
nificant impact on the relationship between citizens and the state. Alberta is 
unique among provinces in that until 2015, it did not have a progressive income 
tax system; all citizens who earn above $17,787 paid a 10 percent flat tax.  For 
middle- and high-income earners, this represents a huge tax saving. For low-
income earners, however, there is little tax relief.  Additionally, Alberta is the 
only province in Canada that does not have a provincial sales tax. When citizens 
pay very low taxes, the bond between citizens and their government is weak-
ened. Politicians must be re-elected of  course, but when little money is gener-
ated directly from citizens, the political focus is on those who make the largest 
contributions to government budgets. While Alberta boasts low corporate rates 
of  taxation, the government’s dependence on resource rents for its operating 
expenses provides high incentive to nurture the corporate-government con-
nection. Very low participation rates in elections in Alberta, which dipped to 
40.6 percent in 2008 (Leger Marketing 2008), give Albertans the distinction of  
being among the most apathetic citizenry in Canada. Even in one of  the most 
exciting elections in recent memory, voter turnout in 2015 was less than 54 
percent (Elections Alberta 2015). Neoliberal governments have repeatedly told 
citizens over two decades that the government’s role in their lives should be 
minimal; it appears that many have begun to believe that the state truly is so 
irrelevant that they cannot be bothered to vote.
In addition to changing Alberta’s tax structure, Premier Klein (and Stelmach 
after him) set Alberta on a path of  deep integration with the United States 
with respect to energy policy. Both premiers made trips south to “pitch the 
Americans on the notion that Alberta’s bitumen sands represent an energy 
source of  strategic importance to the continent” (Byfield 2002). In the United 
States, the Clinton and Bush II eras led a global shift toward neoliberalism 
through a number of  regulatory reforms such as dismantling the Glass-Steagall 
Act.  During this time, Klein and Stelmach’s promotion of  bitumen develop-
ment met little resistance—perhaps because the environmental degradation 
was perceived to be “remote” and of  little consequence (Stefanick 2009). The 
global shift toward a neoliberal policy orientation at the international, national, 
and provincial levels did not occur without resistance, however.
Around the turn of  the millennium, a number of  massive protests took 
centre stage in cities like Santiago (1998), Seattle (1999), and Québec City (2001) 
to protest the excesses of  capital and the entrenchment of  neoliberalism as a 
policy framework serving the interests of  transnational corporations and an 
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emerging global elite. Labour union representatives, environmentalists, stu-
dents, pro-democracy activists, and others marginalized by decades of  govern-
ment cuts, decreased access to services, job losses, and environmental strain 
took to the streets. Energy policy was a concern to the extent that it was tied to 
the activities of  transnational corporations and the global elite who ran them; 
however, the issues associated with bitumen extraction were not yet top of  mind. 
That said, the move away from energy conservation in this era was underscored 
by the opulent lifestyles of  those who were benefitting from the new global 
order. When OPEC cut production to take advantage of  increased consump-
tion, oil prices rose, and those least able to afford the increased costs were hurt 
by the price inflation. By early 2001, these protests had disrupted a number of  
international meetings, capturing the attention of  media, the general public, 
and law enforcement. The events of  11 September 2001, however, dramatically 
changed the framing of  these protests from being a legitimate response to the 
policies of  neoliberalism to being unpatriotic and even treasonous.
The September 11 terrorist attacks were pivotal for American foreign policy; 
the top priorities of  the United States became ensuring security and curbing 
the spread of  terrorism. Before 2001, the focus of  the American public was on 
energy—specifically, how to ensure affordable energy from a reliable source 
in the face of  increasing demand. Oil and gas shortages, rising prices at the 
gas pumps, and periodic electrical power blackouts in California heightened 
American anxiety about long-term energy supply. At US$2.50 per gallon, the 
price of  gasoline became the dominant issue of  the presidential election con-
tested by Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W. Bush. Since 
9/11, however, concern for American national security has defined a number 
of  continental policies, such as border security, drug trafficking, and, as this 
chapter contends, energy security.
A particularly poignant example of  the difference between the pre- and 
post-9/11 American world view is demonstrated by the question posed by a 
Wall Street columnist just prior to 9/11: “While the U.S. imports 52 percent of  
its energy, it’s not clear why that’s a problem either. The producing countries 
will always have an incentive to sell the oil somewhere, and in a world market, 
the U.S. will always be able to buy its portion. Moreover, foreign producers also 
tend to be the low-cost producers. Why make U.S. consumers pay higher prices 
to drain domestic reserves?” (Taylor 2001). After 9/11, most Americans could 
answer this question: they have grave concerns about oil-producing nations 
holding their country hostage to threats of  turning off  the taps. Moreover, 
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existing producers were unable to keep up with increased demand for energy 
caused by the global economic boom beginning in 2003. Upheavals such as 
Nigeria’s civil war, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq, and hurricanes in the Gulf  of  
Mexico further disrupted supply. Prices rose 300 percent, with some observ-
ers claiming that the price increase was a result of  oil companies manipulat-
ing prices in response to disruptions (Smith, Carlisle, and Michaud 2003). 
Whatever the source of  rising oil prices, the concern over America’s energy 
security became that much more acute. Unconventional sources of  crude oil 
that were previously prohibitively expensive (such as the bitumen and heavy 
oil found in Alberta and Venezuela, and the shale in mineral deposits in the US 
Rocky Mountains) now became an attractive alternative.
In the immediate post-9/11 world, the idea of  increasing oil imports from 
its “friendly neighbour,” Canada, became very appealing to Americans. With oil 
prices reaching unprecedented levels, Alberta’s lucrative extraction of  natural 
resources became an increasingly important component of  the Canadian econ-
omy (Stanford 2008, 7). The new federal government elected in 2006 moved 
swiftly to cement the security/prosperity nexus.
The Entrenchment of the Security/Prosperity Nexus
The economic policy Advantage Canada: A Strong Economy for Canadians 
(Canada, Department of  Finance 2006) outlined the top priorities of  the new 
Conservative government led by Stephen Harper. As one might expect from 
a title so closely linked with the Alberta Advantage corporate brand, the five 
major components of  the federal policy were the following: reducing personal 
and corporate taxes; eliminating government net debt; reducing “unnecessary 
regulations” and burdensome “red tape”; creating an educated, skilled, and flex-
ible workforce; and building modern infrastructure as required (6). In terms of  
energy, the Harper government aligned itself  with those of  Premiers Klein and 
Stelmach: “Advances in technology have made the Alberta oil sands a viable 
alternative to conventional sources and are pushing down costs of  production 
for renewable sources. In the oil sands alone investments could top $100 billion 
over the next decade” (61). Moreover, “the Government will support Canada’s 
emergence as an energy superpower by making the needed investments in 
knowledge and people and creating the economic environment that will attract 
capital from home and abroad” (61).
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With the economy red hot in 2007, including skyrocketing prices for energy 
and record profits for oil companies, growing public pressure in Alberta sug-
gested that oil companies should be paying higher royalty rates, despite inter-
nal government reviews saying that royalty rates were appropriate. Premier 
Stelmach ordered an external review, and the resulting report not only rec-
ommended increasing royalty rates by nearly 20 percent for all three major 
resources (conventional oil, natural gas, and bitumen) but also noted that the 
government had failed to collect royalties already owed (Hunter et al. 2007). 
The government partially implemented the review panel’s recommendations, 
although it then rolled back many of  the royalty increases in 2010, after the 
economic downturn.
The nexus between security and economic prosperity at the provincial, 
national, and international levels remained strong after President Obama was 
elected in 2008. Obama’s first foreign visit was to Canada to meet with Prime 
Minister Harper, and among the top priorities on their agenda were economic 
recovery, energy, and security (Canada, PMO 2009). These sentiments mani-
fested in a number of  ways through Canada’s coordinated efforts with the 
United States on security and economic growth. Both governments jointly 
released Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness as a declaration for “a new long-term partnership” in order to 
“enhance our security and accelerate the legitimate flow of  people, goods, and 
services between our two countries” (Canada, Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade 2011, iii, 34). A Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council was 
established, aiming “to better align our regulatory approaches to protect health, 
safety, and the environment while supporting growth, investment, innovation 
and market openness” (v). In the area of  security, Beyond the Border notes areas of  
cooperation as joint integrated threat assessments, a harmonized approach to 
screening cargo and travellers, and shared information on immigration. With 
respect to strategies to increase trade and bolster economic growth, the report 
cites as examples the free flow of  goods and services, supply-chain connectiv-
ity, and the reduction of  administrative burdens through streamlining (12–22).
In terms of  the energy sector, the freer flow of  goods causes deeper inte-
gration of  Canada and the United States. Canada’s export of  energy products 
(including oil, natural gas, and electricity) had been steadily increasing since 
2000–2001 (Canada, NEB 2011, 1). By 2010, almost all of  Canada’s oil exports 
were going to the United States, representing 22 percent of  US oil imports 
(3). The bulk of  US imports of  natural gas was also coming from Canada, 
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representing 14 percent of  US consumption (4). The security/prosperity nexus 
encouraged this energy relationship, facilitated the consolidation of  neoliberal 
reforms in Canada and the United States, and hindered resistance to its effects. 
This is not to suggest, however, that dissenting voices were silent. Indeed, it 
was the articulation of  the negative effects of  rapid resource extraction for 
export that led to both the “dirty oil” descriptor by opponents of  bitumen 
extraction and the adoption of  the “ethical oil” moniker as a counterpoint. 
The Canadian federal government subsequently adopted the notion of  oil as 
ethical, using this as a tool to stifle opposition, particularly that pertaining to 
the environment.
Environmental Resistance and the Neutralizing of Dissent
The consolidation of  neoliberal policy and the increasing intransigence of  its 
opponents were occurring at the same time that challenges to the security/pros-
perity framing of  bitumen development were assuming new and more power-
ful forms. The sheer scale of  the project to extract oil out of  the province’s 
massive reserves strikes anyone who visits the bitumen sands industrial com-
plex in northern Alberta. The bitumen lies under 140,200 square kilometres; 
as of  31 December 2012, 767 square kilometres had been cleared or disturbed 
for development (Alberta, Alberta Energy 2014). Bitumen oil extraction is criti-
cized because of  its heavy toll on the environment; for example, two tonnes of  
bitumen sands must be extracted to produce one barrel of  crude oil.  As dis-
cussed in chapter 7 in this volume, additional environmental impacts include 
the destruction of  habitat and its impact on wildlife and birds; the removal of  
peatland, which in its intact state acts as a carbon sink; greenhouse gases that are 
emitted as part of  the extraction process; the amount of  water used (although 
estimates vary, according to one government source, three to four barrels of  
water are used to mine one barrel of  oil [Canada, NRC 2013, 3]); and the stor-
age of  contaminated water in massive tailings ponds, now covering 176 square 
kilometers of  land.  Back in 1999, the environmental issues had sufficient pro-
file that the Canadian Senate Subcommittee on the Boreal Forest wrote: “The 
world’s boreal forest, a resource of  which Canada is the major trustee, is under 
siege” (quoted in Burton et al. 2003).
When the sharp increase in oil prices in 2003 made extracting oil from bitu-
men cost effective, the environmental community in Alberta became seriously 
alarmed and began to look outside the province for support. In December 2005, 
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twelve prominent, nationally focused environmental groups issued a declara-
tion that urged politicians to institute a new bitumen sands “licence to operate.” 
Two years later, 1,500 scientists from more than fifty countries petitioned the 
Canadian government to protect the boreal forest (CBC News 2007). Critics also 
pointed out the myriad of  social concerns and complained that the low roy-
alty paid for this nonrenewable resource results in a massive transfer of  wealth 
from the people of  Alberta to oil corporations (Campanella 2012).  Yet despite 
the environmental damage of  the bitumen sands operations, its social conse-
quences, and its impact on local Indigenous groups, the critics failed to garner 
much media attention or to mobilize significant opposition within the province 
to bitumen extraction projects.
It was the deaths of  1,600 migrating birds that mistook a tailings pond for 
fresh water in 2008 that galvanized media attention (Nelson et al. 2015). That 
same year, Andrew Nikiforuk’s book Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent 
appeared in bookstores, and the moniker of  “dirty oil” became the tagline of  
opponents. The following year, Canadian activists made a presentation about 
the global impact of  the bitumen extraction at a “green summit” in rural 
Virginia attended by top American environmental activists (McCarthy 2012). 
The National Energy Board’s approval of  the construction of  TransCanada’s 
1,897-kilometre Keystone XL pipeline elevated American concern over Alberta 
oil. The $7 billion pipeline would carry hundreds of  thousands of  barrels of  
bitumen from Alberta to Nebraska daily; it had been under review since 2008, 
and the US Department of  State concluded in the spring of  2010 that the 
impacts on the environment would be minimal. The conflict between propon-
ents and opponents took the familiar form of  “jobs versus the environment.” 
Over 1,250 were arrested during a sit-in, and nine winners of  the Nobel Peace 
Prize wrote President Obama urging him to reject the Keystone proposal and to 
pursue renewable and clean energy sources. 
By the fall of  2011, President Obama had revoked approval, necessitating 
a reapplication to the US Department of  the State for a Presidential Permit to 
allow the pipeline to cross the border. The president of  Friends of  the Earth, 
Erich Pica, responded to Obama’s decision and captured the position of  
environmental opponents in the debate:
Today’s announcement is a welcome example of  President Obama following 
through on his promise that corporate polluter lobbyists will no longer set 
the agenda in Washington. . . . The Keystone XL pipeline would have been 
dirty at both ends, dangerous in between, and certainly not in our national 
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interest. Big Oil and its bought-and-paid-for confederates in Congress 
couldn’t drown this dirty reality despite all of  their threats and bullying. 
(Friends of  the Earth 2012)
Not to be outdone, the federal government in Canada countered with equally 
strong rhetoric. In an open letter to Canadians posted on the Government of  
Canada website, Minister of  Natural Resources Joe Oliver claimed that
there are environmental and other radical groups that would seek to block 
this opportunity to diversify our trade. . . . These groups threaten to hijack 
our regulatory system to achieve their radical ideological agenda. They seek 
to exploit any loophole they can find, stacking public hearings with bodies 
to ensure that delays kill good projects. They use funding from foreign 
special interest groups to undermine Canada’s national economic interest. 
They attract jet-setting celebrities with some of  the largest personal carbon 
footprints in the world to lecture Canadians not to develop our natural 
resources. (Oliver 2012)
Environment Minister Peter Kent went further, alleging that “some Canadian 
charitable agencies have been used to launder off-shore foreign funds” (Max 
Paris Environmental Unit 2012). These statements stake out the position of  the 
federal government in the clearest of  terms: those who oppose the promotion 
of  economic interests have a radical agenda.
In 2011, thirty members of  the House of  Representatives (both Republicans 
and Democrats from eighteen states) wrote a letter to Secretary of  State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton in support of  the approval of  the Keystone XL project. 
According to the members, “Dependence on foreign oil has created difficult 
geopolitical relationships with damaging consequences for our national secur-
ity.” They summarized the Keystone issue as being not only a matter of  national 
interest but also a matter of  national security and urged Clinton to approve the 
transport of  Canadian oil in order to minimize the need for the United States 
to purchase oil from nondemocratic countries in volatile regions of  the world 
(TransCanada 2011). The same year, Michigan’s House of  Representatives 
passed a bill that used similar language in support of  the approval of  the 
Keystone pipeline (Michigan, Legislature, House of  Representatives 2011).
What is notable about the language used is that Canadian oil is seen as an 
alternative to “foreign” oil. This conceptualization of  Canadian oil as a “domes-
tic” source springs from Canada’s position as a friendly liberal democratic 
ally of  the United States: the choice for consumers is between purchasing fuel 
from liberal democratic countries or from regimes that violate basic rights and 
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freedoms. Popularized by Ezra Levant in 2010, this view is based on the argu-
ment that the environmental critique of  Alberta’s bitumen sands is incomplete 
and that Canada’s record needs to be compared to those of  other oil-producing 
nations (Levant 2010, 53). A 2011 report from the Fraser Institute by Mark Milke 
picks up this theme. Using a variety of  measures, Milke analyzes thirty-eight 
oil-exporting countries that produce 250,000 barrels per day. He concludes that 
“with the exception of  Norway, Canada is the only major oil exporting country 
that scores highly on all measurements of  civil, political, and economic free-
dom, including the rights of  women to full career, medical and travel choices, 
media freedom, religious freedom, and property rights, as well as on other 
measurements such as judicial independence and relative freedom from cor-
ruption” (Milke 2011, ii). Ethical oil proponents conclude that the net effect of  
demonizing Canadian oil will be to drive consumers to buy their oil from states 
with far worse records, using any type of  measure.
The billion-dollar question, of  course, is, What are the “right” things to 
measure? The Fraser Institute’s measures are confined to individual freedoms 
and government priorities that impact individual freedom, and the economic 
and social well-being of  individuals. Freedom is defined as the ability to par-
ticipate in democratic elections, judicial freedom, media freedom, religious 
freedom, and so on. The Fraser Institute report also includes property rights as 
an indicator of  freedom (Milke 2011, 25). While the report does include meas-
ures of  such things as literacy rates and access to education as proxy measures 
of  freedoms that contribute to social well-being, it makes no attempt to assess 
the freedom of  minority groups, freedom from poverty, or the health of  the 
environment (31). This focus on individually defined freedom is consistent with 
the neoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility; however, it is in direct con-
flict with a view of  the state as playing an important role in promoting a more 
generalized public good. Even the very notion of  an identifiable Canadian iden-
tity with respect to ownership could be questioned, given that the majority of  
shareholders of  Canadian companies (defined as located in Canada, traded on 
the Canadian stock exchange, and using Canadian accounting practices) are for-
eign nationals, and over half  of  oil and gas revenue goes to foreign entities (De 
Souza 2012).
While the debate raged on over whether Alberta oil is “ethical” or “dirty,” 
both the federal and provincial governments began to dismantle the struc-
tures that had been set in place after WW II to provide both public and sci-
entific input into environmental protection processes. The goal was to make 
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the environmental review process more “efficient,” with efficiency defined as 
the speed with which approvals can be made. Along with the 2012 budget, the 
federal government passed Bill C-38, a massive omnibus bill that included a 
completely new environmental assessment law, repealed the Kyoto Protocol 
Implementation Act, weakened protection of  at-risk species, decreased oppor-
tunities for public participation in environmental decision making, weakened 
accountability by allowing more decisions to be made by cabinet and individual 
ministers, allowed cabinet to override decisions made by the National Energy 
Board, and contained an entirely new environmental assessment law that sets 
timelines for environmental assessment hearings and narrows the range of  
projects that will come under review (May 2012). Another omnibus bill was sub-
sequently passed in 2012 with equally devastating consequences for environ-
mental protection: Bill C-45 made major changes to the Navigation Protection 
Act and the Environmental Protection Act.
The changes to the environmental protection regime were profound, and 
since they were contained in massive omnibus bills, the opportunities for debate 
and deliberation was minimized. In the case of  Bill C-38, the time frame was 
seven days (Whittington 2012). The amendments to the Navigation Protection 
Act and the Environmental Protection Acts followed cuts to and dismantling 
of  advisory bodies such as the National Roundtable on the Environment and 
Economy and the Canadian Environmental Network, the latter of  which com-
prises hundreds of  environmental groups across Canada and, according to its 
website, now operates on a volunteer basis. Environment Canada was also dra-
matically cut, and almost twenty thousand public servants were notified that 
they would lose their jobs, including the cadre of  scientists within government 
departments and agencies who provided policy advice based on their environ-
mental expertise (CBC News 2012a). Given the Keystone controversy, it is ironic 
that these sweeping cuts included the Environmental Emergencies Program, 
the group that coordinated the clean up of  oil spills. In 2013, Alberta experi-
enced two particularly large and damaging environmental incidents involving 
bitumen extraction that together were named the fifth-top news-making story 
of  the year by the Edmonton Journal (“Top Stories” 2013). 
Alberta followed the lead of  the federal government with respect to environ-
mental deregulation, albeit using a very different strategy. In December 2013, 
seventy-five environmental officers who provided oversight of  bitumen extrac-
tion companies left their government posts to take higher-paying jobs with the 
newly created, arms-length Alberta Energy Regulator, which is funded by the 
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oil, gas, and coal industries. By eliminating the Energy Resources Conservation 
Board, which was funded by both government and industry, the government 
handed over responsibility to administer the Water Act, the Public Lands Act, 
and the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, with respect to issues 
pertaining to the energy industry, to the industry-funded regulator. Critics 
argue that having the regulator entirely funded by industry makes it vulnerable 
to regulatory capture, especially given that the chair of  the new entity is one of  
the founders of  a leading industry lobby group—the Canadian Association of  
Petroleum Producers (Pratt 2013; Valentine 2013).
Federally, the auditing of  nonprofit groups to ensure that their advocacy 
activities amount to less than 10 percent of  their overall budget was yet another 
tool to discipline dissenting voices (Canadian Press 2012). Under rules set out 
in the Income Tax Act and a Federal Court ruling, groups that have nonprofit 
status are allowed to pursue nonpartisan advocacy work that is directly related 
to their group’s mission as long as these activities do not consume more than 
10 percent of  their budget. Maintaining charitable status is critical to the abil-
ity of  nonprofits to raise funds, since donors can deduct donations from their 
income tax. The Tides Foundation provides grants to Canadian environmental 
and social justice groups and was among those organizations singled out for 
audit because it receives support from American charitable foundations. A 
Tides spokesperson opined, “I do think it’s very likely . . . that the government 
is really looking at environmental charities, and looking for ways to limit the 
effectiveness of  those charities as they try and stimulate discussion and public 
discourse around major public-policy developments relating to resource extrac-
tion and the like” (Canadian Press 2012). The federal budget of  2012 proposed 
other disciplinary measures, such as fines and limits on the amounts of  money 
charities can give to other charities for advocacy work, in order “to ensure that 
charities devote their resources primarily to charitable, rather than political, 
activities, and to enhance public transparency and accountability in this area” 
(Canada, Department of  Finance 2012, 189). This followed the announcement, 
by the MP for Athabasca-Fort McMurray Brian Jean, of  plans to put forward a 
private member’s bill “to make sure that these people that receive the benefit of  
a non-profit status are transparent” (Banman 2012).
Jean (who would become the leader of  Alberta’s official opposition, the 
Wildrose Party, in 2015) eventually introduced a bill; however, Bill C-526, 
“Cracking Down on Organized Crime and Terrorism Act,” focused on “gang 
members, organized criminals and terrorists.” While Bill C-526 was not passed, 
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the federal Conservatives did introduce another bill that reflects that party’s 
focus on security. Bill C-51 sought to facilitate information sharing within gov-
ernment (with little or no restraints on how information is used—or misused), 
give authorities the power to arrest and detain people suspected of  terrorism, 
widen the scope of  what is considered to be a terrorist act, and greatly enhance 
the power of  Canada’s spy agency, CSIS (Forcese and Roach 2015). One hundred 
academics (mainly law professors) signed an open letter criticizing the bill, and 
rallies were held across Canada protesting both the method of  passing the bill 
(cutting off  debate) and the substance of  the bill—specifically, its threats to 
freedom of  speech in the name of  national security (Payton 2015).
According to Carroll and Little (2001), the significance of  the neolib-
eral mentality is that it removes the space for meaningful political contesta-
tion. Branding a discussion “against the national interest” effectively moves 
it out of  the arena of  debate. Cutting government funding to charities such as 
the Canadian Environmental Network serves to silence potential dissenters. 
Threatening remaining charities with fines or a revocation of  the charitable 
status that is critical to their ability to fundraise is yet another way of  chilling 
the debate. Cutting support to agencies that solicit input or promote evidence-
based decision making in the name of  fiscal austerity serves the same purpose. 
As noted by Carroll and Little (2011, 52), “when the activity of  government is 
refocused on questions of  cost, priority, efficiency, accountability, and ‘con-
tinuous improvement’ in the delivery of  services, the space for debate on sub-
stantial public issues concerning social justice and citizenship rights is severely 
restricted.” The neoliberal conceptualization of  the citizen’s place in society 
focuses on the rights of  the individual; it has little to say about the possibilities 
for either collective choice or collective responsibility. Describing dissenters to 
the ethical oil narrative as using funds from “foreign special interest groups” 
or as being “radical” (Oliver 2012), or accusing them of  “‘laundering’ funds 
from offshore donors” (CBC News 2012b) disperses and neutralizes resistance, 
which, as Carroll and Little (2011, 52) argue, “minimizes the opportunities for 
collective resistance to form around a common demonized identity.” Using 
the levers of  the state to discipline those who challenge neoliberal policies and 
the continentalization project neutralizes dissent. Neutralized dissent, how-
ever, is not equivalent to provincial consensus. This point is underscored by 
the unexpected results of  the 2015 provincial election, when the nearly forty-
four-year rule of  the hegemonic Progressive Conservative Party came to a dra-
matic end, replaced by the left-leaning NDP, who rose from a mere four seats to 
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form government. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, the interests of  
Albertans are not static; nor are they homogeneous.
Dirty Oil, Ethical Oil, and the Public Interest
This analysis underscores the importance of  American and Canadian national 
interests in the development of  Alberta’s energy sector. Recently, the ethical 
versus dirty oil debate entered the discussion, allowing the two camps to pitch 
simplistic but convenient flags. Through the neoliberalization of  the provin-
cial, national, and continental economies, there has been a dramatic shift from 
the province- and nation-building aspirations of  the Lougheed-Trudeau era to 
a neoliberal agenda built on, and reinforced by, the security/economic prosper-
ity nexus. With this shift, we see the transformation of  both political and cul-
tural identity. Pierre Trudeau’s notion of  a “good and just society” embodied by 
robust social programs and Loughheed’s use of  the state to build infrastructure 
and diversify the economy are being replaced by a neoliberal conceptualization 
of  the relationship between the state and citizen, wherein the primary role of  
the state is to provide security defined in terms of  physical safety as opposed to 
social well-being. In this view of  identity, divergent views are framed as being 
in opposition to national security and economic prosperity.
Three distinct developmental periods of  Canada’s oil industry help to 
explain why neoliberalism found such a natural home in Alberta, and more 
recently, why the debate over resource extraction has become so bitter. The 
first period sets the stage for Alberta’s democratic development; it provides 
the context for Alberta’s “business government” during the era when oil was 
discovered. During the latter part of  this period, Premier Lougheed’s province-
building strategies collided with Prime Minister Trudeau’s nation-building 
strategies, leaving an indelible mark on the psyche of  Alberta. The clash over 
the NEP is the defining moment of  this period, congealing Alberta’s identity 
as a political community alienated from the interests of  Central Canada. The 
second period begins in the 1990s, when Ralph Klein became the premier of  
Alberta; this period saw the transformation and consolidation of  neoliberalism 
in Alberta and, later, in Canada more generally. The result of  this consolidation 
is a weakening of  the bond between citizens and the state, as the state shrinks 
its range of  activities to focus on economic development. The mid-point of  
this period saw the end of  economic recession, the beginning of  global resist-
ance to the neoliberalization of  post-industrial economies, and the emerging 
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preoccupation with security as defined by the events of  9/11. The third period 
began in the early years of  the new century; this was the era of  hypergrowth 
in the oil patch as a result of  a booming world economy punctuated by a spec-
tacular crash. The province’s rapid growth and economic development saw an 
equally rapid rise in Alberta’s political importance on the national stage. With 
this came the entrenchment of  the frame of  Canadian oil extraction as domes-
tic US supply within the context of  American national security and Canadian 
economic prosperity.
Oil-based economic growth brings with it social and environmental prob-
lems, which have resulted in increasingly frustrated critics taking their con-
cerns to the global arena. New inter- and intrastate relationships have been 
supported by the framing of  Canadian oil as “ethical” and weakened by its por-
trayal as “dirty,” while opposition to the continental energy regime has been 
construed as radical. With criticism marginalized, neoliberal globalization 
flourishes: industries operate in an increasingly deregulated or self-regulated 
environment. Ironically, however, the transnational nature of  the oil industry, 
which has allowed governments to define the public interest from a continental 
perspective, is the very thing that makes transnational mobilization effective.
The economic downturn of  2008, pronouncements that the development 
of  US shale deposits will position the United States to become energy self-
sufficient by 2020, the discovery of  shale oil in Australia and China, and the 
collapse of  oil prices in 2014 signal the beginning of  another era of  global 
energy relationships. The rise in fortunes of  the federal NDP after the election 
of  their provincial counterparts in Alberta provides another interesting vari-
able to consider. A regime change at both levels will change the playing field, 
as presumably more attention will be given to environmental considerations. 
Given that bitumen oil is much more expensive to produce than other sources 
of  oil, these new developments will have a significant impact on the markets for 
Canadian oil and will renew concerns about Canada’s energy security due to the 
continued reliance of  Central Canada on imported oil. Canada will move from 
depending on American consumption of  its oil to pursuing emerging markets. 
New possibilities for resistance present themselves through the globalized and 
splintered character of  the oil industry; however, the “dirty oil” frame that has 
been effective in the past in focusing attention on the environmental and social 
costs of  bitumen extraction and transport may be less so in the future if  the pri-
mary consumers of  Alberta oil are not American. Similarly, framing Canadian 
oil as “ethical” will probably become less useful in the future, considering the 
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rapidly changing and complicated market for Canadian oil. The only certainty 
in all of  this is that the debate within Alberta will continue to occupy centre 
stage, given the enormous economic impact that bitumen extraction has on the 
province—and the equally enormous social and environmental consequences.
Notes
1 Harper’s remarks are quoted in Steven Chase, “Harper’s Embrace of  ‘Ethical’ Oil 
Sands Reignites ‘Dirty’ Arguments,” Globe and Mail, 7 January 2011. Kent had just 
declared that the United States should give preference to Alberta oil on the grounds 
that it is “the product of  a natural resource whose revenues don’t go to fund 
terrorism.” Quoted in Steven Chase, “Peter Kent’s Green Agenda: Clean Up Oil Sands’ 
Dirty Reputation,” Globe and Mail, 6 January 2011.
2 See Canada Revenue Agency, 2014, “Alberta Tax and Credits,” http://www.cra-arc.
gc.ca/E/pbg/tf/5009-c/5009-c-14e.pdf.
3 In the proposed 2015 Alberta budget, Premier Prentice introduced the elimination 
of  the flat tax, replacing it with a progressive tax that, among other things, would 
see the tax rate of  those making over $131,000 rise 1.5 percent over three years. 
Those who make over $250,000 would pay 2 percent over three years, although in 
the fourth year, their taxable rate would decrease 0.5 percent (Bellefontaine and 
Estabrooks 2015). There was no change to the corporate tax or oil royalty rates. While 
the additional amounts that high-income earners would be paying were modest, 
Prentice claimed that “this will be the most significant budget in modern times in 
the province” and that, as such, “whoever is the premier had better have a mandate” 
(Bennett 2015). With that, the government, breaking its own recently passed law 
fixing election dates, called an election a year early. The result was the historic 
election of  an NDP majority government, which promised even more significant 
changes: replacing the flat tax with one that is progressive, increasing corporate 
taxes, and reviewing royalty rates.
4 The 1933 US Glass-Steagall Act, or the Banking Act, sought “to provide for the safer 
and more effective use of  the assets of  banks, to regulate interbank control, to 
prevent the undue diversion of  funds into speculative operations.” In 1999, sections 
20 and 32, which stated that banks could not be affiliated with securities dealers, were 
repealed, helping to deregulate the conduct of  banks and securities dealers. Since the 
stock market crash of  2008, a number of  policies have been developed in an attempt 
to regain some government oversight into operations.
5 See “Recovery or Extraction,” Alberta Energy, 2015, http://www.energy.alberta.ca/
OilSands/1719.asp; see also “Oil Sands: Unlocking Untapped Energy,” Chevron, 2015, 
http://www.chevron.com/deliveringenergy/oilsands/.
6 Canadian Association of  Petroleum Producers, “Tailings Ponds,” Oil Sands Today, 2015, 
http://www.oilsandstoday.ca/topics/Tailings/Pages/default.aspx.
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7 See “Managing Oil Sands Development for the Long Term: A Declaration by Canada’s 
Environmental Community,” 1 December 2005, http://www.pembina.org/reports/
OS_declar_Full.pdf.
8 Bitumen extraction is also criticized for its social impacts: the consequences of  
hypergrowth on the small city of  Fort McMurray, such as severe housing shortages, 
escalating prices, strained public services, and increased crime and drug use; the 
declining health of  individuals in nearby First Nations communities; the increasing 
reliance on temporary foreign workers as a solution to chronic labour shortages; 
the stress on families due to the boom-bust cycle of  shiftwork; and the high rate of  
worker injury and death, including those incurred on the so-called Highway of  Death 
between Fort McMurray and Edmonton, which has seen over 125 fatalities since 1990. 
(See chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 in this volume, as well as Bartko and Mertz 2015.)
9 See, for example, “Check the Facts: Energy Security—Good for Nebraska, Good for 
America,” Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy Independence, n.d. , http://www.jobsandenergy.
org/Facts/EnergySecurity.html.
10 The letter from the Nobel Women’s Initiative to the president, dated 7 September 
2011, is available at http://nobelwomensinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
KeystoneXL_Obama_Sept2011_Final.pdf.
11 The first incident involved a spill in an in situ bitumen sands project on the Cold Lake 
Air Weapons Range, while the second incident involved containment ponds on the 
Athabasca River upstream of  the province’s largest bitumen site.
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The Political Economy of  Oil and Democracy 
in Venezuela and Alberta
Paul Kellogg
The discussion of  oil in Alberta is very politically charged. On 5 May 2015, 
Rachel Notley’s New Democratic Party (NDP) won a stunning majority, ending 
nearly forty-four years of  rule by the Progressive Conservatives (PCs). The next 
day, Canada’s major stock exchange plummeted two hundred points, largely 
in reaction to Notley’s campaign promise to review royalties paid by oil and 
other resource-based corporations (Gerson 2015). Four days before the elec-
tion, in part prompted by the threat of  rising royalty fees, five Edmonton busi-
nessmen—including Doug Goss, member of  the board of  governors of  the 
University of  Alberta—held what one commentator labelled a “highly unusual” 
press conference in which they “pilloried Rachel Notley’s ‘amateur’ NDP poli-
cies and highlighted the ‘solid’ track record of  Jim Prentice’s Progressive 
Conservatives” (Kleiss 2015).
This kind of  fear mongering has deep roots. In 2011, Paula Arab, a Calgary 
Herald columnist and editorial board member, asserted that when one is dis-
cussing Alberta’s oil industry, using tar rather than oil as the adjective for sands is 
“inaccurate and pejorative. It has become part of  the rhetoric of  extremists who 
are anti-oil and who want to shut down the industry” (Arab 2011). Ever since, 
the province has seen a neat division between those who use the adjective tar 
and those who use the adjective oil. While on a tour of  Alberta during the 2012 
federal election campaign, NDP leader Thomas Mulcair very nearly deployed 
the now politically incorrect adjective tar. As he recovered from his near-tar 
faux pas, he suggested the adoption of  a perhaps more neutral and possibly 
more acceptable adjective—bitumen. “They’re bitumen sands,” he said, “because 
the chemicals are neither oil nor tar.” Mulcair indicated his willingness to forgo 
the use of  tar, saying, “If  removing that linguistic impediment can make the 
conversation easier, I’m not going to keep it in place intentionally.” However, he 
5
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added that “a linguistic cleanup doesn’t change anything about what we’re talk-
ing about in terms of  the ecosystems” (Fong 2012).
The truth is that the Calgary Herald–initiated tempest over the use of  tar 
is a distraction from the real issues at stake, one of  which, of  course, is that 
identified by Mulcair—the threat to ecosystems. This chapter has a different 
focus. Bitumen exploitation has two great centres—the nation of  Venezuela 
and the Canadian province of  Alberta. This chapter examines the intersection 
between oil and politics in each of  these jurisdictions, with a specific focus on 
the 2012 provincial elections in Alberta and the confrontation, from 2001 to 
2003, between the state-oil company in Venezuela and the Venezuelan govern-
ment. While bitumen sands play a large role in the politics of  both Alberta and 
Venezuela, they do so in quite different contexts and in quite different ways. 
Venezuela remains extremely poor, while Alberta is a centre of  enormous 
wealth and entrenched corporate power. This wealth difference is rooted in 
the very different places occupied by Venezuela and Canada (and by exten-
sion, Alberta) in the world hierarchy of  nations: Venezuela is a semi-peripheral 
member of  the world economy’s Global South, while Alberta, as part of  Canada, 
is very much a core member of  the world economy’s Global North.
The relationship between oil and democracy in Venezuela has been marked 
by the desperate attempt to assert sovereignty over the oil industry, a struggle to 
shift the locus of  power out of  the hands of  what one might call a state-capitalist 
comprador elite into the hands of  the Venezuelan state. In Alberta and Canada, 
by contrast, the oil and gas industry that intersects with Canadian democracy 
is, for the most part, very Canadian. There may well be issues of  accountability 
and popular control in Canada that need to be addressed. Indeed, this chapter 
documents the heavy corporate footprint left by the oil and gas industry in the 
2012 Alberta provincial election. However, unlike Venezuela, Canada does not 
face a national task of  wrenching control of  the bitumen sands from forces out-
side of  the country. The dilemmas posed by the exploitation of  bitumen sands 
in Alberta cannot be outsourced. They are quintessentially Canadian dilemmas, 
to be grappled with and addressed (or ignored and allowed to fester) by our own 
institutions of  democracy and governance.
The Two Worlds of Alberta and Venezuela
A 2001 study estimates that Venezuela and Canada together hold approxi-
mately 3.4 trillion barrels of  “original oil in place” (OOIP) trapped within their 
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bitumen-soaked mud (2.2 trillion in Canada and 1.2 trillion in Venezuela), 
accounting for between 55 percent and 65 percent of  the known reserves of  
such oil in the world. In Venezuela, the heavy oil exists in the Faja Petrolífera 
del Orinoco deposits, also known as the Orinoco Belt. In Canada, this resource 
is located in the heavy oil belt of  northern Alberta and Saskatchewan, with 
Alberta containing the vast majority (Dusseault 2001, 1–2). In 2013 the Energy 
Resources Conservation Board estimated that in Alberta, 177 billion barrels of  
this OOIP are recoverable using current technologies. However, since the sci-
ence and technology is constantly evolving, the “ultimate potential” of  this 
resource “using reasonably foreseeable technology” is thought to be 315 bil-
lion barrels (ERCB 2013, 2–10). Venezuela’s slightly smaller heavy oil deposits, 
are somewhat more recoverable, one report estimating their potential at 267 
billion barrels using current technologies (Dusseault 2001, 2). A 2010 esti-
mate by the US Geological Survey was much higher, at 513 billion barrels (BBC 
News 2010). The world’s greatest known reserves of  easily recoverable oil are 
located in Saudi Arabia, which had an estimated 250 billion barrels of  recover-
able oil in 2001, a figure that had grown to 260 billion by 2010 (Dusseault 2001, 
2; BBC News 2010). The Alberta potential of  177 to 315 billion barrels, and the 
Venezuela potential of  267 to 513 billion barrels, put both constituencies very 
much in Saudi Arabia’s league. The bitumen-soaked deposits in Venezuela and 
Alberta are without question an extremely important source of  oil for the world 
economy in the twenty-first century.
The intersection of  oil and politics in the two societies is, however, quite 
different. In Venezuela, that intersection has, for years, occurred on a terrain 
that is volatile and sometimes violent. The year 1935 saw the end of  the twenty-
seven-year dictatorship of  Juan Vicente Gómez, only to be followed by the 
emergence of  another dictator, Eleazar López Conteras, in power from 1935 to 
1941. Political liberties were restored in the 1940s, but military dictatorships 
returned for much of  the 1950s. Two parties vied for office through the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s—Acción Democrática (Democratic Action) and Partido Social 
Cristiano (Social Christian Party, or Christian Democrats). Recent decades have 
seen economic and political turmoil, including an uprising in Caracas against 
austerity in 1989, in which three thousand people died and a 1992 coup attempt 
led by the late Hugo Chávez (who was finally elected president in 1998; Heckel 
et al. 2012). In Alberta, the picture is very different. Without doubt, there is an 
intersection between oil and politics, as is demonstrated below, but the terrain 
on which it has occurred has always been much less volatile. One party, the 
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Social Credit, held office from 1935 until 1971, and the Progressive Conservative 
Party held power for almost the next forty-four years, until its 2015 meltdown. 
There have been no coups d’état or revolutions.
In large part, these differences reflect the different places that Venezuela and 
Alberta occupy in the world economy. If  they are similar in terms of  heavy-oil 
deposits, they are extremely dissimilar in terms of  their positions and trajec-
tories in the global economy. The Canadian province of  Alberta is in the Global 
North, while the Latin American nation Venezuela is in the Global South. While 
by no means one of  the poorest countries of  the South, Venezuela’s economic 
position is extremely far removed from that of  Alberta and Canada. Many 
within the field of  international political economy are more specific, classi-
fying Canada as being in the core of  the world system and placing Venezuela 
in the semi-periphery—that important zone of  countries that functions as a 
buffer between the core and the periphery.1
Measuring gross domestic product (GDP) per capita provides a helpful 
snapshot of  a country’s place in the world’s hierarchy of  economies. Figure 5.1 
displays GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars for Canada and Venezuela 
from 1960 until 2013 and for Alberta from 1981 to 2013. Interestingly, the two 
countries were not worlds apart in 1960, with Canada’s GDP per capita sitting at 
$12,931 and Venezuela’s at $5,940. There were some who, based on these kinds 
of  statistics, placed Venezuela, along with countries like Canada, as a member 
of  the core rather than the semi-periphery of  the world system (Babones 2005, 
52). Today, no one would make such a decision. Figure 5.1 shows that over a half  
a century, Venezuela’s GDP per capita stagnated, by 2013 sitting at just $6,402—
roughly the same as it was in 1960. Canada’s, in contrast, increased steadily to 
$37,524. These kinds of  comparisons between core countries such as Canada 
and semi-peripheral countries such as Venezuela are, however, considerably 
distorted by the weak exchange rates typical of  the latter, whose usually under-
valued currencies have the effect of  seriously reducing GDP per capita when 
expressed in US dollars. The dashed line in figure 5.1 takes this into account, 
expressing Venezuela’s GDP per capita between 1990 and 2013 (in constant 2011 
international dollars) using “purchasing power parity” (PPP), a method that 
largely removes this distortion. But while GDP per capita in Venezuela does 
increase by this measure, so do comparable figures for Canada (the dotted line), 
and Venezuela still lags considerably behind GDP per capita in Canada and 
still displays long decades of  stagnation, contrasting sharply with the steady 
increase in the Canadian figures.
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Figure 5.1. GDP per capita: Alberta, Canada, and Venezuela, 1960–2013. Source: Compiled 
from data available in World Bank (2014) and Statistics Canada (2014a, 2014b, 2015).
The most striking contrast, however, emerges from a comparison not of  
Canada to Venezuela but of  Alberta to Venezuela. When Alberta’s GDP per 
capita is expressed in 2005 US dollars, the picture that emerges is startling. 
Between 1981 and 1999, Alberta’s GDP per capita, while greater than overall fig-








Alberta (constant 2005 US$)
Canada PPP (constant 2011 international $)
Canada (constant 2005 US$)
Venezuela PPP (constant 2011 international $)
Venezuela (constant 2005 US$)
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
144   Paul Kellogg
since 1999, it has greatly exceeded the Canadian average, surging by 2008 to 
$57,630, falling back considerably during the recession of  2009, but then con-
tinuing to increase again, until by 2013, it sat at $55,697, almost 50 percent 
higher than the figure for Canada as a whole and almost nine times greater than 
the US dollar figure for Venezuela. Without question, Alberta and Venezuela 
exist in extremely different places in the world hierarchy of  economies.
Figure 5.2. Maternal mortality per 100,000 live births: Canada, Venezuela, and the 
United States, 1990–2013. Source: Compiled from data available in World Bank (2014).
I am not arguing that there is a universal condition of  wealth in Alberta and 
a universal condition of  poverty in Venezuela. These kinds of  aggregate figures 
are helpful at a very general level in placing different economies in the world 
system into appropriate categories (core, semi-periphery, etc.). By themselves, 
however, they tell us nothing about how the wealth within those economies 
is distributed. Travel to Calgary, and you will see ostentatious wealth existing 
side by side with the most extraordinary and visible poverty. A 2009 City of  
Calgary report observed that in the city, despite “enormous opportunities and 
socio-economic prosperity . . . we are seeing growing income disparities and 
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entrenching of  poverty in racialized and Aboriginal populations” (Pruegger, 
Cook, and Richter-Salomons 2009, 1). Travel to Caracas and search for centres 
of  support for the politics of  the late Hugo Chávez, and you will inevitably end 
up in the neighbourhood of  Petare, which Jonah Gindin (2004, 31) refers to 
as “an infamous epicentre of  rebellion and politicization,” noting that “Petare 
residents played a leading role in the caracazo—the popular uprising against 
the neoliberal policies of  then President Carlos Andres Perez in February 1989.” 
In 2002 after an attempted coup against Chávez, “Petare residents stormed 
the state television station, bringing it back on the air to inform the country 
of  the coup, rallying Chávez’s supporters to successfully demand his return” 
(31). Petare is extremely impoverished, leading many to see it as “the notori-
ously dangerous barrio of  Petare” (Eulich 2010). By contrast, should you use the 
privileges that come with carrying a Canadian passport and visit the Embassy 
of  Canada, you will find yourself  in the Altamira neighbourhood of  the city, a 
place of  wealth and comfort on a Global North scale. 
GDP per capita, in other words, is not a “lived” category, but rather an over-
all general indicator. Our lives are ordered according to more specific aspects of  
the economy—wages received from work, social wages received from govern-
ment-provided services, access to education, access to fresh water and sanita-
tion, and so on. For a complete picture of  life in any society, all of  these need 
to be examined. GDP per capita figures should be seen as just the beginning 
of  an analysis, a preliminary window into the complex entities we call “econ-
omies”—an important beginning, often providing critical clues to what we 
will find when more specific categories are examined, but nonetheless, just a 
beginning. Here, we will look at just one such specific category. Figure 5.2 dis-
plays a key development statistic that is actually experienced—maternal mor-
tality per 100,000 live births, from 1990 to 2013 in Canada, the United States, 
and Venezuela. In Canada, the figure was 6 in 1990. By 2010, it had more than 
doubled to a startling 13 per 100,000 live births, declining to 11 in 2013. The 
situation in the United States is worse. In 1990, maternal mortality was already 
at 12 per 100,000. In 2005 it jumped to 17, in 2010 it went to 27, and by 2013 
it had reached the shocking figure of  28, more than twice what it had been in 
1990. These figures reflect the shameful effects of  neoliberal policies on one of  
the most basic indicators of  development in two of  the richest Global North 
states, Canada and the United States. Shifting our gaze to Venezuela, however, 
the figures are qualitatively higher. In 1990, maternal mortality rates were 93 
per 100,000 live births, increasing to 98 in 1995. The rates declined to the low 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
146   Paul Kellogg
nineties in 2000 and 2005, reflecting the reforms implemented by Chávez 
and his successors, but in 2010, they shot back up to 110, where they remained 
in 2013—many times higher than rates in Canada and the United States. In 
Venezuela, in other words, it is far more risky for a woman to give birth than it 
is in Canada or the United States. For every other development indicator, these 
kinds of  contrasts are visible. For example, in 1999, Chávez’s first full year in 
office, mortality rates for infants per one thousand live births (i.e. , the number 
of  babies who would die before their first birthday) was a very high 18.8. This 
figure has been systematically lowered in the years since, by 2012 sitting at 13.1. 
Still, this is more than double the rate in the United States and almost triple 
the rate in Canada (6.0 and 4.7, respectively; World Bank 2014). The GDP per 
capita figures, in the case of  these three countries, do not lie. Life is lived, on 
the whole, very differently in a Global South semi-peripheral country such as 
Venezuela compared to a Global North core country such as Canada.
Bitumen and Politics I: Alberta, 2012
How does oil intersect with politics in these two very different societies? In 
Alberta, the picture is somewhat opaque, but the 2012 provincial election provides 
a useful window. The surprising defeat of  the Wildrose Alliance Party, despite its 
lead in every pre-election opinion poll, and the return to office of  Alison Redford 
and the Progressive Conservatives is a story in itself. There had been a flight 
from the Tories toward Wildrose by a conservative base that saw new Tory leader 
Alison Redford as being too “liberal.” This collapse of  the Tories’ conservative base, 
apparent to everyone in the province, seemed to point to a Wildrose victory. But 
to the surprise of  many, there was an even bigger flight to the Tories driven by 
concern about the perceived pro-corporate and socially conservative politics of  
Wildrose. Commentators had anticipated a flight of  this nature from the Liberal 
Party, but that in itself  would not have been enough to stop Wildrose. What few 
predicted—and it proved to be the decisive factor—was the surge in voter par-
ticipation, a surge clearly driven by an “anyone but Wildrose” sentiment (Kellogg 
2014). Bitumen was part of  this drama. The political economy of  oil has many 
dimensions, but one of  them is the relationship between bitumen sands develop-
ment and climate change. Smith alienated many in the province when she argued, 
one week before the election, that the question of  climate change was not yet set-
tled (Canadian Press 2012). After the election, she acknowledged that controver-
sial Wildrose statements including “her questions about climate change . . . may 
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have given undecided voters ‘some pause’ as they made up their minds. . . . ‘The 
fact of  the matter is there are certain policies that clearly Albertans didn’t want to 
see implemented,’” she said (CBC News 2012).
Many “oil-positive” media outlets had backed the election of  Wildrose, 
including the editors of  the National Post, who argued that “Alberta’s gov-
ernment could use some fresh blood and vibrant new ideas” (“National Post 
Editorial Board” 2012). However, the fact that Smith, an oil company favour-
ite, lost, in part because of  her stance on climate change, does not mean that 
the oil companies themselves lost. The editors of  the Globe and Mail differed 
from their colleagues in the National Post, backed the Tories because, in their 
eyes, Redford was a more positive voice than Smith for Alberta’s oil industry. 
Redford’s “Canadian Energy Strategy would facilitate the shipment of  oil-sands 
oil to Asia, the US and Central Canada; she also promises to help fund oil-sands 
extraction technology” (“Time for Big Alberta” 2012). The Globe and Mail editors 
were reflecting the point of  view of  big sections of  corporate Alberta. The key 
issue in the election was to put in place an oil-friendly government. The National 
Post editors gave a nod to Wildrose. The Globe and Mail editors gave a nod to 
the Tories. These two conservative media outlets were reflecting the thinking 
in the boardrooms of  corporate Alberta, comfortable with a victory by either 
Wildrose or the Tories. Both parties received corporate donations running to 
hundreds of  thousands of  dollars—in the case of  Wildrose, reaching almost $1 
million. Table 5.1 lists all the corporations that made donations to both parties, 
beginning with those involved in the petrochemical and energy industries. 
Table 5.1. Corporate support for both the Wildrose and Progressive Conservative parties
Petrochemical / Energy corporations Wildrose PCs
Cenovus Energy Inc. $25,500 $10,001–30,000
Enbridge Pipelines Inc. $5,000 $5,001–10,000
EnCana Corporation $15,000 $10,001–30,000
Ensign Energy Services Inc. $5,000 $5,001–10,000
Marathon Oil Canada Corporation $5,000 $10,001–30,000
North West Upgrading $7,000 $5,001–10,000
NOVA Chemicals $12,000 $10,001–30,000
Penn West Petroleums Ltd. $10,000 $10,001–30,000
Suncor Energy Services Inc. $7,500 $5,001–10,000
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Petrochemical / Energy corporations (cont'd) Wildrose (cont'd) PCs (cont'd)
Transalta Corporation $12,500 $5,001–10,000
TransCanada Pipelines Limited $5,000 $375–5,000
Other corporations Wildrose PCs
Axia Supernet Ltd. $7,500 $5,001–10,000
Borden Ladner Gervais LLP $10,000 $375–5,000
Brookfield Residential $10,000 $375–5,000
CANA Construction Co. Ltd. $15,000 $10,001–30,000
CCS Corporation $5,000 $5,001–10,000
Deloitte Management Services LP $10,000 $5,001–10,000
Don Wheaton Ltd. $5,000 $10,001–30,000
Maclab Enterprises $5,000 $375–5,000
Prairie Merchant Corporation $30,000 $375–5,000
Ramsay Ranches Inc. $6,000 $5001–10,000
Shane Homes Ltd. $5,000 $375–5,000
Sherritt International Corporation $10,000 $10,001–30,000
WAM Development Corporation $5,000 $10,001–30,000
Witten LLP $5,000 $375–5,000
Source: Compiled from data available in Wildrose (2012); Audette and PC Alberta (2012). 
Wildrose provided actual amounts; PC Alberta provided ranges of support: hence the 
difference in the presentation of data.
Significantly, twenty-five corporations gave cash to both parties—includ-
ing many companies in the petrochemical and energy industries. For Cenovus, 
Enbridge, Encana, Marathon Oil, North West Upgrading, NOVA Chemicals, 
Penn West Petroleum, Suncor Energy, Transalta, and TransCanada Pipelines, 
there was a certain indifference. Smith or Redford would do. Either of  them 
would be a good bet to allow the expansion of  bitumen sands production into 
the foreseeable future.
Clearly, oil and gas corporations play a central role in Alberta politics. But 
whose corporations are they? When we turn to an examination of  Venezuela, 
we will see how the entire oil-politics connection has been shaped by the 
presence of  an oil industry controlled in an earlier age by non-Venezuelan 
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oil multinationals—in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, by 
an externally oriented state-capitalist comprador elite. This is not the case in 
Canada. What has emerged in the oil and gas industry as a whole, and in the 
bitumen sands in Alberta in particular, is a capital accumulation process with 
Canadian firms entrenched as dominant players. Elsewhere, I have examined 
this in some detail (Kellogg 2013). For the purposes of  this chapter, we need only 
examine the highlights.
Figure 5.3. Country of control: petroleum and natural gas (percentage of capital 
employed, 1954–87); oil and gas extraction and support activities (percentage of assets, 
1999–2012). Source: Compiled from data available in Statistics Canada (2000, 2014c).
Statistics Canada provides a breakdown for the control of  the petroleum and 
natural gas industry in Canada, from 1954 until 1987, on the basis of  percent-
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1999 on, we have statistics showing control for the industry by assets, operat-
ing revenue, and profits. Of  the three categories, the one for assets is the most 
comparable with the earlier series. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Canadian 
control was quite low, at less than 40 percent, while nonresident corporations 
controlled in excess of  60 percent every year until 1970. Of  this, the vast major-
ity comprised US control. Through the 1970s and 1980s, however, the situation 
changed markedly. By 1987, 60 percent of  the industry was in Canadian hands, 
US control had declined to 26 percent, and the share of  other nonresident cor-
porations stood at 14 percent. When the story picks up in 1999 with the new 
series based on assets, we see that Canadian control of  the industry remains 
above 60 percent, US control slips to just below 20 percent, and other non-
residents represent the rest (in 2012, just over 17 percent). Three trends stand 
out here: first, the clearly visible Canadian corporate dominance in the field; 
second, the steadily declining portion of  nonresident control represented by 
US corporations; and third, the steadily increasing portion of  nonresident con-
trol represented by “other than US” corporations.
Let us switch from the general category of  petroleum and natural gas to 
the subcategory of  bitumen sands production. Clearly some of  the corpora-
tions involved in bitumen sands exploitation in Canada are nonresident. Statoil 
Canada is owned by Statoil Norway, Imperial Oil Ltd. is 69.6 percent owned 
by Exxon-Mobil in the United States, and Murphy Oil Corp. is headquartered 
in El Dorado, Arkansas.2 But there are some who claim that other, nominally 
Canadian corporations are in fact not Canadian. Since “71 per cent of  all tar 
sands production is owned by non-Canadian shareholders,” argues one influ-
ential report, it is justifiable to deny that what is going on in the tar sands is 
made in Canada (Skuce 2012, 1). On this basis, Husky Energy is considered 
to be non-Canadian as are the two biggest oil and gas producers in Canada 
(Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. [CNRL] and Suncor Energy Inc.), as well as 
the seventh biggest (Cenovus Energy Inc.), the thirteenth biggest (Canadian Oil 
Sands), and the thirty-third biggest (MEG Energy Corp.; Skuce 2012). A specific 
controversy over the Canadian bona fides of  Husky Energy is due to the dual 
citizenship of  the family members who control it, a controversy I have dealt 
with elsewhere (Kellogg 2013). As for the others, the method by which their 
corporate nationality has been determined is misleading. The fact that just over 
50 percent of  the shares of  CNRL, Suncor, Cenovus, and Canadian Oil Sands 
are held outside of  Canada says very little about who controls these companies. 
As noted in their 2011 annual reports, all of  them are headquartered in Calgary, 
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and none are subsidiaries of  another corporation. Furthermore, the issue of  
a majority of  shares being held outside of  Canada is by no means indicative of  
control. According to the very standard understanding of  corporate power pro-
vided by the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD 
2003), “control of  a corporation occurs when a single institutional unit owning 
more than a half  of  the shares, or equity, of  a corporation is able to control its 
policy” (2003). In other words, non-Canadian ownership of  50 percent or more 
of  the shares of  a corporation would only be significant if  those shares were con-
trolled by a single entity. The OECD goes further: “In practice, when ownership of  
shares is widely diffused among a large number of  shareholders, control may be 
secured by owning 20 per cent or less of  total shares.”3 With the OECD definition 
of  ownership as a basis, Figure 5.4 provides a snapshot for 2012, the year of  the 
Redford election, showing the twelve top-producing bitumen-extraction corpora-
tions operating in Alberta and ranking them by barrels of  bitumen per day, cur-
rent and planned. It makes very clear the physiognomy of  the industry in Alberta.
Figure 5.4. Top twelve bitumen-extracting corporations measured by barrels of 
bitumen per day (current and planned), Alberta, 2012. Source: Compiled from data 
available in Alberta (2013).
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There are two Asian-based corporations on this top twelve list (Dover and 
Nexen, numbers 7 and 8), as well as one based in the United States (Imperial, 
number 6) and one based in Europe (Shell, number 4). Most striking, however, 
is the overwhelming Canadian presence on the list. The top three—Suncor, 
Cenovus, and CNRL—are all Canadian corporations, as are Syncrude (number 
5) and MEG, Teck, Athabasca, and Husky (numbers 9, 10, 11, and 12). Even if  we 
were to remove Husky from the list because of  the dual citizenship of  its prin-
cipal owners, the key corporations are, without any question, Canadian. Overall 
percentage of  control for bitumen extraction, current and planned, are given in 
percentages at the bottom of  the figure. At 64.8 percent, Canadian corporations 
dominate the field. Far behind them are Europe (13.5 percent), the United States 
(9.8 percent), and Asia (9.2 percent).4 We cannot outsource the problem of  the 
bitumen sands—the problem is very Canadian, very Albertan.
Bitumen and Politics II: Venezuela, 2001–3
When we shift our gaze to Venezuela, we see a different political economy of  
oil, characterized in particular by a much more visible, volatile, and politic-
ally charged relationship of  the oil industry with the state. This story has, for 
decades, been bound up with the Great Powers. Oil is the indispensable fuel 
that drives Great Power economies, a lubricant for their international rival-
ries and a source of  incredible profit for their corporations. In the immediate 
aftermath of  World War II, “Enrico Mattei coined the phrase ‘the seven sis-
ters’ to describe the Anglo-Saxon companies that controlled the Middle East’s 
oil” (Hoyos 2007). Several generations later, these remain very large and very 
powerful corporations. Table 5.2 lists the twelve biggest public corporations in 
the world, according to the 2011 figures compiled by Forbes.5 Those highlighted 
in grey represent the former Seven Sisters, reduced to four through mergers. 
PetroChina and Petrobras (Petróleo Brasileiro) have recently risen to promin-
ence and are oil companies from the Global South. Six, then, of  the top twelve 
corporations in the entire world are involved in the oil industry, four of  them 
being the consolidated continuation of  the old Seven Sisters group. In 2011, the 
total sales of  these contemporary six sisters amounted to $1.97 trillion, with net 
profits of  $165 billion.
The economics of  Big Oil, throughout the twentieth century, was inextric-
ably linked with the politics of  Great Powers. The premier of  France, Georges 
Clemenceau, famously argued in 1917, that “gasoline was as necessary as blood 
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in the battles of  tomorrow” (Bérenger 1920, 60; my translation). In 1918, ten 
days after the armistice, Lord Curzon—former Viceroy of  India and soon to be 
British Foreign Secretary—told the assembled guests at a British government 
dinner put on for the Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference that “the Allied cause 
had floated to victory upon a wave of  oil” (Yergin 2008, 167).
Table 5.2. The twelve largest corporations in the world
Rank Company Country Sales Profits Assets Market 
value
1 Exxon Mobil USA $433.5 $41.1 $331.1 $407.4
2 JPMorgan Chase USA $110.8 $19.0 $2,265.8 $170.1
3 General Electric USA $147.3 $14.2 $717.2 $213.7
4 Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands $470.2 $30.9 $340.5 $227.6
5 ICBC China $82.6 $25.1 $2,039.1 $237.4
6 HSBC Holdings UK $102.0 $16.2 $2,550.0 $164.3
7 PetroChina China $310.1 $20.6 $304.7 $294.7
8 Berkshire Hathaway USA $143.7 $10.3 $392.6 $202.2
9 Wells Fargo USA $87.6 $15.9 $1,313.9 $178.7
10 Petrobras Brazil $145.9 $20.1 $319.4 $180.0
11 BP UK $375.5 $25.7 $292.5 $147.4
12 Chevron USA $236.3 $26.9 $209.5 $218.0
TOTALS: $1,971.5 $165.3 $1,797.7 $1,475.1
Note: Figures are in billions of US dollars. Corporations in shaded rows are the former Seven 
Sisters. 
Source: DeCarlo (2012).
World War I was the cauldron from which the United States emerged as the 
world’s dominant power; at the time, it was also the world’s greatest producer 
of  oil. As the US went abroad looking for sources of  oil to import, Mexico was, 
at first, more important than Venezuela. That changed on 18 March 1938. In the 
context of  a strike in the oil fields “against the appalling conditions in shan-
ties and hovels,” Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas nationalized the foreign-
owned oil companies So popular was this move, and so central to Mexican 
society, that 18 March was “proclaimed as a new day of  independence.” The 
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response from the Great Powers was swift. A boycott of  Mexican oil was organ-
ized by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Even when 
the three governments lifted the boycott “to satisfy the demands of  the Second 
World War,” the Seven Sisters were busy looking for an alternative place to do 
business (Sampson 1991, 105).
Venezuela was a natural choice. There, too, oil workers had engaged in a 
strike against appalling conditions, this time in 1936, but the Venezuelan gov-
ernment took the side of  the oil companies, using police force to suppress 
dissent (Prashad 2007, 189). On 22 January 1937, a wildcat strike by petroleum 
workers was settled through the granting of  a small wage increase, but “in July 
of  that year several labor leaders—dubbed as ‘agitators’ by the oil compan-
ies—were expelled from the Maracaibo area” (Baloyra 1974, 43). Venezuela was 
revealing itself  as a more congenial place than Mexico for the oil companies to 
do business. Thus, while the Mexican people were left to “drown in their own 
oil,” to use the words of  US ambassador Josephus Daniels (Prashad 2007, 192), 
the Seven Sisters shifted their focus to the more compliant state of  Venezuela. 
“In the 1950s, oil production doubled. . . . In 1957 alone the Seven Sisters made 
$828 million in Venezuela, whose regime allowed them to remit all their profits 
without restrictions. As one US banker noted, ‘You have the freedom here to do 
what you want to do with your money, and to me, that is worth all the political 
freedom in the world’” (189, 191).
Beginning in 1958, the political and economic situation changed in form 
but not in substance. In 1958, a “new relatively progressive government led 
by Acción Democrática (AD)” took office (Prashad 2007, 192), and in 1960, 
the Venezuelan government created the Corporación Venezolana de Petróleo 
(CVP) “in an attempt to give the government more control over the oil industry 
within the country” (McNew 2008, 150). This was followed in 1976 by a nom-
inal “nationalization” of  the oil industry, in large part through the “creation of  
a new national company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA)” (150). But the 
oil industry remained, in reality, in the hands of  the Seven Sisters. The PDVSA 
did not do away with the oil concessions previously granted to the foreign 
transnational corporations. Instead, it “absorbed the fourteen existing entities 
and made them subsidiaries,” which “left a substantial amount of  power in the 
hands of  transnational managing boards that had formerly controlled the oil 
industry in Venezuela” (151).
The oil industry in Venezuela became even more oriented toward the trans-
national oil companies in 1992 through what was called the “Apertura,” or 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
The Political Economy of  Oil and Democracy in Venezuela and Alberta   155
“Opening.” This is when the bitumen sands in the Orinoco Belt become a major 
factor. The Apertura involved the signing of  “thirty-two operating agreements 
and . . . four joint ventures operating within the Orinoco Belt.” These agree-
ments involved “lower taxes and royalties to attract private enterprises under 
the premise that marginal oil fields were more risky and costly to operate” (152). 
The transnational corporations were in effect subcontracted by PDVSA and 
were, in legal terms, not considered producers of  oil but service providers. This 
was very positive for the transnationals and very negative for the government 
of  Venezuela:
Classifying these companies as service providers . . . allowed for more than 
simple involvement in the oil industry; it also allowed for considerable tax 
and royalty breaks unavailable to “oil producers.” Because these contract-
ors were not oil producers, they did not pay the 67.7 percent income tax 
rate—the rate applicable to oil activities at the time they were created—
instead, they only paid the 34 percent income tax rate applicable to non-oil 
activities. (153)
Because royalties were to be paid by the producer and because the transnational 
oil corporations were classified as “service providers,” they were also able to 
avoid virtually all royalties. “The PDVSA capped the royalties to be paid by 
these projects at 1 percent, as opposed to the 16.6 percent maximum available 
at the time” (153).
Why would a government, and a government-run enterprise such as 
PDVSA, enter into such one-way contracts with foreign oil corporations? 
Perhaps they were in no position to bargain and so had little choice. But perhaps 
there are other, more complex class-related factors at work. In the dependency/
underdevelopment literature, the term comprador is used to describe an internal 
elite—economic and/or political—that works to enrich economic interests in 
the Global North at the expense of  national economic development. The term 
originates in China and “refers to any national economic elite that enriches sub-
stantially itself  through selling out its own country’s assets and wealth to for-
eigners” (Dobbin 2007, 526). In an analysis of  Egypt, Patrick Clawson (1978, 21) 
summarizes what he calls neo-Marxist understandings of  the comprador bour-
geoisie as “the large bourgeoisie based on trade and landownership . . . said to 
be tied to foreign capital, and totally reactionary.” PDVSA is not “based on trade 
and landownership” and was not situated in the private sector. Nonetheless, 
until the 2001–3 strike wave (examined below), describing the company as a 
comprador is completely justifiable—a corporation based in the Venezuelan 
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state but oriented toward the Global North, rather than toward national 
development in Venezuela. PDVSA, until the 2001–3 watershed, was a “state 
capitalist” comprador corporation. The upper levels of  management at PDVSA 
were increasingly seen as being a “state within a state” representing “a parallel 
power to the elected president and the legislature. . . . PDVSA officials viewed 
themselves as part of  a global managerial petroleum network, whose decisions 
reflected international concerns rather than primarily Venezuelan interests” 
(Tinker-Salas 2005, 52). This exactly corresponds to the term “comprador state 
capitalist elite.” Between 1976 and 1995, according to an article entitled “El para-
sitismo petrolero” (“Petroleum Parasitism”) by Uslar Pietri, this comprador oil 
elite “generated and largely squandered US$270 billion dollars from oil sales” 
(cited in Tinker-Salas 2005, 52).
This was the situation that Hugo Chávez, who took office as president in 
1999, set out to change. By 2006, he would label his goal “full sovereignty over 
oil” (Carreño 2006; McNew 2008), with the aim of  gaining 51 percent ownership 
of  the thirty-two joint ventures with foreign companies, raise income taxes to 
50 percent (O’Grady 2005), and increase “royalties payable to the government 
from as low as 1 percent to 33 percent” (Collier 2006). This process began in 
2000 with much more modest goals, the National Assembly passing that year 
an enabling act allowing Chávez to rule by decree for one year. “In November 
2001, shortly before the act was set to expire, Chávez enacted 49 decrees. These 
included the Hydrocarbons Law (“Venezuela—Chavez” 2007). Initially envi-
sioning a 30 percent flat rate for royalties, the bill as introduced called for a 
“softer” royalty regime, “assessed on a sliding scale between 20% and 30%.” 
Most controversial was the provision that “the state hold a majority stake in 
exploration, extraction, transportation, and initial storage of  hydrocarbons” 
(“Venezuelan Strike” 2001).
The reaction from big business was one of  outrage. On 10 December 2001, 
there was a twelve-hour national strike called by the “top business association, 
Fedecámaras, of  which the Venezuelan Oil Chamber is a member.” In an extra-
ordinary development, this bosses’ strike was also supported by “Venezuela’s 
largest confederation of  trade unions, the Workers’ Confederation of  Venezuela 
(CTV)—which includes oil workers” (“Venezuelan Strike” 2001). This initiated 
a “united front” between the bosses’ organization, Fedecámaras (Federación 
de Cámaras de Comercio y Producción), and the trade union central, CTV 
(Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela)—a coalition that was to domin-
ate the anti-Chávez, pro-PDVSA movement from that point until early 2003. 
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These pro-corporate actions by Venezuela’s unions are why there is a literature 
analyzing some of  these institutions as representing not labour as a whole but 
rather a “labour aristocracy” (Rutledge 2005, 95).
The December strike did not stop Chávez’s attempt to reform PDVSA. In 
February 2002, Chávez fired the head of  PDVSA and replaced him with Gaston 
Perra, a move widely seen as “intended to quash mounting resistance within 
the company to demands from the government for heavier fiscal contributions” 
(Webb-Vidal 2002). On 28 March, Fedepetrol (Federación de Trabajadores 
Petroleros, Químicos y sus Similares de Venezuela—the union representing 
oil and gas workers) launched a forty-eight-hour strike, ostensibly over wages 
(Webb-Vidal 2001). The real issue was the attempt to reform PDVSA. Chávez 
pushed ahead with these reforms, dismissing seven senior managers on 6 April. 
On Tuesday, 9 April, CTV leader Carlos Ortega and Pedro Carmona Estanga, the 
leader of  Fedecámaras, “with the support of  many other civil society organiza-
tions, called for a general strike” to stop the reforms at PDVSA (Encarnación 
2002, 42). Initially, this was to be a twenty-four-hour strike, but it soon escalated 
into a mass confrontation with the regime itself  (Lapper and Webb-Vidal 2002). 
On Thursday, 11 April, a massive march to PDVSA headquarters was redirected 
toward the presidential palace. In circumstances that remain extremely con-
troversial, gunfire erupted and perhaps as many as twenty people, both pro- 
and anti-Chávez, were shot dead (Cannon 2004, 285). Over the next three days, 
Chávez was removed from office and a new government installed, headed by 
Pedro Carmona, but a massive pro-Chávez uprising made that new govern-
ment unsustainable, and, with the support of  a section of  the army and mass 
demonstrations in the streets of  Caracas, Chávez returned to office.
In and around this enormous social upheaval, a reconfiguration of  class 
forces was taking place. At the base of  society, new mass organizations were 
in formation, a process that had begun in 1999—the first full year of  Chávez’s 
presidency. With the official union movement deeply corrupted because of  
its privileged position inside the parasitic oil industry, Chávez had set out to 
establish new grassroots organizations “drawn mainly from the poorest sec-
tors of  Venezuelan society.” These Bolivarian circles were in part social wel-
fare institutions, delivering “healthcare, job-training and short-term credit” 
to the very poor in the country. They were also centres of  political mobiliza-
tion. “During the April coup, the members of  the Bolivarian circles . . . took 
to the streets to demand the return” of  Chávez (Encarnación 2002, 41). Marta 
Harnecker (2004, 39) notes that after the defeat of  that coup, “Bolivarian Circles 
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multiplied throughout the country, adopting more varied forms. New organiza-
tions emerged, such as urban land committees and specific middle-class groups 
of  doctors, teachers, and lawyers. Further, union leaders from various indus-
tries, critical of  the complicity of  the CTV, accelerated their efforts to build an 
independent labor force to support the revolutionary process.”
Chávez’s return to office on 14 April 2002 did not end the dispute. In 
November and December, all the old issues re-emerged. A new general strike was 
launched in December: the hope was “to topple Chávez by reviving a military-
civilian coup effort that overthrew Chávez for two days in April 2002.” The situ-
ation, however, had evolved considerably since the spring. In April, when CTV 
leaders had called out their members, they had been relatively unchallenged 
from within the union ranks. By the autumn and winter, this was no longer the 
case. In October, Fedepetrol announced that it would not support a twelve-hour 
strike called against Chávez. Union official Rafael Rosales “said that he believed 
85% of  the federation’s membership opposed the strike”; Rosales described the 
strike call “as a ‘political ultimatum’ by foes of  Chávez” (“Fedepetrol” 2002). 
Nonetheless, the strike began on 2 December and was widely supported by the 
white-collar employees at PDVSA. About half  of  PDVSA’s workforce, “execu-
tives, engineers, technicians and ship captains . . . went on strike and shut down 
almost all operations for three months” (Collier 2006). Unlike the earlier strike, 
however, many in the blue-collar unions were now supporting Chávez. In the 
end, this was to prove decisive (Toro 2002).
When the strike began, oil output was averaging three million barrels a day. 
The strike caused this to drop to almost nothing. By early January, produc-
tion levels had crawled back up to 400,000 barrels a day, after the government 
was able to “restart production with loyal personnel” (EIU 2003). By the end 
of  January, the strike was essentially over. Chávez officially ended it, declar-
ing it unconstitutional and dismissing eighteen thousand PDVSA employees 
(International Business Publications, USA 2012, 98). Some put the figure at 
nineteen thousand (“Venezuela—Ali Rodriguez” 2005). The blue-collar work-
ers supported Chávez. The more well-off  workers, the white-collar “executives, 
engineers, technicians and ship captains,” opposed him and were let go. The dis-
missed employees represented fully “90 percent of  PDVSA’s white-collar work-
force” but only half  of  the company’s entire workforce (Collier 2006).
The departure of  the vast majority of  the intelligentsia who had directed 
work at PDVSA has been extremely serious for the Venezuelan oil industry. 
Three years after the strike, one industry analyst put it this way: “The firing of  
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over 50% of  PDVSA’s work force, over 19,000 employees, has had an irrecover-
able impact on production” (“Venezuela—Ali Rodriguez” 2005). Anti-Chávista 
commentators have been quick to document these troubles. One blogger sum-
marized it this way:
PDVSA’s effective crude oil production capacity has dropped to about 2.3 
million barrels per day at best, compared with over 3.5 million barrels per 
day in 1998. . . . PDVSA’s refineries—Amuay, Cardon, El Palito and Puerto 
La Cruz—are falling apart. All of  PDVSA’s programmed maintenance 
activities at three refineries have . . . suffered frequent delays and postpone-
ments over the past several years. And dozens of  workers have been killed 
or injured in refinery accidents since 2005.6
All agree that there are problems at PDVSA, and these problems are certainly 
related to the dismissal of  virtually the entire PDVSA intelligentsia. However, 
it is not clear what choice Chávez had. The flow of  profits had to be redirected 
back into Venezuela, instead of  out of  the country and into the pockets of  the 
corporations of  the Global North. The strike could not have been allowed to 
go on much longer, as it had brought the country to its knees, “with real gross 
domestic product (GDP) contracting 29 percent in the first quarter [of  2003], 
and 9.2 percent for the entire year, after already contracting 8.9 percent in 
2002” (International Business Publications, USA 2012, 97). The Spanish bank 
BSCH “described the situation as the ‘biggest [example of] wealth destruction in 
Venezuelan history’” (EIU 2003). The choices were either to capitulate and leave 
the power of  the comprador elite intact or to create PDVSA anew with a polit-
ically reliable workforce, since only such a workforce would agree to a PDVSA 
oriented toward Venezuelan development rather than toward corporate profits 
in the Global North.
Conclusion
This chapter opened with a survey of  the somewhat silly linguistic polemic cur-
rently under way in Alberta, polarized around the use of  the adjective tar. One 
of  the difficulties confronting those who, with a kind of  neoliberal political cor-
rectness attempt to vilify the use of  the tar word, is that the pairing of  this adjec-
tive with the noun oil is quite well-established in the industry itself. In early 
2015, I searched for the term tar sands on the website OnePetro, which describes 
itself  as “a unique library of  technical documents and journal articles serving 
the oil and gas exploration and production industry” and is operated by the 
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Society of  Petroleum Engineers.6 At that time, the “library” contained 160,000 
documents produced by eighteen publishing partners. The search resulted 
in 2,028 different hits related to research papers as varied as “Comparing 
Venezuelan and Canadian Heavy Oil and Tar Sands” (Dusseault 2001) and 
“Promising Approaches to Enhance SAGD Performance in Uneconomical Tar-
Sands” (Akhondzadeh et al. 2012). Perhaps it is time to raise the level of  dis-
course somewhat—to get beyond a dispute over adjectives and grapple with 
some of  the real issues at stake. This chapter has outlined one such issue—the 
different ways in which the economics of  processing bitumen impacts politics 
in Venezuela and Alberta, a difference shaped by the contrasting positions 
those economies occupy in the hierarchical world economy.
There is a deeply human side to this story. In the wake of  the mass firings of  
2003, hundreds of  former PDVSA employees made their way to Alberta to put 
to use, in the bitumen sands of  Alberta, heavy-oil skills developed in Venezuela. 
One of  those is Pereira Almao, who, in 2006, estimated that there were “300 
former PDVSA families in each of  Calgary, Edmonton and Fort McMurray and 
more are on the way. Among the biggest employers of  Venezuelans are Suncor 
Energy Inc. , Syncrude Canada Ltd. , Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. and 
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc.” (Cattaneo 2006). According to Almao, “Canada 
is in a very privileged position. . . . Canada will expand its marketing of  heavy 
oils and I don’t think Venezuela is going to grow. . . . It could be 50 years before 
you see real activity and real growth in the Venezuelan oil industry again” 
(quoted in Harding 2006). The irony couldn’t be more profound. The oil-related 
issue in the past for Venezuela was the flow of  oil profits out of  the country to 
the Global North. Chávez successfully reversed that flow, increasing taxes and 
royalties to keep the profits in Venezuela. But the price of  that reversal has been 
a new flow out of  the country—a flow into the Global North of  talented, trained 
and experienced professionals.
Alberta is a subnational state within Canada, a member of  the core of  the 
world economy situated in the Global North. Venezuela is a semiperipheral 
country situated in the Global South. A comparative analysis of  these two 
societies demands an approach sensitive to the complex relationship between 
classes, and between class, nation, and the world economy. Venezuela’s oil 
economy began as an effect of  Great Powers and corporate oil machinations 
(the need to punish Mexico and keep oil development under corporate, Global 
North control); it then continued, until 2002, to function under the direc-
tion of  a comprador, state-capitalist elite. The effects were typical of  resource 
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development under neocolonialism—vast wealth removed from the country, 
leaving behind pools of  stagnation and poverty. That stagnation has been evi-
dent for decades. Writing in 1973, Norman Gall documented that “Venezuela 
and West Germany had roughly the same per capita GNP in 1956. Since then, 
however, West Germany’s per capita GNP increased from around $650 in 1956 
to $1,300 in 1960 and $53,034 in 1970, while Venezuela’s has remained largely 
stagnant” (Gall 1973).
By contrast, this chapter has documented the dynamic expansion of  GDP 
per capita in Alberta. That province, like Canada as a whole, is one of  the small 
number of  places in the world that provides a home to the transnational cor-
porations—among them oil corporations—that have over the years extracted 
enormous wealth from countries in the Global South. Oil corporations exert 
political influence in Alberta: the evidence from the 2012 provincial election 
makes this absolutely clear. The extreme reaction to the 2015 NDP electoral vic-
tory shows, by way of  negative example, where their political loyalties lie. But 
they do not exert this influence as a “comprador elite” operating in a manner 
to frustrate capitalist development in Alberta. They do so as full partners with 
the provincial political elite, with both focused on establishing a self-sustain-
ing cycle of  capitalist accumulation in the province. Since the 1980s, a new, 
indigenous capitalist class has become entrenched at the apex of  the Alberta 
economy, highlighting the prescience of  John Richards and the late Larry Pratt, 
who in 1979 argued in Prairie Capitalism that “it would be absurd to conclude” 
that the Alberta government is “merely an instrument of  external capital or 
that Alberta’s new bourgeoisie is ‘comprador’ in nature—i.e. , that its role is 
merely to facilitate the penetration of  the local economy by foreign capital” 
(227). Their thesis was that the provincial intervention into the oil economy of  
the 1970s was laying the basis for an indigenous bourgeoisie in later years. This 
analysis has been completely confirmed. In 2005, in an interview with Jeremy 
Mouat, Pratt indicated that in the years since the now classic Prairie Capitalism 
was published, Alberta has become home to
big world-scale Alberta companies . . . not just operating in Alberta, but 
internationally. Those are not foreign owned, they are Canadian-owned. . . . 
If  you add them up, there’s maybe 15 to 20 companies that are big enough 
to operate outside the country, and which also have significant operations 
inside the United States. In a sense, that is what we were getting at in Prairie 
Capitalism: the growth of  an indigenous bourgeoisie, in Marxist terms, or an 
indigenous capitalist class. (Mouat 2005)
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Oil development in Venezuela was dominated, until this century, by a state-
capitalist comprador elite oriented toward non-Venezuelan external interests 
rather than Venezuelan economic development. Alberta, by contrast, has seen 
regional (provincial) state capitalism lay the basis for the development of  what 
Richards and Pratt, years ago, called “a nascent regional bourgeoisie of  sub-
stance and considerable power” (1979, 11), a development deeply rooted in the 
exploitation of  mineral staples, particularly those associated with the bitumen 
sands. This reinforces a perspective being developed by a new generation of  
young Canadian political economists, who begin by situating Canada as a core 
economy, a mature capitalist country, actively helping to shape the policies of  
the Global North, the very policies that oppress and impoverish countries like 
Venezuela. (Two recent examples of  this new scholarship are Klassen [2009] 
and Gordon [2010].)
This comparative framework can help us navigate Alberta’s political ter-
rain over the next few years. A clue as to what we might expect comes from the 
political biography of  the new MLA for Lethbridge-West, Shannon Phillips, 
who is the NDP's minister of  the Environment and minister responsible for the 
Status of  Women. “As a policy analyst for the Alberta Federation of  Labour, Ms. 
Phillips . . . steered the federation's opposition to the Northern Gateway pipe-
line,” a position that clearly positions her against the oil elite. However, Phillips 
is also “a supporter of  Enbridge's Line 9B proposal . . . ‘because it established 
east-west connections, energy security for Canada and import substitutions for 
eastern Canada’” (Giovannetti 2015). This positions her and the Alberta NDP on 
side with the oil elite in Alberta and in opposition to the climate justice move-
ments in Ontario and Québec, which have campaigned for years against the 
Enbridge proposal. There will be pressure applied to the new NDP administra-
tion by the powerful and entrenched oil elite in Alberta. There will be points of  
friction and tension. But Alberta is not Venezuela. We are not likely to see this 
scenario unfold through attempted coups and revolutions. The NDP is not likely 
to inspire equivalents to the Chávez-era Bolivarian Circles. We have many 
examples, in Global North countries, of  social-democratic parties such as the 
NDP tapping into popular discontent with elite politics, but then adapting their 
policies, once in office, to the pressure of  those very elites.
That, however, opens up a line of  inquiry outside the scope of  this chap-
ter. There are many other such issues which require further investigation. This 
chapter has not focused on the deep inequities within Alberta’s bitumen sands 
economy. It has not focused on the environmental devastation that accompanies 
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bitumen sand exploitation. It has not raised the issue of  Indigenous rights 
and land claims, which are inextricably intertwined with bitumen economies. 
Other authors in this volume take up many of  these questions. All that is being 
said here is that the profound differences in the manner in which oil corpora-
tions have exerted political influence in Venezuela and Alberta are inexplicable 
without understanding the two economies’ very different relationships to the 
world hierarchy of  nations.
Notes
1 In recent years, a strand of  Canadian political economy (CPE) has emerged that is 
influenced by world systems theory (WST) and takes a contrary view, conceptualizing 
Canada as a semi-peripheral rather than a core economy (Clarkson 2001; Clarkson 
and Cohen 2004; Glenday 2010; Ikeda 2004; Laxer 2004). The analysis offered by this 
strand of  CPE is discordant with WST-influenced international political economy 
(IPE) literature, which almost universally conceptualizes Canada as a member of  the 
core (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Babones 2005; Boli-Bennett 1980; Chirot 1977; Kentor 
2000; Kick and Davis 2001; Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994; Smith and White 1992; 
Van Rossem 1996). I find the latter school much more persuasive, and throughout 
this chapter, the terms core and semi-periphery are used, with IPE scholarship in mind. 
In chapter 2 of  Escape from the Staple Trap (Kellogg 2015), I provide an overview and 
critique of  both the CPE and IPE strands of  WST-influenced approaches to Canada in 
the world system.
2 See “Company Overview of  Statoil Canada Ltd. ,” Bloomberg Businessweek, 
n.d. , http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.
asp?privcapId=24402363; “2011 Summary Annual Report,” Imperial Oil Limited, 2012, 
29; and “2011 Annual Report” (El Dorado, AR: Murphy Oil Corporation, 2012), 1.
3 This does not by any means exhaust the issue of  the influence of  non-Canadian 
corporations on the trajectory of  development in this country. The investment rules 
embedded in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) give considerable 
scope for corporations to bypass the Canadian political and judicial processes and 
to seek redress through the dispute-settlement provisions of  NAFTA (chapter 11). 
Using just this provision, for instance, the US-based oil and gas company Loan Pine 
Resources, on 8 November 2012, filed notice of  intent to submit a claim for a quarter 
of  a billion dollars in damages from the Government of  Canada for what it saw as 
impediments to its fracking activities in Québec (Bennett Jones LLP 2012; Council of  
Canadians 2013). The point is to contrast the situation in Alberta with the situation in 
Venezuela.
4 The smallest category, Canada-China (2.75% of  the total), is a one-company category, 
capturing the previously referenced controversy over the nationality of  Husky 
Energy. How we resolve that controversy will be immaterial to the findings here.
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5 It has become fashionable to highlight Apple as the world’s biggest corporation. But 
this is true only if  a single criterion is used—market value. The Forbes list is more 
accurate, as it avoids distortions that can arise when corporate size is “based on a 
single metric.” When Forbes uses “an equal weighting of  sales, profits, assets and 
market value to rank companies according to size,” Apple falls to twenty-second place 
(DeCarlo 2012).
6 “Train Wreck at Pdvsa,” Caracas Gringo (blog), 2 November 2009, http://caracasgringo.
wordpress.com/2009/11/02/train-wreck-at-pdvsa/.
7 OnePetro, 2015, https://www.onepetro.org.
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Petroleum, Patriarchy, and Power
Women’s Equality in Canada and Iran
Joy Fraser, Manijeh Mannani,  
and Lorna Stefanick
The question of  whether a country’s economic dependence on oil has an effect 
on democracy has stimulated much debate, but analysis on the effects of  oil-
based economies on women remains relatively limited. While some scholars 
suggest that such economies hamper gender equality (Ross 2001, 2008; Sherk 
2003), others argue that the roots of  inequality for women are far more com-
plex (Charrad 2009; Miller 2004). Using global indicators of  gender equity (i.e. , 
the degree to which people of  different genders are treated with impartiality), 
we analyze the status of  Canadian and Iranian women’s equality (i.e. , the state 
of  being equal). These “snapshots” of  women’s equity and equality tell only part 
of  the story, however. Therefore, we also employ the insights of  Sylvia Walby 
on equality and human rights and of  Erich Fromm and Michel Foucault on 
modernity to probe the issue of  equality for women.
We begin this chapter by defining and exploring the concepts of  “patri-
archy” and “gender equality,” as well as the utility of  nationally based indicators 
of  equity. Because of  the shortcomings of  these indicators in identifying same-
ness and evaluating difference, we provide a historical and cultural analysis of  
Iran and Canada as a context in which to evaluate the impacts of  systems and 
structures on the status of  women. Given both this book’s focus on Alberta and 
the province’s retrogressive status within Canada with respect to gender equal-
ity, we also consider the status of  women in that province within the larger 
Canadian context. We show in our analysis that both Iran and Canada score well 
on some indicators of  women’s equity and equality relative to men and not so 
well on others. In both countries, women have not been able to build consist-
ently on their achievements. This is largely because patriarchy is entrenched 
and reactive in both Canada and Iran, becoming even more pronounced in 
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times of  social dislocation. We conclude that giving primacy to oil dependency 
as a causal factor of  gender inequalities is simplistic in societies where patri-
archy is deeply embedded within political, social, cultural, and religious norms.
Patriarchy and Gender Equality in Iran and Canada
Sylvia Walby (2005, 20) defines patriarchy as “a system of  social structures and 
practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.” Patriarchy is 
a system of  power relations through which men control women’s production, 
reproduction, and sexuality. Gender stereotypes are not only derived from 
patriarchy; they perpetuate it in that they reinforce inequality. Patriarchy is not 
static; gender relations are dynamic and complex, vary among societies, and are 
based in class, status, religion, region, ethnicity, and socio-cultural practices.
Concepts related to gender equality, as well as the routes to achieving it, 
are equally complex. Walby describes the three most common models used 
to define gender equality: “equality through sameness (equal opportunities or 
treatment), through equal valuation of  difference (special programmes) and 
[through] the transformation of  gendered practices and standards of  evalua-
tion” (374). She notes that while some progress can be made using the first two 
approaches, they tend to maintain the status quo by leaving uncontested the 
masculine norm as the standard against which equality is measured. De Bonfils 
et al. (2013, 8) observe that the “sameness” approach emphasizes women becom-
ing equal to men, whereas the “difference” approach suggests that “women’s 
physical difference from men results in different life patterns, psychology and 
moral values.” Advocates of  the latter approach (e.g. Cockburn 1991) tend to seek 
parity rather than sameness. The distinction between the first two approaches 
is particularly germane to this study, since the quest for equality in the Eastern 
context is frequently based on “complementarity” (equal but different) rather 
than on the rights-based notion of  “sameness” through which feminism in the 
West is often expressed.
Walby (2005, 374) contends that for true gender equality and justice to 
occur, there must be transformation and social reorganization of  institu-
tions, standards, and gender relations, for “it is not possible to be ‘different but 
equal’ because differences are too entwined with power and resources.” Other 
scholars and the European Commission argue for using a combination of  all 
three approaches—sameness, difference, and transformation—in the attempt 
to achieve deep cultural changes, create new structures, and transform the 
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gendered nature of  society (Daly 2005; De Bonfils et al. 2013; Martin 2003; 
Verloo 2005).
We begin our analysis using parameters that measure equality through 
sameness, but we also examine gendered practices implicit in Walby’s third 
model. With respect to sameness, we use the “freedom” indicators employed by 
human rights bodies to categorize countries along a spectrum, with democracy 
and dictatorship at opposite ends. Various government and nongovernment 
agencies regularly rank countries on civil, political, and economic indicators 
of  freedom and democracy, progress on human development (e.g. , fertility 
rates), and the gap between outcomes for men and women in terms of  educa-
tion and labour force participation (Freedom House 2012; Hausmann, Tyson, 
and Zahidi 2011; OECD 2012; UN Women 2011; World Bank 2011). There are 
arguments against using this approach. For example, in her discussion of  the 
institutionalization of  “gender” within governance discourse in South Africa, 
Linzi Manicom (2001, 18), suggests that “evaluating the status of  the nation in 
terms of  the status, or freedom, of  its ‘womenfolk’ echoes a patronizing coloni-
alist stance that moralises hierarchical inter-state relations. It positions women 
as objects of  rescue rather than as agents and equal participants in the national 
transformation project.” Nevertheless, we use such indicators because they help 
illuminate the sources of  inequalities that exist in Canada and Iran when exam-
ined within a human rights framework. The norm of  gender equity is central to 
the rights-based approach, “which resists, rather than accommodates, relativ-
ist approaches to the interpretation of  human rights” (Goonesekere, n.d. , para. 
7). Resisting relativism is particularly important when studying two countries 
with significant differences in culture, religion, and history.
In many respects, Canada and Iran could be seen as complete opposites: 
Canada is considered a “free” state, whereas Iran is “not free.” Canada is a fed-
eration in the Global North, and Iran is a unitary state in the Global South. What 
these two countries have in common is that they are both among the world’s top 
ten energy producers and exporters of  oil (IEA 2011). To complicate our analy-
sis, oil is concentrated in the province of  Alberta in Canada and in the province 
of  Khuzestan in Iran. The equivalent of  country-level statistics and indices are 
not always reported at the subnational level, and provinces in both countries 
vary linguistically and culturally. However, because provinces share common 
political and economic structures within their country, as well as a national 
identity, we use national measures as proxies for the oil-producing provinces. 
Given this book’s focus on Alberta and the historical importance of  Alberta 
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women to gender politics in Canada, we also consider the state of  women in 
Alberta, despite the methodological challenges.
Interestingly, Alberta and Iran both have reputations as socially regressive 
regimes. Within Canada, oil-rich Alberta is known as the “redneck”; the Alberta 
government has historically resisted attempts to promote the equality of  min-
ority groups (Harder 2003) and until 2015, has been dominated by conserva-
tive parties since the rise to power of  the Social Credit in 1935 (Barrie 2006; 
Finkel 1989; Gibbins and Arrison 1995). Similarly, Iran is popularly seen as the 
maverick “bad boy” of  the Middle Eastern states: governed by a fundamentalist 
Islamic theocracy, it is known as anti-Western and ultra-conservative, particu-
larly with respect to the equality of  women (Afary 2009). Could the country’s 
economic dependence on oil be an important factor in explaining its conserva-
tism, especially with respect to gender equality?
The Oil Curse: An Explanation for Women’s Inequality in Oil-Rich States
Much of  the limited literature on the impact of  oil on women’s equality suggests 
that oil reinforces patriarchal norms. With special reference to the Middle East, 
Michael Ross (2008, 120) maintains that “petroleum perpetuates patriarchy.” 
According to Ross, during an oil boom, the number of  women in the labour 
force shrinks for two reasons: first, because the “tradable goods” sector—the 
sector where women are more likely to be employed—decreases, causing a 
decrease in demand for women’s labour, and second, because the size of  house-
hold income (via the male earner) increases, causing women to be less willing 
to take low-paying jobs (109–10). In turn, decreased participation in the labour 
force reduces the political influence of  women; thus, oil-producing countries 
end up with unusually strong patriarchal norms, laws, and political institu-
tions. Ross concedes that the reduction of  female participation in the economy 
or in politics is not seen in oil-rich countries such as Norway, New Zealand, and 
Australia, a point noted by Mounira Charrad (2009). Charrad points out that 
the strong patriarchal cultures and institutions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
Libya that Ross attributes to oil predate the oil economies in the Middle East 
(548). In her view, the pre-existing patriarchal, tribal, and kinship structures 
(solidarities in the political system that rely on bonds among men) are the basis 
for the formation of  political systems and social structures, onto which the oil 
economy was later grafted, especially in the Muslim Middle East.
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A study by Gloria Miller (2004) of  the experiences of  women engineers in 
the Alberta oil industry suggests that the oil industry itself  exhibits a particu-
lar kinship structure based on hypermasculinity, to which women must adapt. 
Predictably, this high-paying sector remains predominately male, reinfor-
cing the powerful patriarchal networks that perpetuate gender inequality. 
Likewise, Susan Sherk’s (2003) study of  women working in the oil and gas 
sectors in Canada reveals male-dominated organizational cultures that dis-
courage alternative perspectives that may be brought in by women; ultim-
ately, these women are under pressure to conform. Other factors—such as the 
lack of  alternative work schedules, including part-time work and job-sharing, 
as well as challenges with child care arrangements—bar women from partici-
pating equitably and advancing within petroleum industries. The barriers 
to employment and promotion in this lucrative field help to exacerbate the 
difference in earning potential between men and women, relegating women 
to jobs that pay much less. Sara Dorow (this volume) explores the gendered, 
hierarchical nature of  the oil industry and its impact on both jobs and family. 
Dorow argues that the oil economy both benefits from and perpetuates these 
unequal configurations.
Particularly germane to our work is Mark Milke’s 2011 Fraser Institute 
report, which uses Freedom House indicators to compare thirty-eight oil-pro-
ducing nations from five continents on civil, political, and economic freedoms. 
Indices include electoral democracy; media, religious, and economic freedoms; 
the legal system; property rights; corruption; and judicial independence (22). 
Milke concludes that oil-producing countries are strikingly different. For 
example, women in Canada are “free,” whereas women in Iran are “not free,” 
and, this being the case, it is more “ethical” to purchase oil from Canada than 
from a country like Iran that suppresses the freedom of  women. If  we accept his 
conclusions at face value, we might conclude that oil production has a differen-
tial impact on the equality of  women in various countries. In the next section, 
we examine the evidence for this assertion.
Women’s Status Assessed: The Evidence from Canada and Iran
Indicators that measure the liberal-democratic rights of  their citizens under-
score stark differences between Canada and Iran. Canada scores very well in all 
areas (Milke 2011, 36, 53), while Iran has no electoral democracy, and no media, 
religious or economic freedoms. Iran scores moderately well with respect to 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
176   Joy Fraser, Manijeh Mannani, and Lorna Stefanick
its economic system, legal system, and property rights; however, in the areas 
of  corruption and judicial independence, it receives particularly low ratings, 
especially compared to Canada (69–71).
With respect to freedoms specific to women, Milke reports that Canadian 
women are free to choose careers, to travel outside the country without a male 
guardian’s permission, and to have surgery without a male guardian’s permis-
sion (53). In contrast, Iran scores poorly (71). But while Canadian women enjoy 
superior basic freedoms compared to women in Iran, they perform at much the 
same level on other indicators, such as education (36, 53, 71). Recent data from 
the World Bank (2011, 60) paints an even more positive picture for Iran with 
respect to literacy and education:
The female-to-male ratio in primary school is the world’s highest, with 1.2 
girls enrolled for every boy. The number of  women in secondary school as a 
percentage of  the eligible age group more than doubled from 30 percent to 
81 percent, and in 2009, more than half  of  all Iranian university students, 
68 percent of  the students in science, and 28 percent in engineering were 
women.
With only 37 percent of  Canadian women enrolled in undergraduate science 
and engineering (and declining) in 2008–9 (Research Council of  Canada 2010, 
11), the participation rate of  Iranian women is significantly higher. In addi-
tion, Iran shows consistent improvements in human development indices for 
Iranian women, particularly with respect to the World Bank’s key indicator: 
fertility rates. Iran has the world’s fastest declining rate: in ten years the rate 
went from 6.9 children to 1.8 (World Bank 2011, 60). Moreover, Iranian women 
now enjoy better health due to better service delivery and new labour market 
opportunities. They now constitute 30 percent of  the labour force (60).
It seems that that there are indeed differential equality outcomes for oil-
producing nations, albeit in different ways than Milke predicted. What is vexing 
for those who maintain that oil suppresses women’s rights is that the gains for 
Iranian women were achieved in the two decades following the 1979 Islamic 
revolution—a time when Iran’s oil-dependent economy almost doubled in 
value (60). Despite Iran having both an oil-based economy and an authoritarian 
regime, human development outcomes among Iranian women have improved 
in terms of  reproductive, education, and economic rights (Bahramitash and 
Kazemipour 2006; World Bank 2011). The next section explores these gains in 
more detail.
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The Quest for Equality in Iran
For centuries, Iranian women have been suppressed physically by the conven-
tion of  the veil and verbally by the conventions of  public silence. Theirs was 
a private world, where self-expression was confined to the accepted family 
circle (Milani 1992, 46). The subordination of  women was particularly evident 
in marital relations, where men have traditionally had the right to divorce at 
will, the ability to execute an adulterous wife, and the right (albeit rarely used) 
to a polygamous marriage. While clearly patriarchal, the family, the kinship 
networks, and the customs surrounding the marriage contract itself  provided 
some degree of  economic and social support for women in their clearly defined 
roles within the family.
Like women elsewhere in the world, however, modernization prompted a 
quest for equal rights. New rights for Iranian women came in the early years 
of  the twentieth century at the time of  the 1905–7 Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution. During this era, members of  the Iranian aristocracy travelled 
extensively abroad and were greatly influenced by Western ideas. The discovery 
of  oil in 1908 resulted in the formation of  the Anglo-Persian Oil Company; the 
agreement struck between Iran and Britain entitled Iran to 16 percent of  the net 
profits. The Anglo-Persian partnership marked the beginning of  a protracted 
period of  agitation for increased gender equality. In the private sphere, women 
began working toward the reformation of  marriage laws and the right to vote. 
But the impetus for change came primarily from the top rather than the bottom; 
the installation of  Reza Shah through a military coup saw the replacement of  
the Qajar dynasty with the Pahlavi dynasty. Maintaining the modernization 
trajectory of  those who had preceded him, Reza Shah ambitiously reformed the 
judiciary and undertook major infrastructure, industry, transportation, health, 
and education projects. This era also saw the modernization of  gender relations 
through the passage of  a new marriage law that limited polygamy, the abolish-
ment of  extrajudicial divorce, and the prohibition of  women wearing the veil in 
public (Goldstein 2010). Milani (1992, 157) describes this era as characterized by 
an “intense thirst” for anything Western, at least on the part of  the new middle 
classes. As Warren Goldstein notes (2010, 53), “Many traditional women felt 
that not wearing a veil in public was like being naked. Consequently, they did 
not go outside.”
During this period, equality came in the form of  rights, but it also came in 
the form of  laws that prohibited traditional cultural norms. Thus, while Reza 
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Shah embraced Western ideas, he did not embrace the notion of  consensual 
rule. Suffice to say, his autocratic governing style did not sit well with intellec-
tual and religious elites. In the public sphere, the agitation for change focused 
on capturing a more equitable share of  profit from Iran’s petroleum partner-
ship. Internal and external tensions over profit sharing increased, culminating 
in the 1941 invasion of  Iran in a combined British-Soviet effort to secure flow-
ing oil for the Allied war effort; the Allies forced the Shah to abdicate to his son 
Mohammad Reza Shah, and a constitutional monarchy was re-established. A 
decade later, the populist, democratically elected government of  Mohammad 
Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In reaction, the West 
used the CIA to overthrow the government in 1953, protecting Western con-
trol of  an enormously lucrative oil infrastructure. The coup also transformed a 
constitutional monarchy into an absolutist kingship and induced a succession 
of  unintended consequences, including the Islamic revolution of  1979 (Kinzer 
2003, 120–21). Modernization continued, but the new government did not tol-
erate political dissent.
Repeated encounters with imperialism caused infatuation with the West to 
be replaced by animosity. Westomania—or more commonly, Westoxification, 
a term coined by Jalal Al-e Ahmad to describe “a contagious disease that [had] 
infested, infatuated, and stupefied Iranians”—captured the sentiments of  the 
larger public in this era (Milani 1992, 156). This new anti-Western orientation 
had little effect on progressive thought, however, and the following decades 
saw achievements of  all kinds, including many relating to the status of  women. 
Female literacy improved, women gained the right to vote, and, in 1963, Iranians 
elected the first woman, Farrokhroo Parsa, to Parliament. In 1968, Parsa became 
the first woman to hold a cabinet post in the Iranian government. In addition, 
two new marriage laws expanded the equality rights of  women. These initia-
tives were part of  a larger worldwide trend to improve the status of  women, but 
in Iran, the combination of  oil revenue and the initial embracing of  Western 
norms meant that change came with extraordinary speed. Dramatic change, 
however, also fuelled festering anti-Western sentiment.
The legal equality of  women took a dramatic U-turn after the Iranian revo-
lution of  1979 and the installation of  an Islamic theocracy (Afary 2009). This 
populist uprising against an unpopular monarch was in part the result of  
many decades of  resentment against Western political and economic inter-
ests. One outcome of  the revolution—the revival of  eighth-century Sharia 
law—caught many Iranians by surprise. As Janet Afary (2009, 265) notes, “The 
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1979 Islamic Revolution was not a wholesale return to the past; rather, the new 
state reinvented and expanded certain retrogressive gender and cultural prac-
tices and presented them . . . through modern technologies of  power.” Within a 
month of  Ayatollah Khomeini’s return from exile, the newly installed Supreme 
Leader of  the country presided over the firing of  all female judges, the compul-
sory veiling of  women, the banning of  co-education of  males and females, the 
barring of  married girls from attending high schools, the closure of  workplace 
nurseries, and the systematic dismantling of  the previous fifty years of  reforms 
to family law (Afshar 1998, 50). Farrokhroo Parsa was executed, and women’s 
participation in the labour force contracted (Afary 2009, 309). The preamble to 
the post-revolution constitution underscores the new orientation. Specifically, 
it states that the roles of  mother and wife had eroded as a result of  the drive to 
modernize and that seizing them back would be particularly empowering for 
women: “Such a position in the family removes women from being objects of  
pleasure or tools of  production and frees them of  the burdens of  exploitation 
and imperialism and enables them to find once more their critical duties of  
motherhood and raising of  humanity” (translated and quoted in Afshar 1998, 
150).
Women in Iran resisted these policies through legal challenges, protests, 
and outright refusals (Afshar 1998; Milani 1992). Had it not been for external 
threats that galvanized popular support for the new republic, it is plausible 
that such regressive “reforms” would not have had quite the staying power that 
they did. Soon after the revolution, militant students took American diplo-
matic staff  hostage, resulting in both a botched rescue attempt by the United 
States and the Iran-Contra affair. Shortly thereafter, Iraq, with whom Iran 
had had ongoing border skirmishes, took advantage of  Iran’s internal turmoil 
and invaded the country. In the ensuing eight-year war, an estimated 500,000 
people were killed; the international community remained silent over the Iraqi 
use of  chemical weapons in this conflict (Pelletiere 1992).
These events provide a backdrop for understanding why some Iranian 
women saw an Islamic government with its regressive policies toward women 
as tolerable in the face of  foreign aggression. For Iranians, aggression took 
the form not only of  invasion but also of  cultural imperialism—namely, the 
Western commodification of  women as sex objects. In her summation of  this 
perspective, Afshar (1998, 15) explains that for many Iranian women, the veil 
“puts an end to the beauty myth and the relentless pursuit of  fashion and 
beauty products. It is this view which, at the end of  the twentieth century, has 
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persuaded many women to abandon the mini-skirt for the veil, and has per-
suaded many Islamist groups and governments to adopt veiled women as the 
public emblem of  Islamification.”
Although the immediate post-revolutionary period saw a dramatic decline of  
women’s rights, gender equality actually improved in the ensuing decades. For 
example, the share of  women in the labour force rose from 20 percent in 1986 to 
33 percent in 2011 (World Bank 2011, 60). A booming oil economy that resulted 
in a rapid rise in female education and a change in demographics accounts, to 
a large extent, for this progress. Moreover, some attribute the absorption of  
women into the education, health, and social services sectors to the fact that 
Iran does not rely on cheap female labour in the manufacturing export sector, as 
other Global South countries do (Bahramitash and Kazemipour 2006, 118–19). 
Thus, contrary to Ross’s conclusion that oil production reduces the number of  
women in the labour force in the Middle East (2008, 1), the opposite appears to 
be true in Iran. In 2009, Shahla Haeri noted that Iranian women are now “work-
ing in various professions and pursuing different sociopolitical goals” (134).
Although some progress toward equality has been made, patriarchy is alive 
and well in Iran. In terms of  labour force participation, oil stimulated the econ-
omy and provided the necessary funds to expand educational and employ-
ment opportunities for women. The primary causal factor in the inhibition of  
women’s rights in contemporary Iran is not oil, but the installation of  an Islamic 
theocracy that interprets the Koran in a paternalistic way.1 Given the strategic 
importance of  Iran to the industrialized world, this orientation can also be seen 
as a conscious rejection of  the modern international political system. The next 
section illustrates that Canada has also not been immune to patriarchy, nor to 
the forces of  change.
The Quest for Women’s Equality in Canada
Since Canada’s confederation in 1867, Canadian women have achieved many 
successes in attaining equal rights, among them the right to own property 
and to vote. Much of  the pressure to grant these rights came from Western 
Canada—and in particular, from Alberta, where women were actively involved 
in politics. The election of  Hannah Gale as alderman on Calgary’s City Council 
in 1917 represented a first for women serving at any level of  government in 
Canada—and indeed, in the British Commonwealth (Sanderson 1999, 28). 
Canada’s Famous Five also lived in Alberta; they were among the first women 
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in Canada to hold legal and political positions.2 Their most well-known accom-
plishment was having women recognized as “persons,” thus making women eli-
gible for appointment to the Canadian Senate in 1929. Commenting on the fact 
that the two main political parties in Alberta in 2012 were led by females, Sylvia 
Bashevkin (2012) references the province’s trail-blazing history in Canada: 
“This pattern is consistent with an international trend that saw women’s rights 
move forward far more rapidly in frontier environments rather than trad-
itional societies.”3
Interestingly, the reinforcement of  women’s unequal status that enraged 
women across Canada also involved an Alberta woman. In 1973, the Supreme 
Court upheld an earlier decision in the Murdoch divorce case that denied an 
Alberta farm wife (Irene Murdoch, from Turner Valley) her rights to a share in 
the family cattle ranch that she had worked on and managed for twenty-five 
years. That same year, the Supreme Court of  Canada made a second inequit-
able ruling that validated a section of  the Indian Act that denied Native status 
to Indian women who married non-Natives. Native men who married non-
Natives did not lose their status (CBC 2001). Thus, achieving equal rights for 
women has had an uneven trajectory, with race and class discrimination often 
embedded within gender discrimination. As is evident in chapter 10 in this 
volume, race- and class-based gender inequality in Canada, and in Alberta spe-
cifically, is still seen today.
The 1970s and 1980s saw the passage of  the Canadian Human Rights Act 
(1977), the adoption of  the UN Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  
Discrimination Against Women (1979), and the entrenchment of  the Canadian 
Charter of  Rights and Freedoms (1982); all contained provisions prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of  gender. Additionally, the federal government 
was actively supporting feminist organizations, which where emerging in this 
era. Feminists in Alberta had the unenviable position of  having to fight just to 
preserve earlier advancements, since this was also the era of  a complex federal-
provincial conflict over oil. The simple act of  accepting money from the federal 
government, which was locked in a battle with the provincial government over 
the National Energy Program, demonized women’s groups in the eyes of  many 
Albertans (Harder 2003, 21).
Growing neoliberalism further exacerbated gender inequality in Canada by 
reducing the allocation of  resources to alleviate gender inequities (Teghtsoonian 
2005, 311). Adopting female-friendly conventions and funding feminist organ-
izations do not mean much if  the political will to promote equality is missing. 
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Neoliberal thought eschews using the state to effect progressive social change; 
by the mid-1990s, governments at all levels were dramatically reducing pro-
grams that benefited women. In 2008, the Canadian Feminist Alliance for 
International Action gave Canada “a failing grade on women’s equality” because 
of  its failure “to comply with its obligations to women under international 
human rights law” (CFAIA 2008, 9). The Alliance noted that Canadian women, 
and especially women from disadvantaged groups (including Aboriginal, and 
other nonwhite women, as well as the disabled, seniors, immigrants, and single 
parents), are disproportionately poor, leaving them particularly vulnerable to 
violence, precarious housing, political exclusion, poor health, and discrimina-
tion (CFAIA 2008). For many women in Canada, access to education, the justice 
system, and participation in politics is increasingly challenging. Moreover, cuts 
to public services do not acknowledge the value of  unpaid labour and the sexual 
divisions of  labour that reproduce inequalities based on gender. With particu-
lar reference to Alberta, New Zealand’s Marilyn Waring observes that services 
are not devolved from the public to the private sector, but to the commun-
ity, which “is usually mom or daughter or aunty or neighbour or some other 
woman” (quoted in Cavanaugh 1998; see also Waring 2012).
In the labour force, Canadian women remain overrepresented in sex-segre-
gated lower-paying jobs. The Canadian Federation of  University Women and 
the National Council of  Women of  Canada highlight the disparity in wages for 
Canadian women generally and have called on the government to follow through 
on its 2009 acceptance of  the UN Universal Periodic Review’s recommenda-
tion to “implement International Labour organization (ILO) and Convention 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CERSC) recommendations to ensure 
remuneration for work of  equal value in public and private sectors” (quoted in 
CFUW and NCWC 2012, 10). Instead, in February 2009, Stephen Harper’s gov-
ernment introduced the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act. The act 
changed the criteria used to assess whether jobs are of  equal value and forces 
women to deal with pay equity at the bargaining table. More importantly, it 
makes pay equity claims more difficult by requiring a “female predominant” 
job group to comprise 70 percent women (10). The Public Service Alliance of  
Canada maintained that “the downgrading of  pay equity as proposed in this bill 
is a violation of  the constitutional Charter equality rights of  working women” 
(PSAC 2009). According to Kathleen Lahey’s analysis of  Budget 2012, there 
appears to be no relief  in sight for Canadian women, whose economic condition 
has remained virtually unchanged since 1997. She concludes that Budget 2012’s 
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cuts to taxes, public services, and Canada’s old age security system, as well as 
its changes to Employment Insurance, benefit men and disadvantage women 
(Lahey 2012).
The labour situation for women in Alberta both reflects and deviates from 
the larger Canadian picture. A study by the Parkland Institute and the Alberta 
College of  Social Workers (Gibson 2012) comparing Alberta to other Canadian 
provinces shows that the province leads the race to the bottom with respect to 
the social safety net, including such issues as maternity leave, child care, support 
for single mothers, and low-wage earners (who are overwhelmingly women in 
Alberta). Yet, according to statistics provided by the Alberta government, the 
province has the highest labour rate participation and highest employment 
rate of  women in Canada. Moreover, while more women work part-time than 
men, over the ten-year period between 2004 and 2014, “the largest percentage 
increases in full-time employment were women in the 65 years and over and the 
45-64 years age groups: 188.7% and 39.1% respectively” (Alberta 2015, 1). Alberta 
women also enjoy the highest average hourly wage ($24.63) compared to the 
overall average of  $22.64 for Canadian women overall. Across all age groups, 
however, women’s average wage is lower than men’s ($31.21) in Alberta, and 
the difference increases with age (1). In the well-paid resource sector, women 
make up only 18.6 percent of  the labour force, and only 1.4 percent of  those 
who run the companies are women (Lahey 2015, 85). The gap between what 
women and men earn in Alberta has increased since the mid-1990s; in 2014, 
women in Alberta earned 63 percent of  the earnings of  their male counterparts 
(12). The wage differential between men and women is attributed to tax chan-
ges that increased the burden on low income earners in whose ranks women 
are concentrated (26) and to the rollback of  social programs for ideological or 
budgetary reasons (89). Despite gains in some areas, women in Alberta are still 
lagging behind men in finding full-time employment, achieving pay equity, and 
escaping poverty. And, as explained by Sara Dorow (this volume), high wages, 
shift work, long commutes, and the lack of  family support in Alberta’s oil patch 
conspire to keep the lower-paid spouse (who typically is female) out of  the 
workforce and taking care of  children. As Lahey observes, Alberta’s “paradox 
of  plenty” produces a situation where women are “underdeveloped” in com-
parison to men “precisely because women’s economic opportunities are more 
dependent on the adequacy of  education, childcare, healthcare, transporta-
tion, housing, employment equality, skills training programs, and the vitality 
of  value chain production. These are all the types of  programs that will be the 
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immediate focus of  spending freezes and cuts when anticipated resource rev-
enues suddenly vaporize due to market swings” (89).
It is evident that whether in the public realm of  paid labour or in the pri-
vate sphere, inequalities persist for Canadian women. Given the current gov-
ernment and its latest legislation on pay equity, Canadian women, in Alberta 
and elsewhere in the country, may be less likely today to achieve wage parity 
than they were in the past. In some ways, Alberta women fare better than 
their sisters in other provinces with respect to “sameness” indices like labour 
force participation, post-secondary education attainment, and hourly wage. 
But Alberta women are worse off  than other women in Canada in terms of  
wage parity with Alberta men and government support for families. There 
appears to be an inverse relationship between the importance of  Alberta’s oil 
to Canada’s economy and the federal government’s concern with promoting 
equality for Canadian women; however, this deterioration could be the result 
of  the entrenchment of  neoliberal thought at the federal level. In the next sec-
tion, we explore an alternative explanation of  gender relations; we give primacy 
to pivotal historical events, fuelled by socio-economic dislocation, for under-
standing the suppression of  women’s equality.
Beyond the Indicators, Beyond the Oil Curse: Explaining the Retrenchment of 
Patriarchy
Sylvia Walby’s idea introduced at the outset of  this chapter, that women’s equal-
ity comes through transformative social and institutional change, leads us to 
an examination of  how public policy affects men and women’s power, either 
reinforcing or challenging the existing forms of  social organization (Paterson 
2010). Foucault (1978, 110) argues that Western societies exercised increasing 
control over individuals, primarily through the family. Combined with urban-
ization, this control caused the role, function, and structure of  the family to 
change. Change created stress, and subsequently, those individuals within the 
family who could not adapt to the new structure were deemed “abnormal.” To 
address this dysfunction, professionals within the new disciplines of  psychol-
ogy and psychiatry emerged to assist individuals in adapting to the new bound-
aries set by society.
In a similar vein, Erich Fromm analyzed the psychological impact on indi-
viduals of  the freedoms associated with liberalism. Fromm (1965, 123–29) 
argues that the negative impact of  modernity on individuals was more acute 
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than the impact of  the retraction of  the rigid class system and social norms that 
happened gradually in the Middle Ages. Freedom from social hierarchies and 
changes in the social order resulted in feelings of  displacement, disconnected-
ness, and trauma within individual members of  society who experienced eco-
nomic instability and loss of  identity in the new liberal order.
Fromm uses this crisis of  identity in explaining why Germans joined the 
Nazi movement—they traded the anxiety associated with freedom for the secur-
ity of  an authoritarian regime. Similarly, Afary (2009) builds on Foucault’s and 
Fromm’s analyses to explain why Iranians embraced the ethico-political struc-
ture of  the Iranian Islamist movement of  the 1960s. She argues that in Iran in 
the 1960s and 1970s, people found themselves “caught between pre-modern 
and modern social values” (19) in the same way that people in Western societies 
experienced “cultural alienation and psychological trauma” as the result of  the 
change in the social order (201). This trauma was particularly acute for a trad-
itional Islamic society that was embracing modernity.
It is important to point out that with respect to Iranian public policy, the 
Islamic conception of  female sexuality differed quite dramatically from the 
Western conception. Prior to the sexual revolution in the 1960s, the norm 
for Western women was to be passive in sexual relations, whereas women in 
Islamic culture typically have been seen as active participants in heterosexual 
relations. Female sexuality therefore cannot be left unrestrained; otherwise, 
chaos might ensue (Mernissi 1975, 31). Accounts of  the awkwardness of  male-
female interaction after the forced unveiling of  women by government decree 
in 1936 reflect this view and explain the high degree of  psychological trauma 
both men and women experienced following the unveiling act (Milani 1992, 35).
While many Iranian women wanted more rights, freedoms, and opportun-
ities in the years leading up to the 1979 revolution, they were uncomfortable 
with second wave feminism because of  its association with imperialism, con-
sumerism, and “free love” culture (Afary 2009, 234). Citing the work of  Andrea 
Dworkin (1983) and Elinor Burkett (1999), American feminist scholars of  second 
wave American feminism, Afray notes similar patterns of  loss of  identity 
and insecurity among right-wing American women’s groups. Young Iranians 
reacted by embracing the regime’s “third way” of  understanding gender rela-
tions that rejected “the evils of  Western imperialism, which turned women into 
sexual commodities, and Soviet communism, which destroyed family values” 
(Afary 2009, 234). Moreover, Islamism provided many Iranian women the 
opportunity to eschew oppressive familial and societal roles by committing 
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themselves to new roles as revolutionaries. As Afary observes, “Their allegiance 
to a highly authoritarian and patriarchal movement that advocated women’s 
subordination to men nonetheless allowed them to gain a measure of  personal 
power, to exercise leadership over others, and to live more gratifying personal 
lives” (257).
Embracing radical Islamism was not just a quest for ideological and spiritual 
support, however. An added incentive for large numbers of  rural Iranians who 
had “left the old hierarchical social order” of  their villages to work or study in 
“urban industrialized environments” was the food subsidies, health care, and 
other services that were available to people with allegiance to local religious 
centres and mosques (201). A broad coalition of  support, including more edu-
cated members of  Iranian society, combined with the rural Iranians who had 
moved to urban environments and a host of  international factors to bring the 
Islamic government into power in 1979. Islamic laws and policies implemented 
by the new regime further augmented the segregation of  the sexes and the sub-
jugation of  women already in place in this millennia-old culture. While women 
made huge strides with respect to educational attainment in post-revolutionary 
Iran, this progress can be explained in part by the Islamic state’s “programme 
for the ‘purification’ of  the minds of  its people” (Afshar 1998, 65), developed 
with the purpose of  eliminating Western and imperialist ideas.
It is clear that the installation of  an Islamic theocracy has had a huge impact 
on women’s equality in Iran. The allegiance to religious fundamentalism can 
be interpreted as a reaction to the social, cultural, political, and economic dis-
placement that resulted from urbanization and the transition to modernity. Oil 
revenue, of  course, is an important component in these transformations, but 
so too are Iran’s twentieth-century economic reforms, its geo-strategic import-
ance, the influence of  Western ideas, and Iran’s place in the global economic 
order.
The loss of  identity that comes with rapid change in the social order is also 
seen in Canada during this time. Canada was being transformed, first through 
immigration and then through urbanization. In Alberta, these changes were 
particularly dramatic. Successive waves of  immigration from Asia and east-
ern and southern Europe challenged the hegemony of  the white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant elite. Adding Catholics, Slavs, and Chinese to a society that previ-
ously counted only Aboriginal people as outsiders threatened the social order. 
As Foucault might have predicted, one way in which provincial elites responded 
to this alienating and traumatic social transformation was to enact the Sexual 
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Sterilization Act 1928, which sought to prevent the province’s “undesirables” 
from reproducing. More than 2,800 people in Alberta were involuntarily steril-
ized over a forty-three-year period ending in 1972, long after other jurisdic-
tions had ended the practice. Timothy Christian (1974) concludes that the act 
was primarily used to exert control over the sexuality—and in particular, over 
the reproductive capacity—of  those deemed to be immoral, delinquent, men-
tally deficient, or otherwise inferior. Women were overrepresented among 
those who were sterilized. Given that the legislation stipulated that one of  the 
reasons for recommending sterilization was the vague criteria of  being “incap-
able of  intelligent parenthood,” it is not difficult to see why Jana Grekul, Harvey 
Krahn, and Dave Odynak (2004, 365) conclude that “sterilization was essentially 
a medical solution for a variety of  perceived social and behavioural problems.”
A second dramatic social transformation in Alberta occurred after the dis-
covery of  oil in Leduc in 1947. This era saw rapid urbanization and dramatic 
population and economic growth, along with political changes. The thirty-
four-year dynasty of  the Social Credit Party came to an abrupt end in 1971, and 
with it ended the authoritarian, faith-based leadership (Finkel 1989, 58–60). 
For the first time, Albertans had a government wherein the number of  repre-
sentatives of  urban ridings surpassed those of  rural ridings. The rapid growth, 
social displacement, and growing inequalities experienced during the oil boom 
contributed to the province having the highest rates of  divorce, suicide, teen-
age pregnancies, and abortion in the country. As Howard Palmer and Tamara 
Palmer note, “Many individuals and couples, lacking family support systems, 
could not stand the stress of  a boom-bust economy that fostered big dreams, 
and produced confused values and identities” (1990, 336).
The provincial government’s response to social injustice and dislocation 
was one of  indifference. With respect to the oil boom in the 1970s, Lois Harder 
(2003, 21) suggests that the oil industry and the state had a symbiotic relation-
ship that benefited the middle class but not those who were struggling:
Those people subjected to the social displacements that emerged out of  
rapid population growth and economic expansion found their crises framed 
in terms of  individual failings or were simply ignored. The seeming ease 
with which wealth was accumulated during this period could be used to 
support the view that systemic inequality could be alleviated by working 
harder, pulling up one’s bootstraps, and taking advantage of  the opportun-
ities of  a booming economy.
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Despite the largesse that came from a booming economy, Alberta did not expand 
social entitlements, even though it was apparent that many Albertans were 
being left behind. As Harder points out, “In the context of  an economic boom, 
the political costs of  alienating groups perceived as marginal were minimal” 
(22). Women, of  course, were the most marginal of  the marginalized groups.
During this era, the plight of  those who were struggling worsened even 
more during the 1980s world economic recession, which culminated in oil 
prices plummeting and Canada’s biggest oil companies teetering on the brink 
of  collapse. In Alberta, there was a dramatic rise in unemployment, outmigra-
tion, business closures, bankruptcies, and housing foreclosures (Gereluk 2012, 
175). Provincially, government involvement in high-profile public investment 
failures and private sector bailouts led many to question the government’s 
fiscal management (Gereluk 2012, 199; Harder 2003, 118). Pressure was increas-
ing on already strained social services as public discontent and social hardship 
increased. In 1986, the opposition ranks swelled from four seats in the legis-
lature to twenty-two (Elections Alberta 2015). The time was ripe for change: 
Albertans were rethinking the complex relationship between the state, mar-
kets, and civil society.
Albertans did not deal with the trauma of  profound societal change by 
embracing a faith-based political movement in the 1990s as Iranians had in the 
1970s. Rather, they embraced a radical restructuring of  the state from activist 
welfare to limited laissez-faire. Alberta was the first jurisdiction in Canada to 
embrace neoliberalism, and other governments copied Alberta reforms, includ-
ing the federal government. This new orientation meshed well with entrenched 
traditional Christian values, particularly as expressed by the Alberta Social 
Credit and Reform movements. The contraction of  the welfare state affected 
women in many ways, including increased demands on the unpaid labour they 
performed within the family unit, and it also led to fewer opportunities for 
human rights and equality claims making. The entrenchment of  neoliberal-
ism in Alberta went hand in hand with the re-entrenchment of  neoconserva-
tive ideology, which emphasized the traditional family and further decreased 
the range of  possibilities for women. As Gurston Dacks, Joyce Green, and Linda 
Trimble (1995, 271) explain, “A central tenant of  neoconservatism is a preference 
for hierarchical and authoritarian social relations. One of  its most important 
expressions is its promotion of  patriarchal social organization—the systematic 
domination by men of  social, economic, and political power—and a social and 
family mythology emanating from and supportive of  patriarchy.” Sara Dorow 
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(this volume) argues that the structure of  the oil industry encourages the neo-
conservative family mythology that supports patriarchy; women become “flex-
ibilized” labourers, adjusting their paid work so that they can accommodate 
the demands of  being the primary family caregiver. In this way, ideology and 
economic structures combined to give a particularly strong expression of  patri-
archy in Alberta.
With the emergence of  Alberta as the economic powerhouse of  Canada, 
and the election of  the Harper Conservative government at the federal level in 
2006, Canada as a whole began to follow Alberta’s neoliberal path of  major pol-
itical and economic reorientation, a change in direction that has already led to 
profound societal change. The prospects for women’s equality in Canada at the 
dawn of  the new millennium are gloomy.
The Impact of Oil on Women’s Equality
What emerges from this analysis is the recognition that the impact of  the oil 
economy on women’s equality status is complex and variegated. In Canada, 
women enjoy fundamental freedoms, many of  which are now denied to women 
in Iran, specifically in relation to legal rights. During the postwar period, when 
oil was gaining economic importance in Iran and Canada, women’s equal-
ity made steady strides forward. In both countries, however, progress toward 
equality has not been linear, with instances of  sliding backwards.
A jurisdiction’s economic dependence on oil may indeed work against 
women’s equality in some instances, but the record is mixed. We suggest that 
many factors are critical in holding women back in Iran and Canada. Social dis-
location has led to what many call “reactive patriarchy.” This can be fuelled in 
part by oil, but it is also influenced by factors such as urbanization, population 
growth, modernization, neoliberal economic and social policies, and religion. 
In the first half  of  the century, immigration to western Canada resulted in a 
dramatic growth of  non-Anglo-Saxon populations that threatened the existing 
pre-oil social order. The discovery of  oil contributed to yet more social change 
in Canada, especially in Alberta. Similarly, the rush to modernize predated 
the discovery of  oil in Iran. The development of  an oil industry that encour-
aged British, Soviet, and American imperialism as well as pro- and anti-West 
ideologies caused yet more social changes in Iran. The identity crises brought 
about by social dislocations pushed the populations in both jurisdictions to 
embrace reactive ideologies that exacerbated existing patriarchal structures. 
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In the case of  Iran, that ideology took the shape of  religious fundamentalism 
steeped in patriarchy. In the case of  Alberta, it took the form of  eugenics in the 
early part of  the century and neoliberalism in the latter part, both emphasizing 
patriarchal notions of  the family structure that actively repress female sexual 
expression and cause women’s equality in the social and economic realms to 
backslide. Neoliberalism would take hold federally in Canada somewhat later 
but with the same effect: not only was the quest for equality suppressed, but 
inequality was exacerbated.
In this chapter, we have demonstrated that while a country’s economic reli-
ance on oil clearly has some influence on women’s equality, this is only part 
of  the picture. Discrimination against women is pervasive, complex, and sys-
temic in the world’s oil-rich and non-oil economies. Moreover, the sources of  
discrimination are linked to deeply entrenched patriarchal systems and social 
structures that have a global reach and considerable staying power, particularly 
during times of  social dislocation. The Iran-Canada comparison underscores 
the need to expand the horizon of  the enquiry about the impact of  oil wealth 
on political and ideological developments within a country. As noted by Sylvia 
Walby (2005), the lack of  movement in the transformation and social reorgan-
ization of  institutions, standards, and gender relations is the biggest obstacle in 
the quest for women’s equality. In trying to understand how a resource economy 
operates, it is critical to pay attention to historical cultural phenomena that are 
embedded in a society. These phenomena play a significant part in preventing 
such a movement toward gender equality, be it in theocratic Iran or democratic 
Canada.
Notes
1 Interestingly, some Iranian feminists also anchor their equality demands in the 
Koran, with reference to a brief  period of  Shiite rule in the seventh century. As 
Afshar (1998, 19) notes, “in their pursuit of  the golden age Iranian Islamist women are 
equipped with 50 years of  history and 114 verses of  a holy book—perhaps as good a 
resource as those offered by any other ideology or utopian vision.”
2 The posts held by the Famous Five were significant even by today’s standards: Emily 
Murphy was appointed magistrate in the British Empire; Louise McKinney and 
Roberta MacAdams were the first women to be elected to a provincial legislature; 
Irene Parlby was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the United Farmer’s 
government, becoming the second woman in the British Empire to serve as a cabinet 
minister; and Nellie McClung was the third woman to sit on the Alberta legislature. 
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“The Famous Five Women,” Famous5Foundation, 2012, http://www.famous5.ca/index.
php/the-famous-5-women/the-famous-5-women.
3 As is noted later in this chapter, despite impressive progress early in its history, 
Alberta has garnered infamy for its egregious violations of  human rights in this early 
period. While Alberta’s most famous suffragettes fought for gender equality, they 
did not extend equality rights universally; in fact, they subscribed to the eugenics 
bio-social movement that promoted the involuntary sterilization of  those deemed 
mentally, physically, or morally deficient. These included the indigent, single 
mothers, prostitutes, immigrants, and First Nations peoples (Christian 1974).
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Development at What Cost?
First Nations, Ecological Integrity, and Democracy
Gabrielle Slowey and Lorna Stefanick
Although the bitumen extraction industry in northern Alberta has been in 
operation for less than fifty years, it has already left a significant footprint, not 
only on the landscape but also on the lives of  Aboriginal peoples living in the 
region.1 For some First Nations who are proximal to bitumen sands develop-
ment, neoliberal globalization diminished the heavy hand of  the state and thus 
pried open some space for First Nation self-determination with the conclusion 
of  land claims settlement (Slowey 2008). It did so, first, by providing the gov-
ernment with the impetus to settle unresolved land claims, a necessary step 
to achieve the goal of  attracting and maintaining investment opportunities in 
the resource extraction sector.2 Second, it provided the motivation for indus-
try to forge impact and benefit agreements (IBAs, also known simply as benefit 
agreements, BAs) with local communities. These agreements—which have for 
the most part been concluded confidentially, outside the environmental and 
labour regulatory frameworks of  government—provide a mechanism through 
which Aboriginal groups can secure local benefits (such as employment) from 
resource-extraction activities (Mills and Sweeney 2013, 8). As recently as fif-
teen years ago in the Aboriginal community of  Fort Chipewyan, located a few 
hundred kilometres downstream of  bitumen extraction sites, the enthusiasm 
was palpable for the new economic opportunities that oil provided.
As the pace of  development accelerated, however, the concerns of  local com-
munities over environmental degradation amplified. Although hypergrowth 
since 2005 has fuelled wealth generation within local Aboriginal communities, 
it has also created alarm over the effects of  pollution on both human and eco-
system health. The result has been deep divisions among an already diverse 
community; accusations that the government is failing in its fiduciary duty to 
consult communities with respect to bitumen sands development; and public 
7
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
196   Gabrielle Slowey and Lorna Stefanick
relations campaigns by industry, governments, and leaders that seek to win the 
hearts and minds of  the international public concerned with human rights and 
environmental integrity. As the stakes increase, the discourse becomes more 
heated. Indeed, some human rights observers now claim that Alberta is com-
mitting “slow industrial genocide” of  Aboriginal peoples by failing to put the 
brakes on regional industrial development until outstanding issues are resolved 
(Huseman and Short 2012).
As Jay Smith sets out in chapter 3, liberal democratic processes require a 
public space for deliberation of  policy issues, a space where a wide variety of  
citizens are engaged and special attention is paid to ensuring that minorities 
within the polity are not marginalized. This chapter considers the case of  one 
such minority: the First Nations peoples of  Fort Chipewyan. It investigates 
two questions: Does bitumen extraction come at the cost of  treaty rights? 
What insights can be drawn from this case about democracy in Alberta spe-
cifically, and Canada more generally? We begin the chapter by providing the 
historical, geographic, and political context of  the Mikisew Cree First Nation 
(MCFN) and the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation (ACFN), with a particular 
emphasis on the relationship of  people to the natural environment. We then 
investigate the contours of  the debate about the environmental consequences 
of  bitumen extraction from the perspectives of  both scientific and traditional 
knowledge. Finally, we examine the consultations with First Nations that are 
informing regional oil extraction decisions, in order to assess whether the min-
ority voice in northern Alberta is being heard within public spaces where bitu-
men development policy is deliberated.
This analysis reveals that the state is retreating from its traditional role as 
the instrument through which public interest and concerns are expressed. The 
new, truncated role of  the state reflects a larger neoliberal conceptualization 
of  citizenship that enhances economic efficiency through maximizing the role 
of  the market and minimizing political negotiation. This market-based ver-
sion of  citizenship is a result of  Alberta’s and Canada’s corporate and political 
elites leveraging their economic and political power to sideline public debate 
about the social and environmental consequences of  bitumen development. 
In that process, democracy in Alberta and in Canada is diminished. Those who 
live closest to bitumen extraction sites—among them, Fort Chipewyan’s First 
Nations—feel most acutely the consequences of  this diminished brand of  cit-
izenship and debate.
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Neighbours to Alberta’s Bitumen Development
Alberta’s bitumen extraction industrial complex is located in the Regional 
Municipality of  Wood Buffalo. The second-largest of  eight communities in this 
municipality, Fort Chipewyan lies approximately three hundred kilometres 
north of  Fort McMurray, on the north shore of  Lake Athabasca and on the 
boundary of  Wood Buffalo National Park. About two hundred kilometres north 
of  the bitumen sands development, the Athabasca River empties into Lake 
Athabasca and forms the Athabasca Delta, which surrounds the community 
with a landscape thick with boreal forests, wetlands, and swampy muskeg that 
nourishes numerous species. Until very recently, Fort Chipewyan’s Indigenous 
peoples depended largely on the local animals, fish, and vegetation found in 
this diverse, cold-hardy boreal ecosystem. Thus, the natural environment fig-
ures prominently in their culture and identity in ways that at times converge 
but sometimes diverge with the interests of  those seeking to protect the natural 
environment.
Founded in 1788, Fort Chipewyan is the oldest settlement in Alberta and 
was a key outpost for the Athabasca region during the fur trade era. While 
Euro-Canadians from the south typically think of  this northern commun-
ity as isolated, historically it has been an important site of  economic and cul-
tural convergence of  people with different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds 
(McCormack 2010, 5). Today, the community is accessible by plane year round, 
by ice road in the winter, and by boat from Fort McMurray in the summer. With 
a population of  only twelve hundred, Fort Chipewyan is a fraction of  the size 
of  the region’s largest community, Fort McMurray, which boasts a popula-
tion of  over seventy-two thousand, including a “shadow population” of  about 
two thousand: temporary residents who are employed by an industrial estab-
lishment and live in the community for more than thirty days. An additional 
forty thousand such temporary residents live in the surrounding service area 
(Alberta, Municipal Affairs 2012, 10). The hamlet of  Fort Chipewyan is a plural 
society, consisting primarily of  three Aboriginal groups: the ACFN, the MCFN, 
and Fort Chipewyan Métis Local 125.3 In 2012, the MCFN had a total registered 
population of  2,841, of  which 72 percent lived off-reserve, primarily in Fort 
Chipewyan, Fort McMurray, Fort Smith, and Edmonton. The ACFN had 1,071 
registered members, with over 78 percent living off-reserve (Canada, AANDC 
2012). The on-reserve MCFN population represents more than half  the number 
of  the residents of  Fort Chipewyan; it is the largest and most affluent of  the 
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three Aboriginal groups living in the hamlet. Because of  Fort Chipewyan’s iso-
lation, a subsistence lifestyle based on hunting and trapping persisted until the 
postwar period. The diet of  local people still comprises a significant proportion 
of  “country food” that is derived from the land (Wein and Sabry 1990, 188).4
For the inhabitants of  the region, the sticky tar-like substance in the sand was 
well known historically: Indigenous peoples often used it to patch their canoes. 
Early Canadian geologists recognized the value of  bitumen sands as oil; they 
also discovered natural gas, gold, silver, copper, and other valuable minerals in 
the region (Fumoleau [1975] 2004, 55–57). The influx of  fifty thousand gold rush 
prospectors into the area, beginning in 1897, pushed the Canadian government 
to negotiate Treaty 8 two years later. This treaty, which covered 850,000 square 
kilometres of  land (the largest territory of  any treaty to date), guaranteed annu-
ities of  five dollars per person, provisions for health care and education, and 
exemptions from taxation and military service, as well as affirming the con-
tinuing freedom to hunt, fish, and trap (56, 69). The Government of  Canada, 
however, did not formally allocate any land in the years following the signing 
of  the treaty, although it did regulate all hunting and trapping in the area. In 
René Fumoleau’s assessment, “Once the treaties had been signed, they were 
forgotten and disavowed by all levels of  Government—the spirit of  friendly 
co-existence of  the Indians and non-Indians disappeared as soon as the ink 
dried up on the treaty documents” (413–14). The desire of  Aboriginal groups 
to control the lands they traditionally inhabited is the basis of  specific land 
claims relating to grievances regarding government obligations as outlined in 
specific treaties and of  comprehensive land claims that have not yet been dealt 
with through legal means. As settlement increased, local Aboriginal groups 
asked for reserves. In 1921, the federal government responded with an amend-
ment (rescinded only in 1951) to the Indian Act of  1876 that made it illegal to 
hire a lawyer to sue the government. The creation of  Wood Buffalo National 
Park in 1922 further restricted Indigenous use of  traditional lands. Parks are 
indeed symbolic of  the divergent interests of  Aboriginal peoples, who wish to 
use wilderness land to sustain life, and conservationists, who want to protect 
wilderness from human use.
After repeated ACFN requests, the government approved Indian Reserve 
201 at the southeast end of  Lake Athabasca in 1937 and allocated the land in 
1940. The reserve would not be officially declared until 1954, however—almost 
fifty-five years after Treaty 8 was signed (ACFN 2003, 69). Nonetheless, a desig-
nated “Indian reserve” gave the ACFN the ability to control its own land and, 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
Development at What Cost?   199
well into the 1960s, ACFN members generated 30 percent of  their income 
from trapping. In contrast, the MCFN gained control of  its land compara-
tively recently. Over a period of  sixty-four years, it made forty-one requests 
to acquire the reserve lands promised in Treaty 8. These requests were denied 
(Selin 1999, 13–16). Many MCFN members turned to wage labour; by the 1950s, 
many had moved from the bush into the community of  Fort Chipewyan, which 
was developing infrastructure, social services, and, perhaps most importantly, 
schools (Slowey 2008; Tuccaro 1990, 239).
While the petroleum potential of  the region long been known and its even-
tual development anticipated (see Fumoleau [1975] 2004, 26), technological 
limitations and the low price of  oil and gas in the early 1970s did not make 
private sector investment worthwhile. During World War II, as part of  its war 
effort, the federal government began identifying bitumen reserves, while the 
provincial government began testing processes to separate the bitumen from 
the sand. By 1962, the Great Canadian Oilsands Company (now Suncor) began 
extracting oil from sand (EUB 2000, 4). The stage was thus set for the develop-
ment of  Alberta’s bitumen sands, a prospect that generated the political will 
to settle outstanding land claims with the MCFN. The First Nation reached a 
tentative agreement with the federal government in 1973; however, given the 
requirements of  the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Act, Alberta’s consent 
was needed (Slowey 2008, 10). Although Alberta agreed to transfer land in 
1975, the agreement was withdrawn in 1977 when the MCFN made it clear that 
it intended to lay claim to parcels of  the bitumen sands in its overall settlement 
(Selin 1999, 16). After nine more years of  trilateral negotiations with both levels 
of  government, the MCFN agreed to take a much reduced amount of  land in 
exchange for cash and, importantly, to drop its claims to bitumen-rich lands. As 
Gabrielle Slowey has argued elsewhere, the impetus for governments to come 
to the 1986 agreement, which clarified issues of  land title and resource owner-
ship, was to provide a stable environment conducive to investment in bitumen 
extraction (Slowey 2008, 10).
Settling the outstanding land claims associated with Treaty 8 paid hand-
some dividends to capital interests, as well as to the governments of  Alberta 
and Canada. Over the past four decades, the political and economic value of  
bitumen has increased dramatically because of  growing concerns over energy 
security, at the same time that new, sophisticated technologies have brought 
down the cost of  production. Consequently, there has been a proliferation in 
the number of  companies operating in the region, from British Petroleum to 
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China’s Sinotec. The population of  Fort McMurray has ballooned from 6,123 in 
the 1970 census to over 72,000 in 2012 (Alberta, Municipal Affairs 1970, 2; 2012, 
10). Alberta became a key driver of  the Canadian economy.
Treaty 8 has also been beneficial for the community of  Fort Chipewyan. 
After the conclusion of  the Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) settlement in 1986, 
the MCFN began working with the oil company Syncrude to develop new busi-
nesses. The result is the Mikisew Cree Group of  Companies, which is now the 
largest employer within the community; it comprises twelve companies ran-
ging from oil field servicing to sport fishing. Other community members par-
ticipate in oil companies’ “fly-in, fly-out” work programs. The most renowned 
band member is Dave Tuccaro, who worked his way up from a heavy equipment 
operator to become a multimillionaire entrepreneur and the founding presi-
dent of  the Northeastern Alberta Aboriginal Business Association. Tuccaro 
estimates that companies run by the Mikisew Cree, Athabasca Chipewyan, and 
Fort McKay First Nations derive $1 billion in annual revenues from bitumen 
extraction (Vanderklippe 2012). The Fort McMurray–based ACFN Business 
Group, rebranded in 2013 as ACDEN, comprises seventeen businesses and joint 
ventures that specialize in oil and gas services. With 24 percent of  its commun-
ity members directly employed in resource-based industries, Fort Chipewyan 
is the most economically diversified of  the ten communities of  the Regional 
Municipality of  Wood Buffalo (RMWB 2012, 99).
The benefits of  bitumen development, however, have been uneven. For 
those who have a treaty right to resource-rich land or who live near resource-
extraction projects, there is a solid basis from which to participate in the market 
economy. In Fort Chipewyan, the proximity to the bitumen development gives 
Treaty Indians a huge advantage over their Métis neighbours, who have cer-
tain rights to use land but do not actually own land. As Fumoleau ([1975] 2004, 
107) observes about the Treaty 8 and scrip settlements, “As had been foreseen 
and feared, the Métis people were left in an unenviable position . . . between the 
white and the Indian world, not belonging to either.” But even for those who 
have treaty status, a legacy of  colonialism has exacerbated the cultural discon-
nection between them and the market economy into which they are expected 
to assimilate. Problems associated with influenza epidemics, racism, poverty, 
inadequate housing, inadequate medical care, substance abuse, and domes-
tic abuse are documented elsewhere (Fumoleau [1975] 2004; Tuccaro 1990). 
Despite IBAs wherein oil companies have supported training initiatives in local 
communities, many Aboriginal people are limited by their lack of  education. 
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Even basic qualifications such as a driver’s licence can be an impediment: Fort 
Chipewyan’s residents must travel to Fort McMurray for certification, which is 
accessible by air in the summer and by an ice road in the winter. Companies like 
Syncrude require that employees have a high school diploma, yet Aboriginal 
people who have post-secondary education are often limited to the lower rungs 
of  the employment ladder and are hired as labourers, as dump truck drivers, or 
as part of  shutdown maintenance crews (Taylor, Friedel, and Edge 2009). While 
for some Aboriginal groups, the benefits of  development are huge, for others, 
the costs far outweigh the benefits.
Suzanne Mills and Brendan Sweeney (2013), who argue that employment of  
Aboriginal people in northern extractive industries represents a “neostaples” 
stage of  development that is both locally empowering and divisive, pick up this 
theme of  mixed effects on First Nations people. On the one hand, “by exerting 
political power and legal rights, Aboriginal governments have altered the trad-
itional compromise among labour, corporations, and the government. Through 
IBAs, Aboriginal governments and organizations become influential actors in 
employment relations.” On the other hand, “participating in economic develop-
ment activities . . . limits Aboriginal leaders’ ability to represent the interests 
of  their worker members by pitting workers’ interests against those of  the 
broader constituency” (28). Accordingly, local agreements through IBAs pro-
vide local benefits for some, but given the international nature of  capital in this 
sector and the weak unions, even these beneficiaries lack significant control 
over important dimensions of  their work lives. More importantly, the uneven 
benefits of  employment undermine community solidarity.
The most urgent problem associated with bitumen development for Fort 
Chipewyan’s residents, however, is its impact on the environment. Local con-
cern that industry and government are ignoring Aboriginal concerns has escal-
ated into a pitched battle in the international arena, as evidenced by the 2014 
Neil Young “Honour the Treaties” concert tour. A comprehensive study that 
chronicles the transformation of  the MCFN after its land claims were settled 
suggests that, as recently as 2003, the local community had a very good work-
ing relationship with industry (Slowey 2008). What changed in the intervening 
decade? As one resident explained, people in the community generally point 
to the arrival of  Dr. John O’Connor in 2000, a Fort McMurray physician who 
became one of  Fort Chipewyan’s family doctors.5 Dr. O’Connor became alarmed 
at the number of  cases of  cancer he encountered in the small community, par-
ticularly cases of  cholangiocarcinoma, a relatively rare cancer of  the bile ducts. 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
202   Gabrielle Slowey and Lorna Stefanick
In 2003, O’Connor suggested to MCFN chief  Archie Waquan that the high rates 
of  cancer were anomalous and proposed that a baseline study be performed 
(CPSA 2009, 3). O’Connor suspected that upstream bitumen extraction might 
be the cause of  environmental changes that some in the community had already 
noted, and he speculated that these might have implications for human health.
In 2006, O’Connor asked Health Canada to investigate, and, in response, a 
team of  representatives from Health Canada and Alberta Health and Wellness 
travelled to Fort Chipewyan. O’Connor reports that one member of  the team 
turned on a tap, took a drink from a mug, and told him, “See, there’s nothing 
wrong with the water here” (O’Connor 2006). According to another resident of  
the area, O’Connor later described this incident as an insult to the local com-
munity. After a year of  sparring, three physicians from Health Canada lodged 
a complaint against O’Connor, charging him with four counts of  professional 
misconduct, including withholding data and causing harm to Fort Chipewyan 
residents because “they made lifestyle decisions based on concerns raised by 
Dr. O’Connor that were not in their best interests” (CPSA 2009). News of  these 
charges generated such media attention, that O’Connor left his practice in 
Alberta and returned to Nova Scotia, much to the dismay of  members of  the 
local community who had become increasingly worried about observed chan-
ges to the environment. O’Connor’s suspicions were underscored by a study 
conducted by Kevin Timoney, of  Treeline Ecological Research, that documented 
unsafe levels of  arsenic, mercury, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in the 
area’s water, fish, and other wildlife (see CBC News 2007b). Early in 2008, the 
media reported that O’Connor had been “cleared” of  the misconduct charges; 
an investigative report written for Alberta’s College of  Physicians and Surgeons 
subsequently denied that O’Connor had ever been formally charged or that 
efforts had been made to “muzzle” him (CPSA 2009, 6).6 In any event, as former 
MCFN chief  George Poitras explained in an interview, it was the sanction of  
O’Connor that led Poitras to launch an international campaign denouncing the 
impact that bitumen development was having on his community and, in par-
ticular, the social and health consequences that he claimed were the result of  
environmental degradation.
Poitras’s “bloody oil” tour took him to London, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Netherlands, France, and the United States. Poitras resigned his position as con-
sultation coordinator for the MCFN’s Government Industry Relations depart-
ment in December 2009, fearing that the MCFN would suffer repercussions for 
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his outspoken criticism. Shawn Bell, a reporter for the Slave River Journal, quotes 
from an email he received from Poitras:
Because of  this very successful campaign in the UK, one of  the oil com-
pany’s executives flew to Fort Chipewyan and attempted to force the hand 
of  my First Nation to “silence or terminate” my employment with the 
Mikisew because they didn’t like that I traveled internationally, on Mikisew 
time, and that by doing so I generated so much negative publicity on the 
tarsands industry. . . . Apparently we are not to speak publicly if  we observe 
water quality issues, health impacts, or worse our people dying too fre-
quently of  cancers. This, they said, was not consistent with the company’s 
“vision” and that if  Mikisew didn’t support their vision there would be 
repercussions. And there were repercussions. Many Mikisew employees 
lost their jobs on this particular company’s site within weeks. (Bell 2010)
The chief  at the time, Roxanne Marcel, responded to the controversy in a press 
release: “Every person in this country and province has the right to share and 
promote their feelings, the last time I checked this was still a democratic coun-
try where the right to speak and be heard was a fundamental cornerstone of  
citizenship right” (Marcel and Monaghan, n.d.). Nonetheless, Marcel also made 
it clear that Poitras was not speaking on behalf  of  the MCFN. Bell reported that 
the MCFN did eventually ask Poitras to refrain from publicly criticizing the 
bitumen sands after Syncrude cancelled millions of  dollars in contracts with the 
Mikisew Group of  Companies. At that point, Poitras decided to resign from his 
position with the MCFN in order to pursue his activism full time. Bell reports 
Poitras as stating, “I left because I would not be silenced” (Bell 2010). A year 
later, Poitras returned to the MCFN as its chief  executive officer. As recently as 
October 2013, he was still raising concern in Europe, despite his employment 
with MCFN, which ended in the winter of  2015 (Wohlberg 2013b).
These events can be identified as the “tipping point” with respect to 
Aboriginal activism: community members began looking beyond Canadian 
borders to mobilize opposition to bitumen sands development based on the 
negative consequences for the environment. As mentioned previously with 
respect to the creation of  Wood Buffalo National Park, while the interests of  
Aboriginal peoples often diverge from those of  environmentalists, in this 
instance they converged. Moreover, members of  the world’s scientific com-
munity had also begun to sound the conservation alarm about the destruction 
of  the boreal forest. In particular, Alberta scientists were beginning to garner 
negative publicity for the oil industry and the governments that are responsible 
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for regulating them by providing evidence for habitat degradation and pollu-
tion caused by bitumen development. The result was the creation of  a potent 
mix of  scientists, environmental activists, and Aboriginal rights advocates.
The Intersection of Environmental and Aboriginal Concerns
Poitras’s charge that development of  the bitumen sands was negatively 
impacting local communities was a valuable addition to the toolkits of  environ-
mentalists, who had begun asking questions about pollution and habitat loss 
fifteen years earlier. In 1995, the Edmonton-based nonprofit Toxic Watch 
launched its “tar sands campaign.” A dozen years later, fifteen hundred sci-
entists from around the world were calling on Canada to provide better pro-
tection for the boreal forest (CBC News 2007a). Shortly thereafter, fourteen 
internationally renowned scientists—including David Schindler from the 
University of  Alberta, who has earned worldwide recognition for his expertise 
on water quality and depletion—created the International Boreal Conservation 
Science Panel (borealscience.org) to conduct interdisciplinary studies for the 
purpose of  providing policy advice to preserve the boreal forest habitat. Two 
Alberta-based think tanks and two national groups, the Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives and Polaris Institute, also undertook research projects that 
examined the negative environmental externalities of  bitumen production 
(Grant, Dyer, and Woynillowicz 2009; McCullum 2006). The catalyst for inter-
national attention was the death in 2008 of  sixteen hundred ducks that mistook 
a Syncrude tailings pond for a lake because the company had failed to install, in 
a timely fashion, scarecrows and air cannons around the tailings pond to warn 
off  wildlife (Weber 2010). Images of  dead ducks covered in an oily substance 
caused an international uproar, and oil from the bitumen sands acquired the 
label of  “dirty oil.”
While the science community is divided over the environmental effects of  
the bitumen sands (see Gosselin et al. 2010), one fact that is not disputed is the 
sheer enormity of  the bitumen extraction project. The bitumen is contained 
in an area covering nearly 142,200 square kilometres, roughly the size of  the 
state of  Florida (Alberta, Alberta Energy 2013). Alberta’s total oil reserves are 
estimated to be 168.7 billion barrels, 99 percent of  which are contained in the 
bitumen sands. In 2013, the production of  oil from Alberta’s bitumen deposits 
was over 1.98 million barrels per day (CERI 2014). These numbers are arrest-
ing when the resulting habitat disruption of  the boreal forest is considered in 
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a global context. The circumboreal forest covers about fourteen million square 
kilometres—about a third of  the earth’s forest cover. Canada is the world’s 
second-largest country, and almost 60 percent of  Canada’s land base con-
sists of  boreal forest; this represents 40 percent of  the world’s total (Burton 
et al. 2003, 1). Although various industrial activities threaten the integrity of  
Canada’s boreal forest, a key threat relates to the activities of  the oil indus-
try. Alberta’s share of  the boreal forest is 381,000 square kilometres, of  which 
only 420 square kilometres had been touched by oil activity in 2008 (Alberta 
2008, 2, 4). Five years later, this number had nearly doubled, to 767 square 
kilometres (Alberta, Alberta Energy 2013, 1). Bitumen sands deposits under-
lie an estimated 142,200 square kilometres, with the area that could poten-
tially be surface-mined limited to 4,800 square kilometres in the vicinity of  
Fort McMurray (Alberta, Alberta Energy 2013, 1). While this represents only a 
fraction of  the total area, the remaining habitat, covering 137,400 square kilo-
metres, will be fragmented by the construction of  roads, pipelines, transmis-
sion lines, and wells, if  the entire area is developed. Over the long term, these 
activities will adversely affect flora and fauna that live on tens of  thousands 
of  square kilometres of  boreal forest (Canada, Parliament of  Canada, House of  
Commons 2007, 47). Owing to its harsh climate and short growing season, the 
human population in Canada’s boreal forest region is less dense than in similar 
regions with more moderate climates, and, until bitumen extraction began to 
ramp up, this habitat was therefore less disturbed by human activity. In non-
human terms, however, the area is populous indeed: its many lakes, rivers, and 
wetlands support large numbers of  birds and mammals that are important for 
global biodiversity (Burton et al. 2003, 2). Given that Canada’s boreal forest 
is the summer home for half  of  North America’s bird species (CBC 2007a), 
Alberta’s resource extraction activities could have far-reaching consequences 
for the continent’s bird population.
The actual process of  extracting oil from the bitumen sands is extremely 
destructive: it requires cutting down trees, disturbing peatlands that have built 
up over thousands of  years, and draining wetlands. Two different processes are 
used in extracting bitumen, depending on how close to the surface the resource 
lies. Shallow deposits are accessed by digging up the land in a process that 
resembles open-pit strip mining. Two tonnes of  bitumen sands must be dug 
up to produce one barrel of  crude oil; trucks then move the oil-soaked ore to a 
cleaning facility, where it is mixed with hot water and diluent chemicals in order 
to remove the bitumen.7 Deposits that are more than seventy-five metres deep 
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are extracted in situ, largely through steam-assisted gravity drainage, which 
involves pumping steam into deep deposits to “melt” the bitumen so that it can 
be pumped out. Because of  the heavy, viscous nature of  bitumen, the in situ 
method requires even more water and energy resources than the excavation 
method. Roughly 80 percent of  established reserves are too deep to be mined 
and so must be extracted using in-situ processes (Alberta, Alberta Energy 2013, 
2); in 2008, 52 percent of  bitumen production occurred through strip mining 
(Pembina Institute 2010).
While in situ extraction has much less obvious effects in its destruction 
of  habitat than excavation does, critics claim that the in situ method also has 
major environmental impacts through the building of  3-D seismic lines, pipe-
lines, well pads, and steam-generation plants (Leaton 2008, 10; Schneider and 
Dyer 2006). Licences to extract the bitumen are given with the condition that 
disturbed land will be reclaimed. As of  the start of  2013, however, only 77 
square kilometres of  land were undergoing reclamation, and only 104 hectares 
(1.04 square kilometres)—that is, about 0.14 percent of  the 767 square kilo-
metres that had been disturbed to date—had been certified as reclaimed by the 
Alberta government (Alberta, Alberta Energy 2013, 1). In the plot that has been 
certified, the level of  biodiversity in the reclaimed habitat has not been shown 
definitively to be equal to previous levels.8
Habitat destruction does not merely threaten wildlife and birds; it is also 
a source of  greenhouse gas emissions. Temperate, tropical, and boreal forests 
store 1.146 billion tons of  carbon; almost half  of  this is located in the boreal 
forest, making it the largest terrestrial carbon storage ecosystem (IPCC 2000, 
4). Bitumen extraction often requires scraping up peatland that is acting as 
a carbon sink. When the peat is disturbed in the mining process, carbon is 
released into the atmosphere. Greenhouse gases are also produced in the pro-
cess of  energy production; the bitumen sands industry is one of  the country’s 
top producers of  emissions. This is primarily due to the scale of  its operations 
and to the fact that it takes three times more energy to produce oil from bitu-
men sands than from conventional sources (Leaton 2008, 11). Canada has the 
dubious distinction of  being the world’s leading greenhouse gas emitter on a 
per capita basis, and it failed to achieve its Kyoto targets. By 2006, its green-
house gas emissions were 19 percent more than 1990 levels, despite its commit-
ment to lower them by 8 percent (Canada, Environment Canada 2014).
The detrimental impact of  industrial activities in Canada’s boreal forest 
has been recognized for many years. Olla Ulsten, the co-chair of  the World 
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Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development, observed in 1999: “New 
ways must be found to slow and ultimately reverse forest decline, and Canada 
has a special responsibility because it still has 20–25% of  its primary forest” 
(WCFSD 1999). Despite these words of  caution, the destruction of  the boreal 
forest accelerated dramatically in the ensuing decade.
Another issue of  concern is the amount of  water that is used to separate 
the oil from the bitumen: about three to four barrels of  water are needed for 
each barrel of  oil (Canada, NRC 2013). According to data obtained from Alberta 
Environment in September 2008, existing licences for bitumen sands projects 
would entail the annual diversion of  550 million cubic metres of  freshwater 
from the Athabasca River basin (Holroyd and Simieritsch 2009, 15). This rep-
resents the equivalent water consumption per year of  a city of  two million 
inhabitants—twice the annual amount used by Calgary, Alberta’s largest city. 
Only 10 percent of  the water taken from the Athabasca is returned to the river 
(Griffiths, Woynillowicz, and Taylor 2006, 3). After its use in bitumen extrac-
tion, much of  the water is recycled, but it eventually becomes contaminated. 
This toxic water is then stored in huge tailings ponds comprising clay, sand, 
hydrocarbons, and heavy metals. As of  January 2013, these ponds (more accur-
ately described as lakes) collectively contained 830 million cubic metres of  tail-
ings and covered 176 square kilometres (Flanagan and Grant 2013, 3). Especially 
given present rates of  reclamation, the question of  what will happen to these 
tailing ponds in the future, when the bitumen runs out and the companies 
cease operations in the area, highlights a serious environmental concern. As 
Erin Flanagan and Jennifer Grant (2013, 3) point out, the 104-hectare area that 
has been certified as reclaimed “was never mined, did not include tailings, and 
is therefore not representative of  the looming reclamation challenges that lie 
ahead.” In the meantime, scientific studies (Frank et al. 2014; Kelly, Schindler 
et al. 2010; Kelly, Short et al. 2009; Kurek et al. 2013) showing leakage into the 
groundwater and into the nearby Athabasca River have fuelled even more 
pressing anxieties about the tailings ponds.
Until recently, the industry-funded Regional Aquatics Monitoring Program 
(RAMP) was responsible for water monitoring in the bitumen sands. In 
response to scientific studies that bitumen sands development was polluting 
the Athabasca River, RAMP claimed that toxins in the Athabasca River water 
were naturally occurring (CBC News 2010). RAMP was set up in 1997; its steer-
ing committee includes representatives from industry, both levels of  govern-
ment, Fort McKay and Fort McMurray First Nations, and Fort McKay Métis 
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Local No. 63. Because its funding has come in large part from oil companies, 
concerns have repeatedly been expressed about access to information and the 
scientific methods employed by the organization (see James and Vold 2010, 
2). In 2010, a group of  scientists, including University of  Alberta biologists 
Erin Kelly and David Schindler, published a study that attributed toxins in the 
Athabasca River to bitumen extraction (Kelly et al. 2010). Schindler criticized 
RAMP’s methods as having serious defects and advocated for an Environment 
Canada monitoring system (Schwartz 2010). These widely publicized state-
ments caused an explosion of  controversy that resulted in a polarized debate 
within both the scientific community and the public. A subsequent 2013 study 
by federal government scientists that built on Kelly et al.’s work found an even 
larger than expected footprint of  the bitumen sands; it linked toxins to bitu-
men extraction in lakes ninety kilometres northwest of  mining operations. As 
pointed out in this study, however, there are no benchmarks that can be used to 
assess the impacts of  the bitumen extraction activities because there was little 
to no monitoring of  air and water in the region prior to bitumen production 
(Kurek et al. 2013).
In response to the study by Kelly et al. (2010) and mounting international 
pressure, both the federal and provincial governments set up panels to inves-
tigate existing pollution-monitoring processes. The federal panel found that 
current monitoring systems produced limited useful data for decision makers 
because they lacked “consistency and coordination,” while the provincial panel 
found that “new approaches” were needed (AEMP 2011, ii). In response, the 
governments of  Canada and Alberta set up a joint federal-provincial water 
monitoring system (jointoilsandsmonitoring.ca). Later in 2012, the provin-
cial government set up the Alberta Environmental Monitoring, Evaluation, 
and Reporting Agency as a new arms-length regulatory body that would con-
trol environmental monitoring. The minister responsible explained, “When it 
comes to resource management and the environment, Alberta recognizes the 
status quo is simply not enough to meet the challenges we face” (quoted in Gerein 
2012). The membership of  this agency is confined to scientific, regulatory, and 
academic experts; there is no Aboriginal involvement. While some critics of  
Alberta’s water policy applauded the establishment of  a regulatory agency as 
being a good first step, others wondered if  the agency’s reports and raw data 
would be made public, thus fulfilling its mandate to be independent from gov-
ernment. Rachel Notley, who at the time was an opposition MLA, argued that 
unless transparency is assured, the regulatory body will be used to assist the 
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government in manipulating information to serve its own agenda (Gerein 
2012). In the spring of  2014, the government appointed the first chairman of  
the agency—Lorne Taylor, a former Conservative MP who served as minister 
of  the Environment from 2001 to 2004. Given that Taylor would be heading the 
agency charged with responding to criticisms of  the environmental monitoring 
that was conducted during his tenure as minister of  the Environment, Notley 
wryly observed, “Only in Alberta would the government not get the irony of  
that” (quoted in Weber 2014).
Meanwhile, in Fort Chipewyan, community members have also noted 
environmental changes. In the past decade, changes in water levels in the 
Athabasca Delta have made travelling across it a challenge. Although the drop 
in water levels has been attributed in part to the Bennett Dam in neighbouring 
British Columbia (Fuller 1990; Ladouceur 1990), local people suspect that the 
vast quantities of  water needed to extract the bitumen is having a direct effect 
on water levels in the delta. Community members complain that muskrat and 
moose populations have decreased dramatically in the area and that the pres-
ence of  deformed fish is a strong indicator that local fish are no longer edible 
(Candler et al. 2010). As one resident commented in an interview, “When we go 
out on the land, the most significant item hunters bring is a Gerry can filled—
not with petrol—but with clean drinking water.” Residents keep bottled water in 
their homes for drinking, and the local municipality is building an indoor water 
park because the delta is considered too polluted for children to swim in.
The problem for the residents of  Fort Chipewyan who are convinced that 
the integrity of  the local environment is declining is that traditional know-
ledge is not accorded the same status as scientific knowledge within decision-
making circles. As discussed further in chapter 14, even though the previously 
respected status of  scientific knowledge has come under attack in recent years, 
it still trumps traditional knowledge. Scholar Frances Abele (1997, iii) defines 
traditional knowledge as “knowledge and values which have been acquired 
through experience, observation, from the land or from spiritual teachings, and 
handed down from one generation to another.” It is based on cumulative empir-
ical observations gleaned from centuries of  living close to nature in particular 
ecosystems and depending on the plants and animals found locally for every-
thing from food to medicine. Knowledge is passed down orally and is not tested 
with Western scientific methods. Moreover, traditional knowledge infuses 
authority systems, traditions, culture, and religion. The lack of  separation 
between the secular and the sacred within traditional systems of  knowledge 
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makes it easy to dismiss by those who are rooted in Western, rational ways of  
thinking. While the scientific community might be divided as to the reasons 
for environmental change in the area (Alberta, Alberta Environment 2011), the 
community is convinced that local environmental change is a negative exter-
nality of  the bitumen extraction process. As MCFN chief  Steve Courtoreille put 
it, “We depend on . . . our livelihood, our way of  life . . . out in the land.” He went 
on to say that the government is “supposed to protect our land, waters, air. Now 
it’s giving industry open season to our territory” (quoted in Mackinnon 2013). 
MLA Notley agreed: “It’s profit first; protecting people and the environment 
second” (quoted in Henton and Brooymans 2009).
As documented in chapter 3 in this volume, the marriage of  environmental 
concerns with issues of  Aboriginal rights has proven a potent mix in the court 
of  international public opinion. Yet its effect on domestic political decision 
makers has been limited. The federal government has fiduciary obligations 
with respect to Aboriginal people, as well as responsibility for environmental 
regulations. It does not, however, have the political will to meet these obliga-
tions; responsibility for both consulting with Aboriginal peoples and for pro-
tecting the environment has been passed on to the Province of  Alberta, which 
in turn has passed these responsibilities on to industry. In response, Aboriginal 
groups have increasingly looked to the courts for redress.
The Dishonour of the Crown
Section 35 of  the Constitution Act, 1982 both recognizes and affirms Aboriginal 
rights, including treaty rights, in Canada. Decisions in a series of  cases brought 
before the Supreme Court of  Canada have resulted in a ruling that govern-
ment has a “duty to consult” local Aboriginal communities whose rights may 
be affected by a proposed development project. No study of  the consultation of  
Aboriginal peoples living in the Canadian North can ignore the example of  the 
Berger Commission. In the 1970s, Justice Thomas Berger was asked by the fed-
eral government to tour northern Canada in order to determine whether a pipe-
line should be constructed through the Mackenzie Valley. Expected to take only 
six months, the inquiry took two years as Berger travelled to communities all 
over the North, consulting the people who would be most affected by develop-
ment. As he recounted in a retrospective documentary, democracy requires 
more than voting government in or out, and consultation produces better pro-
jects (WCEL 2012). Indeed, consultative inquiries can be a critical part of  the 
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democratic process because they allow people to have a say about what their 
future might look like. In recommending a ten-year moratorium on the build-
ing of  the pipeline, Berger recognized that the enormous wealth that would be 
generated by exploiting the resources in northern Canada might very well come 
at the expense of  the rights and well-being of  the Aboriginal peoples who live 
in those regions. According to Berger (1977, 33), “What happens in the North . . . 
will be of  great importance to the future of  the country; it will tell us what kind 
of  a country Canada is; it will tell us what kind of  a people we are.”
The importance of  consultation to democratic processes was highlighted 
almost twenty-five years later in the “diversity model” developed by the 
Canadian Policy Research Network (CPRN). This model seeks to foster social 
cohesion when tension is created by competing values within society. In a dis-
cussion paper about the CPRN model, Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon (2001, 
38) argue that attention must be paid to democratic spaces such as government 
consultation processes that structure state-society discussions:
In a highly diverse society, such deliberation is essential for minorities’ 
inclusion in the broad citizenry. It reinforces the legitimacy of  public insti-
tutions and policies for groups that feel excluded from the classic demo-
cratic process, where the rule of  the majority tends to obscure their voice. A 
strong and healthy public sphere is thus essential in a polity such as Canada 
where conflicts over the nature and boundaries of  the political community 
are constantly negotiated and debated.
The popularity of  such an approach can be seen by the proliferation of  gov-
ernment-sponsored citizen engagement models to promote active citizenship. 
One might expect that resource-development planning in Alberta for a project 
as immense as the bitumen sands would include meaningful opportunities for 
citizens to provide input into decision making. The difficulty, however, is that 
the processes used reflect the deepening of  the neoliberal institutional model 
in Alberta, which promotes the short-term interests of  the oil industry over 
everything else.
Case law, however, is clear that the Canadian federal government and all 
provincial governments have a duty to consult with First Nations before taking 
any steps that might infringe on Aboriginal rights or on treaty rights, whether 
these are claimed or have already been established (Sanderson, Bergner, and 
Jones 2012). Beginning in 2004 with the Haida Nation’s case against British 
Columbia, which was followed by the 2004 Taku River Tlingit First Nation 
case and the 2005 Mikisew Cree First Nation case, the Supreme Court set out 
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the “duty to consult” doctrine.9 As Dwight Newman (2009, 12) explains, these 
three cases extended existing case law “in elaborating the existence of  a duty to 
consult Aboriginal communities potentially affected by government decision-
making prior to final proof  of  an Aboriginal rights or title claim.” Although the 
duty to consult is clear, the scope of  the consultation is tied to the discretionary 
determination by government as to whether the infringement would be major 
or minor, with consultation processes mirroring the government’s assessment.
It has further been established that the Crown cannot delegate its author-
ity to consult. This means that corporations cannot negotiate agreements that 
effectively discharge the Crown’s duty (Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh 2010, 30). 
Part of  the problem, however, in Alberta as elsewhere, is that while the duty 
to consult is ultimately the responsibility of  the federal and provincial Crown, 
certain procedural aspects of  the consultation process can be delegated to the 
proponents of  a planned project, according to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in the Haida case (Ritchie 2013, 409). Indeed, as Ginger Gibson and Ciaran 
O’Faircheallaigh (2010, 30) note, “In practice, much of  the obligation to consult 
falls to the industrial proponents.” In other words, project proponents do play 
a procedural role in discharging the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate 
Aboriginal peoples whose rights or title may be infringed by development.
For its part, the Government of  Alberta has preferred a remarkably hands-
off  approach to matters of  consultation. As an August 2013 report on benefit 
agreements in northern Canada put it: “Currently, the Alberta government 
does not engage in socio-economic agreements/plans with resource develop-
ment proponents directly, nor does it require industry proponents to develop 
BAs with First Nations’ communities” (PPSRD 2013, 13). Moreover, historically, 
corporations that negotiate IBAs with Aboriginal groups have been under no 
obligation to disclose the content of  these agreements to the Alberta govern-
ment.10 Thus, to date, only two IBAs are officially on record in Alberta (PPSRD 
2013, 20). Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh (2010, 35) point to the political climate 
in the province, which has been “strongly supportive of  resource development 
and antagonistic to Aboriginal rights.” Concretely, this means that, as matters 
presently stand, the Alberta government does not directly discharge its duty 
to consult with Aboriginal communities, nor does it formally delegate proced-
ural aspects by demanding that industry proponents engage in such consul-
tation. Moreover, should an oil company voluntarily choose to negotiate with 
Aboriginal groups prior to development, the company is not routinely required 
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to reveal the content of  resulting IBAs, which therefore remain untracked and 
unrecorded.
When asked in an interview what recent consultation processes for new 
resource extraction projects look like, one resident of  Fort Chipewyan explained 
that industry representatives typically show up with buckets of  Kentucky Fried 
Chicken and spend an afternoon at the community centre, hoping that people 
will stop by for a few wings and a chat. The community has come to expect this 
type of  flippant approach to consultation, and, as a result, the sessions are not 
well attended. If, per the Delgamuukw precedent, consultation is undertaken 
“with the intention of  substantially addressing the concerns of  the aboriginal 
peoples whose lands are at issue” (Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 
SCR. 1010 at 1113), it would appear that, to date, the goal has not been met with 
respect to the Aboriginal communities of  Fort Chipewyan.
In the fall of  2012, the ACFN launched a $1.5 million lawsuit alleging that 
Shell had not complied with IBAs made with the ACFN regarding projects now 
underway within its territory. These agreements entailed mapping out trad-
itional areas and analyzing the potential impact of  Shell projects on sacred 
sites, in addition to setting up community monitoring programs (Wohlberg 
2013a). The ACFN also challenged the Shell Jackpine mine expansion plan on 
the basis of  Treaty 8 rights, arguing that the expansion project, which would see 
a hundred thousand more barrels of  ore mined from its territory per day, would 
infringe upon the First Nation’s treaty and Aboriginal rights. Recognizing the 
significance of  the suit, ACFN chief  Allan Adams declared: “Our rights are being 
overlooked, and that is a truth that cannot be denied. . . . If  there is a violation of  
our constitutionally protected treaty rights, it should be dealt with before this 
project is found to be in the public interest” (quoted in Wohlberg 2012b). ACFN 
spokesperson Eriel Deranger elaborated, explaining that the chief  and council
repeatedly asked the government and Shell to engage in a new form of  con-
sultation that adequately looks at what our treaty rights really are, by work-
ing with traditional knowledge holders and implementing TK [traditional 
knowledge] and Western science to identify baselines for what our treaty 
rights are and how that adequately protects them. . . . There’s been abso-
lutely no support for that from the government or Shell to move forward in 
that direction. (Quoted in Wohlberg 2012a)
In response, ACFN chief  and council declared a ban on development north 
of  the Firebag River, about 150 kilometres north of  Fort McMurray. They also 
promised to challenge any development projects that will operate on lands that 
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various studies have identified as traditionally used by Aboriginal commun-
ities for hunting and trapping purposes.11 Although the area is not currently 
under development, several project applications, including Shell’s Pierre River 
Mine and Teck Resources’ Frontier Project, involve land that is, and has been, 
integral to traditional Aboriginal economies (Wohlberg 2012a).
In December 2012, the federal government introduced Bill C-45, an omni-
bus budget bill that made changes to the Indian Act, the Navigation Act, and 
the Environmental Assessment Act. Opponents criticized both Bill C-45 and its 
predecessor, Bill C-38, as being antidemocratic because the sweeping changes 
contained within them were subjected to very limited legislative debate. These 
bills provided the impetus for the Idle No More campaign, a protest begun 
by four Aboriginal women in Saskatchewan (CBC News 2013). The campaign 
quickly spread through social media. In addition to the Aboriginal commun-
ity, the campaign captured the interest of  Canadians who were concerned about 
the bills’ implications for both environmental regulation and capacity, as well 
as the potential for omnibus bills to stifle the debate that usually accompanies 
budgets.
A month later, in January 2013, the Mikisew Cree joined with the Frog Lake 
First Nation in a lawsuit to challenge the environmental provisions in C-38 and 
C-45 (MacKinnon 2013). They argued that the bills gutted environmental legis-
lation and streamlined environmental review to facilitate rapid approvals of  
industrial megaprojects. Indigenous leaders claimed that Bill C-45 violated the 
federal government’s duty to consult with First Nations. The Navigable Waters 
Protection Act, established in 1882 (and recently amended to the Navigation 
Protection Act), stipulated that any water that was deep enough to float a 
canoe could not be blocked, altered, or destroyed without federal government 
approval. While this act was cumbersome because of  its scope, the new act only 
provided protection for major waterways. The two First Nations groups feared 
that the thousands of  tributaries within the delta could be altered by bitumen 
sands development and said that government did not consult either band about 
development that might affect these lands and waters.
Bill C-45 makes additional changes to the Environmental Protection Act and 
alters the Indian Act to allow reserve lands to be leased by a majority vote of  
those attending the meeting as opposed to a majority of  eligible voters. It also 
gives the Aboriginal Affairs minister the power to ignore resolutions from a 
band council that opposed the decision made by majority vote (CBC News 2013). 
These latter changes are of  particular significance to Aboriginal peoples, and, 
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perhaps because of  this, the early environmental thrust of  the Idle No More 
movement was eclipsed by concerns specific to Aboriginal communities. The 
overwhelming message of  Idle No More is that current methods of  doing busi-
ness with Aboriginal groups are inadequate and that the failure to take their 
concerns into account is indicative of  weak democratic processes.
Although, as mentioned above, no study of  the consultation of  Aboriginal 
peoples living in the Canadian North could ignore the Berger Commission, it 
appears that forty years later, Canadian governments are indeed ignoring this 
precedent-setting inquiry. The duty to consult is a legal requirement set out by 
the courts and tied to the potential infringement of  Aboriginal rights. But it 
has broader application: consultation is recognized as an important compon-
ent of  the citizen engagement that is necessary for deliberations that represent 
diverse societal interests. Recent Canadian experience suggests, however, that 
the public space for such deliberations is contracting. As governments increas-
ingly withdraw from their regulatory and mediation roles, these functions fall 
to industry or are simply eliminated. Industry, however, must respond to the 
demands of  the marketplace. As a result, consultation processes are weakened, 
and along with them, so is democracy.
Resource Management and Bitumen: A Case of Spin and Dig
The dramatic changes within and around Fort Chipewyan reflect the dizzying 
pace and scale of  industrial development and the subsequent speed and scope 
of  change in the natural environment. This community illustrates both the 
diversity within Aboriginal communities and the competing perspectives on 
bitumen extraction. The presence of  bitumen provided the impetus for gov-
ernments to settle outstanding land claims and for industry to negotiate IBAs, 
which in turn has allowed some community members to take advantage of  eco-
nomic opportunity. Fear about the impact of  bitumen extraction activities on 
traditional lands and the subsequent impact on human health was the spark 
that ignited Aboriginal opposition, which fanned the flames of  environmental 
opposition that spread to the international arena. This battle coincided with an 
equally bitter debate between the government and environmentalists over the 
environmental consequences of  large-scale bitumen extraction activities, par-
ticularly on natural habitat and water management.
These conflicts underscore different aspects of  the same phenomenon: 
neoliberalism reducing the opportunities for input into decisions regarding 
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resource development because of  its systematic de-emphasis of  the role of  the 
state as the site for political discourse in favour of  an emphasis on the market 
as the final arbiter of  resource management decisions. The move toward mar-
ket-based governance at both the national and provincial levels of  govern-
ment necessitated the settlement of  land claims; land ownership has created 
economic opportunities that have produced increased prosperity, particularly 
for the First Nations peoples in Fort Chipewyan. But along with these benefits 
have come serious costs. Where once the governments of  Canada and Alberta 
accepted their “responsibility” to protect First Nations peoples as wards of  
the state, now governments are neglecting their duty to consult by effectively 
relinquishing negotiations regarding project development and expansion to 
corporations. By dismantling existing environmental regulations and leaving 
industry to monitor such things as water quality, responsibility for the environ-
mental commons is vulnerable to regulatory capture by industry. In the 1990s, 
in the neighbouring province of  British Columbia, continuing to cut down the 
forest while competing interests argued over forest management was referred 
to as the “talk and log” approach to resource planning. In neoliberal Alberta, 
proceeding with industrial bitumen development while competing interests 
try to influence the markets for Alberta oil through public relations campaigns 
could be referred to as the “spin and dig” approach.
If  democracy rests on the consent of  the governed, then Aboriginal dissent 
caused by industrial degradation of  treaty land implies that the institutions 
of  governance in Alberta lack legitimacy. Both the ACFN and the MCFN spent 
many years asking for the land they were promised many years after signing 
Treaty 8 in 1899. The irony is that for members of  the MCFN, just twenty-some 
years after the watershed moment in 1986 when this “oversight” was rectified, 
environmental concerns came to the forefront; self-determination was once 
again in jeopardy because of  the inability of  Aboriginal peoples to protect their 
treaty land from the negative environmental effects of  industrial activities. 
Clearly, settling land claims will not enhance self-determination if  those who 
now control the land have limited ability to maintain its integrity. A failure to 
protect the legal and human rights at both the federal and provincial levels is 
particularly problematic in Canada with respect to its First Nations minority, 
given the relationship of  First Nations with the Crown, treaty rights, and the 
fiduciary responsibilities that have been recognized by courts. But Aboriginal 
people are not alone in their struggle. The loss of  environmental protections 
affects the ability of  all Canadians to protect the land, air, and water from 
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which they derive their livelihoods—and their very lives. By neglecting their 
responsibility for protecting the larger public interest through the regulation 
of  environmental externalities created by industry, governments not only fail 
in their duty to protect the interests of  those most impacted by environmental 
contaminants; they also restrict the space where the debate over what consti-
tutes the public interest occurs.
The democratic implications of  dampening citizen engagement and debate 
by delegating that responsibility to industry are chilling, not only for First 
Nations communities but for all Canadians. This in turn suggests that the ques-
tion posed at the outset of  this chapter—Does bitumen extraction come at the 
cost of  treaty rights?—is too restrictive. First, the words “bitumen extraction” 
could be replaced with “forest harvest” or “hydroelectric dams” or even “frac-
king.” The impact of  large-scale resource extraction activities on Indigenous 
peoples because of  environmental degradation is a well-known theme world-
wide; the players and the resource change, but the results are similar. In this 
regard, Mills and Sweeney (2013, 23) observe that “governance is being neo-
liberalized.” The removal of  the heavy hand of  the state noted at the outset of  
this chapter has been replaced by the indifferent, invisible hand of  the market. 
Second, with respect to bitumen extraction in Alberta, Aboriginal rights can be 
described as the proverbial canary in the coal mine. While Aboriginal rights 
are the first to be sacrificed at the altar of  economic development, Canadians 
more generally will find their autonomy increasingly compromised with the 
ceding of  control over bitumen extraction to corporate interests and with the 
concomitant contraction of  public space to debate the environmental impacts 
of  resource-extraction activities.
Notes
1 The term Aboriginal will be used in the context of  section 35(2) of  the Canadian 
Constitution Act, 1982, to include Indian, Inuit, and Métis peoples. The term First 
Nations has yet to receive legal definition; we will use it to refer to those communities 
that self-identify as such. The term came into widespread use in the 1970s to 
replace the word Indian, which many people found offensive, owing to its historical 
associations with the oppressive colonialism of  the Indian Act. The term is still used 
for certain legal designations, such as “Treaty Indian.” First Nations people form 
the largest Aboriginal group in Canada, comprising more than 850,000 people, out 
of  an Aboriginal population of  more than 1.4 million, and 4.3 percent of  the total 
population (Statistics Canada 2013, 4).
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2 The term land claim refers to the process introduced in 1973 whereby the federal and 
provincial or territorial governments negotiate treaty rights with Indigenous peoples 
with respect to land that they traditionally inhabited before the arrival of  Euro-
Canadians. There are two types of  land claims: specific claims and comprehensive 
claims. Specific claims arise from the nonfulfillment of  existing treaties and 
other lawful obligations, whether these involve lands or other promised goods. 
Specific claims deal with grievances of  First Nations related to Canada’s obligations 
under historic treaties or to the way in which the federal government managed 
First Nations’ funds or other assets. To honour its obligations, Canada negotiates 
settlements with the First Nation and, where applicable, with provincial or territorial 
governments. Treaty Land Entitlement is a category of  specific claims that refers 
to reserve lands that a band has not yet received as promised initially under treaty. 
Comprehensive claims occur in areas of  Canada where Aboriginal title was never 
historically extinguished by means of  treaty or other legal process. These claims 
produce agreements that are, in effect, modern treaties (Slowey 2008, 10).
3 The Métis Nation is organized into locals, which work on behalf  of  Métis 
communities in particular areas. Historically, because the Métis were not covered 
by treaty, they had no legal basis on which to claim land. In Alberta, decades of  
negotiation between the Métis and the provincial government culminated in the 
Alberta-Métis Settlements Accord of  1989. The following year, the Métis Settlements 
Act and associated legislation resulted in the transfer of  1.25 million acres of  land to 
the eight Métis settlements represented by the Métis Settlements General Council. 
The legislation also ensures Métis communities a measure of  local governance and 
provides for the comanagement of  subsurface resources. In Forth Chipewyan, Local 
125 represents local Métis who do not have their own territory. However, in its 2010 
Métis Harvesting policy, the province recognizes Fort Chipewyan Métis as “both 
a historic and contemporary rights-bearing community.” Because of  the paucity 
of  studies indicating Métis traditional land, 106 kilometres of  land are “deemed 
traditional territory,” giving Fort Chipewyan hunting and fishing rights. See the 
submission by the Fort Chipewyan Métis Local 125, Métis Nation of  Alberta, to the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 11 August 2012, https://www.ceaa-
acee.gc.ca/050/documents/p59539/80937E.pdf.
4 For more on the MCFN, see “Who We Are,” Mikisew Group of Companies, 2009, http://
www.mikisewgroup.com/who-we-are.html.
5 In October 2012, Gabrielle Slowey interviewed members of  Fort Chipewyan’s First 
Nations communities. The discussion that follows draws on occasion from four of  
these interviews, all conducted on 16 October.
6 According to the 15 January 2008 issue of  the National Review of Medicine (Lanktree 
2008), the College of  Physicians and Surgeons of  Alberta (CPSA) contacted O’Connor 
in December 2007 with the news that he had been “cleared of  three of  the four 
professional misconduct charges Alberta Health and Wellness and Health Canada 
had brought against him.” This provoked a letter from Howard May, of  Alberta 
Health, who wrote that “Alberta Health and Wellness did not take part in filing any 
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complaint against Dr. O’Connor, nor did we try to stop him from coming forward. 
To the contrary, we have been trying for nearly two years (numerous phone calls, 
emails and letters) to get him to come forward with his clinical evidence.” The editors 
responded that “although Alberta Health and Wellness is not officially listed on the 
complaint filed against Dr. O’Connor, their employees continue to assist Health 
Canada in pursuing action against him,” adding that “Dr. O’Connor says he has 
never received emails, letters or phone calls” (see the “Letters” section, National 
Review of  Medicine, February 2008, http://www.nationalreviewofmedicine.com/
issue/2008/02/5_letters_2.html). The November 2009 CPSA report likewise attempts 
to shift the blame to O’Connor, accusing him of  failing to respond to requests for 
information. For a perceptive analysis of  the struggles of  Fort Chipewyan First 
Nations with the oil industry, including the controversy surrounding O’Connor, see 
Brodie (2014, chap. 6).
7 “Recovery or Extraction,” Alberta Energy, 2015, http://www.energy.alberta.ca/
OilSands/1719.asp.
8 It is worth noting that “reclamation” does not mean restoration. Alberta’s 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act regulations specify that the land 
must be returned to “an equivalent land capability” but that “individual land uses will 
not necessarily be identical.” In the case of  the first certification by the Government 
of  Alberta of  “reclaimed” land in the bitumen sands, a square kilometre of  boreal 
forest and rare peatland that had developed over eight thousand years was replaced 
with a new forest with walking trails for humans that bear little resemblance to the 
complex ecosystem it replaced. Joyce Hildebrand, “Reclamation Illusions in Oil Sands 
Country,” Wildlands Advocate, June 2008, 10–12.
9 The cases—sometimes referred to as the “Haida trilogy”—are Haida Nation v. British 
Columbia (Minister of  Forests) 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511; Taku River Tlingit 
First Nation v. British Columbia 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550; and Mikisew Cree 
First Nation v. Canada 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR 388.
10 This changed (at least to some extent) with the passage in May 2013 of  Bill 22, now 
the Aboriginal Consultation Levy Act, which obliges companies that wish to develop 
on Crown lands to pay a fee, with the funds collected to be distributed to Aboriginal 
groups in order to assist them in participating in consultation. Section 8(1) of  the act 
stipulates that, under certain circumstances, a project proponent may be required “to 
provide the Minister with information, including third party personal information, 
records and other documents, including copies of  agreements relating to 
consultation capacity and other benefits pertaining to provincial regulated activities.” 
The legislation provoked an outcry from Aboriginal leaders, given that the Alberta 
government hadn’t bothered to consult with them prior to passing it.
11 These studies are listed in Shell Canada Limited’s 2007 Jackpine Mine Expansion and 
Pierre River Mind Project, pp. 3-9 to 3-10.
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Worker Safety in Alberta
Trading Health for Profit
Bob Barnetson
Hundreds of  thousands of  Albertans are injured on the job each year (Barnetson 
2012a). In part, this level of  injury reflects inadequate enforcement of  occu-
pational health and safety (OHS) rules. Inadequate injury-prevention efforts, 
which result in unsafe working conditions, are symptomatic of  successive 
Alberta governments’ long-standing preferences for employer-friendly labour 
law, a preference that compromises workers’ right to health.
Historically, Alberta’s Conservative government has favoured employer 
interests in order to achieve electoral and economic goals. To achieve elec-
toral success, the Conservatives privileged rural interests through public 
expenditures and limiting workplace rights. To achieve economic goals, the 
Conservatives enacted repressive labour laws to attract and retain investment, 
primarily in the oil industry. Such laws, operating in a boom-and-bust econ-
omy, have so weakened Alberta’s labour movement that there are few political 
consequences for violating workers’ freedom to associate and, ultimately, their 
right to a safe workplace.
Alberta’s OHS regime exhibits classic symptoms of  regulatory capture by 
employers. These include ineffectively regulating workplace safety, deeming 
employers to be “partners” in regulation, being reliant on employer funding of  
regulatory activity, allowing employers preferential access to policy making, 
enacting policies that reward the appearance of  safety rather than safety itself, 
and promulgating a narrative that blames another stakeholder (i.e. , workers) 
for workplace injuries.
In these ways, Alberta’s regulatory climate undermines workers’ freedom to 
associate and right to health, as well as the principle of  the state acting in the 
public interest. These rights and principles are associated with democratic soci-
eties and constitute the main bulwark that workers have constructed against 
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capital organizing work in an injurious manner, effectively trading worker 
health for profit. While employers have undermined such rights to some degree 
throughout Canada, Alberta’s oil-driven economy appears to have facilitated 
much greater employer evasion and weakening of  these rights.
Human Rights and Democracy in Alberta
Albertans possess a range of  human rights characteristic of  citizenship in lib-
eral democracies. Despite widespread support around the world for human 
rights, they remain conceptually contested. For example, Gary Teeple (2005, 
21) suggests that there is nothing particularly human or universal about civil, 
political, and social rights. Most of  these rights have only existed for a few hun-
dred years, and most humans have little ability to realize them. Rather, Teeple 
asserts, these “human” rights flow from a particular, and widely adopted, eco-
nomic and political arrangement. Specifically, they are needed to legitimize 
capitalist propertied relations—the very relationship that gives rise to many of  
the problems some human rights seek to mitigate.
Furthermore, Teeple argues that these rights are often in conflict with one 
another and are accorded different weight (31). Most human rights are negative 
rights, in that they emphasize freedom from constraint. In this way, they are 
consistent with the tenets of  classical liberalism. Yet the regulation and public 
provision associated with social rights often infringe upon civil rights and are a 
source of  conflict between labour and capital. Given this conflict, social rights 
do not typically find expression in constitutional documents. Rather, they are 
voluntarily codified by the state in legislation or international agreements (53). 
Consequently, social rights are much easier to change over time than are polit-
ical or civil rights and are more subject to particular political alignments and 
pressures.
Civil rights codify a set of  relations between individuals based on the cap-
italist mode of  production. The purpose of  these rights is to protect individ-
ual liberty, property, security, and justice. Civil rights required by capitalism 
are embedded in Canada’s Charter of  Rights and Freedoms and are protected 
by (and from) the state. Also embedded in these constitutional documents are 
certain political rights—rights allowing direct or indirect participation in the 
establishment or administration of  government, such as the right to vote and 
hold public office. These political rights legitimize liberal democratic govern-
ment: the ruled choose the government of  the day and its policies (42). Yet the 
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political choices available to citizens do not typically challenge the underlying 
civil (i.e. , property) rights that structure relationships in society. Furthermore, 
the notional political equality of  citizens is significantly undermined by the 
economic inequalities between various groups of  citizens—most commonly, 
labour and capital.
Social rights, the last type of  rights to be codified in Canada, seek to amel-
iorate the negative effects of  capitalism. For example, when workers are unable 
to access the basic necessities of  life, this threatens the availability of  workers 
as well as workers’ willingness to accept their subordinate position in society—
both necessary components of  reproducing the structures and relationships of  
contemporary society. For these reasons, the state may intervene in the oper-
ation of  the labour market or workplace or may provide necessary services or 
supports (58). This may bring social rights (typically codified in legislation) into 
conflict with civil or political rights and result in weak or no enforcement as a 
result of  political pressure on the state.
Repositories of  human rights include various United Nations declarations 
and covenants, conventions of  the International Labour Organization, the 
Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms, and various pieces of  federal and 
provincial legislation. Typically, civil and political rights are treated quite dif-
ferently from social rights. Consider the United Nation’s Universal Declaration 
of  Human Rights (United Nations 1948): Article 17 casts the right to hold prop-
erty as an absolute, but the right to social security (Article 22) is conditional. 
This division is mirrored in the two associated covenants. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights outlines rights that are immediately 
enforceable and for which there is a mechanism (albeit weak) for enforcement. 
By contrast, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights has no complaint or enforcement mechanisms, and countries agree only 
to work toward fulfilling their commitments as resources allow (Normand and 
Zaidi 2008, 201). This is clear evidence that the imperatives of  the market are 
given priority over at least some human rights.
Two rights important to workers include the freedom to associate (which is 
the basis of  collective action in the workplace) and the right to health (which 
underlies injury prevention efforts). The freedom to associate finds protection 
in the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms, as well as expression in prov-
incial statutes, such as Alberta’s Labour Relations Code. The degree to which the 
Charter protects workers’ ability to unionize, collectively bargain, and strike is 
in significant flux, following a 2007 decision that significantly expanded the 
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scope of  the Charter protections (Fudge 2012). The right to health exists in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which 
includes the right to safe and healthy working conditions (United Nations 
1966, 7[b]). This builds upon a more general right articulated in the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to work, to just and 
favourable conditions of  work and to protection against unemployment” 
(United Nations 1948, 23[1]).
Like most jurisdictions, Alberta has accommodated workers’ desire to avoid 
workplace injuries by enacting a variety of  statutes, including the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act. This act requires that “every employer shall ensure, as far 
as it is reasonably practicable for the employer to do so, the health and safety 
of  workers engaged in the work of  that employer” and empowers the govern-
ment to regulate workplace safety (Alberta, Legislative Assembly 2000). There 
is, however, some question about the degree to which Alberta workers can real-
ize and benefit from the freedom to associate and the right to health.
Workplace Safety in Alberta
By any measure, Alberta jobsites are unsafe places to work and among the least 
safe in the country (Gilks and Logan 2011). Each year, the Alberta government 
reports approximately 150 occupational fatalities and 50,000 serious injuries 
(Barnetson 2012a). While 50,000 serious injuries—injuries that prevent work-
ers from doing some or all of  their jobs the next day—is a lot of  injuries, it is 
important to keep in mind that government statistics dramatically underreport 
the true level of  injury in Alberta. Specifically, these “injuries” represent claims 
accepted by the Alberta Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB), not actual work-
place injuries (Ison 1986, 727).
In fact, there are approximately 500,000 injuries in Alberta workplaces 
each year—ten times the level of  injuries the government likes to talk about. 
In 2009, Alberta reported approximately 149,167 accepted injury claims of  all 
kinds (Barnetson 2012a). Correcting for the 13 percent of  the workforce not 
covered by workers’ compensation and the 40 percent of  compensable injuries 
that are not reported brings the number of  workplace injuries to approximately 
285,760. Even this “corrected” number ignores most occupational disease and 
psychological injuries, as well as minor injuries where no treatment beyond 
first aid was required. These minor injuries include strains, contusions, lacera-
tions, and burns of  a degree that varies based upon a worker’s ability to tolerate 
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the injury without seeking medical treatment. Discussion among health and 
safety practitioners suggests that accounting for disease and minor injuries 
would push the number close to 500,000 injuries per year.
Injuries are primarily caused by hazards that exist in the workplace because 
of  employer choices. Employers who organize work unsafely do so because 
it is in their economic interest to do so. That is to say, contrary to the popular 
maxim that “safety pays,” it is in fact a lack of  safety that pays (Cutler and James 
1996; Health and Safety Executive 1993; Hopkins 1999; O’Dea and Flin 2003). 
Social disruption stemming from this conflict between profits and health is the 
reason that workplace safety laws and state enforcement mechanisms were first 
established (Tucker 1990, 81).
Research suggests that Alberta’s high level of  workplace injury is indicative 
of  widespread employer noncompliance with Alberta’s Occupational Health 
and Safety Code. In 2011, for example, the government announced a safety-
inspection blitz in the residential construction industry. Despite knowing 
that government inspectors were coming, the majority of  the 387 employers 
inspected had safety violations (Alberta, Human Services 2011). In ninety cases, 
these violations posed an imminent danger of  injury or death. These results are 
broadly consistent with the results of  other safety blitzes conducted by the gov-
ernment (Alberta, Employment and Immigration 2010, 2011a, 2011b).
This lack of  compliance may reflect an expectation by employers that 
there is almost no chance they will be caught violating safety rules. On aver-
age, workplaces are inspected less than once every fourteen years in Alberta 
(Alberta, Employment and Immigration 2011c), and it can take safety inspect-
ors up to eighteen days to respond to reports of  unsafe workplaces (Alberta, 
Auditor General 2010). Employers also know that if  they do get caught, there 
is almost no chance they will be penalized. Most commonly, inspectors simply 
order employers to make changes so that they are in compliance with the OHS 
Code—something that took employers an average of  eighty-six days to do in 
2010 (Alberta, Auditor General 2010). While Alberta changed its Occupational 
Health and Safety Act in 2004 and 2012 to allow inspectors to issue tickets for 
violations, the Province only enacted the regulation required for various forms 
of  ticketing to commence in late 2013 (Alberta, Job, Skills, Training, and Labour 
2013). No data were available at the time of  writing as to how many (or indeed, 
if  any!) tickets were handed out.
Alberta does prosecute a handful of  employers each year—typically when 
a worker has been seriously maimed or killed because of  employer negligence. 
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In 2013, Alberta levied fines in seven cases, less than one third the number of  
prosecutions undertaken by Alberta in 1985 (Alberta, Jobs, Skills, Training, 
and Labour 2014; Tucker 2003). In many cases, the fine was paid to a commun-
ity group under Alberta’s creative sentencing guidelines. Creative sentencing 
reduces the stigma attached to the conviction and often generates a tax deduc-
tion for the company—in effect, the taxpayer subsidizes the fine. Furthermore, 
some fines are paid to employer-controlled industry associations—in these 
cases, employers pay their taxpayer-subsidized fines to other employers.
The resulting health and safety dynamic is that ineffective enforce-
ment encourages and facilitates noncompliance, which in turn compromises 
workers’ right to health (Weil 2012). The former Conservative government’s 
approach to enforcement developed over a number of  years (Tucker 2003) and 
is consistent with its 1995 approach to regulatory reform in order to “promot[e] 
prosperity for Alberta through a dynamic environment for growth in business, 
industry and jobs” (Alberta, Regulatory Reform Task Force 1995, 2). “Necessary” 
regulations included those that “contribute significantly and positively to the 
competitiveness of  the private sector” (2). Consequently, occupational health 
and safety in Alberta shifted away from state enforcement to self-regulation 
by employers (Alberta, Labour 1995) in order to create “greater workplace self-
reliance in occupational health and safety” (Alberta, Labour 1996, 2). Employers 
have become increasingly involved in determining and monitoring workplace 
health and safety while state enforcement and monitoring activity has dimin-
ished. Workers are cast simply as recipients of  employer safety programs, and, 
as Jason Foster (2011, 303) asserts, the role of  organized labour has been reduced 
to tokenism.
Labour groups have complained about ineffective enforcement for dec-
ades, suggesting that it is a policy choice rather than an oversight. Supporting 
this notion of  choice is the fact that Alberta also ineffectively enforces other 
employment laws, such as child labour laws (Barnetson 2009a, 2010a). An 
important consequence of  widespread noncompliance is that employers can 
externalize some of  the costs of  production onto workers, their families, and 
taxpayers through workplace injury—the very outcome that statutory OHS 
laws were enacted to prevent. The inability of  Alberta’s unions to resist these 
changes reflects the weakness of  Alberta’s labour movement.
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Organized Labour in Alberta
Organized labour is a weak presence in Alberta workplaces and is largely 
excluded from public policy making. A number of  factors contribute to this 
situation. First, only 22.8 percent of  Alberta workers (mostly in the public 
sector) were unionized in 2013, the lowest rate of  unionization in Canada 
(Alberta, Innovation and Advanced Education 2015; Canada, HRSDC 2012). 
Second, the largest sectors in Alberta’s economy (half  of  the GDP comes from 
energy, construction, and finance) are mostly non-unionized, while heavily 
unionized sectors are among the smallest contributors to GDP (health, public 
administration, and education contributed less than 13 percent of  the GDP in 
2011; Alberta, Innovation and Advanced Education, 2015; Alberta, Enterprise 
and Advanced Education 2012, 9). In this way, the dominant employment para-
digm in Alberta is non-union. And third, the petroleum industry has developed 
sophisticated human resource practices that take wages out of  competition and 
offer employees non-union forms of  workplace representation (Ponak, Reshef, 
and Taras 2003, 282). While segments of  Alberta workers periodically exhibit 
significant support for trade unionism, this has not translated into union mem-
bers or political influence (Finkel 2012a, 144).
This may be partly explained as an impact of  successive Alberta govern-
ments enacting employer-friendly labour laws. Labour laws enacted during 
the tenure of  the Social Credit Party were designed to attract investment by 
(historically American) oil companies (Finkel 1989, 109). Laws enacted by sub-
sequent Progressive Conservative governments have sought to retain invest-
ment via union suppression (Finkel 2012a, 144; Foster 2012, 224; Gereluk 2012, 
182). Taken together, these policies aid employers to resist union organizing and 
collective bargaining. For example, Alberta’s Labour Relations Code requires a 
union to win a certification vote in order to represent a group of  workers. Other 
jurisdictions use the “card check” system, wherein a union which demonstrates 
that a certain proportion of  workers are members is automatically certified as 
the bargaining agent. Certification votes result in fewer certification attempts 
and a lower success rate by giving an employer the opportunity to “chill” an 
organizing drive in a variety of  (generally illegal) ways (Riddell 2004, 509; 
Slinn 2004, 299).
All Canadian jurisdictions identify as unfair labour practices (UFLPs) certain 
behaviours that undermine the intent of  the legislation. For example, employer 
interference in the formation or administration of  a trade union is prohibited, 
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and some jurisdictions have given labour relations boards the power to auto-
matically certify unions when the employer has attempted to illegally thwart 
an organizing drive. This reduces the incentive for employers to engage in this 
behaviour (Godard 2004; Lebi and Mitchell 2003; Slinn 2008). The Alberta 
Labour Relations Board does not have such remedial powers, which means, 
effectively, that there is no consequence for employers who commit UFLPs.
Alberta has resisted calls for first-contract arbitration (FCA) provisions. 
FCA facilitates the establishment of  a collective agreement in a newly certified 
workplace via arbitration. Such provisions reduce the incentive for employers 
to use the first round of  collective bargaining as an opportunity to refight the 
union’s successful certification application by stalling and otherwise pressur-
izing the new union.1 Six Canadian jurisdictions have first-contract arbitration 
provisions. While FCA is rarely used, its very presence has reduced first-con-
tract work stoppages by up to 50 percent (Johnson 2010; Slinn and Hurd 2011).
Alberta has also limited the labour rights of  several groups of  employees. 
Public sector employees are governed by the Public Sector Employees Relations 
Act, which prohibits strikes and precludes arbitrators from making awards on a 
number of  matters, although the arbitral preclusions may be unconstitutional. 
Similar alternative arrangements exist for police officers, as well as professors. 
Farm, ranch, and domestic employees are simply without any right to organize. 
Health care and construction workers have either no right to strike or face oner-
ous requirements in order to strike.
Additionally, the former Conservative government frequently intervened 
directly in the labour market to the benefit of  employers. It intervened in union-
ization to benefit “friendly” unions and punish combative ones. For example, 
in 2003, the government consolidated 480 health care bargaining units into 36 
in a move widely seen as an effort to punish the Canadian Union of  Provincial 
Employees (CUPE) for opposing the government’s earlier (and ultimately 
unsuccessful) efforts to privatize health care (Fuller and Hughes-Fuller 2005). 
The outcome of  this restructuring significantly advantaged the Alberta Union 
of  Provincial Employees (AUPE), which was (at the time) favoured by the gov-
ernment and had been engaged in an ongoing dispute with CUPE.
In 2008, the government amended the Labour Relations Code to invalidate 
certification applications that have come about through union members seeking 
employment at a non-union firm to kick-start an organizing campaign (collo-
quially called “salting”). The amendment also prohibits unions from subsid-
izing contract bids by unionized contractors competing with non-union firms 
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(colloquially called “merfing”). These changes were requested by the non-union 
Merit Contractors Association of  Alberta, were rushed through the legislature 
in seventy-two hours, and were widely viewed as revenge for union-sponsored 
attack ads during the previous provincial election (AFL 2008; Gilbert 2008).
The government has expanded the labour force by increasing the use of  
international migrant workers in order to limit the labour market power of  
domestic workers and facilitate union avoidance tactics (Foster and Barnetson, 
this volume). And the government has intervened directly in collective bar-
gaining, but only when it benefits employers (including itself). For example, 
Alberta’s Labour Relations Code allows the government to prevent a strike by 
appointing a disputes inquiry board (DIB). Alberta labour-side practitioners 
view the imposition of  DIBs as a means by which the government delays strike 
action to allow employers to prepare for the strike. During a 2002 teacher strike, 
the government passed back-to-work legislation after a public emergency dec-
laration by cabinet was struck down by the courts as baseless (Barnetson 2010b; 
Reshef  2007). By contrast, the government refused to intervene in numerous 
labour disputes characterized by employer intransigence and, in some cases, 
violence, such as strikes at Palace Casino, the Calgary Herald, Lakeside Meat 
Packers, and the Shaw Conference Centre in Edmonton (Foster 2012).
Further explanation for the weakness of  organized labour can be found 
within the labour movement itself. Since the Second World War, the move-
ment has been markedly conservative (Finkel 1989; Foster 2012; Reshef  and 
Rastin 2003; but see also Gereluk 2012). More recently, the movement has been 
divided between the Alberta Building Trades Council (with a business union 
orientation) and the Alberta Federation of  Labour (with a social union orien-
tation). Furthermore, the Alberta Federation of  Labour has itself  been the site 
of  both interunion disputes and significant staff  turnover, which has reduced 
its policy salience and capacity. Additionally, many Alberta workers do not see 
trade unions as useful. Practically speaking, there may be some truth to this. 
Alberta’s energy-driven boom-and-bust cycles mean that workers have sub-
stantial personal labour-market power during the booms (i.e. , they do not need 
unions) while unions have difficulty protecting worker interests during the busts 
(Gereluk 2012; Taylor 1997). Furthermore, a significant portion of  Alberta’s 
workforce comprises migrants from other provinces, who may exercise exit 
options rather than resist unfavourable working conditions (Hiller 2009).
The upshot is that Alberta’s labour movement, while not powerless, has not 
been a key player in provincial policy and is often unable to shape public policy. 
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Whether this situation will change under the recently elected New Democratic 
government is unclear. By contrast, there is significant anecdotal evidence that 
employers can shape public policy and that such favouritism has few political 
consequences for the government. For example, Lynette Shultz and Alison 
Taylor (2006, 436) note a loosening of  child labour laws in 2005 to benefit the 
restaurant industry. Subsequently, Alberta introduced a two-tiered minimum 
wage for servers, again at the behest of  employer lobby groups (Barnetson 2011).
The lack of  effective class-based resistance is sometimes explained in terms 
of  Alberta having a unique “quasi-party” political system (Macpherson 1962, 
21) as the result of  either single-member plurality electoral systems (Bell 1992) 
or a unitarist political culture that masks conflicts on the basis of  class or race 
(Pal 1992). As suggested by Harrison (this volume), an institutionalized prefer-
ence for non-class-based electoral politics (or at least the appearance of  this) 
that emphasizes economic prosperity is certainly consistent with the seeming 
contradiction of  a (notionally) free-market government repeatedly intervening 
in the labour market to benefit employers.
Impact of Oil and Agricultural Industries on Public Policy
While broad acceptance of  a need for “non-partisan” government focused on 
economic matters may explain how legislators are able to advance employer 
interests, it does not really explain why they do so. Part of  the explanation may 
be ideological: successive Alberta governments have embraced liberal—and 
more recently, neoliberal—capitalist values (Laxer and Harrison 1997). Yet it is 
also useful to examine the electoral benefits that politicians can gain by main-
taining a repressive and injurious labour relations system.
Historically, agriculture was economically and politically important in 
Alberta (Leadbeater 1984, 63). Prior to 1945, the agricultural community sup-
ported limits on farm worker rights, including excluding farm workers from the 
ambit of  employment legislation. Farmers colluded with the state to suppress 
farm worker wages, and the federal and provincial governments acted (often 
via law enforcement) to prevent union organizing among migrant farm work-
ers (Barnetson 2009b). Despite the growing prominence of  petroleum (which, 
as set out above, triggered anti-union legislation beginning in the 1950s), rural 
Alberta has retained political importance through the development of  a sym-
biotic electoral relationship with the former Conservative government.2 Over 
the past thirty years, as argued in Barnetson (2012b, 150), rural Albertans have 
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sought to maintain their communities in the face of  urbanization via signifi-
cant government support programs (Tupper and Doern 1989, 134; Wilson 1995, 
64). In return, rural communities almost always elect Progressive Conservative 
candidates to the legislature, and Conservative governments have ensured that 
electoral boundaries are drawn to ensure a disproportionately high number 
of  rural ridings (Archer 1993, 185). In this way, rural Alberta was an important 
electoral base for the Conservatives, and rural-friendly public policy (funded 
by petroleum revenue) created a political reward for maintaining pro-employer 
labour laws. This arrangement has come into question following the 2015 elec-
tion of  a predominantly urban New Democratic government.
According to highly suggestive commentary, the former Conservative gov-
ernment used municipal grants to reward supporters and punish detractors. 
There are numerous examples of  Conservative MLAs pressuring various groups 
and individuals to not complain about government policy or funding decisions 
by threatening to withhold funding or otherwise punish complainants. Recent 
examples include school boards, municipalities, and physicians (Kleiss 2012; 
Rusnell 2011; Rusnell and McKenna 2012). Furthermore, there is significant 
evidence that municipalities and public bodies, beholden to government for 
grants, have been using taxpayer money to contribute to the Conservative Party 
(CBC News 2012; Rusnell 2012a, 2012b; Rusnell and Russell 2012).
Revenue from oil-and-gas royalties also allowed the former government to 
fund significant (and often rural) public infrastructure and programming while 
maintaining low personal and corporate tax-rates (Harrison, this volume). In 
addition to the oil industry’s direct contribution to the economy, the industry 
drives activity in a large number of  other areas (e.g. , construction, manufac-
turing, automotive sales and servicing, and the service and hospitality indus-
tries). When oil-industry production, exploration, and construction decline, 
the effects ripple through Alberta’s economy (e.g. , in 1986 and 2008), causing 
widespread job losses and a large reduction in tax revenue. One outcome of  
this dynamic is that the former government faced few political threats when 
it continued the province’s long tradition of  privileging employer interests in 
the oil and gas industry (Harrison, this volume). As noted above, during the 
1950s and 1960s, Alberta’s Social Credit government sought to maintain a weak 
labour movement to facilitate the development of  the oil industry (Finkel 1988, 
1989, 2012a). Warren Caragata (1979, 133) argues that workers in the oil industry 
are disinclined toward unionism. By contrast, Wayne Roberts (1990) indicates 
significant interest among oil-and-gas industry workers in unionization. The 
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truth probably lies somewhere in the middle, with demand for unionization 
influenced by employer and state policies designed to prevent unionization, if  
at all possible.
Alberta’s boom-and-bust cycle has also triggered state intervention to cur-
tail workers’ ability to resist employer demands for retrenchment. This includes 
legislative change in the 1980s to facilitate union avoidance (Gereluk 2012, 
181), public sector wage rollbacks and job losses in the early 1990s (Foster 2012, 
211) and 2010s (Alberta, Finance 2013c; Alberta, Legislative Assembly 2013b), 
and further changes to labour laws (Alberta, Legislative Assembly 2013a), as 
well as the expansion of  child labour (Barnetson 2010a) and migrant worker 
populations (Foster and Barnetson, this volume) to loosen the labour market 
in the 2000s. There is voluminous evidence of  favourable treatment for the oil 
industry in other areas, such as environmental regulation (Buzcu-Guven and 
Harriss 2012; Gosselin et al. 2010; Griffiths and Woynillowicz 2003; Kelly et al. 
2010; Tenenbaum 2009) and resource taxation (Boychuk 2010, 7). The upshot 
of  these circumstances is that the oil industry created pressures, opportunities, 
and inducements for Conservative politicians to continue, and to exacerbate, 
Alberta’s tradition (found originally in agriculture) of  privileging the interests 
of  employers over workers. There is evidence that employers had effectively 
captured the regulatory system governing workplace health and safety issues 
and turned it to their own ends.
Regulatory Capture of Alberta’s OHS System
Regulatory capture occurs when a state agency designed to act in the public 
interest instead acts to advance the interests of  an important stakeholder group 
in the sector its regulates (Shapiro 2012). Regulatory capture occurs when 
groups with a significant stake in the outcome of  regulatory decisions aggres-
sively seek to gain advantageous policy outcomes. Focused efforts are often 
successful, because the public (who individually have only a small stake in the 
outcome) tend to ignore regulatory decision making.
Under a situation of  regulatory capture, the dominant stakeholder group 
can then use the captured regulator to impose costs on other stakeholders, even 
if  such costs are contrary to the public interest. Captured regulators may see 
themselves as partners of  the captors they are supposed to regulate and may 
even find themselves financed by that group. It is important to recognize that 
regulatory capture is a contested concept (see Croley 2012) and that a number 
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of  new approaches to regulatory capture have emerged, such as soft capture via 
the provision of  biased information (Agrell and Gautier 2012).
Alberta’s OHS system exhibits several characteristics of  regulatory cap-
ture. The ineffective enforcement of  the province’s OHS laws (thus negating 
the purpose of  the regulation) is detailed above. The issue of  who funds OHS 
in Alberta is trickier to unravel. Of  the $23.3 million Alberta spent on OHS in 
2009, roughly $21.7 million came from employer premiums transferred to the 
government from the Alberta Workers’ Compensation Board, or WCB (Alberta, 
Auditor General 2010). Following a scathing series of  newspaper articles about 
injury and death in Alberta during the summer of  2010, the government 
increased spending to $27.7 million in 2011–12 and has budgeted $43 million for 
2015–16. This amount appears to be entirely offset by transfers from the WCB 
(Alberta, Finance 2015, 21). In this way, OHS is (indirectly) funded by employ-
ers. This funding is contingent upon continued approval by the WCB’s board of  
directors, which is dominated by employer and government members. While 
it is unclear if  aggressive enforcement would alter the willingness of  the WCB 
to fund OHS activities, a number of  labour- and employer-side practitioners 
privately suggest that this risk exists.
Since the 1990s, industry-funded safety associations have increasingly 
entered into “partnerships” with the government. These partnerships allow 
employers to play a formal role in determining policy and standards and to 
sponsor various safety-awareness campaigns and perform safety-auditing 
functions. A 1997 strategic plan for Alberta’s Partnerships in Health and Safety 
framework explains the thinking underlying this approach:
Partnerships is based upon the premise that more can be achieved through 
a cooperative, collaborative approach than by a one sided, dictatorial or 
interventionist approach. Leverage and synergy is possible without dupli-
cating efforts and “re-inventing the wheel.” Partnerships strives to promote 
a culture of  increased proactive health and safety attitudes and behaviour 
in the workplace. These cannot be legislated! (Alberta, Labour 1997, 3)
This model prioritizes employer autonomy over safety and views government as 
a facilitator of  employer-driven initiatives. Foster (2011, 294) notes that organ-
ized labour is offered the opportunity to collaborate with employers by encour-
aging workers to “take ownership” of  their own safety. Workers have no role in 
the framework, other than that of  passive recipients of  new initiatives (Alberta, 
Labour 1997). In Alberta, the partnerships model divided the labour movement: 
the building trades unions opted to participate in the safety associations, while 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
238   Bob Barnetson
unions affiliated with the AFL declined to do so. The “collaborative” processes 
established by government to review standards created employer-dominated 
“working groups” deliberating over small changes for extended periods. This 
led to a “culture of  compromise” among labour representatives on the groups, 
which undermined the effectiveness of  labour’s capacity to improve safety for 
workers (Foster 2011, 303).
In 2002, with employers facing rising workers’ compensation premiums, 
the Government of  Alberta challenged employers to reduce workplace injuries 
by 40 percent within two years. As part of  the Partnerships in Injury Reduction 
(PIR) program, the government linked receipt of  a Certificate of  Recognition 
(COR) and employer claims costs to WCB premium reductions. Employers who 
passed an audit of  their health and safety management system (performed by a 
certified auditor, generally from a safety association) received a COR (Alberta, 
Employment, Immigration, and Industry 2007). First-time COR recipients 
receive a 10 percent reduction in their WCB industry rate during their first year. 
Furthermore, by reducing WCB claim costs or maintaining claim costs at least 
50 percent lower than the industry average for two consecutive years, employ-
ers can receive further discounts to an overall total of  a 20 percent discount 
(WCB 2007). These incentives are in addition to incentives that exist under 
the WCB’s own experience-rating system, which provided 9,264 employ-
ers approximately $77 million in WCB premium savings in 2010 (WCB 2011a, 
2011c), up from $15.2 million saved by 2,233 employers in 2000. Additionally, 
the WCB issued $230 million in special employer premium rebates in 2011 
(WCB 2011b). A 2010 audit questioned whether PIR has made workplaces safer, 
given that the employers with poor safety records continued to receive PIR 
rebates (Alberta, Auditor General 2010).
Alberta has promulgated the “careless worker” myth in its injury-preven-
tion efforts. The careless worker myth explains occupational injuries as the 
result of  workers being accident prone, careless, or even reckless. Historically, 
the careless worker myth has often been used in reference to workers of  par-
ticular ethnicity and gender (Aldrich 1997, 139; Messing 1998, 24) to shift blame 
for injuries away from employers (Bale 1989, 35; Witt 2004, 119). Worker care-
lessness is a part of  a broader narrative of  “freedom of  choice” that absolves 
employers and society of  moral responsibility for worker injuries (Graebner 
1984). In this narrative, workers choose the jobs they hold, and thus the level 
of  risk they experience. As industrialization reduced worker autonomy and 
increased worker proximity to machinery, employers had a greater role in 
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creating injurious working conditions, and the careless worker myth shifted 
blame back to labourers.
Blaming workers for their injuries is part of  a broader employer strategy to 
evade liability and risk for workplace injuries. This strategy includes not only 
withholding evidence of  harm but also requiring high standards of  proof  of  
causation and, when such proof  is provided, requesting additional research, 
criticizing the methods, prohibiting publication of  the research, misrepre-
senting the findings, and hiring a more compliant researcher to create evi-
dence that there was no risk. It also includes blaming workers and consumers 
for their injuries and then arguing that the harm is simply an unavoidable (or 
otherwise acceptable) cost of  doing business (Bohme, Zorabedian, and Egilman 
2005; Michaels 2008). This is all consistent with a pervasive and negative view 
of  workers. Consider the stigmatization of  workers’ compensation recipients 
as malingerers who exaggerate the extent of  their injuries to maximize bene-
fits from WCB and time away from work (Kirsh, Slack, and King 2012, 144). 
Compensation costs and duration are thought to be increased by the cheat in 
the same way that injury incidence and costs are caused by the careless worker. 
We see similar stereotypes elsewhere in the public policy literature, such as 
the “welfare mom” and the unemployment insurance “cheat” (Mirchandani 
and Chan 2008; Reutter et al. 2009). These stereotypes blame individuals for 
their circumstances while minimizing the contribution of  other factors (e.g. , 
employers organizing work unsafely and not providing real return-to-work 
options). Indeed, these negative perceptions of  workers frame the employer as 
the victim, thus completing a reversal of  blame.
In 2008, Alberta released Bloody Lucky, a gory workplace safety cam-
paign. This campaign was sponsored by the Young Worker Provincial Advisory 
Committee, a collection of  provincial safety associations. The videos that make 
up the campaign, as well as the text associated with each video, clearly and 
inaccurately portray workers as the cause of  their own injuries.3 Bloody Lucky 
is the culmination of  a trend in Alberta safety campaigns of  blaming workers 
for their injuries—a trend that intensified after 1995 (Barnetson and Foster 
2012). An analysis of  this campaign demonstrates that the bureaucrats involved 
with the campaign had difficulty identifying blaming behaviour and viewed 
such a messaging as important in securing political support for the campaign. 
Through this campaign, the state misinformed young workers about the nature 
of  workplace hazards and appropriate mitigation strategies by publicly shifting 
blame for injuries away from employers.
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Workplace Injury as a Bellwether for Democracy
There is substantial evidence that employers have had disproportionate access 
to and say in Alberta’s OHS system. Indeed, Alberta’s workplace health and 
safety system exhibits characteristics suggesting a significant degree of  regu-
latory capture by employers—the very group it is supposed to regulate. The 
result of  this arrangement is that Alberta workers face high levels of  workplace 
injury due to ineffective state regulation. State facilitation of  employers trading 
worker health for profit poses a significant impediment to workers realizing 
their right to health.
This special treatment of  employers by the former Conservative govern-
ment is also evident in Alberta’s employment standards and labour relations 
regimes, as well as in the province’s approach to immigration. Significantly 
limiting workers’ freedom of  association in order to attract and retain invest-
ment in the oil industry has created a weak labour movement. This, in turn, 
reduces the political cost of  operating an ineffective injury-prevention system. 
Consequently, the costs associated with work-related injuries are externalized 
onto workers, their families, and society. This outcome broadly follows Teeple’s 
2005 analysis of  the hierarchy of  human rights, which predicts that social 
rights are subject to weak or nonenforcement due to political and economic 
pressure exerted upon the state by employers.
Alberta’s decisions to limit workers’ freedom of  association and right to 
health reflect incentives, opportunities, and pressures caused or exacerbated 
by Alberta’s oil-based economy. Alberta enticed foreign investment by limit-
ing the power of  trade unions, a pattern that continues to this day. Over the 
past thirty years, the revenue generated from the oil industry has allowed 
the government to ensure electoral success via public expenditures in rural 
Alberta. Employers have sought to minimize production costs via ineffective 
state enforcement of  workplace safety measures, including regulatory capture 
of  Alberta’s OHS system. In these ways, this case supports the notion that there 
is a democratic deficit in Alberta that is at least partly related to the petroleum 
industry. Whether this arrangement will change substantially under the New 
Democrat government elected in 2015 is unclear.
The right to health and freedom to associate represent potentially potent 
legal counterweights to employers’ common law right to organize work as they 
see fit, including organizing work in an injurious manner. While employers 
throughout Canada have undermined the effectiveness of  these social rights 
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since the 1970s, Alberta employers appear to have been unusually effective in 
doing so. Alberta’s oil-based economy may be an important explanatory factor 
in both the historical creation and contemporary maintenance of  this system. 
As noted by Trevor Harrison (this volume), oil revenue played an important role 
in allowing the Progressive Conservative party to maintain political power. In 
the case of  workers, groups and rights that threaten either the economic or 
electoral basis of  this power are constrained through a combination of  state 
and employer action.
Notes
1 To elaborate, unions tend to be weakest immediately after they have successfully 
achieved the status of  official bargaining agent for a unit of  employees at their 
provincial labour board. The next step for a union is to enter into negotiations with 
the employer for a collective agreement. First collective agreements are often the 
most difficult to conclude, because virtually all of  the provisions must be negotiated. 
Employers who continue to resist their employees’ decision to unionize can stall 
such negotiations. This denies the union the opportunity to make good on the core 
expectations of  its new members (i.e. , that a collective agreement will be negotiated) 
and undermines their support. If  no agreement is concluded, the workers then have 
an opportunity to revisit the unionization decision (often with covert encouragement 
and assistance by the employer) and may vote to decertify the union.
2 While outside the scope of  this chapter, it is interesting to note that when the 
Conservatives came to power in 1971, they did so based upon urban support. By 1975, 
rural support had shifted to the Conservatives. This shift was lubricated by oil money, 
and rural support remained essentially “parked” with Conservatives until the 2012 
Wildrose victories in southern Alberta.
3 The videos and associated text are available at “Bloodylucky,” Alberta Jobs, Skills, 
Training, and Labour, 2014, http://work.alberta.ca/occupational-health-safety/
bloodylucky.html.
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Exporting Oil, Importing Labour, and 
Weakening Democracy
The Use of Foreign Migrant Workers in Alberta
Jason Foster and Bob Barnetson
Rapid expansion of  bitumen sands construction in Alberta during the 2000s 
led to an economic boom in the province. As in previous booms, rapid economic 
growth led employers to meet labour needs by seeking migrant workers. But 
the boom of  the 2000s differed in that employers brought in workers from 
around the world rather than from across the country. The immediate cause of  
this unprecedented growth in the use of  temporary foreign workers (TFWs) was 
federal policy changes to the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) that 
made TFWs more accessible to employers. This policy change must, however, 
be viewed in the broader context of  increasingly neoliberal politics in Canada. 
In this case study, we examine why the use of  TFWs increased in Alberta, how 
the former Conservatives government of  Alberta encouraged and justified the 
use of  migrant workers, and how a petroleum-based economy affects labour 
markets and the democratic health of  a region. This study also explores how 
Alberta’s use of  migrant workers is consistent with labour-market dynamics in 
an oil-exporting economy.
Increased reliance on migrant workers has multilayered consequences for 
employers, workers, government, and democracy. In the labour market, grow-
ing reliance on foreign migrant labour disempowers both migrant and Canadian 
workers. Foreign migrant workers have limited ability to realize their rights 
because of  their precarious employment and social isolation. At the same time, 
Canadian workers face competition from less expensive and more docile foreign 
migrant workers, thereby heightening the consequences of  resisting employer 
demands. This pattern is useful to employers since it undermines the capacity 
of  both domestic and foreign workers to resist the economic restructuring 
9
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advocated by neoliberalism. The emergence of  a permanent subclass of  pre-
carious foreign workers also weakens social and community bonds essential to 
democratic functioning and entrenches significant social inequalities.
Growing reliance on migrant labour also marks a significant shift in 
Canadian immigration policy away from multiculturalism and toward differ-
ential exclusion (Castles 2000, 61), facilitating the emergence of  a second class 
of  residents without full citizenship rights. It also raises serious questions about 
the consequences of  shifting control over immigration to employers. This shift 
can be seen within a global context, where the growing use of  migrant workers 
worldwide contributes to the weakening of  workers’ ties to and protection by 
the state, suggesting that consequences of  foreign migrant labour extend far 
beyond Alberta’s borders.
The use of  migrant workers in Alberta cannot be disentangled from the 
context of  an oil-exporting economy. The use of  marginalized, vulnerable, and 
racialized foreign workers to create a conveniently docile workforce is both an 
outcome of  politics in a petroleum-based economy and a part of  the process of  
its construction, with significant implications for democracy.
Migrant Workers in Canada
Worldwide, approximately 200 million workers are employed outside of  their 
home country (Crowley and Hickman 2008, 1225). Many migrants engage in 
employment-related geographic mobility (E-RGM), undertaking extended 
travel from places of  permanent residence to work (Green 2004; Temple et 
al. 2011). The temporary nature of  E-RGM differentiates it from immigra-
tion, although E-RGM may entail significant periods of  temporary residency 
(Edmonston 2011, 194).
Alberta’s oil boom has attracted tens of  thousands of  foreign and Canadian 
migrant workers to the province (De Guerre 2009; Hiller 2009; Mech 2011). 
Relatively few TFWs are directly employed in the oil industry. Most migrant 
workers are employed in related fields (e.g. , construction) or in low-end ser-
vice-sector jobs, many of  which were opened up by Canadian workers moving 
to jobs in or associated with the petroleum sector (Foster 2012a, 36). In this way, 
Alberta’s most recent oil boom intensified an existing trend toward greater use 
of  foreign migrant workers (Foster and Taylor 2011).
Canadian provincial governments have facilitated E-RGM for citizens 
via interprovincial credential-recognition arrangements (e.g. , the Red Seal 
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program) and labour-mobility agreements (e.g. , the New West Partnership 
Trade Agreement). The federal government also operates several programs per-
mitting noncitizens to work. The TFWP, for example, allows employers to recruit 
TFWs if  no qualified Canadian citizens are available. In 2002, the federal gov-
ernment extended the program to include lower-skilled workers (i.e. , National 
Occupational Code classifications C and D). In 2006, the government established 
a list of  “occupations under pressure” for Alberta and British Columbia, reducing 
employer requirements for acquiring Labour Market Opinions (LMOs), which 
grant permission to hire TFWs (Fudge and MacPhail 2009).
In 2012, the federal government dramatically reduced the turnaround 
time for processing LMO applications and amended wage rules in order to 
allow employers to reduce TFW wages (Foster 2012a). These changes include 
shortening turnaround time on LMO applications for high-skill occupations 
to ten business days; waiving the LMO process altogether for American TFWs 
in seven high-demand construction occupations; and allowing employers to 
pay up to 15 percent and 5 percent less than the regional median wage in high-
skilled and low-skill occupations, respectively, if  an employer can demonstrate 
that its Canadian workers also receive such wages. A series of  public controver-
sies involving the program forced the federal government to repeal the differ-
ential wage allowance policy a year later and to institute reforms to place added 
requirements on employers for acquiring LMOs (Canada, Employment and 
Social Development Canada 2013). These changes occurred at the same time as 
the federal government increased the age at which Canadians can receive Old 
Age Security payments and tightened the rules around Employment Insurance 
benefits. Critics charge that the series of  reforms is an effort to make more 
workers available to employers in order to loosen the labour market (AFL 2012).
Following public outcry regarding misuse of  the program by employers, in 
2014 the federal government instituted a further set of  reforms aimed at sig-
nificantly reducing employer use of  low-skilled TFWs (Canada, Employment 
and Social Development Canada 2014). The changes split the program into two 
pieces. Rules around higher skilled workers were loosened, making it easier for 
employers in construction, transportation, and bitumen sectors to hire TFWs. 
Meanwhile, a series of  restrictions was added related to low-skilled TFWs found 
in retail, food, and hospitality industries, including a firm time limit for TFW 
residency in Canada of  four years and phased-in quotas on employers’ use of  
TFWs as a percentage of  their workforce. As of  the time of  writing, the impacts 
of  the reforms are unknown. The authors do not expect that the new rules will 
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substantially reduce bitumen-related use of  TFWs due to the skill require-
ments of  these occupations. The relaxed rules for these occupations may lead to 
increased use of  TFWs in the future.
The TFWP restricts the labour-mobility rights of  TFWs by issuing work 
permits tied directly to employment status, requiring TFWs to receive formal 
permission to change employers or working conditions and prohibiting them 
from applying for work permits or changing immigration status from within 
the country (Abella 2006, 4–5; Martin 2003, 21; Sharma 2007, 167; Trumper and 
Wong 2011, 84; Wong 1984, 89). TFWs are permitted to remain in Canada for 
a maximum of  four years. Restricted labour mobility compounds the effect of  
other characteristics of  migrant foreign workers (e.g. , limited knowledge of  the 
laws, institutions, and labour market; social isolation; language barriers; and 
limited financial resources) that make them vulnerable to exploitation by their 
employers or labour brokers. Such exploitation often manifests itself  in unpaid 
wages, dangerous work, and inadequate housing (Otero and Preibisch 2010, 87; 
Pastor and Alva 2004, 105; Wilkinson 2012, 14). In Canada, workers report dif-
ficulty utilizing the labour rights they do have, although TFWs do sometimes 
exercise such rights, despite the risk (AFL 2009, 12; Foster and Barnetson 2012, 
12–13; Nakache and Kinoshita 2010, 30; Valiani 2009, 7–8).
Rainer Bauböck (2011) differentiates among migrant workers on the basis 
of  their freedom of  movement and the extent of  their equality with perma-
nent residents and citizens, suggesting five “classes” of  migrancy. TFWs fall 
primarily into Bauböck’s guest-worker category: their controlled admission 
is conditional on their return to their home country. These workers typically 
have limited mobility and equality. TFWs selected for the provincial nominee 
program (PNP), the second category, transition toward permanent residence 
and fuller rights. Third, some migrants (e.g. , nannies) may be admitted as guest 
workers who have initial temporary status but who expect to eventually become 
permanent residents with full mobility rights and equality. A fourth group 
comprises TFWs who have stayed after their permits have expired are irregular 
migrants with no right to be in the country. They may experience greater (albeit 
illegal) mobility but are much less able to realize employment rights. Finally, 
Bauböck identifies migrants with citizenship status who have full movement 
and legal rights, such as interprovincial migrants.
The growth in TFWs can also be seen as a shift in Canada’s postwar immi-
gration policy, away from multicultural citizenship and toward differential 
exclusion (Castles 2000, 61) or partial citizenship (Vosko 2010, 10), where 
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migrants are granted access to certain aspects of  citizenship (e.g. , partial access 
to labour market) but excluded from other legal, political, and economic rights. 
Partial citizenship hearkens back to an earlier period in Canadian history when 
immigrants were afforded fewer rights than British-born residents (Whitaker 
1987). This situation creates a class of  “transnational” workers, who are full cit-
izens of  neither the source nor destination country. Nandita Sharma (2006, 7) 
notes that focusing on workers’ citizenship status masks the racist nature of  
Canada’s migrant worker programs. Migrant workers are predominantly from 
the Global South and are thus members of  ethnic, cultural, and/or linguistic 
minorities. Providing migrant workers with fewer and/or different rights is a 
systematized form of  racism that extends long-standing colonial practices of  
wealth appropriation by Western countries.
In addition to having limited labour mobility and difficulty realizing 
employment rights, many migrants also experience heightened labour insecur-
ity “characterized by limited social benefits and statutory entitlements, job 
insecurity, low wages and high risks of  ill health” (Vosko 2006, 4). Precarious 
employment may further limit the willingness of  migrant workers to exercise 
workplace rights and may reduce direct and indirect labour costs (Bernstein et 
al. 2006, 210; Wilkinson 2012, 15–16). For example, employers in Alberta’s bitu-
men sector have adopted a just-in-time model of  staffing that offloads signifi-
cant costs to workers (Ferguson 2011). The growth in migrant labour in Canada 
is linked to employer efforts to reduce labour costs and increase labour market 
flexibility.
Migrant Workers in Alberta
The growth in migrant labour, and therefore in the concerns associated with it, 
has been most noticeable in Alberta. While the province has a long history of  
domestic and foreign E-RGM in agriculture, railway construction, and domes-
tic service (Danysk 1995; Holland 2007; Hsiung and Nichol 2010; Laliberte 
2006; Laliberte and Satzewich 1999; Selby 2012; Thompson 1978; Thompson 
and Seager 1978), the emergence of  oil exports as the dominant industry in the 
province has intensified and altered the nature of  E-RGM. From 1975 to 1982 
and beginning again in 1998, Alberta also saw significant E-RGM caused by oil-
driven economic booms. The majority of  migrant workers during these booms 
came from other Canadian jurisdictions, and when the booms ended, migrants 
often returned to their home province (Hiller 2009). The boom of  the 2000s 
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was different in a number of  ways. First, while there was still significant inter-
provincial migration of  Canadian workers, net interprovincial migration began 
declining in 2006 and was effectively zero by 2009 (Alberta 2011a, 6). Second, 
this reduction in interprovincial migration of  Canadian workers was offset by 
significant growth in both permanent immigrants and TFWs (Alberta 2011b, 
15, 19).
From 2002 to 2012 (inclusive), approximately 250,000 TFWs were admit-
ted to Alberta, with nearly 165,000 arriving between 2006 and 2010 (see table 
9.1). Alberta’s “stock” of  TFWs (i.e. , the number of  TFWs on 1 December of  each 
year; “stock” is the federal government’s official term for the number of  TFWs 
residing in Canada) rose from 15,714 in 2005 to 65,618 in 2009, before falling 
slightly in 2010 and then rebounding to 68,339 in 2012. Not captured by these 
numbers is the (according to anecdotal reports) growing number of  nonstatus 
(i.e. , illegal) foreign migrants in Alberta (Bouzek 2012). These include TFWs 
who stayed on after the expiration of  their work permits, as well as other for-
eign nationals working without a permit.
Table 9.1. Alberta TFWs entries and stock, 2002–12
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
TFW 
stock 10,730 11,376 13,126 15,705 21,973 37,055 57,544 65,572 57,628 58,193 68,339
TFW 
entries 10,011 9,166 10,513 12,645 18,459 29,287 38,990 28,549 22,998 25,573 35,636
Source: Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2013.
This rate of  increase in TFWs residing in Alberta has been much greater 
than in other Canadian provinces and includes a significant increase in the use 
of  unskilled TFWs. Before the 2002 and 2006 policy changes, TFWs were found 
working as university teachers, scientists, specialist technicians, and entertain-
ers. TFWs who arrived between 2005 and 2008 were more likely to be coming to 
work as cooks, clerks, cleaning staff, construction labourers, and truck drivers 
(Foster 2012a). In effect, there has been a significant downward shift in the skill 
level of  the jobs to which TFWs are being recruited.
Employers and policy makers justified the growth in TFWs as necessary 
to address pressing labour shortages due to the economic boom. They also 
argued the program was highly elastic and closely linked to labour demand. A 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
Exporting Oil, Importing Labour, and Weakening Democracy   255
cooling off  of  the boom, predicted Immigration Minister Jason Kenney, would 
“translate into decreased number of  temporary foreign workers” (quoted in 
“Interview” 2010, 13). This did not occur during the recession that began in the 
third quarter of  2008. From 2008 to 2009, unemployment climbed 36 percent 
(400,000 people). The provinces with the biggest booms—British Columbia 
and Alberta—witnessed the largest climb in unemployment rates (LaRochelle-
Côté and Gilmore 2009, 5). While new entries of  TFWs declined in 2009 and 
2010, the overall number of  TFWs remained relatively stable. One explanation, 
as seen in table 9.1, is that employers, while reducing demand for new TFWs, 
are retaining existing TFWs despite unemployment among Canadian workers 
(see remarks by former Minister of  Employment and Immigration Hector G. 
J. Goudreau [Alberta, Legislative Assembly 2009a, 393–94, and 2009b, 964]). 
This shift may indicate an important structural change in Alberta’s labour 
market: the addition of  a permanent class of  guest workers concentrated in the 
service sector with restricted labour mobility and other rights. With TFWs as
a permanent part of  Alberta’s employment picture, there is a need to examine 
more critically their rights under Alberta employment law.
Worker Rights Under the TFW Program
TFWs legally possess the rights guaranteed to all employees by Alberta’s 
employment legislation. As noted by former Minister of  Human Resources and 
Employment Iris Evans:
In our department we offer foreign workers the same protection that other 
employees have working in this province, not only in occupational health 
and safety but by making sure that deductions are properly taken from 
their cheques, that employment standard complaints are followed up on in 
the same fashion. We hold workshops for employers, so they know what our 
expectations are. (Alberta, Legislative Assembly 2007, 20)
These protections include minimum terms and conditions of  employment 
under the Employment Standards Code, such as a minimum wage, maximum 
hours of  work, overtime, and vacations. They also include the rights to know the 
hazards of  the job, to participate in the control of  hazards, and to refuse unsafe 
work under the Occupational Health and Safety Act and Code. TFWs are eligible 
for workers’ compensation benefits if  injured and possess the right to unionize 
under the Labour Relations Code. Despite possessing the same rights as Canadian 
workers, however, TFWs face at least two challenges to realizing these rights.
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The first challenge (shared by all workers) is that enforcement of  Alberta’s 
employment laws is mostly complaint driven. Complaint-driven enforcement 
in Canada has been criticized for addressing only a minority of  actual viola-
tions (Arthurs 2006, 191; Ontario, Auditor General 2004, 239). The literature 
also suggests that workers frequently do not complain when they perceive 
complaining to be ineffective (Weil and Pyles 2005, 63). Alberta has a poor 
record of  enforcing its employment standards and occupational health and 
safety laws (Barnetson 2009a, 2010, and this volume), yet it generates statistics 
that convey the opposite impression (Barnetson 2008, 2012a). Consequently, as 
Bob Barnetson argues in chapter 8 of  this volume, complaint-driven regulation 
has created a culture of  noncompliance in Alberta, wherein workers routinely 
do not receive statutory entitlements.
The second challenge, unique to TFWs, is how TFWs’ circumstances limit 
their ability to realize their rights. The knowledge that TFWs have of  employ-
ment rights is limited and often provided by their employer. TFWs may also 
face significant language barriers and be socially isolated, making them unable 
to access support systems. TFWs are beholden to their employers for both their 
salary and their right to remain in the country, making complaining (which will 
probably be ineffective) a high-stakes proposition. All of  these factors create 
additional barriers to TFWs accessing a complaint-driven enforcement system.
The increased use of  TFWs in Alberta in the 2000s was soon followed by 
complaints of  exploitation and violation of  worker rights. The list of  such viola-
tions includes substantial differences between promised and actual work; inad-
equate wages and working conditions; the requirement for unpaid overtime, 
as well as other breaches of  employment standards; and substandard hous-
ing, often combined with excessive rent owed to the employer. TFWs also face 
racism and threats of  deportation, illegal and exorbitant broker fees, and mis-
leading promises about permanent residency and citizenship (AFL 2007, 2009). 
That said, TFWs are not entirely helpless, and some TFWs have successfully 
resisted these employment practices (Foster and Barnetson 2012). The overall 
picture is one of  a workforce with restricted opportunity to advocate effectively 
for their employment rights, which can benefit employers.
The Utility of Migrant Workers
For employers, the attraction of  TFWs is multilayered. Most employers say 
that TFWs are necessary to alleviate domestic labour shortages (Cook 2007; 
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Vanderklippe 2011), while others acknowledge that TFWs are more compliant 
(Foster and Taylor 2011). It is enlightening to probe when this domestic short-
age arose and why. Harry Hiller’s (2009, 58) analysis of  previous booms—when 
labour demands were met via interprovincial migration—suggests that E-RGM 
reflects combination of  “push” and “pull” factors: individuals must be motiv-
ated to both exit their home community and enter their destination commun-
ity. Push factors included the need to seek employment and, more importantly, 
a sense of  dissatisfaction with life in their home community (415). Pull factors 
included employment prospects in the destination community, as well as the 
desirability of  the destination (e.g. , ability to find and integrate into a social 
community, availability of  housing) (425).
During the boom of  the 2000s, there was a large surge in TFW entries 
beginning in 2006, reflecting employer recruitment efforts in the prior year 
(Alberta 2011a, 6). Net interprovincial migration began falling in 2007. This 
suggests that growth in TFW usage preceded declining interprovincial migra-
tion. Furthermore, interprovincial migration declined despite relatively high 
unemployment (between 7.9% and 14.8%) in traditional “sending” regions 
during this time—a situation that has historically been an important “push” 
factor (Statistics Canada 2015). This suggests that there was no absolute short-
age of  potential interprovincial migrants, particularly for unskilled jobs. 
Alberta’s inability to attract interprovincial migrants may have been affected 
by deteriorating “pull” factors. While average weekly earnings in Alberta grew 
by 4.9 percent in 2006, down from 5.2 percent in 2005, inflation rose by 3.9 
percent in 2006, up from 2.1 percent in 2005 (Alberta, Finance and Enterprise 
2008, 6), significantly eroding wage gains by coming to Alberta. Alberta also 
experienced a severe housing shortage at this time, with workers in Edmonton 
living in tents in campgrounds and squatting in the river valley.
At the same time, the growing use of  TFWs reduced job opportunities for 
domestic migrants. Easing labour shortage is, indeed, the main purpose of  
the TFW program. This dynamic broadly accords with neoclassical economic 
analyses of  the TFW program, which conclude that the program distorts 
regional labour-market patterns by suppressing interregional labour mobility 
from provinces of  higher unemployment to areas of  low unemployment (Gross 
2010; Gross and Schmitt 2010, 21–22). This analysis also suggests that employ-
ers may have viewed TFWs as a means of  loosening the labour market and 
thereby containing wage demands. Canada has a long history of  tapping into 
secondary sources of  labour to loosen the labour market, including the use of  
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
258   Jason Foster and Bob Barnetson
women during both world wars (Crompton and Vickers 2000, 6), migrant labour 
in agriculture (Basok 2002), child labour in the service industry (Barnetson 
2010), and forced labour of  Japanese and enemy aliens during wartime (Daniels 
1981; Farney and Kordan 2005). Further supporting the substitution hypothesis 
is a number of  instances during the 2008–9 recession when Alberta employ-
ers continued to employ TFWs while laying off  Canadian workers (Barnetson 
and Foster 2012). While it is not possible to prove that cost containment was the 
main reason employers increased their use of  TFWs, the evidence is suggestive.
A slightly more nuanced employer explanation for the growing use of  TFWs 
is that there is a skills shortage in Canada. There are two reasons to doubt this 
explanation. First, Foster and Taylor (2011) found several construction employ-
ers who openly admitted that they manipulate the LMO system in order to 
access lower-cost TFWs. This manipulation included conducting “paper” (i.e. , 
insubstantial) recruitment campaigns for Canadian workers, as well as apply-
ing for an LMO only after a foreign worker had been successfully recruited. 
The Auditor General of  Canada identified several shortcomings with the fed-
eral LMO system, including inadequate information to support an opinion 
and a lack of  verification of  the need for the worker (Canada, Auditor General 
of  Canada 2009, chapter 2, 30–31). Second, the proportion of  TFWs in skilled 
jobs is declining while the proportion of  TFWs in unskilled jobs is increasing. 
According to neoclassical economic theory, it should be possible to engage any 
number of  Canadian workers in unskilled work, provided that wages and work-
ing conditions are attractive. Rather than adjust to market conditions, Alberta 
employers have instead sought large numbers of  low-skilled TFWs (Foster 
2012a).
There is some evidence to suggest that employers find TFWs desirable for 
their compliance and willingness to cede to employer authority. Alberta con-
struction employers viewed TFWs as harder working, more willing to accept 
overtime and additional work, less likely to question or challenge, and more 
appreciative of  working conditions (Foster and Taylor 2011). These same 
employers reported that they were looking to TFWs as a long-term solution for 
their labour needs, in part because TFWs were seen as more compliant and also 
because they helped curb concerns about “high wages” in the sector.
Finally, hiring TFWs may be intended to reduce the labour-market power of  
domestic workers. The impact of  the growing number of  migrant workers on 
Canadian workers is largely unstudied. There has been very little research into 
the Canadian labour-market effects of  a sizeable, long-term migrant-worker 
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program reaching into multiple industry sectors. What research has been done 
examined the labour-market outcomes of  TFWs themselves and shows that 
TFWs fare better than landed immigrants because they better fit employer 
needs (Warman 2009).
The availability of  alternate sources of  labour may undermine the militancy 
of  organized labour to some degree. Historically, Alberta employers have regu-
larly sought to displace unionized construction workers with non-union work-
ers, as well as with workers who are members of  employer-dominated “unions.” 
This included a significant push to create “double-breasted” construction com-
panies, with a union arm and a non-union arm, in the 1980s (Gereluk 2012, 181) 
and to develop non-union labour brokers and contract with employer-friendly 
“unions” in the 1990s and 2000s (Foster 2012b, 223). Included in the 2012 
Progressive Conservative election platform was a promise to prohibit unions 
from fining members who work for non-union employers or for employers who 
sign contracts with nonsignatory unions, as well as a promise to allow employ-
ers to opt out of  the existing trade-based construction labour-relations regime 
(PC Party 2012). Such provisions advantage employer-friendly unions as well 
as non-union labour groups. It is possible that TFWs serve as an additional 
alternative labour pool that facilitates employer efforts to undermine and avoid 
unions.
The labour-market experience of  migrant workers broadly accords with 
neoliberal prescriptions of  increasing efficiency and flexibility in the work-
force. It is easier for governments to impose such an industrial restructuring on 
migrant workers than on Canadian workers for two reasons: migrant workers’ 
lack of  political power and the perception that being allowed to work in Canada 
is a charitable act for which migrant workers should be grateful (Sharma 2006). 
Once a low-cost workforce with minimal rights has been established, employ-
ers can use it to threaten the job security of  Canadian workers and thereby 
undermine resistance to such restructuring. The threat posed by TFWs has the 
potential to cause significant resistance among Canadian workers, something 
the Alberta government has the foresight to manage.
Government Support for Migrant Workers
The government plays a role in the production and disciplining of  the work-
force. As noted by Eric Tucker (1990, 116), it is broadly accepted that govern-
ment labour policy must mediate between the potentially conflicting demands 
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of  production and social reproduction (i.e. , producing the structures and rela-
tionships of  contemporary society). On the one hand, government must facili-
tate the capital accumulation process by allowing employers to produce goods 
and services in a profitable manner, thus encouraging private investment. On 
the other hand, government must maintain both its own legitimacy with the 
electorate and the legitimacy of  capitalist social formation. The operation of  
capitalist systems often negatively affects workers, who compose the majority 
of  the electorate. If  enough workers experience low pay, poor working condi-
tions, and workplace injury, they may lose confidence in a particular govern-
ment or in capitalist social formation.
Between 1971 and 2015, the Progressive Conservative government of  
Alberta managed these competing demands by (marginally) accommodating 
the demands of  workers while broadly continuing labour policies established 
by the former Social Credit government (1935–71). Many argue that these poli-
cies favour the interests of  employers (in particular, oil and gas and related 
industries) by facilitating union avoidance and repression as well as minimal 
enforcement of  the limited statutory rights granted to workers (Finkel 1989, 
109). The growing use of  TFWs supports production but may threaten social 
reproduction, which can pose a significant political risk to government. In 
Alberta, the government has managed the threat to social reproduction primar-
ily by (incorrectly) framing TFWs as necessary, posing no threat to Canadian 
workers and facing no threat of  exploitation (Barnetson and Foster 2012).
To accomplish this, government MLAs began by noting that Alberta was 
experiencing a labour shortage due to both an aging workforce and a hot econ-
omy. Migrant workers were mooted as the only solution to this shortage. While 
Alberta did experience a significant labour shortage during the 2000s, TFWs 
were not the only solution (Alberta 2011a, 6). The labour market may have 
returned to equilibrium as rising wages attracted more workers and/or employ-
ers reduced demand for workers (Anderson and Ruhs 2012, 39). The govern-
ment also rejected moderating the pace of  bitumen sands development and 
provincial infrastructure spending, both of  which would have dampened labour 
demand (CBSR 2009, 5; Foster 2007, 12). That MLAs continued to advocate for 
TFWs during the recession of  2008 (despite rising domestic unemployment) 
further undermines this “there is no alternative” rationale and gives credence 
to the suggestion that the government supported loosening the labour market 
to dampen wage demands, thereby benefitting employers.
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MLAs attempted to deflect resistance to importing foreign workers by pos-
iting that TFWs do not threaten Canadian jobs. Specifically, they asserted that 
the federal LMO system only allows TFWs when there are no qualified Canadian 
workers available, that TFWs are more expensive than domestic workers, and 
that TFWs will return to their home country when the demand ends (Barnetson 
and Foster 2012). There is, however, significant evidence that the LMO system 
can be gamed by employers (Foster 2012a; Foster and Taylor 2011). Evidence 
from 2009 and 2010 shows that the TFW program was not elastic and allowed 
employers to retain TFWs when laying off  domestic workers (Barnetson and 
Foster 2014, 354; Foster 2012a, 38). Furthermore, it is not clear that migrant 
workers are more expensive than domestic workers. While recruitment 
costs may be higher for migrant workers, those costs are often offset through 
enhanced flexibility for the employer, higher productivity, and opportunity 
for cost recovery through employment standards violations, informal work 
arrangements, and excessive charges for accommodation. Facilitating union 
avoidance may further reduce the cost of  migrant labour.
Of  greater concern is that temporary workers do not appear to be tempor-
ary. They have largely displaced internal migrants as a source of  workers, and 
a large, seemingly permanent class of  unskilled migrant workers has emerged 
(Alberta 2011a, 6; 2011b, 15, 19; Foster 2012a). When critics raise this concern, 
the provincial government blames the federal government. This approach is 
politically convenient (and perhaps partially correct), but it ignores the prov-
ince’s responsibility for the results of  a migrant-based labour market policy. 
If  there had been more training of  domestic workers and if  employment 
regulation made Alberta workplaces more attractive to internal migrants and 
marginalized groups, TFWs might be less necessary. These options are, how-
ever, more expensive for employers than simply expanding the TFW program. 
Furthermore, there is mounting anecdotal evidence that a large number of  for-
eign migrant workers (up to a hundred thousand) have not returned “home” 
and remain as nonstatus immigrants (Bouzek 2012).
Finally, Conservative MLAs sought to deflect criticism that the TFW pro-
gram was resulting in exploitation of  the TFWs by their employers by noting 
that TFWs have the same rights as Canadian workers (Barnetson and Foster 
2014, 362). As set out above, migrant workers face a variety of  barriers to real-
izing their rights, and an absence of  complaints does not mean an absence 
of  violations (Barnetson 2008, 46). Furthermore, there is clear evidence of  
widespread violations of  Alberta employment law affecting TFWs (AFL 2009, 
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12; CBC News 2010; Foster and Barnetson 2012, 13). There is no evidence sup-
porting MLAs’ assertions that employee or employer ignorance lies at the root 
of  these violations; an equally plausible explanation is that employers’ eco-
nomic interest creates an incentive for violations that are enabled by TFWs’ 
dependence on employers for residency. Substantive response to criticisms of  
exploitation was limited to minor regulatory adjustments (e.g. , restrictions on 
recruiting fees) and educational initiatives aimed at employers and TFWs (e.g. , 
a TFW “hotline”; AFL 2009, 15).
Employer-friendly labour-market policies are consistent with past Alberta 
labour policy. It is also a common feature of  oil-exporting economies elsewhere, 
which frequently use large numbers of  guest workers (Karl 2007, 24–26). But 
using invalid narratives to justify employers’ use of  TFWs may entail political 
risk for a government that relies upon politically conservative voters for elec-
toral support. It is difficult to substantiate the claim that Conservative Party 
supporters opposed growth in TFWs, in part because Conservative supporters 
are not a homogeneous group. Identifiable subgroups include the business com-
munity (which has actively supported growth in TFWs) and rural Albertans. 
Prior to its defeat in 2015, the Conservative Party went out of  its way to cater 
to the interests of  its supporters. For example, Conservative MLAs resisted 
including farm workers within the ambit of  occupational health and safety 
legislation for decades (Barnetson 2009b, 2012b). This suggests that opposition 
to TFWs may be limited, muted, or both. Political considerations are insuffi-
cient for understanding the motivation for the government’s strong advocacy 
for employer recruitment practices that substitute foreign workers for domes-
tic. Further explanation is required.
One explanation is that Alberta’s energy and construction sectors are very 
influential in Alberta politics. Energy is the single largest sector of  the econ-
omy, responsible for 23.1 percent of  GDP in 2013. When combined with finance 
and real estate and construction (sectors closely linked to energy), these three 
sectors constituted nearly half  of  Alberta’s economic activity in that year 
(Alberta, Alberta Innovation and Advanced Education 2015, 6). These employ-
ers are some of  the most supportive of  increasing access to TFWs (Bouzek 
2012). Leaders in these sectors have enjoyed direct access to policy makers, 
continue to have significant political clout, and were successful in ensuring 
that the Conservative government looked after their interests (Nikiforuk 2008, 
159). For example, between 2004 and 2010, the Conservative Party received 
approximately $15 million in donations (excluding donations made directly to 
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constituency associations). The largest corporate donors were oil and construc-
tion companies (Timmons 2012). Such a highly concentrated, organized, and 
influential capitalist class may be able to compel employer-friendly policy and 
leave politicians few options for maintaining legitimacy other than specious 
justifications.
An alternate (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanation is that 
Conservative MLAs viewed the migrant worker issue as relatively nonthreaten-
ing. Although there was substantial opposition to the use (and abuse) of  TFWs, 
opponents of  TFWs did not mount a credible political threat to the Conservative 
government. In 2005, petitions opposing expansion of  the TFW program, with 
over five thousand signatures, were tabled in the Alberta legislature (Barnetson 
and Foster 2014, 355). Yet no meaningful opposition coalesced and the TFW 
issue played little role in the NDP’s electoral success in 2015. Alberta’s long-
term oil boom meant that domestic workers had full employment and did not 
broadly view TFWs as a threat.
Research suggests that contradictory responses (particularly among the 
labour movement) diffused effective opposition (Foster 2014). Some labour 
leaders, especially those in construction unions, initially framed TFWs as 
“threats” to Canadian workers, since they undermined Canadians’ “right” to 
“first” choice of  jobs. By contrast, other labour leaders and many community 
groups framed TFWs as “vulnerable” workers needing government protec-
tion. These competing narratives and their importance ebbed and flowed over 
time, but appear to have undermined the political threat that Alberta’s already 
weak and divided labour movement could mount. Prior to the New Democrats’ 
unexpected victory in 2015, the only political threat that has emerged is from 
the right-wing Wildrose Alliance Party, which has a similar approach to the 
issue of  TFWs as that of  the Conservatives and thus is unlikely to raise concerns 
about the policies.
It may be, then, that the risks associated with increasing TFW numbers were 
low and the potential rewards were high, thereby emboldening the Conservative 
government to favour the interests of  capital. Whether the New Democratic 
government will appreciably alter Alberta’s approach to TFWs is unclear. 
Another factor is that those who are most affected (i.e. , migrant workers) can’t 
vote. One of  the assumptions in the preceding analysis is that the growing use 
of  TFWs reflects an important change in Canadian policy and employer behav-
iour. Sharma (2006) suggests that this assertion is only true in the short term; 
a historical examination of  migrant labour suggests that Western governments 
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have exploited the labour of  noncitizens throughout history, and this may 
merely be the latest example.
Effects of Growing Migrancy on Democracy
Regardless of  its historical origins, the current growth in TFW usage has a 
number of  potentially negative effects for democracy in Alberta. Alberta’s 
workforce was approximately 2.4 million in 2014 (Alberta 2014). There were 
approximately sixty-eight thousand TFWs in 2012, as seen in table 9.1 above, 
constituting approximately 3 percent of  workers. Including other types of  tem-
porary workers (e.g. , students and recent graduates, live-in caregivers, agri-
cultural workers, and up to a hundred thousand nonstatus migrant workers) 
suggests that migrant workers might compose up to 8 percent of  the workforce 
(Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2013). These workers have no 
political voice because they are not citizens, and few citizens are advocating for 
them. Consequently, there are both few political costs to allowing their exploit-
ation and few political rewards for protecting them. As noted by Barnetson and 
Foster (2014), the Conservative government sought to mitigate the political 
risks associated with growing migrancy via careful messaging. The drop in oil 
prices in 2014 did not abate employer demand for TFWs. Changes announced by 
the federal government in 2014 that were aimed at reducing employer reliance 
on TFWs were roundly criticized by Alberta employers as not recognizing the 
significant and long-standing need for migrant labour in the province (Alberta 
Chambers of  Commerce 2014). The reaction of  Alberta employers, even during 
an economic downturn, suggests that Alberta will have a large, vulnerable, and 
growing group of  workers with no political relationship to the state in which 
they work in the years to come.
Growing use of  foreign migrant workers also creates a two-tiered labour 
market, populated by citizen workers and noncitizen workers. While citizen-
ship forms the official basis of  this division, Sharma (2006) suggests that the 
underlying distinction is racial and racist: those workers with the least labour 
mobility and the least ability to access employment rights are also dispropor-
tionately members of  visible ethnic minorities. There are no definitive statistics 
about the ethnic or racial identities of  TFWs and nonstatus migrant workers in 
Alberta, but large numbers of  TFWs come from the Philippines, Mexico, India, 
South Korea, China, and Taiwan (Alberta 2011b, 16). The implications of  this 
arrangement are troubling.
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Justifying the negative experience of  TFWs as being based upon their lack 
of  citizenship undermines the notion that there are basic labour and human 
rights that all governments must meet and enforce. And creating tiers of  work-
ers (who bear different rights) opens the door to denying rights on other bases 
(e.g. , cost effectiveness). Furthermore, the growth in TFWs also undermines the 
ability of  Canadian workers to claim their rights. Loosening the labour market 
allows employers to credibly threaten with replacement any workers who resist 
employer demands or participate in legitimate union activities. While overt 
threats of  termination for union organizing are illegal, subtle threats of  plant 
closings and layoffs are much harder to police effectively. Indeed, simply the 
presence of  a replacement pool may cause workers to behave in a more com-
pliant manner. A docile labour force may also facilitate further weakening of  
worker rights. An example of  disciplining the labour force by widening the 
pool of  potential workers is the government’s move to expand the secondary 
labour market by making child labour increasingly accessible to employers 
(Barnetson, this volume).
A subtler effect of  growing migrancy is the state’s increasing ceding of  con-
trol over immigration to industry. The expansion of  provincial nominee pro-
grams (wherein employers nominate workers for permanent residency) means 
that an increasing portion of  newcomers are being selected based upon their 
utility to industry rather than other factors (e.g. , refugee status, non-employ-
ment related characteristics, family reunification). Recent changes to the immi-
gration system by the federal government to facilitate the transfer of  TFWs 
to permanent residency and the creation of  a new skilled trades class further 
entrench industry’s influence over immigration (Canada, Employment and 
Social Development 2013). The structure of  the TFW program (which restricts 
immigration applications from within the country and imposes a four-year 
limit on TFW permits) is consistent with how Gulf  oil states and Asian tiger 
economies have sought to contain migration via programs that intentionally 
preclude long-term residency and family reunion (Abella 1995; Skeldon 2000). 
Castles (2006) observes that the long-term success of  such policies is unclear, 
particularly given the historical difficulty governments have had compelling 
TFWs to leave the country when their work permits expire. Over time, such 
workers become enmeshed in society and may gain various political and social 
rights.
Beyond labour policy, the presence of  significant numbers of  differentially 
excluded residents weakens social cohesion important for healthy democratic 
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communities. For the migrant workers, their contingent presence in the com-
munity and their conflicted community identities (for home and destination 
communities) weaken their connection to geographic community (Castles 
and Miller 2009, 3; Vergunst 2009, 264), and their ownership of  only partial 
citizenship rights marginalizes them from important community participa-
tion, creating a form of  “institutionalized uncertainty” (Anderson 2010, 311). 
Researchers into social cohesion have argued that this form of  marginaliza-
tion undermines the development of  shared values, equal opportunity, trust, 
and reciprocity that is important in building cohesive communities (Green, 
Janmaat, and Han 2009; Jenson 2002). Indeed, the presence of  TFWs as eco-
nomic competitors to Canadian workers but without accompanying social and 
political commonalities can cause permanent residents to see migrant workers 
as part of  the “other” whose interests are in competition to and in conflict with 
their own, thus undermining any potential for social solidarity (Gibbs 2008).
Conclusion
As expected, Alberta’s most recent oil boom triggered a significant influx of  
migrant workers. Unlike previous booms, however, post-2000 migrants were 
increasingly likely to be foreign nationals rather than interprovincial migrants. 
Foreign migrant workers are vulnerable to exploitation because of  restrictions 
on their labour mobility and access to employment rights. While the prevalence 
of  foreign migrant workers has increased throughout Canada, the growth of  
TFW use in Alberta has been disproportionately high. Alberta’s oil economy is 
at least partly responsible for that increase.
The former Conservative government managed the resulting exploitation 
of  these workers primarily through messaging efforts and, to a lesser extent, 
by providing minor regulatory improvements. This suggests that the state had 
adopted the role of  defender for employer staffing decisions that disempower 
and exploit migrant workers and indirectly undermine domestic workers. The 
creation of  an underclass of  guest workers has been rapid and has profound 
implications for democracy.
In a narrow sense, the presence of  large numbers of  migrant workers pos-
sessing only limited citizenship rights weakens the labour power of  all workers 
in the province by thrusting into the labour market a group of  highly vulner-
able, contingent, and racialized workers. More broadly, the construction of  a 
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marginalized class of  transnational workers undermines important social and 
community bonds that form an important part of  the democratic fabric.
Furthermore, the use of  TFWs, by softening labour shortages caused by 
rapid expansion of  bitumen extraction capacity, deflects public attention away 
from more fundamental questions regarding Alberta’s economic and polit-
ical priorities. By focusing on TFWs as the “solution” to labour shortages and 
assuring the permanent population that TFWs pose no threat to Albertans, the 
former Conservative government neatly sidestepped the thornier debate about 
the pace of  bitumen production and the desirability of  building an economy 
around nonrenewable energy. There is, of  course, a wide range of  tools at the 
government’s disposal to narrow political debate to issues amenable to the oil 
industry. The use of  TFWs, and the narratives built around them, together serve 
as one mechanism to constrain public policy debate, at the expense of  democ-
racy in the province.
The extensive use of  migrant workers in Alberta and the manner in which 
it was defended by the former Conservative government demonstrated the 
power and influence of  energy corporations on Alberta’s economy and pol-
itics. It is also an example of  the processes employed by the energy industry 
to entrench, deepen, and solidify its grip on Alberta politics. The construction 
of  a permanent class of  contingent, marginalized, racialized migrant workers 
becomes a necessary part of  ensuring docile, reluctant workers who perceive 
their interests as aligned with those of  their multinational employers.
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Gendering Energy Extraction in Fort 
McMurray
Sara Dorow
“You know us for oil,” begins one of  the advertisements. “Our story is one of  
production and money. But . . . there’s a quality of  life here that goes beyond 
money, giving people the confidence to build a future, to raise a family.” Above 
the text, an image of  a young boy high in a swing is superimposed over a line 
graph titled “Growth in Domestic Product.” Another of  the ads, with the head-
ing “Fort McMurray, Indicators of  Energy Performance,” avers that “energy is 
more than a commodity; it’s our way of  life.” The accompanying image super-
imposes a youthful female dancer over one section of  a pie chart. In these two 
ads, in a few deft strokes, productive work and reproductive life are closely 
co-defined: oil wealth converts to familial and community riches, and energy 
translates as the “spirit of  our people.”
These advertisements were part of  the Big Spirit campaign launched in 
fall 2007 by the Regional Municipality of  Wood Buffalo (RMWB), the nearly 
seventy-thousand-square-kilometre municipality that sits atop the vast 
Athabasca bitumen sands formation in northern Alberta, at the centre of  which 
lies the “urban service area” of  Fort McMurray. The campaign’s articulation 
of  energy with community spirit echoes branding in the oil-rich province as 
a whole. In April 2010, for example, the Canadian Association of  Petroleum 
Producers (CAPP) and a coalition of  Alberta-based businesses announced 
Alberta Is Energy, “a community-building initiative to raise awareness about 
the important role the oil and gas industry plays in the lives of  Albertans” 
(CAPP 2010).
Attempts to promote the quality-of-life benefits of  the energy economy 
emanate from both public and private entities, reinforcing the importance 
of  questions about oil, democracy, and the “resource curse” in the Global 
North. But these promotional discourses and representations also cry out for 
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an analysis of  the gendered infrastructure of  a political economy built on oil. 
The Big Spirit campaign was, in part, a direct response to the negative repu-
tation Fort McMurray had gained as a barely liveable boomtown of  raucous 
single men who allegedly partied away money earned from plentiful work for 
the short time they were there, especially as the bitumen sands mega-program 
took off  in the early years of  the twenty-first century. Central to the message of  
the ad campaign was the notion that Fort McMurray is in fact a family-friendly 
place, a good place to raise kids, a place of  multiple opportunities for leisure 
and community, and thus a place to which people might want to move. Central 
to the message of  this chapter is the idea that feminized spaces of  work and 
citizenship provide an important material and discursive link between oil 
energy and community energy (see also O’Shaughnessy 2011, and see Mercier 
and Gier 2009 for a historical overview of  the gendering of  resource extraction 
economies); in other words, gendered practices—along with assumptions of  
normative kinship—are integral to the extractive work that makes the bitumen 
sands region an economic engine of  Canada.
Just as the term energy does double duty in public relations for the RMWB, 
so does the term extraction do double duty for my argument. First, it signals that 
the business of  extracting northern Alberta bitumen—the tarry substance that 
is mined or coaxed (with pressure, steam, and chemicals) out of  the third-lar-
gest known source of  oil on the planet—is itself  directly gendered. The male-
dominated work of  construction, mining, and engineering combines with 
a masculinized logic of  northern development to shape a form of  “frontier 
masculinity” (Miller 2004; O’Shaughnessy 2011). As one long-time oil indus-
try administrator put it to me, “There really is an energy here and it’s almost a 
male energy; it’s kind of  . . . I don’t want to fall into any of  the Alberta clichés 
but it is a place where you think that you can do anything and get things done.” 
Second, extraction refers to how multiple forms of  less visible gendered work 
both directly and indirectly supplement oil profits. In this view, gender inequi-
ties are not (only) side effects of  the energy economy (Ross 2008) but are inte-
gral to the broad social arrangements that allow for wealth accumulation. Such 
an analysis is all the more urgent given the increased promotion of  an active, 
self-sufficient citizenship that is touted as “gender neutral” in official Canadian 
discourse (Brodie 2008) even as it continues to rely on gendered hierarchies of  
labour, care, and family. A 7 January 2014 Edmonton Journal article on life for men 
and women in Fort McMurray, for example, highlights a gender-transcendent 
pioneering spirit while also celebrating “moms pushing strollers.”1
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By work, I mean to refer to all forms of  work, paid and unpaid, and to the 
slippery relations between them. The ethnographic evidence I discuss in this 
chapter, drawn from dozens of  interviews and a survey of  more than fifty 
parents and nannies, all conducted in the bitumen sands region from 2007 to 
2009, starts with the work of  child care but connects and extends to examples 
of  voluntarism, familism (a hyperemphasis on the social centrality of  family), 
consumerism, and paid labour in multiple sectors.2 A “social reproduction 
feminism” (SRF) framework understands these productive and reproductive 
activities to be of  a piece and sees the logics governing these two arenas as inte-
grally related (Ferguson 2008, 45). “Economy” and “work” are thus expanded 
to encompass not only the marketplace of  paid work and production but also 
the social reproductive activities that provide individuals with the social and 
physical sustenance and care that they need (Luxton 2006). As Cindi Katz (2001, 
710) puts it, “Social reproduction is the fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff 
of  everyday life. It is also a set of  structured practices that unfolds in dialectical 
relation with production, with which it is mutually constitutive and in tension.”
The SRF approach has also emphasized the importance of  intersection-
ality, the idea that unequal relations of  race, class, age, and sexuality are not 
just relevant but crucial to the gendered dynamics of  work (Arat-Koc 2006; 
Ferguson 2008). Rachel Simon-Kumar (2011, 458) even argues that “class, age, 
and ethnicity are more likely to throw light on the current modalities of  gender 
relations within contemporary forms of  Western democracy” than are dichot-
omies of  male-female or masculine-feminine. In the context of  the high levels 
of  domestic and global labour mobility that mark the northern oil economy of  
Fort McMurray, seeing the various ways in which gender articulates with race, 
class, and age is imperative to understanding forms of  inclusion and exclusion. 
Women and visible minorities, many of  whom are noncitizens (most notably, 
participants in the Temporary Foreign Worker Program), are overrepresented 
in the feminized, precarious, and invisible work of  service, retail, and care in 
Fort McMurray. And while this is true of  the global division of  labour more 
generally, bitumen extraction and production shape and sometimes intensify 
these inequalities in particular ways.
Indeed, the particular character of  the bitumen sands region as a work 
destination is critical to understanding both intersectional modalities and 
gendered dichotomies. The population of  the Regional Municipality of  Wood 
Buffalo (RMWB) grew from over forty thousand to approximately a hun-
dred thousand in the booming first decade of  the century (RMWB 2012), and 
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according to Statistics Canada, it had the highest median family income in the 
nation in 2010, at $169,790 (Statistics Canada 2012). Yet this is also a highly 
mobile population—the 2011 National Household Survey found that two-thirds 
of  the sixty thousand permanent residents (an undercounted population) had 
lived somewhere else five years previous (Statistics Canada 2011c), and accord-
ing to the 2012 RMWB municipal census, one-third of  the total population in 
the region were mobile workers with permanent residence elsewhere (17). This 
mobility cannot be chalked up solely to the short-term need for high numbers 
of  fly-in, fly-out construction workers. High housing costs, relative isolation 
at the “end of  the highway,” the uncertainties of  oil boom and bust, and the 
social stresses and frenetic pace that accompany boom times all contribute to 
high levels of  turnover and low levels of  retention in the workforce. In short, 
while Fort McMurray is home to many people who have lived there for decades 
or generations, it is largely a place to work, a place to make money while you 
can. That “people are just working, working, working to make money, money, 
money,” as one interviewee put it, was one of  the most consistent themes in my 
interviews. The effect of  this working frenzy on time and consumerism was a 
key concern for many interviewees, as they watched the relentless pursuit of  
the “good life” promised by high wages, overtime hours, and long shifts.
The gendered practices that supplement the production of  oil are compli-
cated by a combination of  two factors: the burgeoning economy that makes 
Fort McMurray a place of  employment opportunity for both men and women 
and the special premium that both government and industry place on family-
oriented social life for attracting and keeping workers in the area. Alberta’s 
brand of  late neoliberalism contributes to this sharpened yet depoliticized set 
of  gendered relations. As in the rest of  Canada and other parts of  the Global 
North, the devolution of  social responsibility onto families and local commun-
ities contributes to the reproduction of  gendered inequalities (Gazso 2009; 
Harder 2006), while the valorization of  the productive entrepreneurial subject 
both de- and re-genders subjectivity (Simon-Kumar 2011). In some ways, the 
resource extraction economy of  Alberta intensifies “the neoliberal and social 
conservative threads [in Canada] which simultaneously cast gender as being 
irrelevant and wives and mothers as critical to the reproduction of  families, 
family values, and society” (Brodie 2008, 160–61). And this in a province with 
a history of  political inattention to issues affecting women, as the Parkland 
Institute and the Alberta College of  Social Workers reported in 2012: “Alberta 
is the only jurisdiction in Canada without a minister or advisory council 
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responsible for the status of  women. Alberta is alone in having no mechan-
isms for gender analysis of  social and economic policy, or even a council acting 
in an advisory capacity to government” (2).
Gendered Work in Fort McMurray: A Snapshot of Paid Work
The gendered picture of  paid work in the RMWB (more than 90% of  whose resi-
dents are in Fort McMurray) during the boom that began in the early 2000s is 
especially pertinent, given the combination of  high median incomes and high 
labour shortages that have marked this period. According to the 2011 National 
Household Survey, both male and female employment rates among residents in 
the RMWB were higher than in the province as a whole: 88.3 percent for males 
and 68.6 percent for females, compared to 74.6 percent and 63.4 percent for 
the province, and there is a higher percentage of  women employed in trades 
and transportation than in Alberta or Canada (Statistics Canada 2011a, 2011b, 
2011c).3 These statistics seem to support Ross’s finding (2008, 121) that in coun-
tries with large and diverse economies (like Norway and Australia), women are 
not as likely to be crowded out of  employment in an oil and gas economy.
However, this story deserves further unpacking. First, consider that in 2011 
nearly one-third of  the resident labour force in the RMWB census area worked 
in “trades, transport and equipment operators and related occupations,” and 90 
percent of  those workers were men (Statistics Canada 2011c).4 Thus, the prepon-
derance of  images of  women donning hard hats in oil industry ads and billboards 
is, ironically, more a reflection of  the work that female bodies do to publicly pro-
duce the idea of  inclusive economic participation than of  the reality of  work on 
the ground. Second, while women and visible minorities are overrepresented in 
the sales and service industry throughout Canada and much of  the Global North, 
the percentage of  these precarious jobs occupied by women was actually higher 
in the region than in Alberta or Canada as a whole. An increasing percentage of  
workers in this sector have come to Fort McMurray under the Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program, which, according to a 2011 provincial government report, grew 
sixfold between 2000 and 2010 (Woo-Paw 2011).5
These realities only begin to explain the gendered landscape of  employment 
and income in Fort McMurray. The 2011 National Household Survey showed 
that among those over fifteen years of  age with any income, the percentages 
of  both men and women working full-year, full-time were almost double that 
in the province of  Alberta (Statistics Canada 2011a, 2011c)—so, everyone is 
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working more. However, income differences are striking. Median earnings for 
men in the RMWB were almost three times those of  women, and were still more 
than twice as high when we consider only those individuals working full-year, 
full-time (see table 10.1). This is considerably more of  a gap than in the province 
as a whole, which already has one of  the highest gender wage gaps in Canada.6
Table 10.1. Median Earnings for Men and Women in RMWB and Alberta
R.M. of Wood Buffalo Alberta
Men Women Men Women
Number of 
individuals
Persons 15 years and 
over with income
28,900 22,605 1,386,310 1,364,430
Persons 15 years and 













Persons 15 years and 
over with income
$112,966 $39,648 $47,110 $27,769
Persons 15 years and 
over working full-year, 
full-time
$137,422 $64,337 $63,635 $46,698
Source:  2011 National Household Survey profiles for the Regional Municipality of Wood 
Buffalo and for Alberta (Statistics Canada 2011a, 2011c).
These numbers underscore the almost mundane and tautological point that 
oil economies favour male employment because of  the full-time, high-wage, 
male-dominated jobs available (cf. Ross 2008). However, that this is true even 
in an environment of  work shortages and high housing costs demands that we 
look further. And looking further, we see how the political and cultural econ-
omy of  the bitumen sands shapes gendered, raced, and classed arrangements 
of  work in ways that supplement this extractive economy.
Child Care: A Window on Gendered Work
The work of  child care, both paid and unpaid, is an instructive place to launch an 
examination of  the arrangements of  production and social reproduction—the 
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gendered forms of  “energy”—that supplement the oil economy. Like Alberta 
as a whole, Fort McMurray faces a child care shortage. And as in other boom-
towns (Gillespie 2007), inadequate child care provision is further exacerbated 
by employment turnover and competition from attainable higher-paying work, 
driving up the cost of  child care. Even though the province dedicated new fund-
ing to child care in Fort McMurray in 2009 and 2010, the municipality’s web-
site continued to advise that “child care in Fort McMurray is among the most 
expensive in the province” and that “it is important to plan ahead for child care 
before moving, as there are often waiting lists.”7 As one long-time resident put 
it during an interview in 2007,
For all these families who come here, most of  them have two people work-
ing. Where are the kids supposed to go? We need somebody to invest in 
daycare . . . And then how do you staff  the daycare? . . . And then how can 
they [daycare staff] afford to live here when they make $14 an hour, let’s say. 
They can’t afford to live here. So you know it’s a vicious circle of  how do you 
meet the needs of  these families and these individuals who are coming to 
Fort McMurray. There is so much pressure, it’s like a pressure cooker.
This comment, like much of  the data we gathered from dozens of  interviews, as 
well as from a face-to-face survey of  fifty-four parents and nannies at two sites 
of  The HUB Family Resource Centre in Fort McMurray, suggests that gendered 
decisions and practices of  child care include but go beyond the more general 
problem of  limited provision and high cost of  day homes and child care cen-
tres, to the very structures and cultures of  the bitumen sands economy: pace, 
growth, overtime and shift work, ramped-up cost of  living, and the promise of  
opportunity to live the good life.8
Time, “Good Jobs,” and the Flexibilized Fort McMurray Woman
The frenetic and constant pace of  bitumen production translates into round-
the-clock shift work, work schedules like “ten days on and four off,” lots of  
necessary and/or available overtime, and long commute times out to site and 
back. In this context, complained the spouse of  an oil industry professional, 
“as much as the companies certainly say, ‘Balanced life, that’s what we want,’ 
there’s certainly that dichotomy between ‘Make sure you’re staying healthy 
and not working too much’ but ‘Could you come in and work tomorrow?’” These 
spatial-temporal particularities of  paid work in the bitumen sands zone inten-
sify the gendered experience of  “flexibilization”: women adjusting paid and 
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unpaid work to accommodate the contradictory demands of  economy and soci-
ety in heteronormative, liberal democracies (Luxton 2006; Thorin 2001). First, 
time and distance between the city and the oil sites prompted some women to 
take jobs in town to be closer to home and children (see also Leach 1999).9 This 
included women who at one point had worked in the oil industry. One woman, 
referring to commuting time, said,
It started to get almost an hour now, each way. And I just felt that, you know, 
my time was best served in town. If  one of  us was working at the plant sites, 
that was fine: one could be in town with the son and one could be at the 
plant site. So I focused my careers, all my little careers, in town.
A second form of  flexibilization entailed women taking a paid job that 
worked around a male partner’s schedule in the oil patch. Often this was part-
time work found in public, nonprofit, or service industry employment in town, 
given the relative dearth of  part-time work with the oil companies themselves. 
One of  these women told me, “I’ve been able to choose my hours and that has 
enabled me to work around my husband’s schedule [at site]. . . . I’m able to work 
on one of  the days that my husband has off.”
These decisions were shaped in part by the lack of  child care facilities and 
options. Indeed, half  of  the women we surveyed at The HUB in early 2009 who 
were not engaged in any kind of  paid work indicated that a major contribut-
ing factor was that child care was unaffordable or unavailable; this included a 
lack of  child care outside of  standard work hours. With so much shift work and 
overtime and long commute times, this is an especially acute problem (Preston 
et al. 2000; O’Shaughnessy 2011). It is even more acute for people who do not 
have extended family in the area, which is typical because Fort McMurray is a 
relatively remote work destination. Several women we talked to counted them-
selves very “lucky” that their own mothers lived in town and could provide 
child care; in a couple of  cases, older women had left their own lucrative jobs 
in the oil industry to look after grandchildren whose parents did not have such 
good jobs.
A “good job” in Fort McMurray usually translates as a job in the higher-pay-
ing oil industry, and this has further implications for the gendered distribu-
tion of  child care in heterosexual families, especially given its cost. One young 
mother said that “things would be different”—namely, that her family would 
be able to afford the leeway for her to participate in some kind of  paid work—
if  her husband had a job in the oil sands. Because he worked in less lucrative 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
Gendering Energy Extraction in Fort McMurray   283
employment, when they weighed the cost of  child care against the “extra” 
income she would make in a paid job, it made more financial sense for her to do 
the unpaid work of  child care. Even when people who worked in nonindustry 
jobs (such as education, government, social services, etc.) began to receive an 
extra cost-of-living allowance (implemented in 2007 and 2008), their salaries 
were still not enough to cover the cost of  housing and child care. A firefighter’s 
wife told me that with the already high cost of  housing, paying for daycare was 
just not a viable option, so she did the child care and then worked part-time 
on her husband’s day off. “Lots of  women are doing that,” she said, and, with a 
shrug of  her shoulders, added, “That’s just the way it is.”
This nexus of  productive and reproductive work supplements the extract-
ive needs of  oil capital through both gendered and classed arrangements. To 
begin with, a “good job” is itself  not just a matter of  pay but also of  time, and 
these were quite different for people in trades versus professional jobs in the oil 
industry. A retired professional summed up one class difference:
[At the lower levels] you work fourteen hours, you get paid about six hours 
overtime, that’s a lot of  money . . . [Maybe] your wife is doing the same and 
you are working night and day, night and day. So it’s the money is what is 
inviting that. To the professionals, they don’t pay overtime so you go in the 
morning and you come [home] in the afternoon. That’s it. So you are home 
every night and even if  you are a little late, you’re here at six or seven.
The desire and/or demand for overtime among men (and the limited number 
of  women) who work in trades and construction combine with women’s “flex-
ibility” to deepen gendered arrangements. In many families where the father 
worked in the trades and the mother did part-time or no paid work, there was 
talk of  adjusting to “daddy time”—when daddy returned for a few days after 
working out at site for a week or two, or longer. One long-time child care profes-
sional in the region noted that couples might not be able to find time together 
“because they can’t afford child care or it’s nonexistent, so somebody’s doing 
a part-time job, so every second that daddy’s off  work he’s at home because 
mommy’s going to do something.” One of  the few fathers at The HUB with whom 
we spoke described a stressful transition each time he came off  of  five twelve-
hour days in a row. “But what are you going to do, you have to work,” he said.
“You have to work” becomes a masculinized ethos that contributes to seeing 
women’s flexibilized labour as “just the way it is.” In this instance, in this con-
text, the gendering of  social reproduction is seemingly naturalized by the 
demands of  the particular political economy of  paid work. But then, “you have 
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to work” also attaches itself  to the different versions of  the “good life” promised 
by the neoliberal oil economy.
The Opportunity for the “Good Life”: Family Values and the Fast Track
If  neoliberalism valorizes the economic (productive-consumptive) citizen and 
at the same time reproduces the gendered norms of  responsibility for family 
and community, this has particular effects on child care and other social repro-
ductive work in Fort McMurray, where oil production promises opportunity. 
We might think of  the promise of  plentiful work in the energy economy and of  
the ability to translate it into the “good life” as a corollary to the “rentier effect” 
(Ross 2001)—that is, it may dampen not only broader political challenges but 
also challenges to gender inequities. In Fort McMurray, this translates into a 
network of  gendered arrangements that variously support the opportunity to 
exercise family values and/or to get on the fast track to a handsome income.
The coupling of  traditional family-based values and female-based commun-
ity work constitutes one version of  the good life promised by oil. Sometimes, 
this was narrated as a slowing down of  the frenetic cycle of  work, money, and 
consumption in which the oil boom catches people. As one long-time resident 
put it, “Some people sacrifice living a lifestyle where they have more stuff, I 
guess, where they do keep one parent home. Like, there are women here who 
stay home.” A handful of  women we interviewed and surveyed said that their 
families consciously had chosen to move to Fort McMurray because their hus-
bands’ jobs in the oil industry allowed them to be stay-at-home moms. In other 
words, the opportunity of  high-paying jobs for men provided the opportunity 
to play out a conventional gendered division of  labour.10 Some of  these same 
women were also active volunteers in the community. If  in the late neoliberal 
state “there has been greater involvement of  citizenship participation and 
community partnerships in the formulation and delivery of  policy and servi-
ces,” this is still to some degree feminized work (Simon-Kumar 2011, 42; see also 
Luxton 2006). But in Fort McMurray, there is a particular premium on volun-
teer time: while voluntarism is essential to providing the “community energy” 
touted in the Big Spirit ads, the dominance of  paid work and a relative short-
age of  retired people and women with “extra” time squeezes social reproductive 
time for volunteering, giving it all the more currency as a component of  the 
good life.
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While this first version of  the good life sacrifices money for time, a second 
version, in which both male and female spouses participated in full-time (plus 
overtime) paid work to maximize the monetary benefits of  the boom, sacrifices 
time for money. These benefits were often signalled through conspicuous con-
sumption, such as investments in a home (and by default, an expensive one), sun-
destination vacations, adult toys like a new truck or boat, and shopping trips to 
larger cities to acquire the latest consumer goods or children’s toys. One source 
of  social anxiety was the concern about overworked parents substituting hard 
cash or extravagant toys for quality time with children and family: as one inter-
viewee recalled, “Our kids were telling us that among their peers, both of  [their 
parents] work tremendous overtime and they get a lot of  money and they don’t 
spend time with the kids . . . [instead] they opened their wallet full of  money.”
This sacrifice of  time for money seemed to apply whether the families of  
individual oil industry workers were in Fort McMurray or far away; in both 
cases, time spent in paid work was maximized to fast-track monetary provi-
sions for family. For some, this meant deferring fulfillment of  the first kind of  
“good life” (time for family and leisure) into some unknown time in the future, 
usually in some other place (Dorow and Dogu 2011). It also entailed the com-
modification of  social reproductive work, revealing the globalized intersec-
tions of  race, class, and gender that supplement the fast track to individual 
income and corporate profit.
Stratified Social Reproduction and the Global Service Economy
Exchanging earnings for paid child care is perhaps an obvious response for 
full-time dual-earner families, especially for people in middle- and upper-class 
forms of  work. But these practices of  stratified reproduction (Colen 1995) also 
highlight the reality that as highly educated women in liberal democracies find 
it easier to compete alongside men for better paid jobs (McDowell 2006) and 
as neoliberal governance places particular labouring bodies in differentiated 
global spaces (Ferguson 2008), we see new kinds of  classed and raced divides 
among women. Life in the heart of  bitumen production adds a couple of  twists 
to this scenario. First, in a good number of  well-off  dual-earner families in Fort 
McMurray, two people are earning $30 or more an hour working in construc-
tion and other trades. Second, if  one can afford child care at all, hiring a live-in 
nanny is especially attractive given not only limited and expensive day care but 
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also exorbitant housing costs. In this context, the “savings” of  an extra room in 
the house more than offset the $10 per hour wages for a live-in caregiver.
One-quarter of  the fifty-four people we surveyed at The HUB were nan-
nies, all of  them Filipina. While exact numbers on live-in caregivers in Fort 
McMurray are hard to obtain, the number of  Filipina nannies alone is in the 
hundreds. In almost all of  their cases, one or both of  their employers worked in 
the oil industry, with about half  in administration or professional jobs and the 
other half  in the trades. One of  the mothers we interviewed at The HUB was on 
maternity leave but planned to hire a live-in caregiver when she returned to her 
engineering job—part of  a larger plan to stay in Fort McMurray for another five 
years and save for her and her husband’s early retirement.
This story highlights the ways in which live-in caregivers supplement the 
tradeoffs of  time and money discussed above. Most poignantly, they absorb 
the social reproductive time that allows their employers to work odd and extra 
hours. One child care professional averred that shift workers preferred to hire 
nannies “because of  their long hours. Because they don’t have time for the 
housework when they get home so isn’t it nice to come home and have some 
supper happening that somebody [else prepared] . . . Filipina nannies are the 
oil sands workers’ solution because they’ll clean the house, too.” A subsequent 
survey conducted in 2014 with live-in caregivers in Fort McMurray corrobor-
ated that they work longer on average than local trades workers and often per-
form household duties outside of  the scope of  their contracts; long hours and 
extra duties are more pronounced among those caregivers whose employers 
work in the oil industry (Dorow, Cassiano, and Doerksen 2015).
This can turn into a gendered chain of  increasing “surplus value,” as 
described by two nannies interviewed together:
Vicky: [My] focus is on the child. And if  you have time, you can 
cook, you can clean everything. But in my case my employer 
is a teacher, the lady. And because the guy is six days on, six 
days off  [out at site], with the night shift and the day shift, so 
it’s difficult . . . she doesn’t have time so I will prepare supper 
for us because she’s tired working . . .
Interviewer: It would be very difficult to have a family life working six 
days on, six days off  and night shifts.
Vicky: So far I don’t have [both of  the parents doing] that.
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Mia: Because if  they [both] work six days on, six days off, you’re 
working twenty-four hours.
Vicky: You’re making good money for them.
Filipina nannies are part of  the flexibilized and feminized global labour 
force (Cohen 1994; Piper 2008) that articulates the reproductive and productive 
sides of  the oil economy. Many people on other types of  foreign worker per-
mits work in the local retail, service, and hospitality sectors of  Fort McMurray 
and in the outlying work camps, all of  which have boomed because of  oil. These 
foreign workers do the commodified reproductive work of  keeping industry 
workers fed, housed, groomed, and entertained. They are largely visible minor-
ity and officially “unskilled” people, although many of  them have degrees in 
fields like human resources, accounting, or education. And while their wages 
are often higher than in other places, this is offset by high housing costs and is 
limited by contracts that tie them to specific employers and that prohibit many 
of  them from bringing families to Canada or applying for permanent residency 
(Foster 2012). Also overrepresented in service jobs are other visible minority 
groups, including people who came as refugees or immigrants to Canada.
Interviews with employers in restaurants, big box stores, and cleaning ser-
vices in Fort McMurray revealed ways in which the particularities of  the oil 
economy intensify intersecting inequalities of  race, gender, and class for this 
global, flexibilized work force. To begin with, many such employers had begun 
importing labour because of  a lack of  some of  the usual labour pools, which, 
combined with an abundance of  better-paying work (such as in the bitumen 
sands), created constant turnover and a desperate search for workers. A big box 
store manager lamented that with so many fly-in, fly-out male workers, “you 
don’t have the stay-at-home mom or the teenagers or whatever to come to the 
workforce. Just the dads. And they still want all the services in town but they 
don’t supply anything [to the sector by] bringing their families.” Given these 
shortages, this employer had instituted an extra-ordinary “mommy shift” cor-
responding to school and daycare hours in Fort McMurray in order to attract 
mothers to apply; he had also hired many immigrant women.
While the plenitude of  retail and service work in Fort McMurray creates 
an employment “opportunity” for immigrant and foreign workers, the boom-
and-bust cycle creates its own hierarchical and racialized employment cycle. 
One employer, for example, told us that the downturn of  late 2008 allowed his 
store the time to conduct proper screening and interviewing, which meant they 
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could hire more “locals” who spoke fluent English; some of  these were people 
who had been laid off  from the oil industry and were working in the store as a 
stop-gap measure until oil prices and investments rose again.
Gendered Energy and Democratic Equality
Globalization produces forms of  inequality that make democratic ideals elu-
sive, potentially dampening prospects for “thicker” and more inclusive forms of  
democracy—even in the most advanced democracies (Bayes and Hawkesworth 
2006, 5–6). The case of  Fort McMurray focuses these questions on an oil econ-
omy in the Global North and shows us how some of  the material and discursive 
facets of  that economy produce and normalize gendered, as well as raced and 
classed, arrangements of  paid and unpaid work.
I have also tried to show how these arrangements supplement the ability of  
people who work in the oil industry to take advantage of  its opportunities, and 
also, by extension, the ability of  oil profits to proceed apace. While Hochschild 
(2000) has argued that global chains of  care work supply “emotional surplus 
value,” I argue that gendered chains of  care work provide both emotional and 
material surplus value; in binding oil “energy” to community “energy,” they 
allow the state to make good on the promises of  the petroleum economy.
Neoliberal ideas of  citizenship contribute to the feminizing of  this relation-
ship. Simon-Kumar (2011, 452–53) asserts that in late neoliberalism, the active 
citizen is a political actor “located in the intersections between the state, market, 
family, and community” (see also Sassen 2008); in this context, “citizenship is 
enacted through activities such as volunteering, and by participating in gov-
ernment-defined engagement strategies. . . . Citizenship, in this discourse, is 
ostensibly ‘feminized,’ mapped around feminist principles of  relationships and 
mutual dependence” (Simon-Kumar 2011, 453).
At the same time, neoliberal ideologies contribute to the occlusion of  gen-
dered hierarchies. Brodie (2008, 161) has argued that in Canadian neoliberal-
ism, “promise[s] of  choice and self-sufficiency are . . . masculinist constructs” 
but are not named as such; gendered relations of  power are thus rendered no 
longer visible “through the lens of  social liberalism or the language of  citizen-
ship equality.” In northern Alberta, the value put on both family/community and 
entrepreneurialism seems to narrow the political space for directly addressing 
gender relations as an issue of  democratic equality.
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The pressure cooker created at the social epicentre of  the bitumen sands 
economy has been converted into a fraught form of  strategic political capital. 
As Lauren Cutler reported in a 10 March 2009 article in Fort McMurray Today, 
new child care funding for Fort McMurray had come, in part, through polit-
ical leveraging from the Oil Sands Secretariat, the provincial government 
unit charged with managing “sustainable” growth of  the bitumen sands. And 
the three-term mayor of  the RMWB, Melissa Blake, has effectively used the 
many social and infrastructural challenges in the region to press for cost-of-
living allowance increases for essential services, including child care work. But 
then, these changes have often been made in the name of  attracting workers to 
feed the labour needs of  the oil economy. As a local child care professional told 
me, “I’m under no illusions that the provincial government cares about qual-
ity child care for children and I’m under no illusion that [industry] does. But 
I know they care about getting workers and so we’ll use that, thank you very 
much.” What continues to get lost is a series of  issues that lie behind such pol-
itical expedience: how women and visible minorities bear many of  the social 
burdens of  the pressure cooker, how both men and women are caught in the 
gendered structures of  the oil economy, and how the oil economy both benefits 
from and reproduces these unequal configurations.
Notes
1 Jodie Sinnema’s article, titled “Fort McMurray: It Is Manly and Moneyed . . . but Has a 
Soft Side That Might Surprise You,” was part of  a series of  stories on life in the region.
2 Thanks to Goze Dogu for research assistance in the collection of  interview and 
observational data. I also want to note that we did not have the opportunity to 
interview any parents or caregivers who identified as LGBT.
3 Because Statistics Canada only counts residents and not mobile workers, its numbers 
over represent workers with families and females in the region; the RMWB’s own 
2012 census report on project accommodations (work camps) found that its residents 
are 83 percent male and that just over 50 percent are married or common-law 
(RMWB 2012, 118–19).
4 The proportion of  workers (men and women combined) in this category provincially 
and nationally was 17.4 percent and 14.1 percent, respectively (Statistics Canada 
2011a, 2011b).
5 The only categories of  mobility status in the RMWB in which women outnumbered 
men were for those who had lived outside the country (as opposed to census area 
or province/territory) one or five years ago (Statistics Canada 2011c), which would 
include both immigrants and foreign workers.
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6 It is further worth noting that the earnings of  lone parent families in the RMWB, 
most of  whom are female-headed, equalled just half  of  the overall median family 
income (compared to 57% in Alberta as a whole)—a statistic all the more concerning 
when the very high cost of  housing is taken into account.
7 “Child Care,” Regional Municipality of  Wood Buffalo, http://www.woodbuffalo.ab.ca/
living/Newcomers/Getting-Help-in-Wood-Buffalo/Child-Care.htm (accessed 31 
December 2014).
8 While high housing costs in Fort McMurray are the result of  a complex set of  factors, 
the rapid growth of  bitumen development, along with living allowances provided 
by oil companies, contributed to inflated housing costs during the boom years of  the 
2000s.
9 The 2011 National Household Survey profile of  the RMWB shows a high average 
commute time overall, but more than this, finds that the commute time is twice as 
long for men as it is for women (Statistics Canada 2011c).
10 This isn’t always necessarily an equally shared desire. One woman we interviewed 
felt pressure from her husband to enter paid work in order to even further extend his 
oil industry income, given the plentiful opportunities; another woman stayed home 
because an oil industry salary meant they could afford it, but she indicated that it 
wasn’t necessarily her first choice.
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A Window on Power and Influence 
in Alberta Politics
Ricardo Acuña
The policy context in Alberta has changed significantly over the past forty years. 
A sharp move to the far right in the province’s dominant political paradigm 
has been accompanied by a general disengagement by Albertans from politics 
and from a government whose hands are largely tied in terms of  policy options. 
Although this shift has coincided with a similar process across North America 
over the same period, it would be a mistake to describe it as organic. The cur-
rent state of  affairs has actually been the direct result of  a very strategic and 
purposeful set of  actions undertaken by key players inside Alberta. This chap-
ter uses Joe Overton’s theory of  the “window of  political possibility” to explore 
how Alberta’s corporate elites, and in particular the oil industry, have leveraged 
their economic and political power to support advocacy-based think tanks, the 
media, and well-placed political activists to purposefully shift Alberta’s polit-
ical paradigm in a bid to further increase their power.
As the political window moved in Alberta, the ideas being promoted by the 
province’s elites worked their way into the government. The result is a govern-
ment that is heading into a place of  chronic financial crisis, with the scope of  
policy options at its disposal growing narrower and narrower, and an elector-
ate that has disconnected almost completely from the public policy process and 
politics. This situation bodes poorly for the public interest, for democracy, and 
for the long-term well-being of  the province as a whole. The deep entrench-
ment of  the Alberta policy window on the far right of  the spectrum has further 
damaged democracy by making genuine public dialogue on policy and alterna-
tives unlikely, if  not impossible. In the current reality, what were once seen as 
ideas that were debateable and questionable have come to be seen as something 
tantamount to objective truth, and there is no questioning objective truth.
11
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The Overton Window
Joe Overton developed his idea of  the window of  political possibility (named 
the “Overton window” after his death in 2003) while he was vice-president 
of  the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a right-wing think tank based in 
Michigan. Overton originally used the theory to explain how think tanks can 
help change the course of  public policy, but it is also useful in explaining shifts 
in the political context of  a jurisdiction as a whole. The essence of  the Overton 
window is this: if  all of  the possible policy choices for any issue are placed on a 
spectrum, there will always be a small window along that spectrum where those 
policies that are considered acceptable, sensible, and popular reside. At the very 
centre of  that window is where public policy happens, and as one moves away 
from the window to the left or right of  the spectrum, one finds the policies that 
are considered radical and unthinkable (Lehman, n.d.). If  we use the example of  
gun control to explain how the Overton window works, we would find a policy 
of  strong government regulation and the requiring of  permits in the middle 
of  the window. In the realm of  the radical and unthinkable on one end of  the 
spectrum, we would find the total outlawing and banning of  guns. On the other 
end, we would find a policy of  wide open gun ownership with no regulations, 
registration, or permit requirement. We would also find a broad range of  policy 
options between the window and the unthinkable on either side.
Overton believed that the window can be moved or expanded by flooding the 
public discourse with ideas that are radical and unthinkable. The more people 
hear these ideas and see them represented in the media, the more likely they 
are to begin seeing them as acceptable and sensible—the ideas become normal-
ized. Except for very rare instances, Overton observed, politicians don’t lead, 
they follow. Once the window has moved to a new point on the spectrum or 
its boundaries have expanded to include new ideas, the politicians will follow, 
opting for the politically safe options inside the window rather than the elector-
ally riskier options outside the window. They will all rush to occupy the Overton 
window (Lehman, n.d.).
One part of  the analysis that Overton and his successors at the Mackinac 
Center did not fully integrate into the theory, however, is the idea of  power 
and privilege. All public policies have winners and losers. The winners tend 
to build both economic and political power as a result of  these policies. That 
power allows them to play an important role in filtering which ideas get a broad 
airing in the public discourse and which get shut out. Lewis F. Powell perhaps 
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best articulated how this privileging of  ideas could happen in a memo he wrote 
in 1971 to the director of  the US Chamber of  Commerce. In the memo, which 
has since come to be called the Powell Manifesto, Powell urges “pro-enterprise” 
conservatives to take control of  public discourse by funding think tanks, using 
their influence in the media, reshaping universities, and using the judiciary 
(Powell [1971] 2015). The Powell memo is largely credited for sparking the birth 
of  corporate-funded right-wing think tanks in the United States, and since 
those beginnings, their profile and visibility in the media has increased dra-
matically, largely because of  the support of  “some very wealthy people” (Lakoff 
2004, 15–16). Powell recognized that corporations, the wealthy, and the mass 
media had significant impact over the direction of  public discourse and that 
they could use that power to privilege ideas that would further their economic 
power. He also understood their ability to publicly delegitimize and discredit 
those ideas that pose a threat to their economic power and privilege (Powell 
[1971] 2015).
Although they do not use the same language as Overton, numerous other 
observers of  think tanks and their influence have pointed to this same dynamic 
playing out in Canada since the mid-1970s. Donald Abelson identifies four 
waves in the development of  think tanks, with the third wave being the rise of  
what he calls “advocacy think tanks” (Abelson 2000, 18). He dates the begin-
ning of  this wave in Canada to the early 1970s, when groups such as the Canada 
West Foundation, the C. D. Howe Institute, and the Fraser Institute were born. 
These think tanks, says Abelson, are not driven by a desire to advance scholarly 
research but by a deep commitment to impose their “ideological agenda on the 
electorate” (220). William Carroll and Murray Shaw (2001, 196) take this under-
standing one step further by asking on whose behalf  this ideological agenda 
is being imposed on the electorate and identifying these right-wing advocacy 
think tanks as “embedded elements of  a social network, within which neolib-
eral business activism has taken shape.” Carroll and Shaw explicitly point out 
that the ties between the corporate elite and the world of  think tanks enable “a 
continuing conversation in which political frames can be aligned and adjusted, 
effecting a moving consensus between functioning capitalists and their organic 
intellectuals” (196). They reach the conclusion that, particularly in the case of  
the Fraser Institute, what is more startling than the representation of  large cor-
porations on policy boards is the heightened level of  business activism in the 
field of  public policy since the 1970s, as witnessed in the formation, financing, 
and governing of  right-wing think tanks (211).
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In examining Overton’s idea that the window can be moved by flooding 
the public discourse with radical ideas, Robert Hackett and Yuezhi Zhao (1998, 
157–58) find that this is borne out in the case of  the Fraser Institute and the 
popular media in Canada: the ideas promulgated by those institutions “shifted 
from a comic example of  ultra-right hyperbole to the representation of  reason.” 
Hackett and Zhao also identify the degree to which mainstream media privilege 
these messages by publishing them uncritically and frequently—almost ten 
times as often as the messages of  policy groups at the other end of  the political 
spectrum.
One of  the fiercest arguments for right-wing think tanks constituting a con-
certed effort by corporate elites to change the political fabric of  Canada, and 
perhaps the argument most relevant to Alberta, comes from journalist, author, 
and researcher Murray Dobbin, who has dedicated much of  his writing over 
the past twenty years to tracking the rise of  the neoliberal right in Canada. 
Dobbin draws direct lines from Canada’s most powerful corporations (includ-
ing Alberta’s oil companies) to groups like the Fraser Institute and the National 
Citizens’ Coalition, to the birth of  the Reform Party in Alberta and the eleva-
tion of  Stephen Harper to national power. Through a detailed analysis, he also 
demonstrates the role of  the communications strategies of  these organizations 
and the impact these strategies have had on the public consensus (Dobbin 1998).
Andrew Nikiforuk (2012) brings all of  this home to Alberta in his analysis of  
how neoliberalism has been advanced in petro-states. When jurisdictions are as 
economically dependent on oil and gas as Alberta is, the disproportionate share 
of  economic and political power held by oil corporations makes it that much 
easier for them to fund the development and dissemination of  ideas that will 
further privilege them as an economic and political elite (194–99). Nikiforuk 
points to how Texas oil money helped fund the rise of  neoliberal fundamental-
ism in the United States by supporting right-wing radical candidates, found-
ing and funding right-wing foundations and institutes, and ultimately building 
right-wing media empires dedicated to the spreading of  the neoliberal gospel.
All of  the literature referred to above explains how the move to neoliberal-
ism has happened in North America over the past forty years and highlights the 
dangers and pitfalls it holds for democracy and the ability of  citizens to impact 
or engage with public policy. It also confirms the validity of  using Overton’s 
window, combined with an analysis of  power and privilege, to understand the 
changes in Alberta over the same period of  time and the resulting implications 
for democracy and public policy in that province.
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A Brief History of Power in Alberta
Alberta’s economy has always been export driven, and public policy has always 
prioritized the needs of  that export economy. Historically, these exports were 
agricultural, with the south and central parts of  the province focusing on beef  
and wheat, respectively. Even after natural gas was discovered in Turner Valley 
in 1914, and oil in 1936, agriculture remained the most important contributor to 
Alberta’s economy and therefore the focus of  much government policy. All of  
this began to change after the discovery of  oil in Leduc in 1947, and subsequent 
discoveries in the 1950s and 1960s. International oil companies began setting up 
shop in the province en masse, refineries and pipelines began to be built, and 
the importance of  oil and gas to the Alberta economy quickly increased. By 1971, 
resource mining accounted for almost 20 percent of  the provincial economy, 
while agriculture had been reduced to just over 7 percent (Anielski 2002, 31).
It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 1971 Alberta general election, energy 
policy occupied a prominent place in the platforms of  all political parties. Peter 
Lougheed in particular ran on a platform advocating a greater role and profile 
for Alberta in Canada, but he was also highly critical of  how the Social Credit 
had handled energy policy and proposed a fairly interventionist approach for 
ensuring that the province’s natural resource wealth was developed in the long-
term interests of  Albertans. In particular, Lougheed argued that the provincial 
government had been complacent and irresponsible in its handling of  the oil 
industry, that it had failed to maximize the revenue potential of  the province’s 
resources, that Alberta had become overreliant on the oil industry and needed 
to actively diversify the economy, and that the government had wasted an 
opportunity to put energy revenues to work for Albertans by creating second-
ary and value-added industries (Richardson 2012, 36).
The Socred’s response to these accusations will sound very familiar to 
Albertans today. Their leader, Harry Strom, insisted that it had been harmony 
between the government and industry that had brought record profits to Alberta 
and that the Socred government had always preferred to influence industry in 
a quiet manner that would normally result in voluntary adjustments by private 
business than to enact legislation (Kennedy 1971). Beyond highlighting his pref-
erence for a laissez faire approach to the energy sector, Strom’s position also 
highlights the degree of  political power that the energy industry had already 
attained by 1971.
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Despite only obtaining 5 percent more of  the popular vote than the Social 
Credit, the combination of  the first-past-the-post system and a strong showing 
in Alberta’s cities resulted in Lougheed’s Conservatives winning forty-nine out 
of  seventy-five seats in the Alberta legislature. They moved quickly to enact 
policy based on their election platform. The government increased royalties 
from 16.6 percent to 25 percent to maximize the benefit Albertans were receiv-
ing from their resources and set a target of  capturing 35 percent of  the wealth 
generated by natural resources. Lougheed also moved quickly to establish the 
Alberta Heritage Savings Fund, where Albertans would save 30 percent of  the 
province’s nonrenewable resource revenues, plus any return on investments. 
Within the first ten years of  its existence, the fund grew to $12 billion.
In addition, Lougheed acted on his belief  that the long-term jobs and value 
lay not in mining and extraction but in upgrading and processing. He estab-
lished a specific policy of  diversifying the economy and encouraging value-
added processing of  natural resources. This facilitated the birth of  Alberta’s 
petrochemical industry and also the emergence and growth of  a provincial for-
estry industry. Lougheed’s increased interventionism in the economy coincided 
with the dawn of  Alberta’s first major oil boom. In 1973, the Yom Kippur War 
and the subsequent oil embargo resulted in the international price of  oil almost 
quadrupling, from $3.29 to $11.58, within the space of  a year. Prices increased 
further when the situation in Iran exploded in 1978 and 1979, so that by 1980 
oil had reached $36.83 per barrel (ChartsBin 2014). These were generally good 
times for Alberta. The multinational oil companies were happy with the prof-
its they were making, workers were happy with the jobs available, the popula-
tion was growing significantly, Alberta’s two major cities were booming, and 
Albertans felt that, overall, the government was doing a good job of  balancing 
their interests with those of  the energy sector.
Throughout Lougheed’s tenure as premier, the Overton window of  public 
policy was firmly planted slightly to the right of  centre along the spectrum of  
possibilities. Public policy in Alberta during this time demonstrated a strong 
belief  in the free market, free trade, and individualism, but it also included 
support for strong social services, government funding for economic divers-
ification, strong public health care and education, and even some government 
ownership in key sectors like energy, petrochemicals, and telecommunications.
Although there was still a Social Credit presence in the legislature for at 
least part of  Lougheed’s tenure, the key opposition focus during that period was 
from the New Democratic Party and their leader, Grant Notley. Their critique of  
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government came from the centre-left of  the political spectrum, from a place 
just outside the limit of  the Overton window of  the time. Their focus was seek-
ing to control the political and economic power of  the big oil and gas compan-
ies, protecting workers and increasing their benefits and wages, and protecting 
and expanding social services and public services. Despite being a caucus of  one 
for most of  this period, Notley’s opposition proved quite effective. It could be 
said that as a result of  his articulateness and natural leadership ability, he was 
actually able to move the left boundary of  the Overton window far enough to 
encompass many of  his ideas. This is best exemplified by the fact that by the 
1986 election, after Notley’s death, the New Democrats captured close to 30 per-
cent of  the popular vote in the province and formed an official opposition of  
sixteen members.
The Move to the Right
At around this same time, two different dynamics came together to set the 
stage for a drastic shift in the public policy paradigm in Alberta: the growth of  
extreme right-wing think tanks in Canada and the global recession of  the 1980s.
Public policy in Alberta was greatly impacted by the birth and growth of  
extreme right-wing think tanks in Canada, particularly the Fraser Institute and 
the C. D. Howe Institute. The latter had been in existence since the 1950s as the 
Private Planning Association of  Canada, an institute dedicated to studying the 
bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States, but it rebranded 
itself  as the C. D. Howe Institute in 1982. With the rebranding came a move to 
expand its operations and influence across the country and a broadening of  its 
mandate to include all aspects of  economic policy. Its messages strongly echoed 
the economic theories of  Milton Friedman, with calls for reduced taxes, pen-
sion reform, decreased social spending and government intervention, priva-
tization, free trade, and elimination of  government deficits.
These same messages made up the core mandate of  the Fraser Institute. 
Founded in 1974 by economist Michael Walker and a vice-president from for-
estry giant Macmillan Bloedel, the institute set out specifically to shift the pre-
vailing consensus of  the time (the Overton window) that governments had a 
key role to play in economic development because markets were flawed entities 
(Fraser Institute 1999, 4–5). Its primary focus was privatization and deregula-
tion of  all services, but the institute also made plenty of  room for messages 
around reducing taxes, eliminating government deficits, and decreasing social 
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spending. Although its first year operating budget was only $75,000, by 1988 
its annual revenues exceeded $1 million (Fraser Institute 2004, 3). This growth 
is similar to the expansion of  US think tanks following Powell’s urging in 1971.
Likewise, through the support of  corporate Canada, by the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, both of  these institutes were beginning to have their messages and 
ideas privileged by Canada’s media. By 1986, Michael Walker was doing more 
than 250 media interviews a year, was a regular contributor to newspapers 
across the country, and had a daily radio commentary in Vancouver that was 
syndicated to markets across Canada. At the same time, their messages of  
deregulation, privatization, and lower taxes were starting to generate consider-
able interest in Alberta, where corporate elites saw the possibility for greater 
profit and freedom than they were enjoying with the status quo at the time. This 
further contributed to the visibility and profile of  these messages and to the 
fundraising efforts of  the institutes (Fraser Institute 1999, 29).
This funding of  right-wing think tanks and privileging of  their messages in 
the right-wing media closely resembled similar dynamics that had taken place 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries around the world 
and that ultimately resulted in the elevation of  the likes of  Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher, not only in their own countries but on the world stage. Their 
presence and constant repetition of  similar messages internationally further 
helped privilege those messages domestically in Canada.
Alberta’s drastic move to the right was also fuelled by Alberta’s energy 
sector beginning to feel the impact of  a global recession in the early 1980s, 
caused largely by an international oversupply of  oil coming from OPEC and 
the falling prices that resulted. In 1982, Dome Petroleum, Canada’s largest oil 
company at the time, was bailed out by the federal government and the banks 
(Doern 1983, 26). That same year, Lougheed’s government announced a $5.4 
billion package of  royalty reductions and special grants and credits as a way 
of  helping the industry. It didn’t work. By 1984, unemployment in Alberta had 
more than doubled, people were starting to leave the province in droves, and 
foreclosures and bankruptcies were the order of  the day. The situation grew 
worse through 1986, when the price of  oil bottomed out at around $10 per 
barrel (Cameron 1986). In response, the government stopped putting money 
into the Heritage Fund, investment in economic diversification slowed signifi-
cantly, and the government began running budget deficits and moving into an 
accumulated debt position.
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In her book The Shock Doctrine (2007), Naomi Klein suggests that in times 
of  crisis people tend to turn for solutions to the ideas that are lying around. In 
Alberta in the late 1980s, despite a brief  electoral surge by the New Democrats, 
the ideas that were “lying around” were primarily those on the far right being 
promoted by the likes of  the Fraser Institute, the C. D. Howe Institute, and the 
growing number of  right-wing radio talk-show hosts and newspaper colum-
nists. With a few minor tweaks, those voices were able to leverage the collective 
trauma that Albertans were experiencing because of  the economic crash and 
to begin moving the Overton window to the right. Albertans were told repeat-
edly that the economic crisis came about because of  government spending on 
unaffordable social programs, overpaid civil servants, and the growing debt 
and deficit. This need for government to live within its means resonated with 
Albertans who had just lost jobs, cars, homes, and vacation properties when the 
economy collapsed (Taft 1997).
Alberta’s energy companies were also more than happy to spread the mes-
sages, coming from the same sources, that the bust was made worse by govern-
ment intervention in the oil patch through the National Energy Program and 
that overregulation, high taxes, and high royalties were keeping new invest-
ment out of  the oil patch. In 1981, the Fraser Institute had published the book 
Reaction: The National Energy Program, strongly criticizing the National Energy 
Program (Watkins and Walker 1981). Canadian energy companies helped dis-
seminate this book across the country and used it extensively in their lobby-
ing of  government (Fraser Institute 1999, 28). These companies also joined with 
many others in the Canadian corporate sector to ensure that these messages 
continued to be developed by the Fraser Institute and aired as broadly as pos-
sible. The Fraser Institute’s revenue base grew sixfold between 1988 and 1993 as 
a result of  these efforts.
All of  this effort paid off  for Alberta’s corporations: the Overton window 
began to move, as evidenced by the movement of  politicians who followed the 
window to its new location. In 1988, former Edmonton mayor Laurence Decore 
was elected leader of  the Alberta Liberal Party, and then to the Alberta legis-
lature in the general election the following year. Decore used his position as 
leader of  Alberta’s third party to repeatedly and loudly push for eliminating the 
provincial debt and deficit, cutting spending on public services, reducing MLA 
pensions, and ending the government’s direct involvement in the private sector 
(Kheiriddin and Hennig 2010). Four years later, Ralph Klein became leader of  
the Progressive Conservative Party of  Alberta on a platform that contained 
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virtually the same messages that Decore had espoused. The two faced off  against 
each other in the 1993 Alberta election with almost identical policy platforms. 
The New Democrats ran on a traditional left-of-centre platform, which by this 
time was well outside the parameters of  the Overton window and into the realm 
of  the radical and unthinkable. Significant oil and corporate money flowed to 
both the Liberals and the Conservatives to help finance their respective cam-
paigns, and both the media and the corporate sector worked hard to reinforce 
the New Democrats’ positions as out of  touch and unrealistic.
Ralph Klein’s Conservatives won the election with 44.5 percent of  the popu-
lar vote, which was enough to secure fifty-one of  eighty-three seats in the legis-
lature. The Liberals, with 39.7 percent of  the vote, won the remaining thirty-two 
seats, and the New Democrats were totally shut out. With a comfortable legis-
lative majority and the knowledge that 84.2 percent of  voters had, in essence, 
supported the right-wing platform on which both he and Decore had run, Ralph 
Klein felt no qualms about beginning to implement policy that would have been 
considered radical in Alberta just a few years before. The Overton window in 
Alberta had moved, and Ralph Klein’s election platform had been right in the 
middle of  it.
The Klein government immediately implemented across-the-board cuts to 
all government departments and services, laying off  thousands of  public ser-
vants in all parts of  the province. Those who got to keep their jobs were pres-
sured to, and ultimately did, accept wage rollbacks. Alberta registries, liquor 
stores, and highway maintenance were privatized (Martin 2013). The govern-
ment sold off  its remaining stock in Alberta Energy Corporation, used the pro-
ceeds of  the sale to eliminate the provincial deficit, and began the process of  
fully deregulating the provincial electricity market. Government investment 
in public infrastructure and the Heritage Fund stopped altogether, and the 
process of  introducing greater private delivery of  health care through Bill 11 
and other measures began. The Conservative government also began provid-
ing public funds to private schools in the province—something that the Fraser 
Institute in particular had been advocating for years. As the flow of  ideas from 
the far right continued to flood the realm of  public policy dialogue, the Overton 
window continued moving to the right. Ralph Klein won even more convincing 
majorities in the general elections of  1997 and 2001 and felt even more embold-
ened in making sure that policy kept up with the window as it moved. This move 
in the late 1990s was further reinforced by examples from other Canadian prov-
inces, like Ontario, and internationally in countries like New Zealand.
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The Klein government proceeded to implement significant changes to 
Alberta’s royalty regime, introducing inflation indexing and new tiers of  roy-
alties to reduce rates and establishing the 1 percent prepayout royalty rate for 
bitumen sands operations. The Conservatives also reduced Lougheed’s target 
of  35 percent for revenue capture from the oil and gas industry to 25 percent, 
a target that they never met (Campanella 2012, 9–10). They then proceeded 
to drastically cut Alberta’s corporate taxes and introduced a 10 percent sin-
gle-rate personal income tax regime. Both of  these were policy options that 
twenty years earlier would have been considered unthinkable and radical by 
Albertans, but, as a result of  the moving Overton window, these changes were 
accepted and even applauded. These policies had a very significant impact on 
Alberta at the time they were implemented. They created significant job loss 
among government workers, reduced capacity in public services like education 
and health care, and initiated twenty years of  serious neglect of  the province’s 
infrastructure.
Despite the clear policy wins for the neoliberal economic project, the flood 
of  extreme right-wing ideas did not cease. If  anything, these ideas appeared to 
gain momentum as a result of  their proven ability to directly influence govern-
ment policy. This combination of  the ongoing flood of  privileged ideas from 
the right and the severe economic restructuring of  Alberta set in place by Ralph 
Klein’s policies of  the 1990s had two very significant long-term impacts that 
have largely determined where Alberta is today in terms of  democracy and 
public participation in policy: the consolidation of  the energy industry’s power 
and the entrenchment of  Overton window on the far right of  the political spec-
trum. In the remainder of  this chapter, I explore these two impacts in depth.
The Overton Window in Alberta Today
As a result of  reduced tax revenue, infrastructure spending, and investment in 
diversification, Alberta’s oil and gas industry became further entrenched as the 
only show in town, both politically and economically. A quick look at any of  
Alberta’s provincial budgets, annual reports, or economic outlooks since 1993 
is enough to demonstrate the degree of  the province’s dependence on the oil 
and gas industry. In the 2012–13 Alberta budget, for example, nonrenewable 
resource revenues accounted for almost 28 percent of  total projected revenues 
(Alberta, Finance 2012, 13). In the 2014–15 fiscal year, even with the complete 
collapse of  international oil prices, the Alberta government was still projecting 
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that nonrenewable-resource revenues would make up fully one-fifth of  prov-
incial revenues (Alberta, Finance 2015, 6). In terms of  the provincial economy, 
according to the Government of  Alberta, the oil and gas sector accounted for 23.1 
percent of  Alberta’s GDP in 2013 (Alberta, Alberta Innovation and Advanced 
Education 2015). Despite the drop in oil prices in 2014–15, that percentage is not 
expected to change drastically and will probably continue to grow. This number 
includes only extraction and rises significantly once those portions of  the 
construction, manufacturing, and transportation industries that are directly 
or indirectly linked to oil and gas extraction are added. Of  Alberta’s approxi-
mately two million workers, about 7.7 percent are involved directly in oil and 
gas extraction, with a significant number of  the province’s 230,000 construc-
tion workers also engaged directly by the energy industry (Alberta 2014, 10). 
Again, those numbers do not include all those workers in transportation and 
service industries that are directly or indirectly linked to the oil and gas sector. 
The Pembina Institute’s work on a genuine progress indicator for Alberta high-
lights how much less diverse Alberta’s economy was in 2003 than it was in 1971, 
with natural resources playing a much more prominent role than ever before 
(Pembina Institute 2005).
When one sector of  the economy accounts for anywhere from one-fifth to 
one-third of  government revenues and GDP, and 10 to 15 percent of  jobs in the 
province, it is also bound to have significant political power. One of  the clearest 
manifestations of  this political power came during the 2007 review of  royalty 
rates in Alberta. One way in which Ralph Klein had justified reducing royalty 
rates in the 1990s was by asserting that because oil prices had dropped, indus-
try needed the incentive in order to continue investing in Alberta. Beginning 
in 1999 with the publication of  the report Giving Away the Alberta Advantage by 
the Parkland Institute, a number of  Alberta-based groups including Parkland 
Institute, Pembina Institute, and the Alberta Federation of  Labour began trying 
to move public consensus back to higher royalty rates. As the price of  oil started 
to increase rapidly in the early 2000s, followed by record oil company profits, 
the repeated message from these groups that Albertans were not getting their 
fair share began to resonate, and the idea of  increasing royalty rates began to 
move from the realm of  the unthinkable to the realm of  the reasonable and 
possible.
By the time of  the 2006 Conservative leadership race to replace Ralph Klein, 
the Overton window on the royalty regime had moved enough that it became a 
leadership issue. During the leadership race, Ed Stelmach promised that if  he 
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were elected, one of  his first orders of  business would be a full review of  the 
province’s royalty structure. Once elected, he appointed a blue-ribbon panel to 
carry out the review and promised to implement changes based on their rec-
ommendations. Although the panel did not go as far in recommending higher 
royalties as had been suggested by groups like Parkland, it did ultimately rec-
ommend an increase in royalties and an overhaul of  the system (Acuña and 
Gibson 2007).
In response to the recommendations, the oil and gas industry in Alberta 
launched a significant advertising and public relations campaign, including 
the funding and organizing of  a sizeable rally at the legislature, to convince 
Albertans that increasing royalties would break the provincial economy. 
More importantly, however, industry representatives demanded and received 
closed door meetings with the premier and Energy minister to echo the veiled 
threats being issued publicly about the consequences of  increased royalties 
(CBC News 2007).
In response to the industry’s reaction, the new regime that Ed Stelmach 
announced in 2007, and implemented in 2009, was significantly weaker in 
terms of  royalty collection than the review panel had recommended (Acuña and 
Gibson 2007). In the provincial election that took place between the announce-
ment of  the royalty regime and its implementation, the Conservatives actually 
increased their share of  the popular vote from the previous election and won 
a convincing majority, but the industry was still not happy with the pending 
increase in royalties. The industry set out to send Ed Stelmach, and all future 
premiers, a strong message. Companies began throwing their political and 
financial support behind what had been a fringe start-up party until that point, 
the Wildrose Party. They supported the leadership campaign of  an articulate 
and charismatic young woman, Danielle Smith, who also happened to be a 
graduate of  the Fraser Institute’s youth internship program (Canadian Press 
2012). Corporate Alberta then ensured that the party was presented by the 
media as a viable option to the Conservatives—a process aided by her husband, 
an executive with Sun Media, and by her own past experience as a columnist at 
the Calgary Herald and the host of  an interview show on Global Television.
The rise of  the Wildrose Party on the right flank of  the Conservatives caused 
significant division in the Conservative caucus, since many members felt that 
they needed to move further right to accommodate what they saw as a shift to 
the right among voters. This division in the party is what ultimately led to the 
secession of  two Conservative MLAs in 2010 and the resignation of  Finance 
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Minister Ted Morton and Premier Stelmach in 2011—just three years after 
Albertans had given him a clear mandate as premier. Alberta’s energy industry 
had flexed its political muscle, thrown a government into disarray, and signifi-
cantly influenced the leadership of  the province.
The second impact of  the political dynamic that has played out in Alberta 
in the past four decades has been an entrenchment of  the Overton window on 
the far right of  the political spectrum. Well-funded and well-connected groups 
like the Fraser Institute, the Canadian Taxpayers Federation, and the C. D. 
Howe Institute continue to flood the arena of  dialogue and debate with extreme 
right-wing ideas. The danger here is that the Overton window has become so 
entrenched on the far right of  the spectrum that what are actually ideologically 
based and political ideas are interpreted by the public as objective truths. These 
are the ideas at the heart of  neoliberal economic theory that have been repeated 
across North America by right-wing think tanks and the mainstream media 
since the 1970s: that government is by nature inefficient, that markets can 
deliver services more effectively than government, that low taxes are object-
ively good, that quality public services are unaffordable, that politicians and 
public servants are self-interested and greedy, and that unions result in ineffi-
ciency and waste.
The impact of  this, in terms of  change, is twofold. First, acceptance of  these 
market ideologies as unquestionable truths has moved a significant portion of  
the population to a place where we see ourselves first and foremost as consum-
ers rather than as democratic citizens with rights and responsibilities. Second, 
a majority of  citizens are no longer willing or able to consider or entertain 
anything that might contradict these “truths.” That being the case, anything 
remotely to the left of  the Overton window is discounted offhand not just as 
radical and unthinkable but also as contradicting basic sense and logic.
As John Ralston Saul (1995) suggests in The Unconscious Civilization, in its 
evolution as a “science,” neoliberal economic theory has come to be considered 
economic law. In places like Alberta, therefore, you would have as much luck 
arguing for increased taxes or public ownership as you would arguing that 1 + 1 = 
5. Fraser Institute head Michael Walker reportedly once responded to the birth 
of  a left-wing think tank in British Columbia by declaring that the laws of  the 
free market can no more be resisted than the law of  gravity (Klein 1998). Until 
these theories are removed from the realm of  truth and brought back into the 
realm of  ideas, there is no possibility of  the Overton window moving anywhere 
but further right, if  at all.
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
A Window on Power and Influence in Alberta Politics   309
Conclusion
The implications for policy in Alberta of  the consolidation of  the oil and gas 
industry’s power and the entrenchment of  the Overton window are significant. 
It will be extremely difficult for any provincial government—regardless of  pol-
itical stripe, rhetoric, or the ideological leanings of  its leader—to alter the prov-
incial royalty regime, significantly raise personal or corporate taxes, or justify 
consecutive operating deficits that lead to a net debt position. This means that 
the range of  real policy options in Alberta is severely limited by what the indus-
try will allow without mounting a capital strike.
This inevitability was highlighted by the 2015 Alberta budget which, despite 
a $7 billion revenue shortfall and growing popular consensus that corporate 
taxes needed to be increased, included no increases to either royalties or corpor-
ate taxes, and only minor tweaks to the provincial income tax system (Howell 
2015). The immediate reaction by the energy industry and financial investors to 
the election of  a New Democrat majority in May 2015 provides further proof  
of  the role of  the energy industry in entrenching the Overton window. The 
day after the election, world oil prices rose to above $62 per barrel for the first 
time in months, yet the energy sub-index of  the Toronto Stock Exchange saw a 
drop of  3 percent as the selloff  began, and groups like the Canadian Federation 
of  Independent Business warned of  major job losses if  taxes are increased 
(Johnson 2015).
When public policy is seen as inevitable and economic theories are seen as 
truth, people have no reason to engage with the political processes that impact 
their lives. This trend is reinforced by messaging from the far right that con-
sistently labels government and politicians as irrelevant, inefficient, and self-
serving. Voter turnout and participation in political parties in Alberta are both 
likely to continue dropping for the foreseeable future, further abandoning the 
realm of  public policy to the energy industry and think tanks.
The rise of  right-wing think tanks in Canada and their close connections to 
the country’s corporate sector, and in particular the oil industry, were able to 
leverage Albertans’ experiences of  the economic bust of  the 1980s to precipitate 
a significant shift to the right of  Alberta’s Overton window. This in turn led to 
the election of  Ralph Klein. Klein’s government enacted a set of  public policies 
that consolidated the political and economic power of  Alberta’s energy sector, 
thus entrenching the Overton window on the far right of  the political spectrum. 
As a result of  these dynamics over the past thirty years, public policy in Alberta 
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today has become subservient to corporate interests. The neoliberal logic of  the 
market is the primary driver of  policy change, and, such being the case, policies 
from the right are the easiest to implement. The unexpected election of  a left-
leaning majority government after nearly forty-four years of  uninterrupted PC 
rule gives pause to the prediction that the prospects for significant change are 
slim. Yet even though the 57 percent voter turnout in the 2015 election was the 
highest in two decades, the reality is that almost half  of  all Albertans remain 
politically disengaged. While the end of  Tory rule is significant symbolically, 
the constraints imposed by the shift in the Overton window to the right may 
preclude a dramatic change in policy direction. Then again, in Alberta stranger 
things have happened.
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The Paradox of  Plenty
Ending Homelessness in Alberta
Joshua Evans
Homelessness is a prominent public policy issue in Canada, where an afford-
able-housing crisis has unfolded over the past two decades (Gaetz, Gulliver, 
and Richter 2014). This crisis is particularly acute in the country’s biggest 
cities, where street homelessness has become an everyday feature of  the urban 
landscape (Laird 2007). Alberta’s prodigious prosperity has not exempted the 
province from these trends. In fact, Alberta has experienced some of  the worst 
affordability problems and sharpest increases in homelessness in Canada, 
all in the midst of  recent resource development booms (Calgary Homeless 
Foundation 2012). In the summer of  2007, the housing crisis became so severe 
that a large encampment of  the homeless, which came to be called “Tent City,” 
formed on a vacant lot in Edmonton’s inner city (Ruttan 2007). Over several 
months, Tent City grew to a population of  several hundred people. Although 
the encampment was initially tolerated, safety concerns and public pressure 
forced the hand of  the City of  Edmonton, and Tent City was dismantled. Camp 
residents were moved into emergency shelters and transitional housing units. 
But the encampment caught national media attention, exposing the underside 
of  Alberta growth.
In October 2008, the Province of  Alberta introduced an ambitious pro-
gram to end homelessness in ten years (Alberta Secretariat for Action on 
Homelessness 2008). At the time of  writing (April 2015), Alberta is the only 
province in Canada with such a plan; however, Ontario’s poverty reduction 
strategy, initiated in 2014, includes “ending homelessness” as a long-term goal. 
The provincial strategy pledges investments to the tune of  $3.316 billion, with 
the goal of  moving eleven thousand individuals and families out of  homeless-
ness by 2019. Central to this strategy is the Housing First (HF) model developed 
in the early 1990s in New York City to meet the housing and health needs of  
12
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
314   Joshua Evans
chronically homeless populations (Falvo 2009). HF is based on the theory that 
rather than making permanent housing contingent on abstinence-based treat-
ment in a shelter or transitional setting, permanent housing should be pro-
vided to chronically homeless individuals at the outset because this creates a 
better foundation for the recovery process (Tsemberis 2010).
The ambitious policy outlined in 2008 in A Plan for Alberta: Ending Homelessness 
in Alberta in 10 Years is no doubt made possible by Alberta’s abundant resource 
endowments. Alberta’s carbon-fuelled exceptionalism is the backdrop to rather 
bold social policy objectives in this regard, a pattern not uncommon in other 
oil-rich states (Karl 2004). But when it comes to what these policy develop-
ments say about the relationship between oil and democracy, it is imperative to 
scrutinize the type of  democratic action they represent.
In this chapter, I examine democratic politics in the oil-rich province of  
Alberta through the lens of  homelessness policy, employing a definition of  
democracy developed by philosopher Jacques Rancière. Here, rule (kratos) by 
the people (demos) is understood as action that springs from the realization that 
politics lacks any natural foundation capable of  justifying oligarchic govern-
ment—that is, the rule of  a minority over a majority. Democracy is grounded 
upon an anarchic presupposition of  innate equality: that we are all similarly 
capable and worthy of  participating in the political community. Equality is the 
basic fact that we have in common. This radical presupposition of  equality is 
perpetually at odds with hierarchical orders instituted along lines of  gender, 
race, and class. It is the mésentente, the disagreement, between equality and 
hierarchy that constitutes politics. As Rancière (2007, 94) argues, there is pol-
itics because there is democracy. Democratic politics can thus be conceived as 
actions, taken by or on behalf  of  those who have no part—no share—in a pre-
vailing order, that demonstrate how equality has been wronged by hierarchies. 
In Rancière’s estimation (1999), democracy—and by extension, politics—very 
rarely occur, particularly in the industrialized world, which is increasingly 
dominated by approaches to government that Rancière pejoratively character-
izes as “postdemocratic.”
Rancière’s view on democratic politics invites a particular examination of  
policies purporting to “end” homelessness. Can they be read as democratic, 
as actions that denaturalize prevailing hierarchies in the housing system and 
demonstrate how equality is fundamentally wronged by homelessness? Or are 
these policy developments better read as postdemocratic solutions to the col-
lateral damage wrought by years of  welfare state retrenchment and oil-fuelled 
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economic booms and busts? In this chapter, I address these questions through 
a discursive examination of  homelessness policy, using an approach that draws 
attention to how discourse shapes what can be said, and in turn understood, 
about homelessness. I argue that the discourse of  “ending homelessness” is an 
economically rationalized, technocratic, and consensual mode of  governing 
that aims interventions toward particular subpopulations of  homeless people 
and, in doing so, neglects systemic problems in the housing system that per-
petuate affordability problems. Such a policy environment effectively hampers 
democratic action around housing justice and thus invites comparisons to what 
Rancière calls postdemocracy.
Policy, Politics, and Democracy
Rancière’s writings invite social scientists to think about politics and democ-
racy differently. His novel political ontology rests on a distinction between the 
“police” and “politics,” two contradictory logics. “Police,” for Rancière (1999, 
28), does not refer to law enforcement or the state apparatus; rather, it refers 
to a logic that “arranges that tangible reality in which bodies are distributed 
in a community.” The police (or policy) is an order in which bodies are counted 
and assigned to a proper place. These hierarchical orders function as epistemo-
logical grids, systems of  seeing and hearing, that establish the conditions for 
governance. Rancière (1999, 2010) discusses the establishment of  a police 
order as one aspect of  le partage du sensible, “the distribution of  the sensible.” 
The term partage refers to sharing out, dividing, or apportioning. Hence, the 
distribution of  the sensible is simultaneously to make something common, to 
classify, and to allocate. Public policy is grounded in particular distributions 
of  the sensible that—by rendering populations visible, problematizing them, 
and building a discursive world around them—evoke particular police orders 
(Dikeç 2005).
Politics also takes on a different meaning in Rancière’s (1999, 2010) frame-
work. Politics is the disruption of  the police order by what is unaccounted 
for, by unnamed parts of  the whole that have no proper place in the sensible 
field, parties outside of  established orders rendered invisible within prevail-
ing distributions. Their voices heard as noise, they are thus unrecognizable 
and unaccounted for. As Dikeç (2005, 176) puts it, politics “is the disruption 
of  the police order—the sum of  the fully counted, rightly named, and properly 
placed parts—by a part that has no part in this particular counting, naming and 
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partitioning.” Politics is the struggle for recognition by a party that has no part 
in an established police order, a struggle launched in the name of  radical equal-
ity. In this sense, politics is conflict over who is recognized, whose voice is heard 
as speech rather than noise, and the divisions by which these relationships are 
established and changed. Politics is not a matter of  recognizing an additional 
group that is not counted in society—this simply establishes another police 
order—but those moments that reveal the radical equality of  anyone and 
everyone (for example, Edmonton’s Tent City). It is the enactment of  this equal-
ity, by identifying how it is systemically wronged within a police order, that 
functions as the (negative) ontology of  politics (Rancière 1999).
Rancière’s unique perspective on politics invites different ways of  think-
ing about democratic politics. Rancière (2010, 50) views democracy as “neither 
a form of  government nor a form of  social life. Democracy is the institution 
of  politics, of  politics as a paradox.” By paradox, he means that politics is the 
enactment of  how equality is wronged. Politics “consists in blurring and dis-
placing the borders of  the political. This is what politics means: displacing the 
limits of  the political by re-enacting the equality of  each and all” (54). Rancière 
stresses how democracy implies this practice of  displacement, a practice he 
calls “dissensus,” which is continuously muted by budding police orders.
In Rancière’s estimation, political dissensus is continuously thwarted in 
Western democratic politics by what he labels “consensus thinking”: the “pre-
supposition of  inclusion of  all parties and their problems that prohibits the 
political subjectification of  a part of  those who have no part, of  a count of  the 
uncounted” (1999, 116). Rancière calls the resulting postpolitical state of  con-
sensus building “postdemocracy,” which he describes as “the consensual prac-
tice of  effacing forms of  democratic action” in the name of  democracy. As he 
goes on to explain, “Postdemocracy is the government practice and conceptual 
legitimization of  a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated 
the appearance, miscount, and dispute of  the people and is thereby reducible to 
the sole interplay of  state mechanisms and combinations of  social energies and 
interests” (101–2).
Rancière contends that postdemocracy is itself  a distribution of  the sens-
ible, a “regime in which the parties are presupposed as already given, their 
community established” (102). Postdemocracy is the evaporation of  any gap 
between the excess that has no part and the order in which everyone is assigned 
to their proper place, the disappearance of  any gap between politics and the 
police.
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The Discourse of “Ending Homelessness”
Michel Foucault’s (1972) archaeological approach to knowledge offers a useful 
means to examine the discourse of  “ending homelessness.” Foucault concep-
tualizes discourse as contingent formations of  knowing and thinking that make 
up specific domains of  knowledge and practice (Murdoch 2005). The archaeo-
logical method focuses on discursive discontinuities and ruptures that make 
possible the emergence of  formal domains such as policy models (Scheurich 
1994). The elementary unit of  analysis when using the archaeological method 
is the statement (enoncé; Foucault 1972). Statements are not equivalent to sen-
tences or propositions insofar as the meaning of  the statement is not reducible 
to grammatical rules, logical formulations, or a single referent. Statements 
acquire their meaning on an enunciative level: “whatever it is that makes people 
at a certain period take certain speech acts seriously” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1983, 58). Analyzing statements on an enunciative level involves describing 
those rules and conditions that enable or constrain what registers as sensible, 
comprehensible, or thinkable about people, relations, places, or experiences at 
a given point in time.
The discourse analysis on which this chapter is based focuses on major 
policy documents on the issue of  homelessness at provincial and municipal 
levels in Alberta. This section identifies five statements—statistical, biograph-
ical, economic, planning, and philosophical—that together constitute Alberta’s 
enunciative environment. This environment of  speech acts and discursive 
events both enables and constrains what registers as thinkable (i.e. , Rancière’s 
“the distribution of  the sensible”) with regard to homelessness in Alberta. This 
enunciative environment, established through the relations between state-
ments, makes it possible to declare that an “end” to homelessness is within the 
realm of  governmental possibility and responsibility. It is therefore pivotal for 
understanding the nature of  policy shifts as well as their democratic relevance.
Statistical Statements
Statistical statements are indispensable discursive events when it comes to 
homelessness policy-making. Enumeration, tabulation, and categorization 
play constitutive roles in the social categorization of  temporarily unhoused 
people as a distinct and measurable group: it is through statistical statements 
that people, united primarily by their lack of  permanent housing, appear as 
a “homeless population.” How many people are homeless? Who is homeless? 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
318   Joshua Evans
How long are people homeless? By answering these questions, a “homeless 
population” finds expression—in the form of  tables, graphs, and pie charts—
across research reports and policy documents. The conversion of  people into 
a quantifiable population, in terms of  their housing history and sociodemo-
graphic characteristics, is a noteworthy event insofar as it produces the objects 
of  intervention for homelessness policy.
Statistical descriptions of  homeless populations are central features of  
Alberta’s policy discourse. As far back as the early 1990s, authorities in both 
Calgary and Edmonton formalized programs to enumerate the homeless using 
“point-in-time” (or “snapshot”) census counts that collected data on the size and 
social characteristics of  the homeless. Over time, these statistical statements 
evolved from simple charts and graphs to more complex population models, 
forecasts, and service utilization rates (see Sorensen 2010). These changes rep-
resent fundamental shifts in the enunciative environment. Two in particular 
are notable.
First, the “systems of  classification” (Foucault 1972) used to define home-
less persons became more complex over time. In Calgary and Edmonton, for 
instance, early counts drew upon the classic United Nations distinction between 
“absolute” and “relative” homelessness. Over time, classificatory schemes in 
both cities multiplied in terms of  scope and specificity. In 2006, Calgary adopted 
the European Typology of  Homelessness and Housing Exclusion (ETHOS). The 
ETHOS typology designates four conceptual categories—roofless, houseless, 
insecure, and inadequate—which are broken down into a total of  thirteen dif-
ferent operational categories. These classification schemes permitted policy-
makers to speak about the homeless population with more precision and 
accuracy. Alberta’s strategy to end homelessness, as laid out in A Plan for Alberta: 
Ending Homelessness in 10 Years (Alberta Secretariat for Action on Homelessness 
2008, 7), identifies three major categories of  homeless Albertans—the chronic 
homeless, the transient homeless, and the employable homeless.
A second shift occurred when the “authorities of  delimitation” (Foucault 
1972), those individuals and groups empowered by society as a whole to address 
homelessness, began to favour individuals and groups with professional exper-
tise. In the early years, task forces, committees, and working groups were priv-
ileged speakers. These coalitions of  elected politicians, appointed civil servants, 
private sector philanthropists, academics, and nonprofit representatives were 
granted authority over enumeration programs; however, over time social 
researchers, and social research units in particular, were accorded a special role 
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in determining the size and characteristics of  homeless populations. Today, 
research units coordinate the count of  homeless populations, and it is common 
to contract out such research activities to professional research consultants and 
academics. Together, these shifts in systems of  classification and authorities 
of  delimitation reflect the consolidation of  a research agenda, the adoption of  
more sophisticated data management systems, and the accumulation of  addi-
tional research capacity and resources.
Biographical Statements
While statistical statements constitute one part of  the enunciative environ-
ment for producing knowledge about the homeless as a population, homeless-
ness policy is also replete with statements about homeless individuals. In this 
sense, another object, the homeless person, is constructed. But rather than 
offering objective statistics about housing status, age, or gender, biographical 
statements individualize the experience of  homelessness through direct quota-
tions, third-person narratives, and photographic images.
Biographical statements are relatively rare in early policy documents. 
For instance, the 1999 report of  the Edmonton Task Force on Homelessness, 
Homelessness in Edmonton: A Call to Action, contains only a single direct quote 
from a “former homeless” person (5). This dearth of  biographical information is 
addressed over time. More specifically, a new type of  biographical statement—
the case study—surfaces in later policy documents. Consider, for instance, the 
following statement from A Place to Call Home, a report written in 2009 by the 
Edmonton Committee to End Homelessness:
Take Charles. He is 42 years old, HIV positive, and has spent most of  the last 
25 years sleeping on the street or in crack houses. But Charles’ life changed 
the day he went into the Jasper Place Health and Wellness Centre for a cup 
of  coffee and a shower: he developed a relationship with the staff  at the 
Centre, who were able to give him the tools he needed to get an apartment of  
his own. They were there when Charles filled out the form for his lease, they 
helped him with the security deposit, and they assured the landlord that 
they would be responsible for the apartment if  anything went wrong. The 
assistance and encour¬agement did not end there: a support worker went 
grocery shopping with Charles to help him stretch his dollar as efficiently 
as possible; he helped Charles out with furniture and learning to cook. Then 
when Charles decided to deal with his cocaine habit, the Centre gave him 
the resources he needed. The Housing First principle does work. (29)
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Using third-person narratives, biographical statements tell a “success story” 
about interventions. These success stories represent a fundamental shift in the 
enunciative environment—namely, the formation of  new “enunciative modal-
ities” (Foucault 1972) governing who can speak, from where, and in what situa-
tion. Two aspects of  these narratives are notable.
First, these biographical statements emanate from specific institutional 
sites in the community, including research and evaluation sites associated with 
Housing First programs (such as Calgary’s Pathways to Housing or Edmonton’s 
Jasper Place Health and Wellness Centre). Through biographical statements, 
these sites become embedded within broader multistakeholder policy pro-
cesses. Second, biographical statements can be described in terms of  the situa-
tions that bring a subject and object into a relationship. The success stories 
presented above evoke a new situation: “clients” are followed, monitored, and 
managed over time via highly synchronized case management approaches 
to mental health service delivery. The Edmonton report A Place to Call Home 
(Edmonton Committee to End Homelessness 2009, 64) defines case manage-
ment as follows: “A collaborative process of  assessment, planning, facilitation, 
and evaluation of  the options and services required to meet an individual’s 
health and human service needs. It is characterized by advocacy, communi-
cation, and creative resource management to promote quality, cost-effective 
outcomes.” In this sense, relationships between subjects (such as the Alberta 
Secretariat for Action on Homelessness and the Edmonton Committee to End 
Homelessness) and objects (“Charles”) in these stories are mediated by actual 
HF programs and their requisite case management orientations. In this way, 
biographical statements are no longer simple snapshot descriptions that per-
sonalize homelessness. Instead, they are narratives that tout the economic effi-
ciency of  the professional case management process. These homeless stories 
give a different inflection to “success.”
Planning Statements
Statements referring to specific policy models and their procedures are prom-
inent features of  discourse surrounding homelessness policy. These planning 
statements diagram why and how interventions should work in practice. They 
presuppose a set of  actors, each with specific roles and responsibilities, and 
prescribe a set of  actions designed to achieve policy goals.
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The planning statements that appear in early policy documents convey a 
particular set of  policy goals. Foremost among them is rehousing the homeless. 
As late as 2005, Edmonton’s community plan evoked this very premise:
The Plan is built on the premise that Edmonton needs an integrated system 
that enables and encourages people to “move up” through various housing 
options, and ultimately, if  possible, into the private housing market. This 
requires a sufficient supply of  different types of  housing units at each stage, 
along with support services that encourage and enable people to become 
as independent as possible. (Edmonton Joint Planning Council on Housing 
2005, 2)
Planning statements at that time evoked a particular conceptual formulation: 
a service orientation called the “linear residential treatment” (LRT) continuum 
(Tsemberis 2010). Until 2007, the LRT continuum was a prominent feature of  
policy documents. This model of  rehousing the homeless encompasses a range 
of  services and supports, including street outreach and emergency accommo-
dation, transitional housing, and independent housing. In this model, tran-
sitional and independent (and in some cases emergency) housing is provided 
on the condition that consumers participate in job training and psychological 
counselling and maintain sobriety. It is therefore sometimes referred to as the 
treatment first (TF) model (Tsemberis 2010).
Beginning in 2008, planning statements began to change with the adoption 
of  an alternative model, the Housing First (HF) model, which calls for immedi-
ate access to permanent housing regardless of  clients’ commitment to treat-
ment or sobriety. For example, Edmonton’s A Place to Call Home (Edmonton 
Committee to End Homelessness 2009, 27) states: “The primary goal is finding a 
permanent home for people who are without a place to live, regardless of  their 
past or present issues. This includes accessing rent subsidies and potentially 
negotiating leases with landlords, on behalf  of  the client.”
Alberta’s ten-year plan to end homelessness (Alberta Secretariat for Action 
on Homelessness 2008, 17) is even more explicit, stating: “Top priority is given 
to rapid re-housing of  homeless Albertans into permanent housing. Permanent 
housing doesn’t mean a shelter. It means a secure home using a housing option 
that’s appropriate for the circumstances of  the individual or family.” This 
conceptual reformulation evokes a different style of  reasoning. Rather than 
simply provide the opportunity to “‘move up’ through various housing options, 
and ultimately, if  possible, into the private housing market” (Edmonton Joint 
Planning Council on Housing 2005, 2), as in the case of  the TF model, these later 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
322   Joshua Evans
planning statements direct service providers to house individuals immediately 
in the private housing market (Edmonton Committee to End Homelessness 
2009, 27).
This conceptual reformulation reflects significant shifts in the enuncia-
tive environment. First, in the case of  the HF concept, planning statements 
are organized around the presupposition that homeless individuals inherently 
deserve housing regardless of  personal problems or behaviour. Housing is a 
human right and should be provided with no strings attached. A Place to Call 
Home (Edmonton Committee to End Homelessness 2009, 8) summarizes this 
basic premise of  the HF concept:
The Housing First approach says the first step in solving the problem is to 
find people permanent homes and give them the support they need to be 
successful in those homes. This philosophy represents a shift away from 
the theory that people have to be “prepared” or “transitioned” into housing 
by first dealing with mental health and addiction issues or finding a job. It 
recognizes that the best place to deal with those issues is not living on the 
street but in safe, secure housing.
In contrast, TF typically takes as its premise that homeless people are dispro-
portionately sick or troubled and must be made “housing ready.” The concep-
tual reformulation accomplished by planning statements in recent plans and 
reports is based on a recalibration of  deservedness.
Second, this enunciative environment extends beyond Edmonton, Calgary, 
and Alberta to other places in the world. The Calgary Committee to End 
Homelessness cites specific studies on the effectiveness of  the HF approach in 
US cities:
The principles and strategies at the heart of  Calgary’s 10 Year Plan have 
been put to the test in other communities, with encouraging results:
 • In the short space of  18 months after the implementation of  
Portland, Oregon’s 10-year plan, the city reduced its chronic home-
less population by 70 per cent.
 • Denver, Colorado has seen an 11 per cent reduction in overall home-
lessness and a 36 per cent reduction in chronic homelessness since 
the city implemented its plan in 2005.
 • Hennepin County, Minnesota has seen a dramatic decline in family 
homelessness since it implemented its 10-year plan. From 2002 to 
2004, the community saw family homelessness decline by 43 per cent, 
from 1,819 to 1,046. (Calgary Committee to End Homelessness 2008, 6)
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When it comes to the HF concept, planning statements are constituted by 
flows of  knowledge from sites around the world. These distributed sites serve 
as instrumental points of  reference in legitimizing this particular style of  
reasoning.
Economic Statements
Economic concerns regarding housing systems have long been prominent fea-
tures of  policy discourses dealing with homelessness. Alberta research reports 
and policy plans contain numerous references to the hardships of  poverty, the 
affordability of  housing, and the costs associated with maintaining an adequate 
housing continuum. Questions and recommendations relating to funding levels 
for housing and support programs are prominent and generally take the form 
of  a “gap analysis.”
Over time, a different type of  economic statement emerged, focusing on 
the indirect, or “spillover,” costs of  homelessness and the financial implica-
tions of  different service models. Calgary’s 10 Year Plan (Calgary Committee to 
End Homelessness 2008, 7), for example, points out some of  the social and eco-
nomic costs of  homelessness:
The social costs of  homelessness are many and well understood. We know 
that people with mental illness or addictions get worse when they are 
un-housed and unable to receive treatment, and they often end up in ambu-
lances and emergency wards. Citizens and visitors to Calgary are often dis-
turbed by seeing so many people experiencing homelessness on our streets. 
Many don’t feel safe downtown at night, particularly in and near the East 
Village and along the Bow River pathways. But we’ve also begun to realize 
that homelessness is exacting a terrible economic toll. Our own analysis 
shows it costs taxpayers more to manage homelessness than it would to end 
it. . . .
If  Calgary’s current homelessness growth rate continues into the next 
decade, we estimate that the number of  people homeless on any given night 
could reach 15,000 and cumulative spending could be more than $9 billion.
Statements such as these constitute the first half  of  the “business case” con-
cept. This business case has also been taken up by the province and other cities. 
In a quintessential arrangement of  economic statements, the provincial strat-
egy (Alberta Secretariat for Action on Homelessness 2008, 8) enunciates it as 
follows:
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If  Alberta continues its current approach of  simply managing our current 
homeless population, it’s estimated that the Alberta government will incur 
costs of  $6.65 billion over 10 years. This is because managing homelessness 
is extremely costly to taxpayers. The Alberta government incurs direct costs 
relating to homelessness, such as the emergency shelter system, services for 
homeless Albertans, and programming to homeless-serving agencies. The 
government also incurs expenses through indirect costs—that is, spend-
ing in other government systems such as the health system, corrections 
system, and justice system. Homeless Albertans utilize these systems in 
multiple ways that result in higher costs to the taxpayer.
Citing Steve Pomeroy’s 2005 study for Canada’s National Secretariat on 
Homelessness, the Edmonton Committee to End Homelessness (2009, 27) 
employs this same style of  economic reasoning in A Place to Call Home:
Studies across Canada have shown that institutional responses (detention, 
prison, psychiatric hospitals) for a person experiencing homelessness cost 
taxpayers between $66,000 and $120,000 each year. Emergency shelter 
costs average between $13,000 and $42,000 per person, per year. (In 
Edmonton, an average of  $15,000.) The price of  supportive housing for that 
person would be between $35,000 and $40,000 per year.
The last statement here is key: the business case not only accounts for the full 
societal costs of  homelessness; it also employs a comparison of  alternatives—
in this case, supportive housing. This administrative style of  cost-benefit rea-
soning is a prominent feature of  economic statements.
This pattern of  concept formation reflects additional shifts in the enuncia-
tive environment. First, as in the case of  the HF model, it is clear that statements 
originating from outside Alberta are highly influential, particularly those eman-
ating from the United States. Anecdotes such as the following, from Calgary’s 10 
Year Plan to End Homelessness (Calgary Committee to End Homelessness 2008, 44), 
are common:
Into that atmosphere stepped Mr. Philip Mangano, Executive Director of  
the United States Interagency Council on Homelessness. Mangano spoke 
to a September 2006 breakfast meeting arranged by the Calgary Homeless 
Foundation. At that meeting, Mangano spoke passionately about the eco-
nomic case for addressing chronic homelessness and about a new 10-year 
planning model that was showing some remarkable results south of  the 
border.
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Edmonton is no different. In A Place to Call Home, the Edmonton Committee to 
End Homelessness (2009, 24) observes that “where the Housing First model has 
already been fully implemented in the United States, evidence is emerging of  
social and financial benefits.” Judging from these Alberta documents on home-
lessness, the United States Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) and 
the National Alliance to End Homelessness (NAEH) significantly influenced the 
genesis of  the business case in Alberta.
Second, underlying the business case concept is the tacit assumption that 
not all policy is created equal. Within Alberta, the notion of  “best practices” 
governs how the business case concept has been translated and rendered into 
local models for implementation. “Best practices” connotes the “expectation 
that an intervention has been successful according to some criteria and that it is 
better than something else” (Øyen 2009, 1). In Alberta, the translation of  the US 
business case is underpinned by networks of  policy learning spanning an ever-
expanding evidentiary landscape of  HF research in North America.
Philosophical Statements
A final statement constituting Alberta’s policy discourse is the philosophical 
statement. Philosophical statements communicate broad-based, overarch-
ing policy themes. In Alberta, a new theme emerged, beginning in 2007. A 
Plan for Alberta: Ending Homelessness in 10 Years (Alberta Secretariat for Action on 
Homelessness 2008) was distinguished by a clear emphasis on putting a defin-
itive end to homelessness. In a section titled “Setting the Vision,” the report 
states:
Homelessness is unacceptable in a province as prosperous as Alberta. No 
Albertan should be forced to live on the streets or remain in a shelter for an 
extended period of  time. Albertans have the resources, the creativity and 
the compassion to effectively address homelessness in their communities. 
For a province built on great achievements and innovation, and a people 
who don’t shy away from big challenges, the Secretariat has set a bold vision 
for its Plan: Homelessness is ended in Alberta by 2019. (14)
This emerging theme surfaces in the titles of  other major policy documents as 
well. For instance, the titles of  plans in Edmonton evolved from Homelessness 
in Edmonton: A Call to Action (Edmonton Task Force on Homelessness 1999), 
to Edmonton Community Plan on Housing and Support Services (Edmonton Joint 
Planning Council on Housing 2005), to A Place to Call Home: Edmonton’s 10 Year 
Plan to End Homelessness (Edmonton Committee to End Homelessness 2009). A 
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thematic pattern is discernible, moving from “taking action,” to “managing 
accordingly,” to “ending homelessness.”
This pattern reflects a fundamental shift in the enunciative environment that 
was shaped by a number of  conditions. First, these thematic choices derive from 
the coexistence of  statistical, biographical, planning, and economic statements: 
together, they yield a particular theoretical option that was not possible before. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, advocates, policy-makers, and service provid-
ers were working within an enunciative environment that afforded a managerial 
style of  reasoning focused on gaps in service. It was through the interrelation-
ships established between new ways of  representing homeless populations, por-
traying their lives, planning interventions, and rationalizing costs and benefits 
that previous policy approaches became subject to critique as “managerial” in a 
pejorative sense. The very opportunity to juxtapose “ending homelessness” with 
“managing homelessness” is itself  a product of  these emergent relations. The 
philosophical statement is the mode in which these strategic contrasts emerge.
Table 12.1. The discourse of “ending homelessness”
Rules of formation Statement Example Conditions 












Strategy Philosophical Ending homelessness Quasi-public planning 
process
In summary, a close examination of  the shifts in Alberta’s policy discourse 
reveals a significantly modified discursive formation (see table 12.1). The state-
ments discussed above—statistical, biographical, planning, economic, and 
philosophical—are insinuated in the formation of  new objects (a homeless 
population) and speaking positions (“success stories”), and they are mobilized 
together to form novel concepts (“Housing First” and the “business case”) and 
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strategic possibilities (“managing homelessness” versus “ending homeless-
ness”). These statements, along with their conditions, constitute a renovated 
enunciative environment (or “distribution of  the sensible”) for homelessness 
policy-making in the province, one in which it becomes possible to declare “the 
end of  homelessness.”
A Refashioned Police Order
Following Rancière (1999), this enunciative environment can be theoretically 
interpreted as a new distribution of  the sensible and, by extension, a refash-
ioned police order. Policing encompasses the configuration of  a perceptible 
field that functions as the basis for governing understood in the widest possible 
sense. As Dikeç (2005, 19) states:
The police, therefore, is both a principle of  distribution and an apparatus of  
administration, which relies on a symbolically constituted organization of  
social space, an organization that becomes the basis of  and for governance. 
Thus, the essence of  the police is not repression but distribution—distri-
bution of  places, people, names, functions, authorities, activities, and so 
on—and the normalization of  this distribution.
“Ending homelessness,” therefore, can be taken as a police order, a mode of  per-
ceiving predicated upon the identification of  a whole (a homeless population) 
and the distribution of  parts (homeless individuals) according to qualifications 
(recently homeless, periodically homeless, and chronically homeless), com-
petencies (mental illness, substance use problems), and places (street, shelter, 
independent housing).
In tracing the discursive turn toward “ending homelessness,” we are left 
with a clearer picture of  Alberta’s reorganized police order. This enunciative 
environment is constituted by the following:
• Evolving modes of  classifying and categorizing homeless people 
(statistical statements);
• The substitution of  new speaking positions, such as the “success story,” 
from which homeless voices are heard (biographical statements);
• The introduction of  new styles of  reasoning such as “housing first” 
(planning statements) and the “business case” (economic statements);
• The deployment of  new modes of  critique (philosophical statements).
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Within this new perceptual field, the homeless appear as a governable object 
of  a different sort—a measurable population having particular social charac-
teristics, personal problems, service utilization rates, and economic costs. As a 
network of  statements that transform what can be said about, and done to, the 
homeless, the discourse of  “ending homelessness” supplies a new police order 
for targeting the subpopulation representing the greatest costs—the chronic-
ally homeless.
It is vital to recognize that “ending homelessness,” as a discourse and police 
order, is co-emergent with a number of  enunciative conditions. For instance, 
statistical statements and the formation of  homeless populations co-emerged 
with the consolidation of  social research units, data-gathering activities, and 
increasingly complex data management and information systems. Biographical 
statements and the new speaking positions from which they emanate co-
emerged with the formation of  professionalized client-management systems. 
Planning statements and economic statements, along with the concepts of  
“Housing First” and the “business case,” co-emerged with distended policy net-
works connecting sites of  experimentation and evaluation around the world. 
Finally, philosophical statements, and thematic distinctions between “manag-
ing” and “ending” homelessness, co-emerged with technocratic public policy-
making processes. The public expression of  the goal of  “ending homelessness” 
reflects not only a significant transformation in Alberta’s policy discourse but 
also a reconfiguration of  Alberta’s institutional landscape. This marks a signifi-
cant event with implications for democracy in the province.
(Post)Democracy in Alberta?
Drawing on Rancière’s theoretical framework, Erik Swyngedouw (2009, 605) 
usefully describes the intrinsic link between politics and equality: “Politics is 
the arena where the principle of  equality is tested in the face of  a wrong experi-
enced by ‘those who have no part.’ Equality is thereby axiomatically given and 
presupposed rather than an idealized-normative condition to move towards.” 
Swyngedouw goes on to emphasize that equality is the necessary precondition 
of  democracy:
In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic pol-
itics is constituted; it opens up the space of  the political through the testing 
of  a wrong that subverts equality. Equality is, therefore, not a sociologically 
verifiable concept or procedure that permits opening a policy arena which 
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will remedy the observed inequalities, but the ontologically given condition 
of  democracy.
Distinguishing between “the police” and “politics”—and more specifically, 
between the “policing of  homelessness” and the “politics of  homelessness”—is 
useful when considering the democratic implications of  Alberta’s recent policy 
shift. Rancière’s (1999) theoretical framework gives us pause when interpreting 
policy changes in Alberta. Housing First (HF), as a historical event, can be inter-
preted as more democratic than the treatment first (TF) approach in that HF 
challenges the hierarchy (i.e. , deserving versus undeserving) that precludes 
access to housing under the TF model. In the HF model, equality (specifically 
in terms of  the right to housing) is a presupposed given rather than a condition 
to move toward. In this sense, HF can be read as an expression of  the politics of  
homelessness.
While recognizing this democratic impulse, it is hard to dismiss the wider 
characteristics of  “ending homelessness” as a new police regime. Here, “ending 
homelessness” can be read as an economically rationalized, technocratic mode 
of  consensual governing where power is centred outside of  democratic account-
ability in the hands of  experts and elites who target expensive subpopulations 
to minimize their “spillover” costs. Moreover, this new discursive formation 
circumvents systemic hierarchies in the housing system that precipitate hous-
ing crises. Thus, while taking extraordinary steps to house the chronically 
homeless, this regime normalizes housing inequality. This approach could be inter-
preted as an attempt to manage inherent contradictions in the housing system 
while keeping it tightly fastened to the marketplace.
What will authorities make of  housing problems in 2019, after “home-
lessness” has been “eradicated”? In other words, what form will the politics 
of  homelessness take after the supposed end of  homelessness? If  politics is a 
mode of  action that enacts dissensus, then what form can politics take in the 
face of  political consensus that a wrong no longer exists? In light of  the inequal-
ities that will still exist in the housing system, taking this policy turn—“ending 
homelessness”—at its word forecloses upon the properly political; it replaces 
dissensus with consensus, and in doing so, it imposes a type of  closure on ques-
tions relating to housing justice. Paradoxically, therefore, “ending homeless-
ness” can be read as a postdemocratic moment in the province.
In conclusion, one theoretical argument developed in this chapter is that 
democracy is stifled when issues of  equality are subsumed within the realm 
of  the police and out of  the reach of  democratic struggle. It is the stifling of  
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dissensus through consensual practices that forecloses upon democratic 
action. If  one accepts Rancière’s definition of  politics, then it is difficult to read 
Alberta’s shift toward “ending homelessness” as a democratic move. While 
these policy developments have undoubtedly expanded access to housing and 
services for a subset of  homeless people, they also constitute a strategy to end a 
specific type of  homelessness (i.e. , chronic homelessness) rendered perceptible 
in terms of  economic spillover costs. Alberta’s policy turn risks silencing con-
versations about homelessness as an expression of  social injustice. The Alberta 
government’s recent policy response to homelessness nicely illustrates the 
“paradox of  plenty” as it relates to democracy: oil wealth provides states with 
extraordinary abilities to mute the social dissension and discord that is itself  
symptomatic of  systemic social inequalities.
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“The Sharpest Knives in the Drawer”
Visual Culture at the Intersection of Oil and State
Karen Wall
While perusing aerial photographs of  the Athabasca bitumen sands, I hear the 
sounds of  road construction outside. Turning from scenes of  shining black flows 
attended by various machines, I look down from the second-storey window to 
road-resurfacing workers and machines pouring an oily river of  black asphalt. 
The overlapping images serve as reminder of  the reach of  remote extraction 
sites into everyday life, of  oil constituting not simply a resource but, as Imre 
Szeman notes, a part of  the social ontology underlying industrial capitalism 
(quoted in Melathopoulos 2010). In Alberta, where the petroleum industry is 
deeply infused into the social and cultural imaginary, oil companies and prov-
incial governments have together shaped discourses of  prosperity, identity, and 
citizenship for generations. This chapter outlines ways in which oil money has 
sustained a conjunction of  cultural, political, and economic power as it flows 
through networks of  fine art, community entertainment, cultural institutions, 
and artistic practice. In that context, I inquire into how practices of  visual arts 
“can be integral to political dialogue filling the vacuum left behind by the lim-
itations of  representative democracies” (Plessner 2012).
In a petro-culture, key characteristics of  which are manifest in Alberta, our 
understanding of  objects and events is deeply informed by oil energy, which 
shapes not only everyday life but also its representation and content.1 At present, 
the entrenched association of  the oil industry with a certain configuration of  
social power supports an adversarial rhetoric that posits critical analysis and 
challenge as being against the common good. The coincidence of  government 
and industry interests raises questions about the limits to public political par-
ticipation. If  cultural expression is a dimension of  democratic citizenship, what 
role can the visual arts play in both constructing and resisting dominant claims 
of  the centrality of  oil to the public interest and to provincial identity? Over the 
13
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long integration of  the oil industry into the complex social and environmental 
imaginary of  the province, both the private and public sectors have supported 
the arts and cultural production, helping to shape a rich community capacity 
for critical thought and expression. However, the ongoing loss of  public fund-
ing for cultural production at both federal and provincial levels, coinciding with 
steady surges of  taxpayer-funded oil industry promotional materials, suggests 
that this potential wealth of  voices is becoming increasingly muffled.
The following discussion first considers visual expression as potentially 
challenging the legitimation of  oil as the central medium not only of  energy 
but of  regional identity, prosperity, and quality of  life. Drawing on contempor-
ary reportage, public relations statements, policy documents, and exhibition 
statements, the second section traces the relationship of  Alberta governments 
and oil industry players to cultural development in the historical contexts of  
province building and the advent of  neoliberalism. The analysis considers the 
potential for contestation and complicity in a province where culture remains 
integrated into the political and economic conditions of  its production. 
Although a comprehensive survey of  relevant cultural production is outside 
the scope of  this chapter, I present representative examples of  work in fields 
of  visual arts, including installation and performance, in both institutional and 
everyday urban space and touch on the role of  the Internet in expanding audi-
ences and enabling participants in visual production. A central concern here is 
the instrumental role taken by the arts and cultural production.
Culture, Citizenship, and Consensus
The public sphere includes the cultural body of  ideas informing public debate, 
as well as the media and spaces of  public interaction. In practice, public influ-
ence on state decisions through debate is kept, through political institutions, 
in an orderly balance between social stability and change. When channels of  
communication fail, though, citizens no longer identify with the system and no 
longer give it legitimacy (Castells 2008). The understanding of  visual cultural 
forms as part of  these mediated networks of  communication is particularly 
important as traditional spheres and spaces of  citizenship shrink or vanish. 
Artists potentially fill a role that was previously taken by a political class 
involved in critiques of  assumptions that steer public policy, helping to liber-
ate thought from the status quo (Latour and Weibel 2005; Miller 2011). Szeman 
notes that art practices may activate a waning political will by “reminding 
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publics that social life is something to be created and celebrated rather than 
feared or endured” (cited in Robertson 2006, 13). Commenting more straight-
forwardly on this potential role of  artistic production, an Alberta rancher 
reportedly called the arts “the sharpest knives in the drawer” of  creative demo-
cratic tools (quoted in Robinson 2012).
Visual culture, then, participates in discourses of  everyday life that produce 
a set of  common assumptions and tacit beliefs underlining public communi-
cation. Discourses are understood here in general terms as systems of  ideas 
and practices that construct our understandings of  the world and that medi-
ate social and cultural identity, economic development, and social consensus 
around relations of  power. Image-centred discourses and narratives, which 
Appadurai (1996, 35) calls mediascapes, shape notions of  reality in this way and 
interact with ideoscapes, which are often directly ideological. However, visual 
imagery is so ubiquitous in our society that, like the network of  pipelines under 
our feet, it can go unremarked as a vehicle of  important social and cultural 
understandings. Creative visual production outside of  political and commer-
cial realms has the capacity to visualize or embody the absent or the invisible, 
whether metaphorical or literal. Such works can potentially break into systems 
of  ideas that seem to be “matters of  fact” and complement dominant claims 
to truth, intervening across boundaries of  space—by bringing the far into the 
near, for example—and of  time by reminding us of  overarching values and 
long-term imaginaries.
Modern government arts policies have historically been based on ideals 
of  the democratization of  culture, whereby state arts funding, for instance, 
cannot support elite aesthetic tastes or political agendas but must serve the 
general public interest. All citizens have access to existing cultural resources 
and legacies; cultural programs and products are considered public goods. 
The concept of  cultural democracy involves a more radical participation of  
citizens in cultural production and challenges the insistence of  dominant 
powers that ordinary people remain passive consumers of  the cultural status 
quo. Overwhelmingly, international neoliberal market economies have effect-
ively defined cultural products as commodities and services labelled entertain-
ment, tourism, and knowledge production (Mulcahy 1991). While citizenship 
historically emerges around civic rights, in the context of  neoliberalism, a 
mass-mediated culture shapes notions of  identity and subjectivity in terms of  
individual opportunity and commodity consumption. Arguments for cultural 
citizenship in this context broaden a concern with inclusion, belonging, and 
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cultural identity to include potential for creative expression: that is, producing 
and manipulating dominant meanings of  images in order to participate in the 
presence and volume of  voices in public space (Miller 2011).
Critical theorists have called for devalued people and knowledge to engage 
in cultural participation to produce, as Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) put it, 
“authentic” art that emancipates citizens from the dominance of  instrumental 
rationality that supports capitalist regimes. However, in practice, the knives 
usually don’t travel far from the proverbial drawer for long. Revolutionary art 
movements have been repeatedly absorbed into established structures, the 
avant-garde tied to elite power with “an umbilical cord of  gold” (Greenberg 
1939, 38). Alternative cultural imaginaries are absorbed into mainstream sys-
tems of  exhibition and marketing (Fisher 2009, 9).
Since Alberta governments have corralled culture into ministries also vari-
ously responsible for multiculturalism, sport, parks, recreation, tourism, and 
“community spirit,” the visual and performing arts have their highest profile as 
a leisure consumption activity provided by oil wealth. As such, the arts, includ-
ing visual representations and messages, serve as selling points for provincial 
destinations and align with economic discourses of  creative commercial innov-
ation and civic competition (Harvey 1990, 346–49; Robertson 2006, 12–14). 
In a petro-state, where state and corporate interests interlock to effectively 
shape the cultural imaginary, the impacts of  oil on democratic society are usu-
ally sufficiently normalized as to be hidden in plain sight. Where government 
revenues accrue without requiring citizen legitimation through tax dollars, or 
even citizen political engagement, a political culture of  “dependence, passivity, 
and entitlement” ensues (Karl 2007, 21). Alberta, where the Conservatives held 
power for over four decades, has historically had some of  the lowest provincial 
voter turnouts in the country (Takach 2010, 154–58).2 What political and eco-
nomic relations rule the distribution of  public funds to the creation of  culture? 
What role, if  any, have the visual arts played in the development of  local cul-
tural citizenship? As discussed in the following section, the state participates in 
an uneasy relationship with arts and culture, its support varying with changes 
in cultural and economic policies.
The Spirit of Alberta: Public Cultural Policies and Corporate Investment
Discourses and narratives are constituted not only of  specific content but 
also of  the externalized meanings of  objects and phenomena. Oil extraction 
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operations and sites such as the Athabasca bitumen sands have been framed 
in narratives that have effectively fossilized over several decades of  capital-
ist political power. They are further embedded in histories of  Canadian visual 
culture in naturalizing discourses of  industrial capitalism since the late 1800s, 
with artists, governments, and industrialists connecting resource extraction 
and nation building in photography, paintings, and majestic murals (Hodgins 
and Thompson 2011, 394). In the 1970s, industrial images such as a giant bucket 
wheel used for bitumen extraction adorned postage stamps as a natural com-
ponent of  a collection also featuring hockey, wilderness, animals, and pol-
iticians (Davidson and Gismondi 2011, 65). When Stephen Harper, in 2006, 
compared the “epic” Alberta bitumen sands project with iconic structures such 
as the pyramids or China’s Great Wall (“only bigger”), he placed oil extraction in 
the historical framework of  established dynasties of  power and public legacy 
(Canada, PMO 2006).
With respect to community and regional arts programs, Alberta gov-
ernments have invoked cultural development as an instrument of  province 
building since at least the 1920s. Goals of  economic diversification rational-
ized related activity and infrastructure in the next decades. Associated ideals 
of  social progress emphasized democratic access to culture, in part to counter 
stereotypes of  the region as a frontier resource base (Whitson, Wall, and 
Cardinal 2011). The major oil strike of  1947 in Leduc launched a rapid expansion 
in cultural spending, and 1970s oil prosperity underwrote the Lougheed gov-
ernment’s innovative funding programs on the principle “that the province’s 
wealth had something to offer the spirit” (Knecht 2010, 21). Related cultural 
policies are largely responsible for the building of  a significant community of  
artists and for nurturing audiences in both rural and urban areas (Fraser 2003).
State commitment to cultural funding has predictably risen during boom 
times and wavered during periods of  economic recession in oil markets. 
However, as the influence of  neoliberal ideas has expanded, cultural production 
that falls outside market processes, like other spheres of  civil society, effect-
ively draws power away from political toward economic frameworks. The state 
exists primarily to protect individual and commercial rights and must exert 
a minimum of  power in a society that is driven by the pursuit of  profit with 
the consequence of  the commodification of  all spheres of  activity (Steinhauer 
2009, 7–8; Thorsen 2011). In the economic downturn of  the 1980s and early 
1990s, described by former Edmonton city councillor Michael Phair as “a par-
ticularly dark period of  benign neglect (bordering on hostility)” (quoted in 
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Babiak 2008b), the Klein administration slashed cultural and social program 
funding while paying large subsidies to the private sector and collecting the 
lowest oil royalties anywhere (Steinhauer 2009, 7–8).
Despite rising provincial revenues in the 2000s, the paths of  oil wealth and 
cultural investment have diverged. In 2011, for example, funding for the Alberta 
Foundation for the Arts ($35 million) was less than 0.1 percent of  the total $38 
billion Alberta budget; the wealthiest jurisdiction in the country ranked sixth 
among provinces in its per capita funding in 2011 (Professional Arts Coalition 
of  Edmonton 2011) However, in 2008 the province had the highest level of  pri-
vate sector support of  the arts in the country (Alberta 2011, 49.) While neolib-
eralism assumes that economic, political, and cultural realms remain discrete, 
they are in fact inextricable from each other. Discourses of  neoliberalism tend 
toward privatization, and rhetoric of  family and community devolve cultural 
activity from the responsibility of  the state or collective action to consumer 
activity. For example, the three-day provincial arts festival called “Alberta Arts 
Days” underwent a name change in 2012 to “Alberta Culture Days.” The ori-
ginal focus on artists expanded to include “family-friendly” experiences such 
as heritage and multicultural events and performances by youth organizations 
(Hayes 2012; Kuhl 2012). Ideals of  diversity, like those of  family, align with the 
status of  the arts as a medium for increasing cohesive community and qual-
ity of  life. Government spending from general revenues tends to go to facility 
infrastructure such as museums, while lottery funds remain the source of  arts 
funding for contemporary cultural production and critical voices (Wall 2013). 
Again, the amenities of  entertainment and nonconfrontational activity are an 
unobjectionable perk of  a comfortable society. Nevertheless, the trend reflects 
an ongoing pattern of  the withdrawal of  government from the provision of  
platforms for critical expression and for cultural citizenship as participation in 
production.
Although cultural funding directed to the arts is distributed on an arm’s 
length basis, political strings tend to trail behind, as suggested by responses 
greeting state funding of  films critical of  the bitumen sands operations. In the 
name of  economic diversification in 2008, the province increased the budget 
of  the Alberta Mutimedia Development Fund (AMDF, now the Alberta Media 
Fund) from $20 million to $34 million (Gill 2006). Since that date, AMDF 
funds have contributed to the production of  films including Downstream 
(2008, $67,000), Dirty Oil (2009, $54,000), and Tipping Point: The End of Oil (2011, 
$239,083) (Platt 2011). Controversy followed outrage that, in the words of  a Sun 
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News columnist, Alberta pays millions to counter negative images of  the oil 
sands while it funds directors “who don’t even bother to hide their anti-oilsands 
agenda,” with “every penny potentially damaging the province’s economic 
engine” (Platt 2011). Leslie Iwerk, director of  Downstream, argued that her work 
exposed the “province’s own truths” and cost far less than efforts “to sugar coat 
and cover up far more than this film could ever reveal” (Christian 2010).
Shortly after the release of  Iwerks’s Downstream, Alberta’s minister of  
Culture, Lindsay Blackett, awkwardly suggested that ministry investment 
should instead “show Alberta in a better light, to create an economic diversifi-
cation” in order to avoid “a negative impetus on this province” (quoted in CBC 
News 2008a). A week later, he retracted comments about possible censorship in 
response to an outcry, asserting instead that his job was “to protect free speech, 
and [that] trying to exercise creative control over movies would be hypocritical” 
(CBC News 2008b). Three years later, Alison Redford, at the time campaigning 
for party leadership, emphasized that independent funding processes “protect 
our freedom of  speech and protect our citizens from government-led propa-
ganda,” adding that she encouraged potentially fruitful debate toward “positive 
change” (Platt 2011).
The subject of  censorship arose again in 2012 when Edmonton artist Spyder 
Yardley-Jones exhibited a collection of  work, combining graphics and text, 
that critiqued the environmental impacts of  the bitumen sands. Designed to 
provoke discussion about issues rarely raised in the mainstream media, the 
satirical work included images of  Mother Earth being assaulted by the Harper 
government and an image with sexual innuendos of  government complicity 
in the whims of  Big Oil. Protesters objected, not to provocative challenges to 
the industry but to government funding of  the exhibit, on the grounds that 
the metaphorical images, taken literally, offended taxpayers’ social and moral 
standards (Di Massa 2012; Ramsay 2012). A year later, Fort McMurray residents 
protested singer Neil Young’s assessment of  the area as resembling Hiroshima, 
and a local radio station banned his music from their broadcasts (CBC 2013).
Similar charges have been regularly levelled at publicly funded art in the 
past, of  course, but the points to consider here are that local cultural produ-
cers are explicitly associating their critique of  the oil industry with demo-
cratic expression and that challenges to that process under the imprimatur 
of  defending public coffers and morality are, at least briefly, considered to be 
acceptable by community members and leaders. Meanwhile, a 2011 provincial 
delegation to the Middle East to promote bitumen sands investment met with 
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Sheikha Hussah Al-sabah to plan the exhibition of  her art collection at the new 
Art Gallery of  Alberta (Alberta, International and Intergovernmental Relations 
2011). International exhibition capacity was a selling point of  the gallery design, 
but government use of  the nonprofit facility to ameliorate oil industry part-
nerships is striking in a context of  ongoing funding cuts for local artists and 
organizations. As international neoliberal market economies effectively define 
cultural products as commodities and services, the “Spirit of  Alberta” cul-
tural policy (Alberta, Culture and Tourism 2008) and the Alberta Chambers of  
Commerce (2014) called for greater private arts investment to supplement gov-
ernment funding. In its 2014 policy brief  on the arts and creative industries, 
the Alberta Chambers of  Commerce argued that the province’s arts sector “can 
work in tandem with the economy” (1) and recommended that the government 
leverage existing funding through, for instance, an expanded system of  match-
ing grants to attract private donations (3).
As ideologies of  neoliberalism have advanced since the late 1970s, arts 
organizations have increasingly fostered relationships with private donors. Oil 
industry money funds major Canadian institutions. As art historian and con-
sultant Barry Lord puts it, “Where there’s oil, there are museums. . . .Where our 
energy comes from determines our values”; it is surplus energy, he says, that “makes 
our culture possible” (Lauder 2012). An understanding of  cultural expression 
and development in Alberta must include the seminal role of  the oil industry 
from its early days in Alberta. Eric Harvie and Samuel C. Nickle, petroleum 
entrepreneurs of  the 1940s, not only accumulated important art collections 
but later established key public cultural institutions, the Nickle Arts Museum 
and the Glenbow Museum, respectively. Following World War II, multinational 
oil interests increasingly collected and commissioned industrial images rather 
than more traditional fine art subjects. Pictures of  golden grain fields dotted 
with drilling rigs, for instance, visually associated the oil industry with estab-
lished mythic dimensions of  Canadian and Albertan identity, much as had the 
public works and visual culture of  an earlier era.
In the 1950s, the largely foreign-owned Imperial Oil, eager to associate 
itself  with Canadian history and nationalism, not only collected Canadian art 
but commissioned public relations work by prominent artists, including prairie 
scenery untarnished by oil rigs (Lerner and Williamson 1991, 360; see also Art 
Gallery of  Ontario 1959). In 1951, the Canadian Bank of  Commerce, then as now 
invested in oil, commissioned a collection of  Alberta artist Roland Gissing’s 
paintings of  oil extraction sites (Foran and Houlton 1988, 44). These and other 
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collections were displayed in public galleries and corporate buildings, further 
helping to integrate the oil industry into the complex social and environmental 
imaginary of  a progressive province. Such images reflected the merging of  pol-
itical and economic interests in that oil extraction activities were normalized as 
central to regional identity and prosperity. By the late 1980s, corporations were 
the fastest-growing sector of  Canadian cultural support as neoliberal economic 
priorities shifted corporate involvement from direct patronage to influential 
partnerships with public institutions. Today, major oil companies hold profes-
sionally curated art collections that are regularly loaned to public institutions 
in return for promotional access, including facility and event-naming rights 
(Setterfield and Schabas 2006).
Benefits to the oil industry extend to public perception of  industry provid-
ing amenities and infrastructure once accruing to the state, including access 
to culture and quality of  community life. In 2000, when Petro-Canada found 
its large collection too expensive to maintain, the company reported that it 
would “unlock” its hold on some of  the country’s best art through donations to 
public institutions (CBC News 2000). Enbridge’s support programs are motiv-
ated to provide communities with “inspiration and beauty,” and Suncor has 
partnered with Fort McMurray area civic institutions to construct an eponym-
ous performing arts centre.3 Other corporations including Syncrude, British 
Petroleum (BP) Canada, Enbridge, Chevron, Imperial Oil, and Enmax sponsor 
prominent organizations such as the Alberta Ballet, the Royal Alberta Museum, 
the Glenbow Museum and Archives, and the Art Gallery of  Alberta, as well as 
youth programs (Hunt 2014; Nestruck 2012).
There is no question that public benefits have accrued from such inter-
ventions and that artists and organizations have been enabled; the history of  
cultural development in Alberta would inarguably be bleaker without corpor-
ate involvement. At the same time, urgent questions about the future of  oil 
dependency and environmental impacts demand a long-term view. As arts and 
culture associations provide oil companies with social legitimacy, symbolic 
capital, and established audiences, fossil-fuel dependency is normalized in 
contexts of  pleasant aesthetic experiences in public spaces. The idea “that it is 
therefore normal to continue to burn fossil fuels subtly seeps into our imagina-
tions” (Thomas-Muller and Smith 2012).
A recurring critique of  government cultural funding is that its instability 
discourages long-term planning and the development of  a thriving culture. But 
the distribution of  corporate funds is often contingent on shifting commodity 
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prices and competing claims to resources. In the wake of  a global recession and 
spreading environmental concerns about the bitumen sands, some companies 
redirect public relations funding to higher-profile conservationist groups (Van 
Herk 2009). In 2008, Syncrude abruptly ended its substantial arts funding in 
Edmonton primarily in order to prioritize new marketing featuring conserva-
tion activities; diverted funds would have proved useful when, after hundreds 
of  ducks died in its tailing ponds in 2008, it paid a $3 million fine in the form 
of  donations to several environmental research and conservation organiza-
tions (CBC News 2010b; Saxe and Campbell 2012; “Syncrude Announces” 2012). 
Epcor and Enbridge stepped in to sponsor Syncrude’s abandoned arts groups 
and Imperial Oil made an unprecedented donation of  $300,000 to the Art 
Gallery of  Alberta (Babiak 2008a). However, Epcor ended its agreement with 
Calgary’s Epcor Centre in 2010, and provincial government funding was with-
drawn in 2013, leaving the performing arts facility with a critical financial defi-
cit (CBC News 2013, 2014.)
In 2008, Syncrude donated $1.8 million to Fort McMurray’s Keyano College 
to begin the Aboriginal Trades Preparation Program, aimed at training First 
Nations people to work in the oil industry (“Canadian Oil and Gas” 2010, 3).4 
In 2012, the college abruptly laid off  twenty faculty and staff  from its arts 
programs, calling them “under-utilized” to the point that supporting them 
would undermine new engineering and business programs (Thomas 2012; 
see also Moher 2012). Low enrolments meant loss of  government funding. 
Critics viewed the transfer of  classroom space to new engineering technology 
and business degree programs as a provincial strategy to prioritize trades and 
industrial programs and a “devaluation of  arts programs” (Yogaretnam 2012). 
The college’s pledge to serve the broader interests of  the community coincides 
with consistently falling support for arts education from a provincial govern-
ment that bases its funding primarily on enrolment numbers and that increas-
ingly stresses goals of  job training. Programs to extend oil jobs to Aboriginal 
people will provide positive employment opportunities to individuals, but in 
this context, the consequent loss of  other opportunities for artistic expression 
and employment further shuts down potential channels of  cultural citizenship 
through critical creative training.
Meanwhile, oil companies continue to invest in high-profile professional 
Aboriginal artists, including Joane Cardinal-Schubert, George Littlechild, Alex 
Janvier, Bill Reid, and Jane Ash-Poitras, as well as in cultural artifact collections. 
Arts organizations and programs are also targeted: for example, Enbridge, at 
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the same time that it is negotiating a controversial pipeline over Indigenous 
lands, is the sponsor of  an Aboriginal youth writing program (Enbridge 2014), 
and Syncrude sponsors the Travelling Exhibition Program (TREX), an Alberta 
Foundation for the Arts program. Through TREX, professional and amateur 
painters from First Nations communities have exhibited their work. Two recent 
exhibitions, “Creator Paints the World . . . the Colour of  Our Voice” and “Our 
Wilderness Is Wisdom,” have focused on the human relationship to land and 
wilderness, through which Aboriginal artists can “speak our truth” amid louder 
voices (AFA 2011, 3; see also Arndt 2012; for “Our Wilderness Is Wisdom,” see 
AFA 2012; Syncrude Canada Ltd. 2011, 23).
Despite the wide resistance to the bitumen sands project by some Aboriginal 
peoples (chapters 2 and 6, this volume), the corporate support of  First Nations 
artists points to the fact that oil companies often sponsor or purchase art overtly 
critical of  the status quo. One reason they do this is because “cutting-edge” art 
aligns with narratives of  the sponsors’ creative innovation and unbiased social 
responsibility (Giroux 2005, 31–32). Another is that in a relatively wealthy soci-
ety, the accommodation of  tolerated forms of  social critique tends to under-
mine art’s potential for social change since “the arts contribute less as a force 
for social change and more as a vehicle facilitating the reproduction of  exist-
ing social formations” (Kenyon 1996, 33). In other words, cultural capitalism, 
whether underpinned by oil resources or other commodities, tends to absorb 
ideological conflict rather than give expression to it. As spaces of  cultural cit-
izenship come to exist primarily inside institutional walls, corporate cultural 
partnerships become the norm (Bewes and Gilbert 2000).
Together with the federal government, Enbridge sponsors Aboriginal Arts 
and Stories (formerly the Canadian Aboriginal Writing and Arts Challenge), 
a youth arts competition. Aboriginal Arts and Stories, a program of  Historica 
Canada, has as its mandate to “build active and informed citizens through 
a greater knowledge and appreciation of  the history, heritage and stories 
of  Canada.”5 The project has widespread endorsement and participation by 
Aboriginal cultural leaders, but a group of  opponents attending an Enbridge 
meeting in 2012 included Trevor Jang, a previous contest winner. Jang had 
appeared in Enbridge promotional material and renounced the corporation for 
using him as a “native poster boy” for the company (quoted in Healing 2013).
I now turn the discussion back to broader dimensions of  visual culture and 
consider aspects of  display and performance in public space and their impli-
cations for cultural citizenship through narratives of  belonging and identity. 
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Associated at various times with images of  wilderness scenery, agricultural 
abundance, and the Wild West, the notion of  “being Albertan” resonates today 
with the oil and gas industry. In 2010, the Canadian Association of  Petroleum 
Producers (CAPP) mounted a public relations campaign called “Alberta Is 
Energy,” and the Alberta Enterprise Group likewise asserts that the energy 
industry is “what makes us Albertans” (Haluza-DeLay 2012, 2–3). Both the 
public and private sectors are deeply involved in the construction of  meaning 
and consensus in these terms. In 2006, the Province of  Alberta contributed a 
display to promote “Alberta’s culture, quality of  life and natural beauty” to the 
prestigious Smithsonian Folklife Festival in Washington, DC, an event con-
ceived as an “educational exposition of  living cultural heritage” featuring “com-
munity-based cultural exemplars” (Alberta, Alberta Community Development 
2006).6 Alberta displayed information on exports, investment, and tourism; 
innovation in oil extraction methods was linked to powerful motifs of  historic 
frontier heroism. Looming in the midst of  sideshows of  cuisine and music, the 
central display featured a spectacular eighteen-foot-tall model of  an oil sands 
haul truck parked on the Mall as part of  the major section on the bitumen sands 
(Trescott 2006). In challenging the authority of  the ministry to define cultural 
identity in terms of  the energy industry in an international exhibition, the 
Canadian director for the Natural Resources Defense Council implied that the 
exhibit was a symbol of  the “destructive environmental disaster” occurring in 
Alberta (quoted in Freeman 2006). In response to related criticism, the curator 
of  the exhibit denied that the depiction of  Alberta’s living cultural heritage 
was, in essence, “an ad for the oil industry” (quoted in Freeman 2006). 
CAPP and the federal Canadian Museum of  Civilization announced a $1 
million, five-year sponsorship deal in 2013 in support of  the museum’s planned 
exhibits celebrating the 150th anniversary of  Confederation. The museum’s 
president pointed out that inadequate government funding made such partner-
ships necessary, while the lobby group’s president confirmed the oil industry’s 
motivation of  self-promotion. CAPP was previously involved in controversy 
after it was revealed that sponsorship of  another federal museum exhibit 
had been accompanied by pressure to portray the industry in a positive light 
(Cheadle 2013).
Advertising and public relations are often indistinguishable in discourses 
of  Alberta oil, as the provincial “brand” is contested and reconstructed. 
Contentious public debate carries on in what are essentially battles over dis-
cursive authority to associate cultural identity and expression with corporate 
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activity in public spaces. Objecting in part to BP’s investment in Alberta’s “dirty 
oil,” as well as to the 2011 Gulf  of  Mexico oil spill, the activist group Art Not 
Oil vehemently protested the corporation’s long-standing sponsorship of  the 
Tate Gallery in London. The group staged another protest event in early 2015 
addressing Shell’s sponsorship of  a Rembrandt exhibit at Britain’s National 
Gallery (Thomas-Muller and Smith 2012; Werth 2015).
In 2010, the American organization Corporate Ethics International, as 
part of  its Tar Sands Campaign, launched multimedia advertisements under 
the tagline Rethink Alberta. The short videos contrast provincial tourism-
campaign images of  natural beauty “with disturbing images of  oil-covered 
birds, contaminated tailings ponds, and industrial pollution” (CTV News 
2010). Alberta retaliated in print and billboard media in the United States in 
an attempt to change “negative public perceptions of  the oilsands” (CBC News 
2010a). Corporate Ethics International, like Greenpeace and other activist 
organizations, relies on private donations, while the provincial government’s 
international public relations campaigns are funded by taxpayers, rendered 
complicit by association. Those taxpayers did not manifest any substantial 
objections to the government’s PR campaign, contrasting sharply with numer-
ous complaints about government funding for a major new provincial art gal-
lery in Edmonton around the same time (Wall 2011, 25).
Interventions in Petro-culture: Spectacle and Performance
To this point, I have suggested that oil capital has underwritten long, if  capri-
cious, state support of  cultural production and consumption and has enabled 
decades of  direct patronage and sponsorship of  the arts by the private sector. 
Within this complex, the arts have, to varying extents, served instrumen-
tal purposes for both sectors. In the period of  the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
art production increasingly supported neoliberal strategies. Defined as the 
creative or culture industries, the arts were economically viable resources to 
be exploited, and funding was provided according to instrumental outcomes 
(Robertson 2011). Art production also continued to challenge the status quo 
(Robertson 2006, 11–12), with visual art in particular providing powerful oppos-
itional tools. As suggested above, visual disruptions of  singular perspectives, 
whether visual or ideological, force us to rethink previously fixed meanings. A 
survey of  the proliferating forms of  artistic critique of  the industry is beyond 
the scope of  this chapter, but it is worth noting that the production of  spectacle 
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is particularly well situated at the intersection of  art and politics (Boyd and 
Duncombe 2004; Debord [1967] 1995).
The spectacle experience is particularly powerful, both cognitively and 
emotionally, in art and performances that mingle elements normally opposed 
in social categories, such as the dirty, or contaminated, and the clean, or pris-
tine. The concepts of  “dirty oil” (i.e. , unethical oil) and “clean” corporate patron-
age point to ideological associations, while sensory creative productions also 
effectively engage a range of  physical senses. Tactical media strategies, includ-
ing performance-based interventions and installations, have dramatized the 
eroding of  protective boundaries between notions of  “here” as pristine and 
under control and “there” as toxic and chaotic (Forkert 2008). Artists and activ-
ists, for example, have inundated the Tate Gallery entrance with gallons of  oil-
like molasses (Nayeri 2011), covered valuable wildlife paintings with pools of  
black oil paint (Fong 2008), installed binoculars on a Vancouver beach showing 
a 3D view of  a catastrophic imaginary oil spill at the site (Vancity Buzz 2014), 
and staged a mock oil spill outside Vancouver pipeline company offices (De 
Souza 2012).
Mainstream gallery exhibits are typically more subtle and metaphorical 
in their approach to critique, but some do include overtly didactic pieces such 
as large immersive environments of  slag, sand, and tar replicating oil extrac-
tion sites. Mitch Mitchell, for his 2009 installation in Edmonton, “Tar Plane 
Wayfarer,” constructed forms out of  newsprint, asphaltum, and carborundum 
from the bitumen sands to immerse viewers in remote visual and olfactory 
realities (Fung 2009). In Toronto, Allison Rowe’s interactive gallery installa-
tion “Bringing Home the Tar Sands” and a mobile “Exploration Station” famil-
iarized viewers with bitumen extraction substances, models, and information 
(Harbourfront Centre 2010). Canadian sculptor Mia Feuer exhibited an instal-
lation in Washington, DC, during political debates about the Keystone XL 
pipeline. Inspired by bitumen, the work includes an “ominous black skating 
rink” that “may or may not be a metaphor for oil’s grip on Canadian politics” 
(Nikiforuk 2014).
Alberta artists Sherri Chaba, Lyndal Osborne, and Brenda Christensen, 
to name a few, have exhibited work, including installations, that brings home 
the impacts of  oil on everyday life and landscapes (Peter Robertson Gallery 
2012; Ryan 2012; Willerton 2011). Like the filmmakers noted above, Mitchell, 
Osborne, and Chaba have each received provincial funding in the form of  pur-
chase by the Alberta Foundation for the Arts, the government entity responsible 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
“The Sharpest Knives in the Drawer”   347
for distribution of  grants and support to artists. Such acquisitions, though, 
remain low profile, proceeding quietly without public discussion or regular 
display, and are rarely noted by anyone outside the arts community; the likeli-
hood of  controversy is remote. Public funding has also supported exhibitions 
with topical themes addressing the history, significance, and challenges of  the 
oil economy. “Black Gold,” an exhibition organized in 2013 by the Art Gallery of  
Alberta for TREX, featured six artists whose works “shine a spotlight on the oil 
industry in Alberta” and invited viewers to reflect on “the diverse and complex 
environmental and social issues associated with the extraction and use of  ‘black 
gold’” (AFA 2013, 4).
Artistic photography has possibly had the widest reach among viewers of  
work that merges documentation with aesthetic, emotional impact. Szeman 
and Whitehead (2012, 54) note the attempt by critical photographic realism to 
reveal the “largely hidden dynamic of  globalization: the system of  oil extrac-
tion and production that is the lifeblood of  capitalism.” Photographer Louis 
Helbig argues that art can provide “cultural touch stones” to help articulate our 
relationship to toxic spaces normally omitted from both industry narratives 
and from standard Canadian nature iconography (quoted in Gismondi 2012; 
see also Cezer 2012). Edward Burtynsky’s renowned views of  industry include a 
series of  bitumen sands images in huge aerial views of  the “big picture” and the 
stunning scale of  a complex “landscape that cannot be comprehended from the 
ground” (Punter 2010). Burtynsky’s body of  work traces entire systems, includ-
ing the cycle of  oil from extraction to consumption, pointing to complicit links 
of  consumers with production conditions and impacts (Shimshock 2008).
In contrast, focusing on the immediacy of  a landscape with immediate 
material consequences for local life, photographer Andriko Lozowy’s work con-
structs a roadside, shifting view of  local environmental experience (Patchett and 
Lozowy 2011). Edmonton artist Brenda Christiansen has produced paintings of  
everyday oil culture in Fort McMurray. Anya Tonkonogy portrays the story of  
oil’s impact “through the faces of  those people whose livelihood depends on 
what the Great White North has coursing through its earthly veins.”7 Visual art 
by Susan Turcot and a 2013 film called Oil Sands Karaoke, directed by Charles 
Wilkinson, both take a holistic approach, addressing the nature of  labour and 
daily life by industry workers (“Visual Arts” 2014; McGinn 2013). Kristopher 
Karklin of  Fort MacMurray and Calgary creates large staged photographs based 
on his experiences in the “sensory-deprivation-like environment of  oilsands 
work camps” (Hunt 2015).
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Figure 13.1. Anya Tonkonogy, I've Been Doing This for a Long Time, 2010. Oil on birch 
panel, 20 x 30 in. Courtesy of the artist.
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The subjective point of  view has also proven effective for oil companies’ 
public relations materials, which tend to feature close-ups of  people flyfishing 
and canoeing on restored industrial lands, Aboriginal cultures and bison, com-
munity philanthrophic projects, and happy workers in the field or at gas stations 
(Friedel 2008). Aware of  the public relations value of  the personal scale, Shell 
Canada offered artists access to a refinery during a closure for maintenance to 
create works portraying individual workers’ crafts and stories (Cooper 2013). 
Whatever their intrinsic merits, such products serve to domesticate extractive 
activities and integrate the benefits of  toxic oil further into cultural imaginaries 
of  the natural, pristine, and nurturing dimensions of  Alberta landscapes.
One of  the few Canadian collective actions by artists, as opposed to environ-
mentalist groups, occurred when prairie artists and musicians appearing in 
the National Arts Centre’s 2011 Prairie Scene! Festival opposed sponsorship 
by Enbridge Pipelines in light of  the company’s successive oil pipeline spills. 
The letter argued that “the National Arts Centre should choose sponsors that 
help to promote its values as an innovator in community programming” and 
that the Enbridge partnership “tarnishes that image with the company’s dis-
astrous environmental record.”8 One of  the best-known public protests against 
oil industry cultural involvement in Alberta was mounted by the Lubicon Lake 
Cree in opposition to the Glenbow Museum’s 1988 exhibition “The Spirit Sings: 
Artistic Traditions of  Canada’s First Peoples.” Shell Oil, a major sponsor, was 
at the time conducting disputed drilling operations on Lubicon land. Another 
issue was lack of  consultation with Aboriginal groups concerning the exhibit’s 
production (Devine 2010).
As environmental impacts cross a “conceptual threshold . . . from slow 
change to slow catastrophe,” some see a unique “opportunity for a social jus-
tice movement to truly articulate a different vision” (Doubleday 2008, 33). 
Underscoring a comparable lack of  substantive influence on oil industry oper-
ations in areas directly affecting their lands, First Nations artists have acted 
outside mainstream cultural institutions. Raising awareness of, and funding 
for, opposition to the Enbridge pipeline project, West Coast artist Roy Vickers 
produced T-shirts bearing the slogan “Oolichan Oil Not Alberta Oil” and an 
oolichan fish—a mainstay of  traditional West Coast cultural life—against a 
background of  water darkening in layers to black (Drews 2012). In 2010, a group 
that included children and First Nations elders produced a painting for public 
exhibition in open spaces of  protest; funds for this initiative were provided 
by Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. The canvas, measuring 
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thirty-five by twenty feet, depicted a First Nations face enmeshed in a mosaic 
of  images, including the BP oil spill, pipelines, dead ducks, deformed fish, and 
gashes in the earth (BC Council for International Cooperation 2010; Schambach 
2010.). Cultural performance at marches and demonstrations—incorporating 
traditional ceremonial dress, drums, and chanting—remains the most vis-
ible public expression of  collective Aboriginal direct action in the mainstream 
media (Postmedia News 2012).9
Activist interventions occurring in urban corporate and retail zones are a 
form of  democratic representation that reclaims the space by redefining it as 
a more complicated narrative of  public life and citizen activity. Artist Peter 
von Tiesenhausen, whose rural property displays scores of  his earthworks and 
sculptures, exercised similar powers after fighting years of  legal challenges 
from oil and gas interests determined to drill his land for its rich natural gas 
reserves. Taking the creative step of  copyrighting his property as art in itself, 
which would make compensation costs for destruction much more prohibitive 
(Fung 2010; Jaremko 2006), he redefined the meaning and value of  his land 
using legal discourse in an attempt to place it beyond the reach of  the petroleum 
interests that have long had the upper hand in decision making. Presumably to 
avoid the risk of  a drawn-out legal battle and bad publicity, natural gas com-
panies have left Von Tiesenhausen and his land in peace (Goyal, n.d.).
In a framework of  plural claims to truth, the production of  meaning may 
be best democratized through dispersing understandings across enclaves of  
knowledge and practice: public and private, economic and aesthetic, literary and 
scientific (Gordon 2012; Stern and Seifert 2009, 33–34; Stevenson and Dryzek 
2012). Opposition to the environmental effects of  bitumen sands extraction, for 
example, links climate activists, audiences, scientists, Indigenous commun-
ities, and producers across continents (Fend 2001).10 Kester (1999) suggests a 
“littoral art” or middle space between discourses of  art and activism and across 
disciplinary bodies of  knowledge, vaulting the sharp divide between official, 
institutionalized fine art and activist or amateur production. In this ethos, the 
artwork or project is not a discrete commodity, artifact, or object but a medium 
of  socially engaged practice that can transgress dominant meanings.
Virtual Public Space
As Jay Smith puts it in chapter 3, “in a globalized world, the spaces of  politics are 
being transformed. No longer is politics solely centred around the institutions 
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of  the state.” Since new technologies of  power cannot be identified with terri-
tory or centralized apparatus, the classic opposition of  domination and resist-
ance is also dispersed in a society which has become a .multitude of  mobile 
subjectivities (Hardt and Negri 2009, xiii-cvi). As has been posited by a pleth-
ora of  observers, the Internet has a demonstrated capacity to link oppositional, 
democratic interests as well as to connect imaginatively with distant sites and 
forms of  knowledge. As new digital tools and technologies such as YouTube and 
social media are available for dissent, narratives expand and splinter in con-
tact with a broader range of  participants who are able to develop faster tactical 
responses and meanings of  messages (Jenkins 2011). International artists stead-
ily produce works in visual, cinematic, literary, digital, and performative media 
that critique and challenge the ecological impacts of  the fossil fuel industry and 
its involvements with cultural institutions (Aidt 2013).
To illustrate, it was community members rather than oil companies who 
publicly objected to the 2012 Spyder Yardley-Jones exhibit of  satirical images 
(Di Massa 2012). Responses are markedly different when very similar images 
make the leap from small gallery spaces to comparatively huge audiences 
online. In 2012, Enbridge released an animated video promoting its pipeline 
proposal with a series of  pastel, romantic images of  families, communities, and 
forests. Postmedia News cartoonist Dan Murphy adapted this utopian narrative 
by adding intermittent eruptions of  oily black goo redolent of  pipeline spills. 
After Enbridge reportedly threatened to withdraw advertising, the publisher 
pulled the piece off  its website (CBC News 2012). Even more telling was the 
cancellation of  federal government funding to Canadian artist Franke James, 
whose text-adorned graphics, which are very similar to those of  Yardley-Jones, 
critique the oil industry and its political wingmen. In 2011, when Canada was 
negotiating a European trade deal while fighting European objections to “dirty 
oil,” a federal grant supporting a European show of  James’s work was cancelled 
because her message was “not in sync” with government messaging (James, 
quoted in MacCharles 2011)—an event she documented in “Banned on the Hill 
(and in Europe!)” (James 2011). James reached a much larger audience by pub-
lishing an online series of  pipeline images titled “What Is Harper Afraid Of?” 
(James 2012; see also LaFontaine 2012).
New media have inarguable value for cultural producers, whether amateur 
or professional, and thus expand the resources of  cultural citizenship as they 
vastly expand audiences. However, dominant economic and political inter-
ests also adapt to new channels, and autonomous communication is under 
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increasing stress. Sharp though the knives of  virtual culture can be, those of  
other media need not become dull as means of  dialogue. Public spaces, for 
example, can function as media for display and performance, as well as exhib-
ition, in ways that enhance their potential for building social relationships and 
reimagining politics as part of  everyday life. And conventional gallery spaces 
remain important media for exploring aspects of  petro-culture, including the 
Athabasca bitumen sands. A few examples of  recent international art exhib-
itions examining the impacts of  oil include an Ontario show called “Perspectives 
on Canadian Tar Sands and the Northern Gateway Pipeline,” a New York City 
exhibit titled “Petroleum Paradox: For Better or For Worse?” and a show in 
Texas called “Necrocracy” that examined fossil fuels in terms of  our ongoing 
dependency on dead forms of  life.11 These and many more interventions in the 
visual discourses of  oil energy across multiple media all have potential to con-
tribute to a littoral public repository of  knowledge and action.
Cultural Citizenship and “Peak Imagination”
The notion of  a divide between a humanist approach to culture as having 
intrinsic value and a market-driven set of  criteria for its existence has become 
blurred, if  not collapsed, in the context of  contemporary capitalist societies. 
Both the private and public sectors enable production at various levels, provide 
spaces of  consumption, and legitimize the arts as commodity and as public 
goods, at least within certain boundaries of  social cohesion, entertainment, and 
individual expression. A political culture that supports the arts benefits from 
association with long-term humanist values, including cultural identity, social 
cohesion, and free expression. Support by industry bestows direct and indirect 
public relations value amounting to economic strength. In practice, democratic 
values of  cultural identity, cohesion, and free expression have been associated 
through the cultural realm with the needs of  industry for deep embeddedness 
in political decision making. Cultural and corporate citizenship tend to overlap. 
At present, the emancipatory potential of  cultural production is compromised 
by the steady withdrawal of  public funding from individuals and organiza-
tions, along with a rise in public spending on the production of  ubiquitous 
public relations imagery defending the oil industry.
Is oil wealth a positive force for democratic cultural development and 
expression? Is there any sign that art has successfully changed the course of  
politics or economic growth? Again, cultural production and citizenship are 
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long-term processes, and it may be most useful to think about the arts not in 
terms of  direct impacts of  products or images but as a complex of  practices and 
knowledge that are building or undermining consent to the status quo. On the 
one hand, government and corporate support of  the arts in Alberta has pro-
duced not only a rich body of  work but also several generations of  artists and 
cultural activists questioning authority on a number of  fronts. On the other 
hand, the fulcrum of  effective change is the perceived legitimacy of  the speak-
ers. In a wealthy jurisdiction that is largely content with the status quo, the arts 
tend to be relegated to the status of  entertainment, festival content, and cultural 
capital. They remain delegitimized both as serious occupations and as options 
for productive communication by nonprofessionals; funding cuts to arts edu-
cation, as well as to practice, suggest the difficulty of  collectively overcoming 
these stereotypes. With continually accelerating international attention to the 
impacts of  Alberta’s oil industry, however, the meaning of  cultural citizenship 
in the province is perhaps less limited to its designated borders or to depend-
ence on state or corporate permission. LeMenager (2012, 69) reminds us that, 
after all, we have not yet reached “peak imagination.” The historic electoral vic-
tory of  Rachel Notley and the New Democratic Party in 2015, displacing a four-
decade political monopoly by the Conservatives, signals the determination of  
Alberta citizens to imagine new ways to reach that peak.
Notes
1 The study of  petro-cultures is relatively new, but expanding. In 2011, the University 
of  Alberta established the Petrocultures Research Group, which conducts and 
supports research into “the social, cultural and political implications of  oil and 
energy use on individuals, communities, and societies around the world,” in order to 
“observe, assess and analyze the multiple and complex impacts of  the development 
and management of  the oil industry and of  energy more generally.” “Petrocultures,” 
2015, http://petrocultures.com/about/.
2 Turnouts were especially low in the provincial elections of  2004 and 2008: 45.12 
percent and 40.59 percent, respectively (Elections Alberta 2015).
3 See “Everyone’s Community: Social, Cultural, and Educational 
Achievement,” Enbridge, 2015, http://www.enbridge.com/InYourCommunity/
CommunityInvestment/Community.aspx; and “Suncor Energy Foundation Partners 
to Build Fort McMurray Performing Arts Centre,” news release, 1 October 2008, 
http://www.suncor.com/en/newsroom/5441.aspx?id=1088505.
4 “Syncrude Donates $5 Million to Keyano College,” Academica Group, 15 October 2008, 
http://academica.ca/top-ten/syncrude-donates-5-million-keyano-college.
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5 “About and Contact Us,” Aboriginal Arts and Stories, Historica Canada, 2015, http://www.
our-story.ca/about/.
6 “Mission and History,” Smithsonian Folklife Festival, Smithsonian Institution, 2015, http://
www.festival.si.edu/about/mission.aspx.
7 See Christiansen’s artist statement for “The Fort McMurray Series” at http://www.
brendakim.com/statement_ftmcmurray.html. Anya Tonkonogy’s words are taken 
from her artist statement, 23 July 2012, at Latitude 53: Contemporary Visual Culture, 
http://blog.latitude53.org/post/27850079373/this-weeks-incubator-artist-anya-
tonkonogy-is.
8 The group, calling itself  Prairie Artists Against Enbridge, expressed their objections 
in a letter of  25 January 2011 to Christopher Dearlove and Rosemary Thompson, of  
the National Arts Centre. By accepting support from Enbridge, they argued, the NAC 
“associates itself  with the company’s irresponsible corporate behavior.” The letter is 
available at http://pipeupagainstenbridge.ca/news/prairie_artists_against_enbridge.
9 For example, the fifth annual Tar Sands Healing Walk, sponsored by the Keepers of  
the Athabasca, took place on 27–29 June 2014 (http://www.healingwalk.org/home.
html).
10 One example of  an attempt to bring together “creatives, scientists, and informers” to 
produce an international “cultural response to the climate challenge” is the UK-based 
Cape Farewell project (http://www.capefarewell.com/about.html).
11 See “Perspectives on Canadian Tar Sands and the Northern Gateway Pipeline,” 
Elora Centre for the Arts, Elora, Ontario, 17 May–8 July 2012, http://www.
eloracentreforthearts.ca/index.cfm?page=Gallery_2012TarS_MED; “Petroleum 
Paradox: For Better or for Worse?” Denise Bibro Fine Art Inc. , New York, 24 May–23 
June 2012, http://www.denisebibrofineart.com/exhibitions/1256; and “Marina 
Zurkow: Neocracy,” DiverseWorks, Houston, Texas, 17 March–21 April 2012, http://
www.diverseworks.org/past-works/archive/marina-zurkow-necrocracy.
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Blurring the Boundaries of  Private, Partisan, 
and Public Interests
Accountability in an Oil Economy
Lorna Stefanick
Accountability regimes are recognized worldwide as crucial components of  a 
democratic state because transparency helps to expose corruption, ensures due 
process in law, and encourages the citizen engagement that is central to citizen 
participation. In short, transparency aids in holding governments to account. 
As one democratic theorist observes, “Governance without accountability is 
tyranny. Few principles are as central to democracy as this” (Borowiak 2011, 
3). For newly emerging democracies, the concept of  “open government” chal-
lenges previously accepted notions that the interests of  society (as expressed 
through the power of  the state) take precedence over the interests of  individ-
ual citizens. Institutions such as the World Bank and the UN Development 
Programme identify transparency as a critical component of  good governance 
in all countries (Shrivastava and Stefanick 2012).
Studies of  resource-rich countries that suffer from the “oil curse” under-
score the importance of  transparency as a bulwark against corruption. There 
are widely differing forms of  corruption in the Global North and South; the oil-
curse studies focus on the Global South. Since regulatory capture by financial 
and industrial lobbies is also a form of  corruption, it is important to examine 
the effect on accountability regimes of  the neoliberal notion of  “governing 
without government” (Rhodes 1996). The economic meltdown in 2008 high-
lighted the decreased capacity of  the hollowed-out state to safeguard the public 
good in a global market arena. These deficiencies have resulted in calls for the 
reaffirmation of  the state in defining, pursuing, and protecting collective inter-
ests. As Martin Painter and Jon Pierre (2005, 1) note:
14
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The events of  the last decade have failed to prove the superiority of  the 
market over the state in terms of  fostering economic development and 
growth. Capital markets across Western Europe have generated massive 
losses, with consequent problems in respect of  welfare, pensions and 
employment, while unregulated international capital movements coupled 
with liberalized domestic regulatory regimes were in large part responsible 
for the Asian financial crisis.
The new decentralized governance structures wherein the state shares func-
tions with quasi-state, private, and nonprofit actors are here to stay. However, 
these structures—and in particular, the role of  the state within them—must 
be continually scrutinized in order to ensure that the collective interest is 
promoted.
Even though Alberta was an early adopter of  mechanisms to support gov-
ernment accountability, it has not escaped criticism.1 During the nearly forty-
four-year rule of  the Progressive Conservative (PC) party in Alberta, the 
increasing shrinkage of  the distance between the political and administrative 
systems in Alberta put a strain on democratic institutions. Ordinarily, this dis-
tance prevents the administration from becoming a tool to keep the govern-
ment of  the day in power. The merging of  the political arm of  government and 
the administrative apparatus that serves it is part of  the legacy of  the “business 
government” tradition in Alberta, which over the past few decades has been 
expressed by the merging of  the interests of  the oil industry with the public 
interest. Public sector accountability is compromised when a premium is put on 
market accountability, and a blended form of  government is reduced to being 
an instrument for creating the most favourable climate possible for business 
interests. These trends are exacerbated by the ever shrinking role of  the state 
and, in particular, by the reduction of  government support for the creation and 
dissemination of  information and knowledge that contributes to robust public 
policy debate.
This chapter evaluates democracy in Alberta through an analysis of  
accountability. It focuses on both political and administrative structures, and 
in particular, on the independent offices of  the legislature that were established 
to be “watchdogs” of  both the political and administrative arms of  government. 
Embedded in the discussion is an analysis of  the evolution of  the administra-
tive apparatus of  Alberta’s public service, with reference to the ways in which 
the oil-based economy has shaped it. Institutional structures that provide scru-
tiny of  public sector activities will only be as strong as the political will that 
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underpins them; both citizens and long-serving governments in a strong econ-
omy lubricated by resource rents become complacent about the need for demo-
cratic accountability, because it is assumed that interests of  the governing party, 
the government, corporations, and the public are one and the same. While his-
torians will no doubt have much to say about the toppling of  the PC government 
in 2015 by the left-leaning New Democratic Party (NDP), a post-election survey 
overwhelmingly suggested that voting patterns did not reflect an ideological 
shift but were driven instead by a desire for change and by disappointment with 
PC leader Jim Prentice (Markusoff  2015). This chapter suggests that the anger 
expressed in the “Anyone but Conservative” sentiment evident in the campaign 
may have been fuelled by an implicit recognition that democracy rests on polit-
ical accountability to citizens rather than to corporate interests.
Transparency, Democracy, and the Curse of Oil
A key dysfunction of  political regimes that are not transparent is that secrecy 
can hide corruption. Corruption can be defined as “the misuse of  public author-
ity for private gains” (Shen and Williamson 2005, 327). Typically, corruption 
involves activities that are illegal. The United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption calls corruption “an insidious plague that has a wide range of  cor-
rosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of  law, leads 
to violations of  human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of  life and 
allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flour-
ish” (United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime 2004, iii). The United Nations 
goes on to note that corruption is found in all countries, but it is in the Global 
South that its effects are most damaging, particularly with respect to the allevi-
ation of  poverty.
Researchers have noted that weak institutions that are vulnerable to cor-
ruption act as a hindrance to socio-economic development in resource-rich 
countries of  the Global South (Kolstad and Wigg 2009; Mehlum, Moene, and 
Torvik 2006; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2006). The political elite in these 
countries has control of  resources and resource rents, which leads to control 
over patronage and the distribution of  resources. The private sector also recog-
nizes corruption as a dysfunction in countries rich in natural resources and has 
instituted initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), which focuses on revenue transparency. According to Ivar Kolstad and 
Arne Wiig (2009, 521), this initiative reflects the popularity of  transparency as 
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a method of  weeding out corruption. But, as they point out, an emphasis on 
transparency alone is insufficient, and, in particular, the emphasis of  EITI on 
revenues is misplaced (529). Kolstad, Wiig, and Aled Williams (2009, 957) argue 
that negative behaviours are ameliorated by strong institutional structures that 
promote private sector efficiency and public sector accountability: the former 
helps to prevent private capture, while the latter prevents capture by govern-
ment authorities. Regularized and transparent decision-making structures 
that produce administratively predictable outcomes provide strong protection 
from patronage.
While the obvious injustices associated with inequality and injustice may 
not be as visible in the Global North, this does not mean that corruption does 
not exist or that it does not constitute a problem with far-reaching implications. 
Corruption can be defined not merely as the abuse of  power by a public official 
for the purpose of  private gain but more broadly as patronage, or as “the distri-
bution of  rents for political purposes” (Kolstad, Wiig, and Williams 2009, 954). 
If  corruption is defined even more expansively as a systemic dysfunction that 
causes certain interests to receive preferential treatment, which in turn cre-
ates or exacerbates inequalities, then the largest economies in the world may 
need the most scrutiny, given that preferential treatment within these econ-
omies results in economic, political, and social advantages that are felt around 
the globe. From this perspective, more insidious types of  corruption exist in 
the realm of  political practices, economic policies, and foreign policy that are 
not captured by the various corruption indices, which are slanted toward docu-
menting the type of  corruption that is most applicable to developing country 
institutions.2
While both efficiency and accountability are popularly used as normative 
markers of  best practices in both the public and the private sector, little time is 
spent defining them. In his book Accountability and Democracy, Borowiak (2011) 
points out that while the notion of  accountability is accepted as a sine qua non 
of  democracy, its weakness is its conceptual ambiguity. He notes that account-
ability is a relational concept: “to be accountable is to be liable to be called to 
account, or to answer for responsibilities, positions, and conduct” (6). With 
respect to liberal democracies, Borowiak asks whether private sector efficiency 
requires accountability to anything beyond the market. Conversely, how is 
efficiency defined with reference to the public sector? From a neoliberal per-
spective, market efficiency replaces democratic accountability. And indeed, the 
blurring of  boundaries that characterizes “governance” dictates that much of  
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the state’s policy capacity resides outside the domain of  the state. But as Martin 
Painter and Jon Pierre (2005, 13) observe, “Private actors are not likely to sup-
port projects that do not directly cater to their interests, hence policy capacity 
in this approach is to some extent a capacity to formulate and execute certain 
types of  policy rather than others.” Accordingly, governance without some 
measure of  democratic accountability will result in a public policy process that 
becomes captive to dominant coalitions of  nonstate actors.
Democratic accountability can be broken down into two forms: political and 
administrative. While much emphasis is put on political accountability, the 
structure and activities of  the administrative apparatus are equally important; 
this arm of  government not only runs programs but translates the decisions of  
elected officials into program policy. The two arms of  government are neces-
sarily connected, but Western public administration theory has long lauded the 
merit of  keeping some distinction between the two. When considering the call 
of  President Woodrow Wilson over a century ago to keep administration out-
side the sphere of  politics, Donald Savoie (2003, 4) notes that “to separate the 
two realms would constitute a powerful counterweight to ‘centrifugal’ democ-
racy, since it would create an apolitical public service.” An apolitical public ser-
vice based on merit as opposed to patronage is important, because it provides 
the best chance that administration will be conducted in a fashion wherein all 
groups in society are treated equally, devoid of  corruption and cronyism.
For the purposes of  this analysis, democratic accountability can be seen as 
the public service being held to account by politicians, and politicians being 
held to account by the electorate. What is missing from this mix is that while 
the political and administrative components of  democratic governance are 
held accountable to citizens, private sector actors have little accountability to 
the political community in which they operate, even though their actions argu-
ably have far more impact on citizens in an era of  globalization and a hollowing 
out of  the nation-state. To say that private sector actors have no accountabil-
ity to either governments or citizens is overstating the case: they are subject, 
of  course, to regulatory regimes. But as mentioned earlier in this chapter, as 
well as in a number of  other chapters in this volume, regulatory regimes can 
show evidence of  regulatory capture, wherein industry co-opts the oversight 
mechanisms in order to promote its own interests. In the same way, the auton-
omy of  legislative officers and public servants can be compromised by work-
ing in a political environment dominated by the same party year after year, 
where all-party legislative oversight committees are numerically dominated 
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by the governing party, and the interests of  the political party and govern-
ment become indistinguishable. This chapter makes this case with reference to 
Alberta, beginning first with the institutional and political context of  Alberta’s 
officers of  the legislature.
Democracy in Alberta: “Business Government” and Accountability
Alberta has had sovereignty over its internal affairs as defined in the Canadian 
constitution since the province was created in 1905. As in other Canadian juris-
dictions, certain disadvantaged groups such as women and Indigenous peoples 
were not initially included in the franchise. Alberta stands among the first three 
jurisdictions in Canada to grant voting rights to women, despite the widespread 
belief  that Alberta is the most conservative province in the country (Carroll and 
Little 2001, 39; Harrison, this volume). “Conservative” could refer to the mar-
ket-based orientation of  recent Progressive Conservative governments. But 
the vernacular usage of  the term aptly describes the disinclination of  Albertans 
to elect new governments on a regular basis. Prior to the NDP victory in 2015, 
Alberta had, in the first 109 years of  its existence, seen only three changes in 
government. In the four elections in which the government changed, the new 
government won a decisive victory, and the number of  seats held by the previ-
ous governing party was either reduced to less than half  or the party was com-
pletely shut out of  the legislature. Almost half  of  the elections in Alberta have 
produced very lopsided victories, with the winning party taking between 85 
percent and 95 percent of  the legislative seats (Elections Alberta 2015b).
But resounding electoral victories do not mean that there is a provincial 
consensus around how the public interest should be defined or how that inter-
est should be promoted in policy. Even in elections in which the popular vote 
has been respectably close, the electoral results have been dramatically skewed 
in favour of  the winning party because of  the province’s first-past-the-post 
system. This electoral system gives the advantage to parties that have region-
ally concentrated support as opposed to those that enjoy widespread but diffuse 
support in a given constituency. The former will produce sufficient voter sup-
port to elect a representative in particular ridings, while the latter will relegate 
political candidates to the “also ran” category in many ridings. Diffuse support 
can produce no elected members in the legislative assembly, even though sup-
port is fairly evenly divided between the winning and losing parties.3
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990295.01
Blurring the Boundaries of  Private, Partisan, and Public Interests   369
In Alberta, diffuse progressive support has traditionally given the advan-
tage to right-of-centre parties whose support is concentrated in rural areas.4 
The gap between the percentage of  the vote the winning party takes and the 
seats awarded is wide, often as much as 30 percent. Doreen Barrie (2006, 57) 
notes that since 1905, the average of  the popular vote received by the winning 
party “is right on 50%, not exactly a stampede towards a single party.” Yet the 
winning parties have been awarded massive electoral victories. Once in power, 
often for very long periods of  time, Alberta governments have been remarkably 
effective in controlling the definition of  what constitutes the public interest.
It is thus not surprising that this unusual electoral history has produced 
ongoing concern about the ability of  opposition parties (and, by extension, cit-
izens) to hold the government members of  the legislative assembly to account. 
C. B. Macpherson’s Democracy in Alberta (1953) notes the virtual absence of
opposition to the Social Credit government. Macpherson explained the lack of
legislative opposition in terms of  social homogeneity, arguing that, in a society 
made up of  petit bourgeois farmers, class and redistributional conflicts were 
downplayed. In so doing, he overlooked the many divisions that in fact existed
in early Alberta society: Canadian-born versus immigrant, Anglo-Saxon versus 
other ethnicities, industrial versus agricultural workers, farmers versus ranch-
ers, Protestant versus Catholic, urban versus rural centres, to name just a few.
Putting aside Macpherson’s monolithic conception of  Alberta society, however, 
his basic point is true: these long-serving governments, with large electoral
victories, define the legislative debate, privileging some forms of  conflict over 
others.
Ten years after Macpherson’s book was published, the Social Credit held 
60 of  the 63 seats in the legislature. Ideas were floated for creating entities 
outside the legislature that “could do some of  the chores ordinarily reserved 
for the House Opposition” (Keen 1963). One novel idea was the creation of  an 
Ombudsman Office that would investigate administrative wrongdoing in order 
to ensure government accountability and fair practices. Even members of  the 
ruling Social Credit Party promoted the idea, though perhaps their enthusiasm 
was less a concern for robust legislative debate and more a reflection of  a gov-
ernment that had been in power for over thirty years looking for new ideas to 
refresh its “brand.” Nonetheless, with the installation of  the Ombudsman in 
1967, the first independent officer of  the Alberta legislature came into being.
With respect to administrative accountability, Alberta is unique in a number 
of  other ways. As Edward LeSage Jr. (2000) and Trevor Harrison (this volume) 
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explain, Alberta has been strongly influenced by turn-of-the-century western 
Canadian progressivism, as well as by agrarian populism. According to LeSage, 
populists shared the neoliberal distaste for the state, seeking to minimize and 
control its activities. Populists, however, recognized the need for Alberta’s 
early governments to build the infrastructure necessary for commerce. Given 
the distaste for government activities beyond this basic function, the division 
between politics and administration was not critical, as it was thought best that 
the administrative arm remain under political control. In contrast, from the 
progressive point of  view, the state was an instrument for social betterment. 
This meant that the division between the political and administrative appar-
atus was critical because an expert, merit-based administrative structure will 
act as a bulwark against patronage. Early Alberta was notable for an awkward 
truce between these two distinct political perspectives. “Progressivist and 
populist ideas do not mix especially well,” notes LeSage, “and, in Alberta, these 
idea systems were uneasily joined under the ‘business government’ notion, 
wherein government serves as the interpreter and steward of  the general com-
munity will” (399). One of  the characteristics of  business government is lon-
gevity: the government has considerable time to both define and shape the will 
of  the community while suppressing dissent from the common vision. Even 
when governments in Alberta have only a slim majority of  voters supporting 
them, repeated re-election gives them both the confidence and the legitimacy 
to claim that they represent the public interest.5
From the perspective of  accountability, the notion of  public interest is 
important. Politicians are accountable to the electorate (the public). Through 
elections, political parties can claim that they have a mandate to define the 
public interest through public policy implemented by public servants. While 
the winning party will dominate the legislature, at the very least the oppos-
ition MLAs can ask questions, present alternative perspectives, and engage in 
debate about what constitutes the public interest. As pointed out by a provincial 
commentator, “For there to be effective accountability, the opposition must be 
able to scrutinize and publicize government actions on an ongoing basis, even 
if  we don’t particularly like what the opposition had in mind” (Gunter 2009). 
Legislative officers provide an additional layer of  scrutiny of  both political and 
administrative activity. The functions of  these officers differ, but ultimately it 
is their job to ensure that public and private interests are separated, that cer-
tain interests are not privileged during elections, that taxpayer money is spent 
appropriately, and that the administrative apparatus treats everyone the same 
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and, in doing so, respects citizens’ rights. In sum, these officers are vital to gov-
ernment accountability.
Administrative Accountability and New Public Management
There are six legislative officers in Alberta; all are chosen and report to an all-
party standing committee. As noted, the Office of  the Ombudsman was the first 
to be established, with the Chief  Electoral Officer, the Ethics Commissioner, 
and the modern version of  the Auditor General’s Office following in subse-
quent years. The Office of  the Information and Privacy Commissioner was 
created in 1994, and in 2012 the Office of  the Child and Youth Advocate was 
established. The all-party Standing Committee on Legislative Offices develops 
the list of  candidates for these offices; members of  the legislature elect candi-
dates by majority vote. Given that the membership of  this committee reflects 
the distribution of  seats in the legislature, it comes as no surprise that there are 
complaints that officers reporting to a PC-dominated committee are not highly 
critical of  government.
While legislative offices in Alberta meet the requirements of  independ-
ence, wide scope of  purview, and accessibility (see Rowat 1985, 183–85), what 
is distinctive about Alberta with respect to their functioning is the province’s 
enthusiastic commitment to neoliberalism in the early 1990s. Faced with a slug-
gish economy, large government deficits, and low oil prices, the PC government 
of  Ralph Klein radically downsized government and adopted new public man-
agement (NPM) approaches to the public sector administration. While some 
aspects of  NPM are attractive to parties of  all stripes (value for money, effi-
ciency and effectiveness, and outcome metrics), other NPM features are most 
consistent with free market, neoliberal political ideology. The NPM approach 
entails mimicking the private sector with respect to management practices, 
dramatically reducing or contracting out services to the private and nonprofit 
sectors, and decentralizing authority by transferring functions to regional 
authorities or community boards. In doing so, the government’s role shifts 
from being the provider of  services to being the body providing supervision of  
service provision.
Like other government bodies, the resources of  the legislative offices were 
cut in the 1990s. The Office of  the Ombudsman is illustrative of  the ensuing 
challenges. Reorganization and the rapid rate of  change from the government 
providing services to overseeing service provision left most people (including 
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Ombudsman Office staff) confused as to who should be held responsible for 
maladministration. Moreover, privatization often meant that the Office of  the 
Ombudsman lost the authority to investigate complaints because the issue was 
outside its jurisdiction. As Ombudsman Johnson observed in 1995, “The priva-
tization of  government services is occurring without protective measures such 
as appeal mechanisms and/or ombudsman services. The lack of  safeguards in 
the system erodes accountability” (Alberta, Office of  the Ombudsman 1995, 2).
For those complaints in which the office maintained jurisdiction, investi-
gations became more complex and time consuming, yet resources and train-
ing did not keep pace. Moreover, NPM places less emphasis on process and 
procedures, favouring the promotion of  “results-based management.” This is 
clearly apparent by the attention paid in annual reports to setting targets for the 
time taken to process complaints and then evaluating the success of  the office 
in meeting these targets. As one long-time observer of  Ombuds offices notes, 
“Results-based management has little regard for due process and for necessar-
ily fair results. The challenges relating to attitude and practice are truly enor-
mous” (Levine 2009, 295).
The difficulties for Ombuds offices in ensuring accountability with respect 
to privatized services and other by-products of  NPM is a problem worldwide. 
However, the speed with which change happened in Alberta is unique. As will 
be illustrated in the next section, the confluence of  neoliberal ideologies and 
NPM since the early 1990s, combined with the conflation of  the governing 
party’s interest with that of  the government, has worsened the already tenuous 
ability of  Alberta citizens to hold their politicians to account. The end result 
not only has implications for the ability of  citizens to access government infor-
mation using enabling legislation; it also reflects a more generalized trend of  
controlling and suppressing information that contributes to policy delibera-
tions. Moreover, merging interests create a culture of  entitlement that supports 
activities, sometimes illegal, that would not be tolerated in jurisdictions where 
the division between government and party is more distinct.
Information Management and “the Message”: When Political and 
Administrative Interests Merge
In Alberta, the Information and Privacy Commissioner is the officer respon-
sible for administering the legislation that ensures citizen access to information 
held by government. Critics have complained that the fees charged for access 
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to information in Alberta are exorbitant, while delays ensure that, in the case 
of  journalists, the “scoop” will be lost. So, for example, in the months leading 
up to the 2004 provincial election, two reporters and the opposition Liberals 
requested the release of  the flight logs of  airplanes used for government pur-
poses. At issue were allegations that the premier and other PC members of  the 
legislative assembly were making inappropriate use of  taxpayer-funded planes. 
The reporter’s request for information was filed in May 2004; the information 
was received three days after the provincial election in November (Simons 
2007). The fee for the leader of  the opposition’s request to examine the same 
Alberta government flight log documents for the years 1996 to 2003 was esti-
mated to be $4,671. In contrast, the fee for examining the much larger flight logs 
of  the federal government was $5 (Taft 2007, 74–77).6 Similarly, the Canadian 
Taxpayers Federation requested details regarding how much Alberta govern-
ment departments were paying communications consultants, but since the bill 
exceeded $11,000 with less than half  the departments reporting, the federa-
tion halted its investigation (75). The passing of  amendments to the Freedom 
of  Information and Protection of  Privacy Act in 2006 gave the force of  law to 
the trend of  suppressing information. These amendments safeguard govern-
ment internal audits from public scrutiny for fifteen years, as well as protecting 
ministers’ briefing notes for five years. A leading access-to-information expert 
described the changes to the act as “noxious” (Alasdair Roberts, quoted in Baxter 
2006). While access-to-information legislation is a useful tool to cut through 
bureaucratic layers, it is not particularly effective if  the information is, for all 
practice purposes, inaccessible.
Some argue that the biggest issue with Freedom of  Information and 
Protection of  Privacy (FOIP) officers promoting access to information is that 
they are embedded in the government bureaucracy (Taft 2007, 72). In this case, 
however, the fundamental problem is larger than that of  individual FOIP officers 
having close working relationships with the departments they oversee: it relates 
to departments not distinguishing between public and partisan interests. In the 
case of  the flight logs, the reporter complained to the Information Access and 
Privacy Commissioner that Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation had pur-
posely delayed the release of  the flight logs until after the 2004 election. During 
the subsequent public hearing, a memo that had been altered was entered as evi-
dence, prompting the RCMP to launch a criminal investigation. In other prov-
inces, the falsification of  evidence before a quasi-judicial body might precipitate 
a scandal that could bring down the government. In Alberta, however, this did 
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not happen. As a reporter for the Edmonton Journal noted with considerable frus-
tration, “We’ve so blurred the line between the Progressive Conservative Party 
and ‘the government,’ we can’t even see it anymore” (Simons 2009).
Shifting to the issues that are under the purview of  the Chief  Electoral 
Officer, it is apparent that a similar problem exists with respect to the strong 
ties between corporate and political elites in Alberta. The province limits dona-
tions to political parties from an individual or corporation to $10,000 per year 
and $30,000 in any campaign period. As is demonstrated in Kellogg’s chap-
ter in this volume, this comparatively high limit has resulted in corporations 
donating hundreds of  thousands of  dollars to Alberta’s PC Party over the years; 
almost half  of  these corporations are oil companies. In contrast, parties such 
as the Alberta Liberals receive comparatively little support and are chronic-
ally struggling financially (Timmons 2013). The 2012 provincial election was 
an anomaly in that corporations donated upwards of  a million dollars to the 
Wildrose Party when it appeared that this party might topple the PC dynasty. 
Unlike the Wildrose Party, which publishes the exact dollar amount and source 
of  the donations it receives, the PCs give only a range (e.g. , from $10,001 to 
$30,000). The ability to make large donations to political parties without pub-
licizing the exact amounts not only strengthens the ties between corporate 
and political elites; it also weakens the ability of  the public to scrutinize the 
relationships.7
Donations from corporations, however, pale in the face of  donations to the 
PCs made by billionaire Daryl Katz and his associates. The high-profile Katz is 
the owner of  the Edmonton Oilers; he was accused of  circumventing Alberta’s 
Elections Finance Act, which prohibits donations over $30,000. Katz made a 
“bulk” donation of  $430,000 to the PCs in one cheque, but an Elections Alberta 
report claimed that the money came from associates who “promptly and fully 
repaid” him (quoted in Walton and Wingrove 2013). In addition to this sum, 
representing almost a third of  the total amount the PCs raised for the 2012 elec-
tion, critics were concerned that the donation(s) violated conflict-of-interest 
guidelines, given that the Katz group was at the same time seeking $100 mil-
lion from the provincial government in support of  building a new arena for the 
Edmonton Oilers hockey team.
While Katz was eventually cleared of  wrongdoing, the government passed 
the Election Accountability Act in response to these and other issues. The bill 
includes ninety recommendations from Alberta’s Chief  Electoral Officer; these 
did not include a limit on the amount parties can spend on an election, nor did 
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the act prohibit donations from corporations or unions, as the comparable 
federal act does. The limit of  $30,000 per individual donation remains and is 
among the highest in the country, compared to the federal limit of  $2,400 per 
year, and $3,600 in an election year. The possibility of  splitting a single dona-
tion still exists. As Bill Moore-Kilgannon of  Public Interest Alberta puts it, 
“It’s still the Wild West when it comes to campaign-finance rules” (quoted in 
Wingrove 2012).
The same pattern of  blurring of  the lines is evident in donations made to the 
PCs by postsecondary institutions over a period spanning 2004 to 2010. These 
publicly funded institutions paid for employees or members of  their Board 
of  Governors to participate in PC Party premier’s dinners, golf  tournaments, 
and policy conferences. This practice is illegal; Alberta law prohibits public 
institutions from directing taxpayers’ money to a political party. Forty-five 
other organizations, including a school board, a department of  Alberta Health 
Services, towns, and municipal districts engaged in this practice over a period 
of  eight years.
Nonetheless, Alberta’s Chief  Electoral Officer Brian Fjeldheim did not 
pursue legal sanctions against any of  the public institutions, prompting polit-
ical scientist Duane Bratt to suggest that Fjeldheim’s behaviour called his non-
partisanship into question. “I don’t want to say that he is working on behalf  
of  the party,” Bratt said, “as opposed to working on behalf  of  Albertans but 
there are some indications of  that, or at least [of] not wanting to exercise his 
full role” (quoted in CBC News 2012). Bratt went on to speculate that perhaps 
Fjeldheim felt “chilled” by the fate of  his predecessor, Lorne Gibson, who was 
fired after casting doubt on the fairness of  Alberta’s electoral process. After 
Alberta Justice did not pursue the prosecution in nine cases of  illegal campaign 
donations, Gibson wrote two highly critical reports about the election pro-
cesses in Alberta, which included a hundred recommendations for improving 
the province’s laws. Gibson later sued the government for wrongful dismissal 
(Wingrove 2011). While the lines might be blurred between partisan and public 
interests, there can be no mistaking that in this instance, the lines were very 
clearly drawn between what independent officers of  the legislature are and are 
not allowed to say.
The same blurring of  lines can be seen with respect to the membership 
of  quasi-governmental organizations. In 2007, the Edmonton Journal detailed 
the “disproportionately large percentage of  card-carrying, high-profile 
Tories” among those who sit on government-appointed agencies, boards, and 
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commissions in Alberta (Edmonton Journal 2007). A particularly egregious 
example was offered by the thirteen-member board of  the Peace Country 
Health Region, each and every one of  whom was a registered PC member. While 
these revelations did not appear to cause much concern in 2007, such partisan 
connections would become glaringly apparent in the 2015 election. A pivotal 
moment in the election was a press conference held by five CEOs four days 
before the election, at which they urged citizens to vote PC as opposed to NDP. 
Collectively, the group had donated nearly $95,000 to the PCs over the past 
five years, and several had garnered government contracts worth millions. One 
of  the CEOs was Doug Goss, a trustee of  the Stollery Children’s Hospital and 
chair of  the government-appointed University of  Alberta Board of  Governors. 
Goss explained, “We want to make sure that people are thinking—thinking 
straight—when they enter into the ballot box on May 5” (quoted in Kleiss 2015). 
Another cautioned that if  the NDP raised corporate taxes, businesses might 
cease corporate donations to charities and worthy undertakings such as the 
Stollery Children’s Hospital. The University of  Alberta’s faculty association 
demanded that Goss be removed from the board in view of  his partisan stance. 
After the election, Goss said he regretted his comments and promised to work 
with the new government. He reflected, “You kinda go, geez, that maybe didn’t 
come out quite the way it should have.” But he insisted that “as a private citizen,” 
he had a right to his opinions (CBC News 2015).
The preceding examples suggest an inability to distinguish clearly between 
public and private—to recognize that personal support (including financial 
support) for the party in power must not be allowed to influence the discharge 
of  public office. This confusion is perhaps not surprising, given that, over 
the course of  its extended reign in Alberta, the PC Party had become all but 
synonymous with “government” in the minds of  most Albertans, especially 
younger ones who had never seen another party at the helm. Moreover, the 
provincial government defined the public interest as equivalent to corporate 
interests. Some analysts point to decades of  government cutbacks to explain 
why citizens and public institutions are so deferential. Alvin Finkel (2012) 
describes this situation as a “culture of  entitlement on the part of  the governing 
party” that coerces various groups within Alberta into silence—a notable 
example being doctors who have reported that they were victims of  intimida-
tion after they engaged in advocacy on behalf  of  patients (see HQCA 2012, 154–
57). While Premier Redford’s sudden resignation in 2014 was depicted as the 
public’s (and her caucus’s) rejection of  what commentator Don Martin (2014) 
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called her “entitlement to perks,” as exemplified in her expensive travel habits, 
it should be noted that the PCs have a long history of  the very behaviour she 
exhibited. As Martin observed, Premier Klein used government planes “like a 
personal shuttle because he could smoke aboard.”
The situation of  postsecondary institutions in Alberta illustrates how reli-
ance on government funding can silence opposition in a one-party system 
where critics can be ignored. In the spring of  2013, postsecondary institutions 
were anticipating a 2 percent increase in their operating grants but were instead 
hit with a 7 percent cut. Calgary’s mayor, Naheed Nenshi, abandoned the usual 
diplomacy of  mayors when dealing with the government that funds them, call-
ing on Mount Royal’s Board of  Governors to push back on this “bad policy” 
(quoted in Dormer 2013). Edmonton’s mayor at the time, Stephen Mandel, 
chimed in his opposition, worrying that the cuts would “shackle the creativity 
of  our brightest people” (quoted in Wingrove 2013). Six months later, the prov-
incial government reinstated a third of  the money it had taken away. As Finkel 
would no doubt have predicted, the response from university presidents over 
this dramatic reversal of  a policy that created huge system-wide disruption was 
one of  subdued gratitude that the money had been restored (see, for example, 
Gerein and Howell 2013). The same phenomenon was observed in the 2014 
budget and again in the budget that Premier Prentice proposed in 2015. Both 
budgets saw continued cutbacks to postsecondary education. Stephen Mandel, 
now a Tory Cabinet minister, had nothing to say about the 2015 cutbacks. As 
columnist Paula Simons lamented, “At this point, universities, colleges and 
technical institutions seem so resigned to playing whipping boy, they’re just 
happy that no one’s hitting them harder” (Simons 2015).
What could be construed as even more dangerous to postsecondary institu-
tions, and in particular to the creation and dissemination of  knowledge that 
could be deployed to promote dissent, is the government’s desire to ensure 
that postsecondary institutions produce graduates whose skills will directly 
feed economic growth. In 2013, the government sent each of  the province’s 
twenty-six postsecondary institutions a draft “letter of  expectation.” In it, the 
minister of  Enterprise and Advanced Education (since renamed Innovation 
and Advanced Education) directed the institutions to review their programs 
to determine whether they are “in demand by employers and students” and 
to enhance their collaborative work with “business and industry to maximize 
the responsiveness to community and regional economic and social needs” 
(Alberta, Enterprise and Advanced Education 2013, 2, 3). Two years later, the 
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minister of  Finance said in his budget address, “We will work with the post-sec-
ondary institutions to preserve high-demand, high-value programs and, cor-
respondingly, to identify and shed low-value programs that do not represent 
good return on investment” (Campbell 2015, 9). Such language clearly presup-
poses a particular definition of  “value.” Many within the postsecondary sector 
and beyond have interpreted these pronouncements as evidence of  the govern-
ment’s conviction that intellectual activities should be driven not by curiosity 
but by commercial potential.
The possibility that the government will dictate the direction of  research 
and curriculum so that education serves economic interests is of  concern not 
only to the academic community in Alberta but to those beyond its borders. As 
David Robinson of  the Canadian Association of  University Teachers put it, “It 
may sound romantic. . . . But I believe the university is the place where we are 
on a search for truth. Once we allow government control over that, we lose our 
way” (quoted in Simons 2013). This “truth” can be created collectively in a post-
industrial society; in this way, education can be seen as a social right, one that 
allows citizens to participate in political decision making. With more involve-
ment from citizens, governance becomes messy, leading some states to declare 
that this excess of  democracy requires that the state exercise more control over 
both the creation and dissemination of  knowledge and information (Harrison 
2013).
The contraction of  public space for debate is thus tied to the state’s control 
over information, leading scholars to fear that as the state knows more and more 
about us, we know less and less about the state (see Harrison 2013; Stefanick 
2011). Those who protest the effort to keep them silent about matters that they 
feel should be subject to democratic debate have responded by revealing infor-
mation that governments are seeking to hide.8 Individuals release information 
at enormous risk, but they often feel that they have no other choice, particularly 
when they are privy to information that reveals conflicts of  interest.
Institutional Responses to Conflicts of Interest
Governments have responded in various ways to the charge that they are sup-
pressing information that properly should reside in the public domain. Alberta 
created new political and administrative accountability positions and passed 
so-called whistle-blowing legislation. In 2012, Don Scott, the first occupant 
of  the position of  associate minister of  Accountability, Transparency, and 
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Transformation, introduced Alberta’s Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower 
Protection) Act. The newly created Public Interest Commissioner (a second 
function that was given to the provincial Ombudsman) will resolve complaints 
made under the auspices of  this act. The legislation imposes fines for those who 
punish or intimidate public sector employees if  they report wrongdoing, to the 
tune of  $25,000 for the first offence and $120,000 for the subsequent offences 
(O’Donnell 2012). While the associate minister claimed that this legislation ful-
filled the promise to Albertans for more open and transparent government, it 
did not include any of  the many amendments proposed by opposition MLAs, 
who deemed it weak and ineffective.
Most troubling to its critics is the total discretion the legislation gives to the 
commissioner to “exempt any person, class of  persons, public entity, informa-
tion, record, or thing from the application of  all or any portion of  this Act or 
the regulations.” According to Wildrose Party MLA Rod Fox, “This is the gov-
ernment saying ‘trust us,’ but from the pattern we’ve seen clearly over the past 
year, we can’t” (quoted in Byfield 2013). One of  Alberta’s most famous whis-
tle-blowers, Liberal MLA Dr. David Swann, cited his own case (that of  going 
public with his concerns over climate change and air pollution) as an example 
of  a situation that would not be helped by the new law (Larson 2012). Similarly, 
the nonprofit organization Federal Accountability Initiative for Reform (FAIR) 
issued a scathing report of  both Canada’s and Alberta’s whistle-blowing legis-
lation. The report’s author says the new Alberta legislation “has fallen far short 
of  the government’s claims by ignoring modern best practice, copying outdated 
legislation from other provinces, and adding regressive measures that render 
the law essentially worthless” (Hutton 2013, 12).
Whistle-blowing often involves the reporting of  conflict of  interest; these 
matters fall under the jurisdiction of  the Ethics Commissioner. In Alberta, 
many critics both within and outside the legislature have called for this legisla-
tive office to be abolished because of  its ineffectiveness (Marsden 2013). Since 
the creation of  the Ethics Office in 1982, there have been three commission-
ers. The first two commissioners appointed by the PC government were former 
Social Credit MLAs. In contrast, the third commissioner, appointed in 2003, 
has strong ties to the governing party. While the two previous commissioners 
conducted twenty-one investigations between 1993 and 2007, the commission-
ers have never imposed sanctions. More pointed criticism, however, is directed 
at the third commissioner, Neil Wilkinson. A newspaper columnist dubbed him 
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“Ethics Commissioner Neil ‘What Happens in Vegas’ Wilkinson,” in reference to 
the perspective that “anything goes” (Byfield 2013).
The criticism of  Wilkinson began with his appointment. A former chair 
of  the now defunct Capital Health Region, Wilkinson was appointed as com-
missioner shortly after his previous job (to which he was appointed by the PC 
government) was abolished. Two opposition members of  the all-party commit-
tee that appointed Wilkinson had serious misgivings about his selection. MLA 
Laurie Blakeman reported that the previous appointment committee she had 
sat on had sought an appointment with whom all MLAs would be comfortable. 
Blakeman not only voted against the appointment, but she made an impas-
sioned speech to the legislature underscoring her concerns about Wilkinson’s 
close ties to the PC Party: “I need to believe as a member of  this Assembly, that I 
will be treated the same as any other member would be. I do not have that faith 
in this particular circumstance, and I’m saddened by that” (Alberta, Legislative 
Assembly 2008, 1518). Other critics pointed to Wilkinson’s lack of  ethical, legal, 
and financial experience. Rachel Notley, then an opposition MLA, noted that 
“based on the criteria we had set out . . . he was not anywhere close to being 
at the top of  my list in terms of  the person that was most qualified” (Alberta, 
Legislative Assembly 2008, 1522).
Criticism of  the commissioner’s bias ramped up after he took office. The 
most notable concern was Wilkinson’s investigation of  a former cabinet min-
ister who was appointed, shortly after he was defeated in the 2012 provin-
cial election, to the department that he had overseen as a minister. PC MLA 
Evan Berger had served one term, including five months as the minister of  
Agriculture; soon after his failed attempt at re-election, he was appointed an 
advisor to the deputy minister who had served under him. Normally, ministers 
are required to observe a one-year “cooling-off” period before they have deal-
ings with the departments with which they were involved during their years in 
government. As Don Braid (2012) from the Calgary Herald quipped, “I can’t recall 
another case of  a defeated minister being directly hired by his own department 
while his office chair was still spinning.” When this appointment was investi-
gated by Wilkinson, he concluded that Section 31 of  the Conflict of  Interest Act 
that prohibits activity that might “create a conflict between a private interest of  
the former minister and the public interest” did not apply in this case because 
the hiring had occurred “within the family, the government family. . . . They 
can move within the government family. In the family there’s no information 
to share. They know it all” (Bell 2012). While the former minister would have 
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had to wait a year before being hired by a private sector firm in a position that 
involved his old department, there was no prohibition on him being hired by 
his own department during that time.
Braid (2012) complained that this decision followed a familiar pattern; he 
also noted that the commissioner had not produced a single ethics investigation 
report since taking office. Opposition critic Shayne Saskiw, a Wildrose MLA, 
put it more bluntly:
The problem here is we don’t have anyone who is independent or non-
partisan because this PC government sets up a system where you basically 
have to be their lapdog. . . .
He [Wilkinson] considers himself  and (Conservative) MLAs to be insid-
ers who are family.
He is obviously not committed to upholding the separation between 
government and political parties, which is fundamental to parliament 
democracy, and he seems to believe as long as you’re family you can do no 
wrong, so what else is he turning a blind eye to? (quoted in Dormer 2012)
While it could be argued that appointing a minister familiar with departmental 
issues and operations is efficient, the fact that the government did not antici-
pate or, at the very least, was not worried about the fallout from this symbolic-
ally nepotistic appointment speaks to its seeming invisibility.
A subsequent ruling created yet more controversy when Wilkinson found 
that PC MLA Peter Sandhu had violated conflict-of-interest guidelines by fail-
ing to disclose six lawsuits against his home-building company. Sandhu sub-
sequently lobbied bureaucrats and politicians for legislative changes to the 
Alberta Builders’ Lien Act (Rusnell and Russell 2013). Wilkinson refrained from 
sanctioning Sandhu. When Wildrose MLA Rob Anderson described legislative 
officers in the Commonwealth as “corrupt,” Wilkinson lashed out at critics of  
his decision in the legislature, describing those types of  comments as “hurtful” 
(Henton 2013). While Anderson later apologized for his remarks, it is useful to 
recall that the word corruption can be used to describe both illegal activities and 
systemic dysfunctions that cause some interests to be privileged over others. 
From this perspective, Anderson’s charge of  corruption may have been well 
founded.
Wilkinson’s last investigation, the so-called Tobaccogate affair, also ignited 
heated debate. It revolved around the government’s decision to give Premier 
Redford’s ex-husband’s law firm a contract to pursue a $10 billion legal action 
against tobacco companies. Redford had vacated the post of  Justice minister 
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shortly before the decision was taken. The Redford government successfully 
resisted efforts by Wilkinson to read a briefing note that would have shed light 
on the premier’s role in the decision, claiming that making the contents public 
could damage the lawsuit. Moreover, Redford had written a communication to 
other government members the previous year while she was in the Justice port-
folio saying that “the best choice for Alberta will be the International Tobacco 
Recovery Lawyers.” Nonetheless, Wilkinson did not feel that Redford’s activ-
ities constituted a conflict of  interest. He ruled: “There is absolutely no evidence, 
nor even a suggestion, that the decision to engage ITRL on the tobacco litiga-
tion furthered, or might further, the private interest of  Premier Redford, her 
spouse, or that of  her minor child” (Alberta, Office of  the Ethics Commissioner, 
2013, 15). While Don Braid was more charitable than most critics in suggesting 
that an “error in political judgment did not prove a failure either of  ethics or 
honesty,” he mused that “perhaps she failed to see, like so many of  ex-premier 
Ed Stelmach’s crew, that the cosy old Alberta PC world was already wheezing 
and dying” (Braid 2013).
The suggestion that the Alberta PC Party was dying—or, indeed, even 
wheezing—was debatable prior to the election of  2015. But the bad optics of  
this situation once again underscore that long-serving governments that do 
not spend time on the opposition benches have little incentive to put much 
energy into creating institutions and practices that promote accountability 
beyond the symbolic level. The suspicion that the PC government has much to 
hide and little interest in transparency was underscored shortly after the 2015 
election by whistle-blowers from within the public service. They complained 
to the Public Interest Commissioner and to the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner that ministerial documents were being illegally destroyed and 
that streams of  shredded paper were flowing out of  the legislature beginning 
the morning after the election (Giovannetti 2015). Indeed, in Alberta, it appears 
that, contrary to the tenets of  NPM, the reflexive instinct is to centralize, con-
trol, and act upon information that is kept out of  public forums where actions 
or policy can be debated. Governments that have been under the control of  one 
party for extended periods of  time are particularly vulnerable to this form of  
democratic dysfunction.
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Transparency, Democracy, and Alberta Oil
Changing existing ideas about what is in the public’s best interest and who is its 
champion is not unique to Alberta or to Canada. Not only do economic power 
and governance flow across sovereign boundaries in a globalized world; so, too, 
do ideas about leaving accountability to market forces. For decades, market 
efficiency was offered as a solution to political and administrative inefficien-
cies, including their extreme form—corruption. Democratic nation-states are 
increasingly unable to regulate global capital markets; if  market accountability 
trumps political accountability, this is not seen as a problem. But as the 2008 
financial crisis demonstrates, it is not only accountability within the market that 
is critical: so is accountability of the market. Actors who enter and exit contracts 
maintain accountability within the marketplace. Governments were compelled 
to intervene in 2008 because the scale of  actors exiting the market created dev-
astating social and political effects. As Borowiak (2011, 128) argues, “Proposals 
for enhanced government oversight can be seen as attempts to save the market 
system by re-embedding market accountability with the structures of  political 
accountability.” No one really anticipated the demise of  the PC government in 
the 2015 election, despite the fact that Albertans consistently complained about 
government arrogance and polls accurately predicted that the NDP would win 
the election. The assumption was that, as Canada’s “most conservative” prov-
ince, Alberta had so firmly embraced neoliberal logic that very little appetite 
existed for demanding political accountability to citizens through the election 
of  a left-leaning government. As such, even those critics who were most opti-
mistic about citizen agency predicted that the inadequacies of  market account-
ability would continue to allow political agency and administrative authority to 
be used for the short-term interests of  the dominant industry rather than the 
pursuit of  long-term collective goals.
While Alberta’s PC government could point to such new positions as the 
associate minister of  Accountability, Transparency, and Transformation as 
evidence of  its commitment to accountability, its record was questionable with 
respect to providing access to information, providing an environment for legis-
lative officers that would encourage scrutiny, and separating the public inter-
est from political and economic interests. Like the Social Credit before it, these 
new positions reflected a desire to refresh a dated image rather than commit-
ment to serious change.9 The government’s complacency was largely due to the 
longevity of  its regime, which resulted in the conflation of  the interests of  the 
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governing party with that of  the government. The lack of  electoral risk over an 
extended period allowed the state to diminish accountability regimes and con-
trol public perceptions of  its performance through various political and admin-
istrative mechanisms. While this trend is arguably independent of  the oil 
economy, it is certainly symptomatic of  a resource- or staples-based economy.
The adoption of  the neoliberal features of  NPM exacerbated problems of  
accountability in the public service through the out-sourcing of  public services, 
taking them out of  the jurisdiction of  legislative oversight. Government spend-
ing cuts also resulted in the downsizing of  the government’s intellectual capital 
that has traditionally produced fulsome public debate about policy direction. 
Without this, governments ceded control of  the definition of  the public inter-
est to private sector interests. Encouraging publicly funded academics to seek 
private sector funds to undertake research that could serve commercial ends 
exacerbated the influence of  the private sector in defining the public interest.
These trends combine to produce a politicized public service where policy 
emanated from the PC executive with little regard for input from public ser-
vants, legislative officers, opposition MLAs, or the public. The dominance of  
PC members on the all-party committee that oversees these officers promoted 
circumspect oversight of  political and administrative activities; robust debate 
was not encouraged, dissenting voices were ignored. Electoral success and a 
strong oil-based economy gave the governing party the legitimacy to claim that 
its neoliberal logic is effective in promoting the public interest. Moreover, the 
business government tradition in Alberta legitimized the PC government both 
defining the public interest and executing policy to support it; the public inter-
est was defined in market terms with reference to the commodity producers 
that fuel the economy. In twenty-first-century Alberta, there can be no doubt 
that the most important commodity is oil and that the interests of  the oil indus-
try are often conflated with the public interest. The oil economy creates great 
wealth but has a dark underbelly that is giving rise to troubling political and 
income inequality. While other chapters in this book discuss the problem of  
regulatory capture by industry, this chapter applies the concept of  regulatory 
capture to the public service; institutional structures that are supposed to be 
apolitical identify closely with the interests of  the PC Party. When the domin-
ance of  the governing party in both the administrative and political arms of  
government is combined with the dominance of  one industry in the economy, 
accountability suffers and democracy is diminished. Whether a new govern-
ment without strong ties to corporate interests will be able to chart a new course 
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for Alberta remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that, with a change 
in government after almost forty-four years, there is hope for the health of  
democracy in Alberta.
Notes
1 In 1967, Alberta became the third jurisdiction in the world to establish an 
administrative Ombudsman, and it established an access-to-information regime 
a decade before the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Germany. While provinces 
in Canada followed Alberta’s lead, the federal government still remains without an 
Ombuds office. (“Ombuds” has been proposed as a gender-neutral alternative to 
“Ombudsman.” I use the latter when referring to the Alberta office.)
2 For example, a study of  Atlantic Canadian retail gasoline price ceilings found that 
price ceilings were enacted to protect the public. However, these price ceilings 
became “focal points” that allowed gasoline companies to collude in order to sell their 
products at high prices (Sen, Clemente, and Jonker 2011, 534). This type of  corruption 
in a Global North economy is not captured in the UN Convention Against Corruption 
or in the various corruption indices.
3 The best example of  this phenomenon is the election in 1940. Liberals, Progressive 
Conservatives, and the United Farmers of  Alberta worked together under the banner 
of  the “independent movement” to run only one candidate against the Social Credit 
candidate in individual ridings. This resulted in a very close election, although 
this is not reflected in the seats awarded: the Social Credit captured 42.90% of  the 
popular vote and the Independents 42.47%, with 11.11% going to the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF). The remaining 3.52% of  the popular vote was 
divided among eight other parties (Elections Alberta 2015a). These shares of  the 
popular vote translated into thirty-six seats for the Social Credit but only nineteen 
for the Independents, one each for the Liberal and Labour parties, with the CCF and 
the other parties shut out completely (Elections Alberta 2015b). Even though more 
people in Alberta voted against the Social Credit by a significant margin, the result 
was a Social Credit government with a strong majority.
4 The 2015 election was an anomaly in that the left-leaning NDP won in many rural 
northern constituencies (Elections Alberta 2015d).
5 Voter turnout in Alberta general elections steadily decreased between 1993 and 2008, 
from 60.2 percent to 40.6 percent (Elections Alberta 2015c), although it rebounded in 
2012 to 54.4 percent, probably in the face of  the threat posed by the Wildrose Party. 
Despite the fact that, in 2008, only 501,063 people—out of  a provincial population 
approaching 3.6 million at the time (Alberta, Treasury Board and Finance 2013)—
actually cast a ballet in support of  the PCs, and despite the fact that the party’s share 
of  the vote declined from 52.72 percent in that year to 43.97 in 2012 (Elections Alberta 
2015a), party leaders continued to assume that their policies reflected the will of  the 
people.
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6 The use of  government planes would come to the fore again in 2014, culminating in 
the resignation of  the premier halfway through her tenure and a pledge from the new 
premier to sell off  the fleet of  planes.
7 Corporate donations became a campaign issue in 2015, with both the Wildrose and 
the NDP parties promising that if  they were elected, they would prohibit donations 
to political parties from corporations and unions. Shortly after being elected to office, 
the NDP made good on this promise.
8 Some of  the notable public sector whistle-blowers in Alberta include Dr. John 
O’Connor, who raised concerns about the incidence of  cancer downstream from 
the bitumen sands, former MLA Dr. Raj Sherman, who leaked information to the 
media about poor emergency room patient outcomes, and Health Canada’s Steven 
Villebrun, who exposed the misuse of  public funds (Hutton 2013, 20).
9 It is noteworthy that in 2013, the Government of  Alberta spent $1.7 million of  public 
money promoting its “Building Alberta” brand on such things as roadside signs—
which featured the name of  Alison Redford, premier at the time, and the PC Party 
colours (Wood 2014).
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Of  Democracy and Its Deficits
Surviving Neoliberalism in Oil-Exporting Countries
Meenal Shrivastava
The substantial oil and democracy literature has contributed tremendously to 
understanding the relationship between oil dependence and liberal democracy 
in the Global South. Little effort, however, has been expended to analyze this 
question with reference to an oil-exporting country in the Global North. This 
book seeks to fill this gap by critically exploring the practice of  liberal democ-
racy and the impact of  that practice on institutions of  democracy at the subna-
tional level in Alberta, as well as in Canada generally. On the back of  Alberta oil, 
Canada has emerged as one of  the top ten oil-exporting countries in the world. 
On the surface, it would appear that democracy is alive and well in Canada. 
After all, Canada is a jurisdiction that fares well in terms of  all the attributes 
of  liberal democracy measured by the influential ranking industry, through 
assessment tools such as the Democracy Index and Polity IV. However, a closer 
examination of  the theory of  liberal democracy reveals a growing rift between 
the two core assumptions of  liberal democracy—capitalist market relations 
and developmental liberalism. This rift is not accounted for in the quantita-
tive measurements of  the practice of  liberal democracy used by most oil and 
democracy studies. In order to broaden the narrow application of  the liberal 
democratic framework in these studies, we suggest complementing it with the 
staples theory of  economic development to examine the political economy of  
an oil-exporting country.
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The oil and democracy literature contains valuable insights regarding the 
political and economic outcomes of  resource dependence, such as the rentier 
effect and the resource curse. By pointing to policy mechanisms to avoid the 
resource curse, however, staples theory enters the realm of  developmental 
liberalism, which is often a missing piece in the oil and democracy literature. 
Ignoring developmental liberalism within a democratic framework marginal-
izes the investigation and understanding of  several characteristics of  the pro-
cess and outcomes of  capitalism, including the source, dynamics, and effects of  
economic and political inequality, of  relations of  power, and of  social upheav-
als and struggles. Consequently, the fourteen authors in this book examined 
significant public policy areas—such as energy, national security, Aboriginal 
issues, the environment, labour law, urban planning, gender, and the arts—in 
the context of  the entrenchment of  the neoliberal ideology in an oil-exporting 
jurisdiction. Observing the role of  neoliberal political ideology on the liberal 
democratic mode of  governing, we note an increase in economic and political 
inequality, as well as a decline in democratic accountability. The negative impact 
of  these trends on the practice of  liberal democracy can indeed be construed as 
a democratic deficit in Alberta, as well as in Canada.
Most studies define a petro-state as a political jurisdiction that depends on 
petroleum for at least 50 percent of  its export, at least 25 percent of  its GDP, and 
at least 25 percent of  its government revenues. Oil and gas account for 18.5 per-
cent of  Canada’s exports and roughly 8 percent of  the country’s GDP. Canada 
is also a major importer of  oil, with Québec and the Atlantic provinces relying 
on foreign oil for more than 80 percent of  their fuel needs (see Campbell 2012). 
Clearly, then, Canada falls well below the standard petro-state thresholds. In 
contrast, oil and gas account for 70 percent of  Alberta’s exports, 27 percent of  
its GDP, and 28 percent of  its government revenues (Alberta, Alberta Energy 
2015). Alberta’s economic profile thus qualifies the province as a petro-prov-
ince within the Canadian federation, which warrants a closer examination of  
the institutions of  liberal democracy in the province. Moreover, it is telling that 
the rise of  Canada as one of  the top ten oil-exporting countries in the world has 
been accompanied by increasing income inequality nationally and a backward 
slide on many socio-political markers in comparison to its peer countries in the 
OECD. Undoubtedly, the impact of  oil does not end at the Alberta border but 
affects the whole of  Canada; therefore, how oil wealth is managed is a major 
national issue with substantial political, economic, social, and environmental 
consequences. A nuanced understanding of  the political economic dynamics, at 
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the national and subnational levels, of  an oil-exporting economy in the Global 
North is likely to contribute to the burgeoning oil and democracy literature, 
which needs to expand beyond its focus on countries in the Global South, espe-
cially since the largest oil-exporting countries in the world now include several 
OECD countries with growing inequality. In this context, the health of  liberal 
democracy can no longer be taken for granted, whether in the Global North or 
in the Global South.
Most of  the chapters in this collection report that governance processes, 
policy, and institutions in Alberta are creating a democratic deficit through 
declining democratic accountability and increasing economic, political, and 
social inequality in the province. While the causal links between oil depend-
ence and democratic malaise typically are not direct, it is well established in 
the oil and democracy literature alluded to in the introduction and in chapter 1 
that significantly large oil extraction generates great wealth for some but also 
creates particular political and economic conditions that inhibit democracy for 
most of  the population in an oil-exporting economy. The growing economic 
and political inequality in Canada (see chapter 1) and in Alberta (see particu-
larly chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12) not only raises moral questions about fairness; 
it also has implications for social outcomes such as quality of  life and life satis-
faction, as well as for long-term economic prospects.1 Various chapters in this 
volume confirm the rising democratic deficit in Alberta (and Canada), as well as 
the mechanism through which it is rising—the entrenchment of  the neoliberal 
state in an oil-exporting economy. The next section highlights themes within 
this volume with reference to the nature of  the neoliberal state, particularly 
in terms of  its application in the governance and administrative apparatus in 
Alberta. This chapter concludes with an analysis of  the practice of  liberal dem-
ocracy in the context of  rising inequality.
The Neoliberal State: Policies, Institutions, and Their Impact on Democracy
Neoliberalism can be defined as a political ideology or a discourse of  governance 
that informs the economistic separation of  democratic spheres and considers 
the economy as a nonpolitical self-regulatory space of  individual enterprise 
immune to the interventions of  the state. The minimalistic conception of  lib-
eral democratic theory in the neoliberal discourse has been fuelling economic 
and political inequality around the world through the vastly expanded role of  
financial motives, market institutions, and elites in the operation of  governing 
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institutions, an expansion that has occurred at the international, national, and 
subnational levels. As I point out in chapter 1, practices and policies affecting 
economic institutions have significant ramifications for political issues such as 
social justice, distribution, and economic performance. Furthermore, the cur-
rent focus on capitalist market relations at the cost of  developmental liberal-
ism is producing limits to the practice of  liberal democracy, a process that is 
occurring through increasing economic and political inequality and decreasing 
democratic accountability.
It is important to note that the penetration of  market values and instru-
ments into the liberal democratic apparatus has not happened exclusively 
in oil-exporting jurisdictions such as Alberta. In particular, the new public 
management principle of  administrative reform has spawned various forms 
of  “new governance” or “third-party government” models around the world. 
Many of  these models redefine public roles and compromise the institutional 
integrity of  the public sector at all levels, creating problems of  political steer-
ing, control, transparency, and democratic accountability (see Peters and Pierre 
2010; Stefanick 2009 and this volume). However, in an oil-exporting economy, 
the rentier effect further exacerbates the democratic deficit created by market-
based structures, as shown by many of  the chapters in this book.
Neoliberal formulations of  political and economic organization began 
exerting their influence in the 1980s and found a fertile home in Alberta. Trevor 
Harrison, in chapter 2, and Lorna Stefanick, in chapter 14, note that while a large 
number of  Albertans vote consistently for opposition parties that represent 
progressive sentiments, their diffuse distribution among parties and through-
out Alberta, combined with a first-past-the-post system, has fragmented the 
vote, producing a reoccurring pattern. While May 2015 saw the unexpected 
election of  an NDP majority government facing a sizeable opposition in the far-
right Wildrose Party, it remains to be seen to what extent this electoral victory 
will translate into changing governance patterns established during the nearly 
forty-four-year rule of  the PC Party. Midway through the province’s history, 
Conservative governments in Alberta moved to the right of  the political centre. 
This orientation—mixed with populism, western alienation, and commitment 
to individualism—made Albertans receptive to the neoliberal reforms imple-
mented by the Progressive Conservative (PC) government of  Ralph Klein in 
the 1990s. As Jay Smith points out in chapter 3, the neoliberal state has been 
referred to as the “garrison state,” in which “the welfare state—a critical means 
to the provision of  social and economic justice (in the form of  social security, 
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equality of  access to education and health care, and the equitable distribution 
of  wealth)—is de-emphasized in favour of  security, the military, the protection 
of  property, and the building of  prisons.”
The impact of  neoliberal reform is evident in most chapters in this book. 
What is particularly noteworthy about neoliberalism in Alberta, however, is the 
interesting marriage it has had with another major strain in Alberta’s socio-
economic culture: business government. Coined by C. B. Macpherson (1953), 
the term business government refers to the important historical role that govern-
ment has played in Alberta’s economic development. Major infrastructure pro-
jects, such as building railroads, were undertaken by the federal government. 
Similarly, the provincial government was active in enticing commercial inter-
ests to Alberta through investments in infrastructure and social development 
(such as education and health care). These activities were an important feature 
of  the first half  of  the PC tenure in Alberta, which began in 1971 and ended in 
2015. In the past few decades, the dominance of  neoliberal ideology is obvious; 
the PCs increasingly abandoned the role of  the activist state and systematically 
dismantled the welfare state.
In chapter 4, Stefanick describes the neoliberal mentality, characterized 
by emphasizing “active citizenship” that focuses on emphasizing individ-
ual responsibility, dismantling the regime that regulates industry; enhancing 
measures for disciplining citizens, particularly those who oppose capitalist 
interests; and shrinking the space for public participation, advocacy, and con-
testation. These trends are linked to the neoliberal conception that the govern-
ment’s role is that of  a facilitator for creating favourable market conditions for 
business. Many chapter authors discuss the disciplinary role of  the government 
in terms of  branding opposition as contrary to the public interest (chapter 4) 
and using tools of  the state to limit and/or control the activities of  civil society 
and advocacy groups (chapters 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12), labour unions (chapter 9), 
workers (chapter 8), and those involved with the arts (chapter 13). In this disci-
plinary role, the Alberta government favours capital interests over the provi-
sion of  social and economic justice, effectively limiting opportunities for public 
engagement with issues that relate to resource development and shrinking the 
public space for discussion and contestation of  public policy. As Stefanick notes 
in chapter 4, the framing of  Alberta oil as “ethical” oil normalizes the economic, 
environmental, and political risks associated with bitumen extraction, leading 
those who question this frame to be branded as “radical.”
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The distance between the two frames is telling. Ricardo Acuña, in chapter 
11, describes how what is considered to be acceptable in Alberta’s public policy 
realm has moved to the right of  the political spectrum through a concerted 
effort to flood the public with radical neoliberal discourse. After a while, these 
radical ideas become normalized, and those whose ideas are slightly to the left 
of  “normal” are portrayed as radical. The shrill responses to the NDP’s recom-
mendation of  a hike in corporate tax from 10 percent to 12 percent is another 
indicator of  how far to the right the policy window has moved in Alberta, and 
indeed in Canada. The rhetoric in the media continues to ignore the effects of  
increased oil production in the United States or of  declining global oil prices, 
while vilifying the proposal in the NDP election platform to modestly revise 
the existing tax regime or review the energy royalty structures for potentially 
threatening the future of  the oil industry (Penty, Tuttle, and Lam 2015).
The power of  framing is seen most pointedly in the case of  Aboriginal issues 
colliding with the extractive industry. Jay Smith, in chapter 3, and Gabrielle 
Slowey and Lorna Stefanick, in chapter 7, argue that the colonized Indigenous 
peoples in Canada are framed as outside of  normal and are thus effectively 
ignored. The danger of  this framing is evident in Bill C-51, which received 
Royal assent as the Anti-terrorism Act in June 2015 and which aims to grant 
exceptionally broad powers of  surveillance to government agencies—seem-
ingly targeting environmental and Aboriginal rights activists under the guise 
of  “anti-terrorism” measures (Payton 2015). Under widespread public pressure, 
the Conservative government made a few amendments to Bill C-51, to osten-
sibly make it more palatable politically, while clearly denying the possibility of  
providing more oversight to protect civil liberties (Bronskill 2015).
The same phenomenon can be seen in chapter 12, with respect to the home-
less. Josh Evans contends that “politics is conflict over who is recognized, whose 
voice is heard as speech rather than noise, and the divisions by which these 
relationships are established and changed.” By seeking to “end” homelessness, 
the government puts the issue into the expert technocratic hands of  public ser-
vants, thus removing the causes of  homelessness from the realm of  democratic 
debate or contestation. This new policy strategy of  “ending” homelessness is 
good for business in that it removes the problem from public view while neatly 
sidestepping the issue of  inequalities in an oil economy that causes some people 
to be left without shelter in the first place. According to Evans, the Alberta gov-
ernment’s policy response to homelessness illustrates the way that “oil wealth 
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provides states with extraordinary abilities to mute the social dissension and 
discord that is itself  symptomatic of  systemic social inequalities.”
As the chapters above suggest, democratic struggle can take place in a var-
iety of  spaces and ways. But as spaces for this debate contract in an oil-exporting 
economy, and as governments increasingly abandon mechanisms for seeking 
public input into decision making, the dissenters turn to different arenas to 
affect political change. As a result, new circuits of  resistance spring up, domes-
tically as well as internationally. The chapters in this volume demonstrate the 
role that oil wealth has played in increasing political and economic inequality, 
while also providing a major incentive for marginalized groups to contest the 
distribution of  that wealth.
Therefore, this book not only confirms the existence of  deficits in the prac-
tice of  democracy in Alberta but also explains the mechanism for the weakening 
of  the bond of  democratic accountability between the government and the 
majority of  citizens. Conversely, the bond between the government and the cor-
porate sector has been strengthening, nurtured by corporations assuming the 
regulatory functions of  the government and through a more direct enmeshing 
of  corporations and government, as Paul Kellogg notes in chapter 5 in relation 
to the corporate support for right-wing parties in Alberta. Kellogg highlights 
the differences between two oil-exporting countries, Venezuela and Canada, by 
virtue of  their locations in two different hemispheres, as well as the nature of  
their corporations. He concludes that oil corporations exert significant political 
influence in both jurisdictions, although with vastly differential economic con-
sequences. The difference, he argues, is tied more to the international hierarchy 
of  nations than to the internal dynamics of  a resource economy.
Considering the existence of  the emerging democratic deficit as highlighted 
by several chapters in this volume, the internal dynamics of  an oil-exporting 
nation could be seen to apply to Canadian political economy, albeit in vary-
ing measures. For instance, from the perspective of  the democratic deficit, 
the issue of  regulatory capture—allowing employers preferential access to 
policy making—is another critical dimension in a neoliberal conception. As 
Bob Barnetson observes in chapter 8, one of  the consequences of  a booming oil 
economy in Alberta has been an employer-friendly policy environment, where 
the basic rights of  workers are compromised by weakening the labour move-
ment and by regulatory capture.
In chapter 9, Jason Foster and Bob Barnetson explore policy changes to the 
federal Temporary Foreign Worker Program, one of  the mechanisms through 
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which an oil economy affects labour issues, noting in particular the impacts 
of  that mechanism on the democratic health of  a region. The Alberta govern-
ment’s justification and encouragement of  the use of  migrant workers in the 
oil industry had created an unprecedented growth in temporary foreign work-
ers in Alberta. Foster and Barnetson note that not only is the growing reliance 
on foreign migrant labour creating a contingent, underpaid, racialized foreign 
workforce, but it is disempowering both migrant and Canadian workers by 
undermining the capacity of  both to resist economic restructuring advocated 
by the powerful industrial lobby. Moreover, the TFWP could also be seen as 
shifting Canada’s immigration policy away from the laudable objectives of  
multiculturalism to a policy of  differential exclusions. The declining local influ-
ence over resource development and employment is not unique to Alberta; it 
is particularly problematic in the context of  encroachments on worker wages, 
benefits, and collective representation across the board in Canada. As I pointed 
out in chapter 1, the relegation of  labour unions to defending a smaller propor-
tion of  workers and the curtailment of  the role of  the labour unions in their 
ability to capture increasing shares of  resource rents in wages and benefits is 
definitely one of  the characteristics of  a neostaples economy.
Last but not the least, in terms of  the nature of  a neoliberal state, it has been 
suggested that the conceptual framework of  neoliberalism goes beyond cap-
ital and class (see Cannella and Perez 2012; Hubbard 2004). The hegemony of  
neoliberalism reflects and reproduces a complex set of  power relations that 
encompasses global capitalism, the neoliberal state, and the patriarchal family. 
In particular, there is a gendered dimension to the processes of  excluding mar-
ginalized groups from political and policy spaces. In different ways, chapters 
6 and 10 highlight how neoliberal policy serves to recentre masculinity in the 
political economy at the same time that it produces inequality. In examining 
the entrenchment of  patriarchy in the political economy of  oil-exporting coun-
tries, these chapters show how the oil economy both benefits from and repro-
duces these unequal configurations, not only in liberal democratic Canada but 
also in the Islamic Republic of  Iran. Despite the best justifications of  new public 
management, however, citizens are not just consumers of  government servi-
ces; they are members of  political and social communities. These complex com-
munities are context specific and are affected by social and institutional facets 
of  the economy. Joy Fraser, Manijeh Mannani, and Lorna Stefanick, in chap-
ter 6, Gabrielle Slowey and Lorna Stefanick, in chapter 7, and Sara Dorow, in 
chapter 10, highlight the gendered and racialized structures of  the oil economy, 
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showing that women and visible minorities bear many of  the social and eco-
nomic burdens of  oil extraction.
Nevertheless, democracy in Alberta is more than just a textbook case of  a 
neoliberal policy cauldron. As mentioned by Stefanick in chapter 14, Alberta 
was on the forefront of  several progressive ideas, being among the first prov-
inces, for example, to extend voting rights to women and to create an Office of  
the Ombudsman. Despite the historical lead on some issues, however, other 
elements of  Alberta’s history exacerbate the entrenchment of  neoliberal for-
mulations of  a small state in contemporary times. Some of  these elements 
include Alberta’s alienation in its relationship with the federal power centre, 
the persecution of  minority groups and the confiscation of  their land, battles 
between levels of  government for the control of  natural resources, and finally, 
the battle over the control of  oil wealth.
Far from being a provincial phenomenon, these trends pertaining to demo-
cratic accountability and developmental liberalism significantly impact the 
whole country. Indeed, Alberta’s insatiable demand for workers from across 
Canada explains why it has been easy to conflate the best interests of  the oil 
and gas sector with national interests, despite the oil industry reportedly con-
tributing only 10 to 12 percent of  Canada’s GDP (Leach 2013). However, it is 
much more than that—it is the entrenchment of  neoliberal ideology which is 
prompting a country that is statistically not a petro-state to behave like one in 
terms of  its disregard for the basic tenets of  liberal democracy and for sustain-
able economic and environmental objectives. A long list of  actions related to 
this assertion have taken place under the leadership of  Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper: centralization of  power in the Prime Minister’s Office and in unelected 
officials, arbitrary prorogation of  Parliament for partisan ends, the Senate 
crisis, violation of  the Access to Information Act (Janus 2013), undermining 
of  unionized public service employers such as educational and medical insti-
tutions and postal services, and sustained attacks on scientific and research 
facilities and on data collection (CBC 2014; Linnitt 2013), and the revolving 
door between powerful industrial and mining sectors and high-ranking pol-
itical officials, to name just a few. The marginalized sections of  society bear 
the brunt of  the resultant political apathy, which has led to record low voter 
turnouts and unprecedented levels of  poverty in one of  the world’s richest 
jurisdictions (see Hudson 2013).
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Inequality: The Stumbling Block in a Liberal Democracy
From early concerns with the issues of  “underdeveloped” countries to con-
siderations of  international economic and political conditions of  development, 
many development studies scholars have seen the complex legacy of  “develop-
ment” as involving ideological discourse and policy directed by the Global North 
toward former colonies in the Global South.2 Much has been written about the 
ascendancy of  neoliberalism in the 1980s, when the Washington Consensus 
was used to “roll back the state” in the Global South, a policy devised and 
pursued by governments in the Global North through bilateral aid programs 
and through interventions by international financial institutions. During the 
same period, however, the political course of  neoliberalism as a program of  
state reform was also “squeezing and splitting” the state in the Global North, 
redefining what states should and can do (e.g. , less redistribution, more “secur-
ity”) and re-engineering the ways in which they do it (see Wuyts, Mackintosh, 
and Hewitt 1992, 61–63). Consequently, the earlier framework of  state-led 
development—which included public investment and employment genera-
tion, strong provision of  public goods, and redistributionist measures—was 
displaced by structures of  incentives and competitive pressures of  “efficiency” 
provided by the market and its price signals. The disastrous economic and 
political consequences of  such “structural adjustment programs” subjecting 
countries in the Global South to market fundamentalism are very well docu-
mented. Interestingly, few studies see these trends in parallel with the trend 
of  major welfare gaps created by squeezing and splitting the state in the Global 
North, leading to losses in formal employment and deteriorating provision of  
strategic public goods such as health care and education during the 1980s and 
1990s. These developments can be directly linked to the unprecedented scale of  
inequality in countries in the Global North.
In 2011, the Occupy movement drew considerable attention to income 
inequality in the United States and globally and brought this issue back onto the 
political agenda. Inequality has been described both as irrelevant in the face of  
economic opportunity in a globalized world (Friedman 1999, 247–50) and as a 
cause of  the decline in social mobility, particularly in industrialized economies 
(see Fukuyama 2012; Krugman 2007; Noah 2013). Politically, the impact of  
inequality can be seen in the declining influence of  average citizens and mass-
based interest groups on public policy, leading to economic elite domination 
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and effectively transforming democracies into oligarchies where the wealthy 
elite wield the most power (Gilens and Page 2014).
While inequality has risen among most OECD countries, since the early 
1970s it has grown the fastest in Canada and the most in the United States 
(OECD 2008). During the three decades after World War II, a “middle-class 
society” with a relatively low level of  inequality emerged in the United States, 
the product of  relatively high wages for the working class and political sup-
port for income-levelling government policies. The return to high inequal-
ity—or what Paul Krugman (2007, 125) calls the “Great Divergence”—began in 
the 1970s, leading to a trend of  declining labour union membership rates and 
resulting diminishing political clout, decreased expenditure on social services, 
and less government redistribution. This period also saw the transformation 
of  American politics away from a focus on the middle class, with a transition 
of  the American elite from pillars of  society to a special interest group, as 
aggressive and well-financed lobbyists and pressure groups effectively acted 
on behalf  of  upper-income groups in the power corridors. As a result, between 
1979 and 2007, the top-earning 1 percent of  households gained about 275 per-
cent after federal taxes and income transfers, compared to a gain of  less than 
40 percent for the 60 percent in the middle of  America’s income distribution 
(United States, Congress, CBO 2011). From 1992 to 2007, the top four hundred 
earners in the United States saw their income increase 392 percent and their 
average tax rate decrease 37 percent. It is estimated that this continuing upward 
redistribution of  income is responsible for about 43 percent of  the projected 
Social Security shortfall over the next seventy-five years (Baker 2013).
Explanations for the “Great Divergence” of  income levels in the United 
States include public policy and party politics, aside from the impact of  race, 
gender, immigration, transformative technology, tax policy, the decline of  
labour, and the rise of  globalized trade. Based on his synthesis of  a number of  
studies, Timothy Noah (2013) concluded that the two biggest contributors to 
income inequality in the United States, each of  which is responsible for 30 per-
cent of  the post-1978 increase in inequality, are the executive capture of  corpor-
ate governance and various failures in the American education system. Most of  
the top earners in the United States work in finance, a sector of  the US economy 
whose deregulated incentive structure relies on complex financial instruments 
increasingly divorced from traditional notions of  value. The finance sector has 
seen its share of  corporate profits rise from less than 10 percent in 1979 to more 
than 40 percent in the early 2000s, which has led to the top 0.01 percent of  the 
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population controlling 7.7 percent share of  US national income (see also Saez 
and Piketty [2003] 2013).
The exception to these trends is Norway, which is often compared to Canada 
because of  the two countries’ many similarities, particularly as major oil-
exporting nations in the Global North with high economic and political indi-
cators. The eighth- and sixth-largest oil-producing countries in the world, 
Norway and Canada are both democratic constitutional monarchies ranking 
very high on the Human Development Index—numbers one and six, respect-
ively (EIU 2013, 3). However, a number of  underlying differences between the 
two countries shed light on the interrelationship of  inequality and democ-
racy, particularly in an oil-exporting economy. For instance, while Norway has 
maintained its second position as the world’s most equal economy with a Gini 
coefficient of  0.25, Canada has slid to twelfth (out of  seventeen peer countries), 
with a coefficient of  0.32 (Conference Board of  Canada 2013).3 Despite the pet-
roleum industry accounting for nearly a quarter of  Norway’s GDP, the coun-
try has maintained its position in the five countries with the highest Human 
Development Index, as well as its top ranking in the Democracy Index (EIU 
2013). An exemplary signatory of  the Kyoto Protocol, Norway maintains a wel-
fare model with universal health care, highly subsidized higher education, and 
a comprehensive social security system, all of  which is funded by its high taxes 
(Holter 2012). The country generates money for its sovereign wealth fund from 
taxes on oil and gas, ownership of  petroleum fields, and dividends from its 67 
percent stake in Statoil ASA (STL), Norway’s largest energy company. Of  course, 
the management of  the Norwegian oil wealth is not without problems, as evi-
denced by the criticism of  its rate of  crude extraction since the 1990s (Anderson 
2012); the cynicism that met Norway’s announcement to achieve emission cuts 
of  30 percent by 2020, which includes significant purchases of  carbon offsets 
to achieve this goal (Rosenthal 2008); and the recent rise of  right-wing parties 
to power (see Wahl 2011). Nevertheless, as illustrated by an Oxfam study (2013), 
despite the above problems, Norway has managed to counter increasing levels 
of  income inequality through its efficient redistributive policies.
As an extreme example of  the rise in inequality in Canada, in 2013 a story 
broke in the local media about cases of  body lice in Edmonton’s homeless popu-
lation (CBC News 2013). Dr. Stan Houston, who first brought the story to the 
attention of  the media, referred to this discovery as “a very powerful health 
indicator of  the kind of  poverty we are seeing (and creating) in this, one of  
the wealthiest political jurisdictions in the world. . . . Not only is body lice a 
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marker of  extreme, refugee camp-like conditions, it can transmit at least three 
potentially life threatening diseases” (pers. comm. , 11 February 2013). Tax cuts 
in particular have stripped hundreds of  billions from the public purse since 
the mid-1990s in Canada, squeezing public programs and support for neces-
sities such as education, health care, housing, child care, and transportation. 
However, there was little acknowledgment of  this bleeding of  public funds 
in Alberta’s “austerity budget” in March 2013, which included severe cuts to 
advanced education, human services, and the environment in the name of  
“fiscal necessity,” despite record profits by oil companies and the growing cre-
scendo of  public opinion for meaningful revenue reforms related to taxation 
and oil rent (AFL 2013; Bower 2013).
Undoubtedly, the predominance of  neoliberal beliefs has led to the growing 
concentration of  income and wealth and to a new thrust in public policy—with 
ideology, rather than evidence, being the driver. Moreover, as Stefanick notes in 
chapter 14, as the role of  the state as a producer or supporter of  evidence-based 
research diminishes, there is little to hold back the tide of  ideology. As pointed 
out in many of  the chapters in this volume, in a neoliberal state, dependence 
on oil revenue is certainly playing a role in increasing income inequality and 
eroding institutions of  liberal democracy, even if  that oil-exporting country is 
in the Global North.
Oil and Democracy in the Global North
The timeliness of  this book lies in wake of  the recent surge in oil production 
driven by the discovery of  massive shale oil reserves in the United States. The 
United States has the largest known deposits of  shale oil in the world, although 
the estimates of  recoverable reserves have been revised recently, raising uncer-
tainty regarding the sustainability of  such high levels of  oil production (Ahmed 
2014). Nevertheless, as of  April 2013, US crude production was at a more than 
twenty-year high, at nearly 7.2 million barrels per day (USEIA 2014), with 
shale oil from the seven most prolific shale-producing regions of  the country 
accounting for 95 percent of  oil production growth from 2011 to 2013 (USEIA 
2015). While shale oil and gas can be extracted by other methods, such as con-
ventional drilling or horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing—the propagation 
of  fractures in a rock layer by a pressurized fluid—is seen as the key method of  
extraction of  shale oil and gas to make it commercially viable.
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However, hydraulic fracturing, commonly called fracking, has raised 
environmental concerns such as groundwater contamination, risks to air qual-
ity, migration of  gases and hydraulic fracturing chemicals to the surface, and 
other risks to public safety and health, challenging the adequacy of  existing 
regulatory regimes (Jackson et al. 2014). Most troubling, according to the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS 2015), are earthquakes induced by hydraulic 
fracturing and the resulting waste disposal wells, which have been reported in 
several locations. Although the magnitude of  these quakes has been small so 
far, the USGS says that there is no guarantee that larger quakes will not occur. 
Moreover, the frequency of  the quakes has been increasing. In 2009, there were 
50 earthquakes greater than magnitude 3.0 in the area spanning Alabama and 
Montana, and in 2010, there were 87. In 2011, in the same area, 134 earthquakes 
occurred, a sixfold increase over twentieth-century levels (Soraghan 2012). 
There are also concerns that quakes may damage underground gas, oil, and 
water lines and wells that were not designed to withstand earthquakes.
Canada has used fracking for decades, and many companies are exploring 
for and developing shale oil and gas resources in Alberta, British Columbia, 
Québec, and New Brunswick (CAPP 2012; Wood 2014). Fracking remains a 
popular technique despite the conclusion of  a British Columbia Oil and Gas 
Commission investigation which found that a series of  thirty-eight earthquakes 
(with magnitudes ranging from 2.2 to 3.8 on the Richter scale) that occurred in 
the Horn River Basin area between 2009 and 2011 were caused by fluid injec-
tion during hydraulic fracturing in proximity to pre-existing faults (BCOGC 
2012, 6–8). The development of  shale oil is going ahead with little regard for 
public outcry or scientific warnings. Indeed, several researchers and commen-
tators have reported difficulty in conducting and reporting the results of  stud-
ies on hydraulic fracturing due to pressure from industry and government and 
the censoring of  environmental reports (“Documents” 2011; Elgin 2015; Urbina 
2011; Wood 2014). It is not a coincidence that the extreme income inequality in 
North America has made it possible to ignore the democratic ideals of  trans-
parent public consultations, or political accountability, under pressure from 
politically powerful industrial interests.
On the other side of  the planet, energy companies are celebrating the shale 
discovery bonanza in South Australia and Queensland, estimated to be nearly 
as large as the total expected oil deposit in Saudi Arabia. Australia is bracing for 
the rush of  large multinational energy companies (Kaye 2013). With the sig-
nificant rise of  income inequality in the past fifteen years (Austrailian Social 
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Inclusion Board 2012), the spectre of  unacknowledged environmental and 
public health concerns (Fraser 2013), the issue of  Aboriginal land rights, and 
racial discrimination (e.g. , Changarathil 2012; NLC 2013), Australia appears 
disturbingly similar to the other big unconventional oil producers—the United 
States and Canada.
The research of  Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (1992) on global eco-
nomic systems reminds us that despite being the economic hegemons of  the 
world economy for several millennia, China and India could not prevent being 
reduced to the poorest countries in the world after only two hundred years of  
colonization. The rise and fall (and the possible re-emergence) of  these coun-
tries serve as an important reminder to not take for granted our perceived 
strengths in political and economic structures. For the countries in the Global 
North, it would indeed be a tragedy if  the significant long-term gains of  a lib-
eral democratic system were sacrificed to the short-term priorities of  the oil 
industry. While the causal relationship between an oil economy and a dimin-
ished democracy is too complex to prove unequivocally, the link between the 
rise of  inequality through the institutionalization of  unfettered neoliberal-
ism in an oil economy and its detrimental impact on democratic institutions is 
undeniable. In this context, revisiting the basic assumptions of  liberal democ-
racy is very instructive. In particular, given the significant pitfalls of  inequal-
ity, it is useful to bring back a focus on developmental liberalism, one of  the 
consistently ignored assumptions of  liberal democracy in a neoliberal context.
The staples theory of  economic development has much to contribute to 
an exploration of  the relationship between oil and democracy. In particular, 
it provides a useful framework for investigating the structural changes in the 
industrial landscape in an oil-exporting jurisdiction and for examining the 
governance of  resource industries from the perceptive of  workers, resource-
dependent Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities, and governments. An 
intellectual and political process of  both deconstruction and reconstruction is 
required to understand and reform the political, social, and economic institu-
tions and practices in an oil-exporting country. We need a wider intellectual and 
political understanding of  developmental liberalism as a process of  redistri-
butional conflict, and we must use the diverse intellectual resources that tran-
scend binaries such as North/South in order to advance such an understanding. 
Moreover, removing the filters of  the North/South dichotomy clarifies the 
global scale of  comprehensive market reforms that rely on similarly compre-
hensive state reforms. Transcending the North/South binary also reveals the 
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reasons for the pursuit of  the narrowly defined “good governance” rather than 
the more expansive conceptions of  liberal democratic framework. As Henry 
Bernstein (2005, 119) reminds us, the hegemony of  neoclassical economics, 
which supports the neoliberal discourse, “is as good an example as any of  a 
theoretical model achieving supremacy as a world view, and global progamme, 
owing to political and ideological conditions rather than intrinsic intellectual 
authority.”
In the introduction to this volume, Lorna Stefanick and I noted that neolib-
eralism has become a global phenomenon, with few exceptions. We wondered if  
the predominance of  a single resource creates special problems for creating or 
maintaining democratic norms, or if  threats to democracy in resource-export-
ing countries are simply manifestations of  a generalized corporate attack against 
democratic norms in a global capitalist era facing a crisis of  accumulation and 
legitimacy. The evidence in this volume suggests that economies dominated by 
commodity production, and particularly fossil fuel production, do indeed pose 
particular challenges for proponents of  liberal democratic norms—especially 
for unabashed proponents of  economic democracy as a necessary complement 
to formal political democracy. The short-term society-wide prosperity created 
by oil allows dominant interests to perpetuate a mythology of  social solidar-
ity in which environmentalists, along with proponents of  social and economic 
justice, are enemies of  a supposedly unchallengeable “progress” and should 
not be permitted to conduct research and disseminate information and ideas 
that challenge the hegemony of  a petroleum-based economic and political elite. 
But, as this book illustrates, movements of  resistance have arisen within states 
dependent on petroleum wealth; the potential of  such movements should not 
be discounted. It is equally important, however, not to discount the particular 
problems that these groups face in countering the dominance and power of  
neoliberal capitalist ideology when it is married to a commodity that dazzles 
huge segments of  the population in countries or in subnational entities that 
house the commodity.
The picture that emerges in this volume of  the relationship between oil 
and democracy in Alberta and Canada is suggestive of  many themes that are 
global in nature. How these themes play out in a variety of  jurisdictions will 
vary depending on the political, economic, and institutional contexts; they will 
diverge in unexpected ways that transcend antiquated binaries. Our hope is 
that by exploring the nature of  the interaction of  oil and democracy in Canada, 
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we can contribute to a sophisticated analytical discussion of  these increasingly 
important political economic issues.
Notes
1 A meta-analytical study (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 2008) associates liberal 
democracy with higher human capital accumulation, lower inflation, lower political 
instability, and higher economic freedom. The researchers found that while 
democracy has no direct effect on economic growth, it has strong and significant 
indirect effects that contribute to long-term economic growth. The findings of  this 
study are in stark contrast to the entrenchment of  neoliberal orthodoxy that relies on 
the economic argument that equality and efficiency are trade-offs.
2 Although the United States had far fewer colonial possessions than did the European 
nations, it has substantial historical experience of  policy making and intervention in 
its “informal empire,” notably in South America.
3 The Gini coefficient measures income inequality by calculating the extent to which 
the distribution of  income among individuals within a country deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution—a Gini coefficient of  0 represents exact equality, while 
a Gini coefficient of  1 represents total inequality—that is, one person has all the 
income and the rest of  the society has none.
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